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 Introduction 
 A detective story works when the conclusion is a surprise. If the butler (or 
frequently, these days, the home secretary or MI5) did it, that has to be 
hidden until the end, however many clues were scattered on the way. Non-
ﬁ ction is under the opposite obligation. Readers want to know where the 
narrative is going. If capitalism is to blame, or is the solution to everything, 
that must be announced from the start. In practice the genres can be 
muddled. Accounts of human life can be presented as if they were a sur-
prise which the evidence has revealed only as the story advances. But any 
account has to begin with some understanding about what is going on. So 
I will describe the assumptions that are illustrated, rather than proved or 
discovered, in the following chapters. 
 I have followed writers as varied as Pierre Bourdieu, who has argued for 
the importance of every aspect of human identity, and Gilles Kepel, who 
has pointed to the importance of religious belief, to present a picture of 
human life as more than a collection of material interests, and have 
assumed that identity might not precede or determine a conception of 
someone ’ s self-interest, but will accompany it. 1 Identity cultivation, com-
posed of both choice and circumstance, has been discussed in many ways, 
from theology ’ s balancing of free will and predestination, through Marx ’ s 
creativity within circumstance, to discussions such as Bourdieu ’ s taxon-
omy of taste. Th e following chapters are not a presentation of a theory of 
social life, but an examination of what kinds of things can be said by start-
ing with identity. 
 Th e chapters that follow are not of equal character, and readers who 
prefer the story to the justiﬁ cation of the plot may want to leave chapter 
 2 until the end, or skip it entirely. Th e book has ﬁ ve principle themes, 
which are no more than abbreviations of well-established ideas not only 
in the social sciences and humanities, but in theology and political theory 
and, quite possibly, art and artistic theory. 
 First, the identity paradox – the continual tension between identity as 
association with some broader group, ideology, or vision, and identity as 
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distinctiveness by contrast within such groups, ideologies, and visions – is 
a continual tangle between the aspiration towards equality and the asser-
tion of inequality. 
 Second, everything counts, no human activity is trivial or meaningless, 
and the visible and audible actions that constitute identity both individu-
ally and collectively – clothing and eating, speaking and moving, architec-
ture and public spaces – are not best seen as expressions of some deeper, 
internal, or foundational essence. Any summary of identity is a summary 
of these components, not a description of a ﬁ rst principle, foundation, or 
source. When Pope satirised the social butterﬂ y who might ‘stain her 
honour, or her new brocade’, he was mocking the value placed on clothing 
and bodily adornment, not disputing its importance, and was conveying 
in a few satirical words an understanding of the role of clothing which 
might have taken an academic commentator rather longer. 2 A commenta-
tor or describer of identities is therefore obliged to be a democratic empiri-
cist, to begin by taking account of all aspects of behaviour, and may not 
dismiss anything as of no signiﬁ cance. Parsimonious accounts are parsi-
monious, and have the same disadvantage as parsimonious meals, plays, 
music, or literature. Th e metaphor of a mask is misleading too – it sepa-
rates the person from the public, evident identity in a way which suggests 
that one is in some sense more real than the other, and that what is seen 
and heard is artiﬁ cial, a pretence by a real person. 
 Th ird, the cultivation of identity in public and political life is conducted 
by people within contexts which provide them with both opportunities 
and constraints, and which, prior to their making choices, cultivate in them 
preferences, conceptions, and perceptions. Th e cultivation of identity is 
therefore a continual negotiation, and neither simply determined nor 
simply free. Th e constraints and the opportunities which form the context 
of choice are themselves the product of earlier actions. In the cultivation 
of identity as an interplay between choice and circumstance, circumstance 
may be the result of the actions or intentions of other people, and choice 
may be a choice to inﬂ uence or control not only one ’ s own identity but 
that of others. 
 Fourth, identity and interests are not alternative ways of describing 
individuals or groups, but are concepts describing diﬀ erent aspects of 
social life, so that the phenomena to which they refer stand in a symbiotic 
rather than a causal relation to one another, each presupposes the other, 
and an account in terms of one is not a denial of the reality of the other. 
 Fifth, general theories of causality can be monochrome or one-
dimensional, and can never fully account for actual events and circum-
stances. By their very universality they exclude much that a fuller but more 
bifurcated account could give, but are nonetheless necessary components 
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of accounts and explanations in conjunction with other descriptions of 
human social behaviour. Social life is composed of many purposes, con-
texts, constraints, and opportunities so that causes, eﬀ ects, patterns, and 
relationships attributed to humanity as a whole will always refer to ideal 
and imagined events and circumstance, never to actual ones. General 
theories or narratives provide the necessary ingredients for complex or 
qualiﬁ ed accounts of real circumstances, not a suﬃ  cient or full account of 
what is going on. It follows that the apparently general accounts I give can 
themselves only ever serve as ingredients for narratives of geographically 
or temporally speciﬁ c events, conditions, or patterns. 
 Each of these issues has been dealt with great skill and subtlety and at 
higher and higher levels of abstraction and universality by writers across 
the social sciences and humanities; an enterprise which I have not 
attempted to join. I have not tried to operate on a philosophical high wire 
whilst juggling a handful of conceptual plates. If this makes my working 
assumptions more arbitrary it will nonetheless, I hope, make them simpler 
and more immediately accessible. 
 Th ese working assumptions mean that the following chapters are syn-
theses of several disciplines, not meticulous operations within any single 
one. Whilst they glean from history, political science, anthropology, law, 
and sociology, they do not make or attempt to make speciﬁ c contributions 
to any one of them. To use a distinction made by Bourdieu in his discus-
sion of art, they deal with the subject rather than with the study or depic-
tion of the subject. 3 Th ey draw on, and I hope engage with, accounts, 
explanations, and theories of several kinds, but as a scavenger rather than 
as a member of any particular academic community. 
 Th ere is a footnote to this introduction. Pierre Bourdieu has argued that 
the most apparently trivial aspects of behaviour and taste and the most 
apparently grand, or sophisticated, are all parts of a coherent whole. Some-
thing similar might be said of accounts of identity, and of the range of 
accounts, descriptions, and histories in the humanities and social sciences. 
Th e theories of academics and the comments and recommendations of 
reformers, politicians, and ordinary citizens often seem surprisingly similar 
in substance while not in style, in dealing with such issues as the relation 
between the built environment and the character and quality of life, or the 
role of clothing in stating and constituting the status, or skill, or valued 
qualities of the wearer. Just as in music and architecture there is an unbro-
ken though not even scale from the vernacular to the professionalised and 
back again, so can there too be in accounts of human identity. Th e aca-
demic work of seeing architecture and the arrangement and creation of 
public space as both aspects of the identity of regimes, communities, or 
classes, and means of cultivating those identities, can draw on and be 
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sustained by the stated intentions of those who created these built environ-
ments, but whose concern was the expected impact, not the view of human 
identity which informed it. Th e institutional boundaries which seem to 
separate novelists from social scientists, dramatists from demographers, 
or poets from political scientists, are less easily insisted on in the produc-
tions of these diﬀ erent communities. Academic accounts raise the stated 
aspirations, expectations, and descriptions from particular locations and 
transmute them into broader, general accounts, which in their turn can 
inform the more particular. Th is book is no exception to that wide com-
munity of argument, explanation, and action which provides an unbroken 
though sometimes bumpy continuity from the vernacular to the academic. 
Plays, poetry, cinema, novels, cartoons, or theatre are not auxiliary illustra-
tions for scientiﬁ c work, but contributions in their own right to description 
and explanation. What follows cannot claim to be any more than a swift 
synthesis of some of this work, and its own contribution is by way of co-
ordination and presentation, not discovery. 
 Since I have stated what I shall do, I should state also what I shall not. 
Th is limitation is a judgment not on the importance of matters and ques-
tions with which I do not deal, but on their volume and complexity, and 
on the possibility always of being able to speak and write only by setting 
boundaries to what is described. A major concern of those who have 
written about identity has been its ethical dimension. What are the impli-
cations for the conduct of public life of an understanding of the nature of 
human identity and human agency? I have not dealt with these questions 
not because they are not important, but because I have attempted some-
thing diﬀ erent and more limited, though some ethical preferences will 
unavoidably, and not necessarily damagingly, be associated with explana-
tory or descriptive assumptions or arguments. Nor have I set out to iden-
tify, or create, laws of human behaviour, but only to indicate some of the 
possible components of behaviour in particular times, places, and socie-
ties. Th is is in part because that would be a separate and substantial enter-
prise, but also because of a suspicion that too often apparent explanations 
of something are simply redescriptions of it as instances of a broader 
category. Alternatively, the explanation of one thing is simply the unex-
plained presence of another thing. 
 Th ere are two further questions that I have not addressed, which is the 
downside of my attempt to treat everything that is evident as evidence. 
First, I have not considered the extent to which the actions, statements, 
and evident identities of people, and in particular of powerful people, 
leaders and rulers, are an aspect of simple greed, obsession, or megaloma-
nia. A modest reply to this criticism is that even if its grounds are accepted, 
the coinage of identity appears to be of very great value if it is thus used, 
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and even if the purposes to which it is put are unacceptable, its role in 
public life has to be recognised and studied. Second, identiﬁ cation by 
association always requires that other members of the association, however 
distinguished from them a leader or an elite is, are friends or allies. Th e 
identity of the association will frequently be contrasted, with varying 
degrees of hostility, with that of other associations who, in the most 
extreme version of the narrative, will be presented as enemies. I have not 
discussed this element of identity cultivation between associations, though 
I have done so elsewhere. 4 Absence of consideration here does not imply 
lack of importance, simply distribution of attention. 
 Notes 
  1  Pierre Bourdieu,  Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste 
(London: Routledge, 1986); Gilles Kepel,  Th e Revenge of God: Th e Resurgence 
of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World (Cambridge: Polity, 
1994). 
  2  Alexander Pope,  Th e Rape of the Lock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
p. 15. 
  3  Bourdieu,  Distinction , p. xxvi. 
  4  Rodney Barker,  Making Enemies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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 Plumage 
 A strange creature in bright feathers; what you get is what you see 
 Replying to Burke ’ s denunciation of the revolutionary regime in France, 
and his apologia for monarchy and aristocracy, Tom Paine famously com-
plained that Burke pitied the plumage, but forgot the dying bird. 1 To which 
a reply – though not one made by Burke or other defenders of tradition, 
hierarchy, or the wisdom of elites – is that without the plumage, the bird 
is not a bird at all, and that observing plumage is one of the ﬁ rst ways in 
which we try to see what sort of a bird we are looking at, or even if it is a 
bird at all rather than some other creature entirely. Nor is the nature and 
function of plumage limited to making recognition possible. Plumage is 
just as necessary to the bird as it is to those who want to identify it. 
Without its feathers, the bird can neither ﬂ y nor swim, attract mates nor 
hide from predators. Th e feathers are neither additions to the bird nor 
expressions of the bird, they are part of what the bird is, as any bird spotter 
would have told Paine. But Paine was drawing on an ancient view of core 
versus superﬁ cialities, essence versus accidents, internal substance versus 
external display, which has served to set aside inconvenient evidence or 
dismiss some of what is seen as superﬁ cial or without signiﬁ cance, ‘mere 
rhetoric’ or epiphenomenal froth, while at the same time assuming an 
underlying but not immediately evident truth, nature, essence, or purpose. 
Th e disadvantage of such a view has always been that it provides an excuse 
for ignoring evidence, or explaining evidence which is acknowledged as 
the eﬀ ect of some foundational feature or principle which is no more than 
a summary of what it seeks to explain. 
 What applies to birds applies with even greater force to humans, 
animals who wear not only their own skin and hair, but that of other crea-
tures as well, adding to and extending their own plumage by creating for 
themselves second and third skins of clothing which are as much a part of 
who they are as are the feathers of the sparrow or the plumes of the 
peacock, and no more artiﬁ cial than a sparrow ’ s nest. Human plumage, as 
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a tangible component of human identity, is not limited to clothing, 
however widely interpreted, but consists of the whole complex cultivation 
of both conduct and environment, from all the visible and audible ele-
ments of individual identity to the created physical environment which its 
members inhabit. Clothing and diet, language and architecture, all are 
part of the plumage of humans, which, being chosen and cultivated as 
well as given and received, can say even more than the plumage of the 
ostrich or the coot, since it is part of the cultivation of an identity which 
diﬀ erentiates one society from another, one household from another, and 
one person from another. Th e plumage of a bird will show to which 
species it belongs; human plumage will show important elements not just 
of acquired or imposed but also of created and cultivated identities. If an 
initial impression is sought of what kind of society, government, polity, 
group, or individual is being looked at, then the visible, tangible, and 
audible expressions they give of themselves, and the ways in which they 
give them, are at the very least an essential ﬁ rst piece of evidence, the 
social anatomy of human identity. Th is elaborate human plumage is as 
much a part of who people are as the feathers of the crow are part of what 
makes it a crow. 
 Th e ﬁ rst answer to the enquiry, ‘Why does taking account of human 
plumage matter?’ is therefore informed by the distinction between free-
range and battery data, and by democratic empiricism, the working 
assumption that whilst what can be observed does not provide explana-
tions, it demands acknowledgment, and cannot be set aside as peripheral 
or epiphenomenal to some deeper or more parsimonious reality. 2 Th e 
second answer is that if there are consistent relationships between the 
cultivation of identity and other dimensions of public life, then plumage is 
one powerful indicator of other aspects of any society. Th e third answer is 
that it is important to understand identity as the ideological or cultural 
dimension of social life, a dimension which has always been there, but 
which was unduly neglected for much of the short twentieth century, par-
ticularly in accounts of political life. How people give meaning and justi-
ﬁ cation for themselves, how they cultivate and present their identities, is 
a prominent element in the human history which both arts and sciences 
seek to describe, interpret, or explain. And the central paradox in that 
cultivation, between identity as association and identity as distinctiveness, 
is found in every component of identity. 
 Th is wider human plumage matters because it tells much about the 
character of the person, institution, regime, polity, or society which is 
being observed. In this view of things, expressed identity is not an instru-
ment or shadow of some inner reality, but the thing itself; its powers and 
limitations are real, and are not under the control of some deeper self or 
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purpose, but are the self and purpose, with its strengths and weaknesses. 
Acted out and observable identities, the ‘habitus’ of Bourdieu, have all the 
importance of the cloak which Clytemnestra threw over Agamemnon, in 
its constricting as well as its enabling possibilities. And like the one which 
enabled Agamemnon to be murdered, while it can be changed, precisely 
because it is a human creation it cannot be cast on and oﬀ  instantly and 
at will. Th is lack of unfettered freedom in all the cultivations of identity is 
an important qualiﬁ cation to the view that since artefacts, whilst assigned 
meaning, are external objects they can be discarded and changed arbitrar-
ily and at will. Cavallaro and Warwick have argued that ‘dress, by encour-
aging us to make and remake ourselves over and again, renders the very 
idea of essence quite absurd’. 3 But it is not any illusory instant replacement 
of identity which calls into question the idea of essence, but rather the 
observation that when all the evident elements of identity have been con-
sidered, there is little if anything left to constitute any further reality. 
 Clothes construct the social person 
 It was in the tradition of Burke rather than Paine, though with rather dif-
ferent political intent, that Virginia Woolf included in her essay on gen-
dered politics,  Th ree Guineas, photographs of men in the elaborate regalia 
of their public roles – judges, generals, university vice chancellors, and 
bishops. Clothing, although it is only the most immediate aspect of culti-
vated identity, nonetheless is evidence and a component not just of per-
sonal adornment but of gender, status, and power. Each of the four roles 
is illustrated by Woolf with photographs of its full formal extravagance, 
with the judicial splendour of curls and scarlet unchanged in style since 
the eighteenth century; movement-constricting military uniforms weighted 
down with medals, braid, and ribbons; hats and cloaks and hoods in aca-
demic procession; and episcopal pomp laden with mineral embossment, 
the servants of God sparkling with the properties of Caesar. 
 Th e clothes people wore were for Woolf much more than superﬁ cial or 
insigniﬁ cant display; they were signiﬁ cant social actions which anyone 
seeking to reform society needed to take seriously. Th e ceremonial dress 
of males:
 serves to advertise the social, professional, or intellectual standing of the 
wearer. If you will excuse the humble illustration, your dress fulﬁ ls the same 
functions as the tickets in a grocer ’ s shop. But, here, instead of saying ‘Th is 
is margarine; this pure butter; this is the ﬁ nest butter in the market,’ it says, 
‘Th is man is a clever man – he is Master of Arts; this man is a very clever 
man – he is Doctor of Letters; this man is a most clever man – he is a 
Member of the Order of Merit.’ 4 
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 Th e clothing both claimed and constituted a status and transmitted a 
message. And whatever the practicality of the clothing that might be worn 
when a particular job was being done, the clothing which was worn when 
the status of the person doing the job was being proclaimed was of a very 
diﬀ erent character – ﬂ amboyant, dramatic, and ceremonial, wholly imprac-
tical but no less functional: ‘Military uniforms, the non-functional kind 
which are not worn for ﬁ ghting, glorify war and make a military career 
appear attractive.’ For women who identiﬁ ed themselves as opponents of 
war, therefore, refusing distinctions, honours, and uniforms would both 
present a public identity which corresponded to the rest of their beliefs 
and actions and would ‘do something, indirectly, to discourage the feelings 
that lead to war’. 5 
 Woolf  ’ s account illustrates graphically that far from humans being, as 
Desmond Morris described them, naked apes, 6 they are clothed apes, and 
often very elaborately clothed ones. Th eir clothing is one of the things that 
distinguishes humans from other animals, and the clothes and all the other 
manufactured, constructed, and cultivated things with which people sur-
round themselves, which they inhabit and in and through which they live, 
are essential components and constituents of identity, of status, function, 
and authority. Th e remarkable thing about the naked human ape is that 
there are possibly only two examples of the species, Adam and Eve, and 
even they did not remain without clothing for long. Th e transition from 
the Garden of Eden to the post-paradisiacal world was marked by the 
putting on of clothes. Even before their expulsion, Adam and Eve were 
provided with garments made of skins, thus marking them oﬀ  from all the 
rest of creation: other animals wore their own skins, humans decked them-
selves in those of other animals. And not just skins, but buttons and bows, 
cloaks and hats, and all the artefacts which are part of human life. Woolf  ’ s 
advice to women on political tactics suggests an even more important role 
for clothing than that of label or price tag. Clothing is not simply an 
announcement of identity; it is part of identity, not an external addition, 
but an organic component. Th e clothing does not simply adorn or express 
the human identity, it contributes to constituting and creating it. 
 Th e importance of clothing as one of the ﬁ rst and most evident compo-
nents of cultivated identity has long been recognised, and it is pleasantly 
appropriate that it was Woolf  ’ s nephew Quentin Bell who in 1947 drew on 
the arguments of Th orstein Veblen from the end of the nineteenth century 
to give an account of the central role of dress far beyond the simple func-
tions of keeping humans warm and dry, and of the inadequacy of an 
unimaginatively narrow utilitarianism to grasp the fecundity of human 
actions and ambitions. 7 Veblen ’ s description of bodily adornment and 
clothing as a means both of ‘emulation’ and of ‘invidious distinction’ was 
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in terms of a single scale of ambition, greater and greater wealth, and to 
that extent assumes a single scale of valued appearance across an entire 
society. 8 But his account nonetheless presaged a broader notion of an 
identity paradox, where association might be sought for many reasons, and 
distinction equally grounded in many allegedly unique characteristics. Bell 
developed Veblen ’ s argument to take in both a social and a totally private 
dimension of identity. Such was the dependence of people on their elabo-
rately and minutely cultivated identities that even when no other humans 
could observe or hear them, the smallest detail of their constructed person 
was important to them. Commenting on this ‘Robinson Crusoe syndrome’, 
though not on Robinson Crusoe, for whom a hat on a deserted island 
constituted the diﬀ erence between civilization and savagery, Bell observed 
that:
 it may frequently happen here, as in other moral situations, that the oﬀ ender 
may be not simply the worst but in fact the only suﬀ erer. A rebellious collar 
stud, a minute hole in a stocking may ruin an evening without ever being 
observed by the company at large. Our clothes are too much a part of us for 
most of us ever to be entirely indiﬀ erent to their condition: it is as though 
the fabric were indeed a natural extension of the body, or even of the soul. 9 
 And once a person is away from the solitude of a desert island or a 
dressing-table mirror, it is the fabric, rather than the body beneath, which 
constitutes for everyone else the visible and tangible social identity. 
 Dress carries immediate social meaning, it is part of a person ’ s identity, 
and it is both defended and sometimes threateningly asserted in its most 
minute detail. Recalling new shoes imposed in childhood, Jenny Diski 
described how ‘it wasn ’ t just the social disaster of such unfashionability 
that froze my heart: it was the fear that appearing to be the kind of person 
who wore such shoes might mean that that was the person I actually was. 
It wasn ’ t just that my peers would despise me: I would despise myself.’ 10 In 
Woolf  ’ s  Orlando , a housekeeper ’ s wedding ring was something from which 
she could not be parted for even a moment, since it deﬁ ned her, and 
without it her very social existence seemed in peril. With it she was a 
respectable married woman. Without it her existence fell into confusion 
and disrepute. And not only her existence on earth: ‘it was by the gleam 
on her wedding ring that she would be assigned her station among the 
angels and its lustre would be tarnished for ever if she let it out of her 
keeping for a second.’ 11 In a similar way for a Protestant Orangeman in 
twentieth-century Northern Ireland, ‘the sash my father wore’ was both an 
expression of identity and a constituent part of the identity which it 
expressed. Clothes and scenery make the person, both for themselves and 
for others. Th ere may or may not be an inner self so that we can say of 
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someone that deep down they are superﬁ cial. But it is the outward con-
struction with which we deal, and which constitutes, for social life, who 
we are. 
 Th e rituals and behaviour of public life are a visible and audible display 
which, in addition to being evidence of what they immediately express, 
communicate important messages about the meaning to be attributed to 
other ways in which people give an account and a justiﬁ cation of them-
selves and the roles they perform. In Woolf  ’ s case, clothing drew attention 
to the otherwise unacknowledged importance of gender distinctions. Men 
in Western society, who normally distinguished themselves from women 
by the unimaginativeness of their dress, their dark and uniform suits and 
subdued colours of shirts and ties, were quite diﬀ erent in their roles as the 
arbiters of state and society – as judges, university vice chancellors, bishops 
and generals – and were decked out with more feathers and frills and 
buttons and bows than could be found in the most extravagant display of 
women ’ s ball gowns. 
 In public life, whether economic, religious, or political, dress is a con-
stituent part and construction of how people see themselves, and how they 
see the other members of their society – a vision of a world which that 
dress at the same time constitutes. It is not only the prominent and the 
dominant who come in bright, or not so bright, feathers. Th e construction, 
cultivation, and display of external form is a part of all social life, and is an 
inherent dimension of the cultivation of social identity and social rank. 
Citizens and rebels, petitioners and demonstrators, exist through their 
attire just as much as do presidents and kings. Public identity is formed of 
all the visible, audible, and communicable aspects of a person and their 
actions and accoutrements. Th is identity explains and justiﬁ es who people 
are and what they do. And yet to put it in that way may suggest that a 
person, an action, and a meaning or justiﬁ cation are in some way distinct, 
so that one can chronologically precede and cause or inﬂ uence the other. 
But each of these analytically distinct features is an integral part of an 
organic whole, each is a dimension or aspect of public identity, and each 
can inﬂ uence and be inﬂ uenced by the others, and has a character which, 
were it isolated and distinct (which it could not be), would be diﬀ erent. 
Th ere is a necessarily integrated character to identiﬁ cation, that whilst it 
may be analytically distinct, concretely and historically it is not, and must 
be seen as an aspect of action, not as a precursor to it. Popular language 
has always recognised this, and when people talk of blue-stockings, Black 
Shirts, suits, anoraks, or hoodies, they are talking about the whole person, 
of whom the clothing is both an indicative and a constituent part. A 
fashion statement is not a superﬁ cial addition, it is part of who, socially 
and humanly, people are. ‘Don ’ t step on my blue suede shoes’ is not an 
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admonition to preserve the shape or cleanliness of footwear. Nor is the 
identity-forming role of clothing limited to the functional items which 
keep out cold and wet. Jewellery is not simply decoration, it is declaration. 
And the functions of jewellery wash over into ostensibly purely utilitarian 
items such as watches and mobile phones. Th e more expensive such small 
items are, the greater the proportion of their function is dedicated not to 
marking the time or enabling communication, but to constructing the 
wealthy identity of their possessor. When late twentieth-century social 
scientists looked at clothing and all the other elements of taste, they did 
so in a way which treated all aspects of cultivated identity as relevant and 
important; Bourdieu ’ s ‘habitus’ was a the portfolio of taste which consti-
tuted social location, ‘schemes of the habitus … embed what some would 
mistakenly call  values in the most automatic gestures or the apparently 
most insigniﬁ cant techniques of the body – ways of walking or blowing 
one ’ s nose, ways of eating or talking’. 12 
 Yet whilst clothing is part of identity, it is not a physically inseparable 
part. It can be changed, and in changing, changes the identity of which 
it is a constituent component. Clothing is more easily changed than any 
other part of who a person is, and so a change of clothing can be used to 
create a change of identity, if not in the eye of the wearer, then certainly in 
the eyes of others. Th e audacious deception carried out by the man who 
became famous as the Captain of Köpenik depended on a uniform and a 
great deal of bravado, but by dressing as a Prussian oﬃ  cer Wilhelm Voigt 
became a Prussian oﬃ  cer in the eyes of those around him, commandeered 
a posse of soldiers, and conﬁ scated 4000 marks from the city treasurer. It 
is a delicate philosophical point whether the posse of soldiers and the city 
treasurer saw a Prussian oﬃ  cer or someone posing as a Prussian oﬃ  cer, 
but the events up until the point of revelation would have been the same 
in either case; publicly, a Prussian oﬃ  cer was precisely what Wilhelm Voigt 
was. Th is instance casts light on the limitations of the theatrical or mask 
metaphor of identity. What happened was no diﬀ erent from what would 
have happened had Voigt been a genuine oﬃ  cer, because as part of a series 
of public events, that is what he was. Knowing in retrospect that someone 
was deceiving the world with his or her performance would alter the way 
events were explained, but not the way in which they were described. Just 
so did Mozart ’ s Don Giovanni and Leporello by exchanging clothes enable 
Giovanni to evade his pursuers. But dressing as someone else has its perils. 
In Eisenstein ’ s  Ivan the Terrible it was by ﬂ attering the conspirators’ can-
didate for the throne into wearing the royal robes that the tzar diverted 
the assassin ’ s knife to the usurper whose cause it was meant to advance. 13 
In an age without photography, ﬁ lm, television, or the Internet, faces were 
unknown beyond an immediate circle, while clothes proclaimed a king. 
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Renaissance theatre is full of identities mimicked or pretended by clothing 
or even by no more than a handkerchief. Nor is the age of visual familiarity 
immune to identity through dress, so long as it is collective rather than indi-
vidual. At the beginning of Charles Gormley ’ s ﬁ lm  Heavenly Pursuits , the 
young priest from Glasgow, arriving at the Vatican, is asked if he can iden-
tify himself and, slightly puzzled, he points to his dog collar. It is suﬃ  cient. 14 
 In politics, the colour of clothing is an immediate and simple way of 
signalling allegiance to a party, country, faith, or family. A Conservative 
might wear red braces, but would be unlikely to wear a red shirt. And 
yet it is on the face of it astonishing that so much signiﬁ cance should 
attach to the colour of items of clothing. But it has always and everywhere 
been so. One of the ﬁ rst things that the states of Europe did when they 
began putting their ordinary soldiers into uniform from the seventeenth 
century onwards, was to select distinguishing national colours: blue and 
yellow in Sweden, white in France, Red in Britain. When it came to revo-
lutionary change, the identity constructed by clothing mattered even 
more. Lynn Hunt has described the importance of costume in revolution-
ary France:
 Diﬀ erent costumes indicated diﬀ erent politics, and a color, the wearing of a 
certain length of trousers, certain shoe styles, or the wrong hat might touch 
oﬀ  a quarrel, a ﬁ stﬁ ght, or a general street brawl. During the Revolution, even 
the most ordinary objects and customs became political emblems and poten-
tial sources of political and social conﬂ ict. Colors, adornments, clothing, 
plateware, money, calendars, and playing cards became ‘signs of rallying’ to 
one side or another. 15 
 Th e inclusions and exclusions of politics are paralleled by those of social 
life. Th e cartoons of H. M. Bateman made the point by parodying both 
exclusiveness and the naivety of those who are unaware of convention, but 
are part of a class or caste society where clothes mark distinction, exclu-
sion, and superior knowledge. ‘Th e man who …’ is a recurring ﬁ gure who 
causes consternation by wearing the wrong clothes for a particular occa-
sion or place, thereby not only announcing that he is an outsider, but 
oﬀ ending insiders by not even being aware of their deﬁ ning normalities. 
 When Kemal Atatürk wished to cast a new and distinctive identity for 
the Turkish state and its members, how Turks looked was treated as an 
important part of who Turks were, and the banning of the fez was not a 
sartorial whim, but a strand in the weaving of national identity 16 A little 
later, but with equally appropriate national and cultural location, Harold 
Nicolson, asked to suggest a uniform for Oswald Moseley ’ s British fascist 
organisation, proposed the restrained English attire of grey ﬂ annel trousers 
and shirts. 17 Perhaps ‘ﬂ annels’ would have been the term used in Britain, 
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instead of ‘Black Shirts’, had his advice been taken, although ‘the wearing 
of the ﬂ annels’ could never have had the same resonance as possessed in 
Ireland by ‘the wearing of the green’. 
 Walking the walk 
 In their clothing, and in their language, their gestures, and the expressive 
environments of art, architecture, music, and decoration which they cul-
tivate for themselves, humans are a species that exists and is created and 
cultivated through the whole complexity of social display, its manners and 
masques, scenery and costume, music and movement. How people move 
within public space is part of their cultural and political identity. It was 
entirely in keeping with the contribution that means of transport make to 
identity that Eliza Doolittle in Shaw ’ s  Pygmalion , once raised to the upper 
classes, should respond to the oﬀ er of a stroll across the park with ‘Walk! 
Not bloody likely. I am going in a taxi.’ 18 How you travel is who you are. 
Th e twentieth-century American poet Wallace Stevens made much the 
same point succinctly:
 I am what is around me … 
 One is not a duchess 
 A hundred yards from a carriage. 19 
 It was this dependence on a visibly expensive means of transport to create 
social status that so concerned Jane Austen ’ s Emma Woodhouse, for whom 
the appropriateness of a possible marriage depended upon a tenuous indi-
rect connection of an ‘elder sister, who was very well married, to a gentle-
man in a great way, near Bristol, who kept two carriages’. When others did 
not travel in a style appropriate to their status there was great concern, 
and the novel ’ s protagonist was much relieved when someone whom she 
otherwise admired, behaved with appropriate display after falling short by 
not using his carriage ‘so often as became the owner of Donwell Abbey.’ 20 
 When pollsters ask respondents to compare politicians to cars, they are 
employing an important insight. 21 John Prescott  is someone who has two 
Jags. Th is is, after all, a point that advertisers take for granted and which, 
if it were not so, would condemn most advertisements for cars as a waste 
of money. You are not just someone who happens to own a Hispano-Suiza; 
you are a Hispano-Suiza owner, a Hispano-Suiza kind of person. Sean 
O’Connell has pointed to the identity-expressing and identity-cultivating 
function of visible car ownership in the early days of the automobile: ‘Th e 
car oﬀ ered owners the chance to express their status and their distinction 
from less wealthy groups in society. It provided this not only in terms 
of its own existence as a sought-after consumer product, but also in the 
opportunity it gave to owners to translate the social space between them 
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and “social inferiors” into geographical space.’ 22 Conspicuous ownership 
made a very public statement about wealth and status. In Mel Brooke ’ s ﬁ lm 
 Th e Producers , spying a chauﬀ eur sprinting out of a large and expensive 
car to open doors for his passenger across the street from his own shabby 
oﬃ  ce, the theatrical impresario Max Bialystock calls out ‘Th at ’ s it, baby, 
when you ’ ve got it, ﬂ aunt it, ﬂ aunt it!’ 23 Th e line is presaged many years 
earlier in Stanley Houghton ’ s 1912 play  Hindle Wakes , when the mill owner 
Natt Jeﬀ cote asks rhetorically: ‘Why did I buy a motor-car? Not because 
I want to go motoring. I hate it. I bought it so that people could see Alan 
driving about in it, and say, “Th ere ’ s Jeﬀ cote ’ s lad in his new car. It cost 
ﬁ ve hundred quid.”’ 24 It was an explanation which Veblen would instantly 
have recognised as an instance of both emulation and distinction. By the 
1920s car ownership had spread across a wide enough social spectrum for 
manufacturers to tailor their models to contribute to the graded identities 
of their customers. A statement from Vauxhall observed that ‘Th ere is a 
class-consciousness in horsepowers, and the manufacturer has to build 
a model for every class’. 25 Boundaries which were in this way cultivated 
could be vigorously defended against those considered as interlopers. 
O’Connell comments of the Swallow Coachbuilding Company ’ s SS1 sports 
car that:
 its comparatively low cost allowed new social groups to enter the sports-car 
niche. Hence its buyers came to be viewed as intruders in a sphere of motor-
ing they had previously been unable to join, with the result that they were 
classiﬁ ed – by the ‘Bentley Boys’ and others amongst motoring ’ s cognoscenti 
– as a motoring  nouveau riche whose sense of good taste had not caught up 
with their purchasing power. 26 
 More than 100 years after the motor car ’ s arrival, it continued to play a 
role in group identity. Th e most extreme form of this was the exclusion of 
whole sections of the population – women – from driving cars at all, in 
nations such as Saudi Arabia. 27 Nor was the social role of the car a novelty 
in the identity-cultivating role of transport. In China, well into the early 
years of the twentieth century, wealth could be publicly asserted whilst the 
physical person could be concealed from the view of the masses in cur-
tained sedan chairs, an older tradition serving the same function as clouded 
glass windows in large limousines. 28 Identiﬁ cation is cultivated by associa-
tion of the individual with the group. But it is cultivated also by distinction 
between one group and another, and between one person and another 
within the group. Exclusion is the other face of solidarity, and the other 
component of identity. 
 Democratisation of societies and states has continued to be character-
ised by changes in the way that diﬀ erent groups travel. In the most steeply 
hierarchical societies, the upper levels of society and polity travel at such 
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a remove from the mass of the population that they might not be viewed 
at all. Visibility to and recognition by the masses were irrelevant to the 
cultivation and conﬁ rmation of identity. When visibility could not be 
avoided, travel was arranged in a way which raised the elite above the mass 
of the people. A chevalier was raised above the crowd by his horse, and 
Yeats employed the ‘high horse riderless’ as his metaphor for an aristocracy 
vanished from the stage of public life. 29 But as the masses are mobilised, 
and even more as they are given some role in public life, seclusion is 
replaced by limited visibility. In Japan, the wedding of the then Crown 
Prince Akihito in 1959 was followed by an open horse-drawn carriage drive 
through Tokyo, another break with a tradition which until then had con-
veyed members of the imperial family in closed palanquins. 30 Th e presen-
tation was of a royal family who were not only visible to the public, but 
receiving the approval, support, and acclamation of the public. Th at is 
something an absolute ruler, and even more so a semi-divine one, not only 
would not need, but would be compromised by seeking or receiving. Th e 
royal rulers of Japan had, like the monarchs of early modern Europe, been 
performers in a ritual without any popular legitimising audience. And as 
with monarchies elsewhere, the Japanese royal family moved from wed-
dings out of the public gaze to a degree of public display at the time when 
the monarchy was moving towards a purely formal and symbolic role, but 
a role which, without the legitimation of privately celebrated power, drew 
legitimation instead from, however restrained, public presence and display. 
 Th e ways in which the identity of monarchy can be crafted can vary 
greatly. A royal yacht in late twentieth-century Spain will be a small sailing 
boat; at the same time in Britain, it was a ﬂ oating hotel. In late twentieth-
century Britain the remaining Edwardian grandeur of the monarchy was 
compared unfavourably with the more mundane style of the royal families 
of Scandinavian Europe. Earlier in the century such comparisons could be 
presented as merely comic. A Cummings cartoon in the  Daily Express of 
1953 shows the coronation as the cartoonist imagined it might have been 
arranged by Nye Bevan, with the horse guards on bicycles, the royal coach 
a shooting brake, and the peers in a double-decker bus. 31 But custom and 
practice can change, and assembled royal dignitaries may now ﬁ nd them-
selves at international weddings transported all together, as they were at 
the marriage of Prince Charles and Camilla Parker Bowles, in a Windso-
rian motor coach. 32 As with much visible identity, custom is easier to 
defend than innovation. When Tony Blair was reported to be considering 
the allocation of a special plane for prime ministerial use, it was mocked 
as ‘ Blairforce One ’, an instance of presumption, whereas the United States 
President ’ s  Airforce One was regarded as a normal attribute of presidential 
presence. 33 
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 A society which mobilises more and more of the inhabitants of its ter-
ritory faces a problem over the cultivation of hierarchy and exclusion. 
Th ere may be a desire to maintain the distinctive identity of elites whilst 
at the same time not wishing to draw attention to the subordinate identities 
of the majority. It is in such circumstances that railway operators will retain 
the designation ‘ﬁ rst class’ whilst replacing ‘second class’ with ‘standard 
class’. Airlines, similarly, use labels such as ‘tourist’ and ‘economy’, ﬁ ne-
tuning the distance between these and a retained ‘ﬁ rst class’ with the utili-
tarian meritocracy of ‘business class’. 
 Politicians who wish to state their popular and populist credentials may 
sidestep even these euphemistic renamings. Whilst dictators and despots 
ride in state, elected, or hoping to be elected, leaders may walk or cycle. If 
they wish to cultivate not only their common touch but also their youth 
and vigour, they may even jog or run. However a person travels, identity 
is being cultivated and expressed. Not to travel is itself an aspect of identity. 
Simply to stand or sit in a public space can be part of homelessness, or 
political protests, or waiting for an acquaintance. It cannot be devoid of 
meaning. Moving or not moving, riding or walking, identities are being 
unavoidably displayed to the world. Social identity is constructed both by 
the use of one means of movement rather than another, and within each 
way of getting about. Th e range from steerage to the captain ’ s table, or 
from one class of plane or train to another, can be paralleled even within 
simple walking. Romans characterised each other by their gait, and even 
their names reﬂ ected this. Gait was taken to be characteristic of social 
position, slaves hurrying and nobler Romans proceeding in a leisurely and 
digniﬁ ed manner. Even families could be identiﬁ ed by how they moved, 
and Cleopatra ’ s son Caesarion was deemed a genuine oﬀ spring of Julius 
Caesar by the way he walked. 34 Whether people move or are moved and 
carried, identity, and its tensions of solidarity and exclusivity are being 
constantly cultivated. 
 Talking the talk: how we speak 
 As for walking, so too for talking, as Eliza Doolittle demonstrated. To 
change the way you speak is to change who you are. Of all the compo-
nents of identity, language is one of the most immediately evident, but 
even more than clothing marks humans oﬀ  from other animals. Humans 
are, even more crucially than clothed apes, speaking apes. John Searle has 
placed language as the constituting phenomenon of human life, on which 
everything else depends, and at an only slightly less generalised level of 
argument, language can be presented as the fundamental constituting 
activity for human identity. 35 Its role is dramatically illustrated when 
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collective identities are being challenged or asserted. Th e assertion of the 
role of Latin in the Catholic liturgy by the Council of Trent in the six-
teenth century was as deﬁ ning for the church ’ s identity as was the shift 
to the vernacular by the Second Vatican Council in the twentieth. 36 
Secular identity as much as religious identity is constructed, cultivated, 
and sustained by language. Language creates both common identities and 
separation and exclusion. Since the rise of modern nationalism, speaking 
and writing in the vernacular have been a part of the collective identity 
of a people or a nation, just as previously a more universal or less geo-
graphically rooted and restricted language had been part of the identity 
of elites: Latin for scholars and clergy throughout European Christendom; 
French for aristocrats and intellectuals in northern and eastern Europe, 
where the language at the court of Catherine the Great in Russia could 
be French, whilst in Prussia Frederick the Great could name his summer 
palace ‘Sanssouci’. Th e widening of the community with which people 
identiﬁ ed beyond those who might, at least in principle, be immediately 
known and communicated with, by the accessibility of vernacular writ-
ings disseminated by what Anderson has called ‘print capitalism’, placed 
language at the heart of the imagined communities of the modern mobi-
lised nation. 37 
 Th e language used, the prosaic substance of what is said, and the manner 
or accent in which it is said are all heavy with signiﬁ cance, but they do not 
exist independently of one another. Language, substance, and manner 
engage with each other, and in any one place and time there are conven-
tional expectations of the character of that relationship. In Eliza Doolittle ’ s 
case, the comedy arises from words associated with one way of speaking 
being presented in the accent of another way: ‘It ’ s my belief they done the 
old woman in,’ pronounced in a cut-glass upper-class accent. 38 Th e come-
dians Alexander Armstrong and Ben Miller used a similar device in the 
twenty-ﬁ rst century with a sketch of Second World War Royal Air Force 
ﬁ ghter pilots using the vocabulary of twenty-ﬁ rst century youth in the 
professional accents of the 1940s. 39 It is a dimension of identity recognised 
by writers across the generations. Changing the way you speak changes 
who you are, or who you are publicly. When Edgar in Shakespeare ’ s  King 
Lear wishes to conceal his identity from his blind father, he adopts a rustic 
accent and becomes a peasant and a stranger. 40 Fathers were not always so 
easily fooled, and Isaac almost sees through the deception of his son Jacob, 
who cheats his brother Esau of his inheritance by impersonating him 
before his blind parent, covering his arms with goat skin to imitate his 
brother hirsute limbs. Th ough Isaac is eventually convinced by his son ’ s 
deception, when ‘the hands are the hands of Esau’, he nonetheless thought 
that ‘the voice is Jacob ’ s voice’. 41 
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 Language is important, from the existence of separate languages for the 
ruling class or caste – Mandarin, Norman French – through the dialects 
of class to multicultural equality in countries such as the late twentieth-
century United Kingdom. Writing in the early years of the eighteenth 
century, Maria Edgeworth could report that in Liverpool a wife with the 
wrong accent could cause embarrassment and impediment to the social 
aspirations of a newly wealthy husband. 42 Th ere is no accurate means of 
recovering either the speech of the wife or that to which her husband 
aspired, but it is unlikely to have been an equally valued accent of identi-
ﬁ cation in the same city, Scouse, which appears not to have developed until 
the end of the nineteenth century. 43 In 1928 the BBC ’ s  Recommendations 
to Announcers informed its readers that ‘A man ’ s social class will be more 
evident from the fashion of his speech than from any other fashion he 
adopts.’ 44 Whatever the socially levelling consequences of the Second 
World War, language survived as a component of social hierarchy. Nancy 
Mitford ’ s presentation of ‘U’ and ‘non-U’ drew only half-sceptical attention 
to the survival of linguistic class in the second half of the twentieth 
century. 45 Th e way in which we speak sends important signals of friends 
and enemies, people like us, and people who are regarded at best as dif-
ferent and at worst as hostile. 
 Just as distinctions of speech are part of a segmented society, the move-
ment of language towards a median is part of a move towards greater 
equality, or at least less inequality. In England in the twentieth century, 
part of a wider democratisation was an erosion of distinctive upper-class 
ways of speaking. Th e change from ‘huntin’ to ‘hunting’ was not just the 
acquisition of a consonant. 46 But a greater democracy of language does 
not necessarily involve homogenisation. Whilst ‘standard English’, ‘received 
pronunciation’, or ‘the Queen ’ s English’ may have become more familiar 
in the mouths of comedians and satirists than in the boundary beatings 
of class, regional dialects have ﬂ ourished as a component of identity in 
public life. 
 Language, dialect, and accent can be learned, acquired, or cast oﬀ , and 
it is not only children who are skilled at ﬁ tting the voice to the occasion. 
Th e miners’ leader Arthur Scargill could use the ‘received pronunciation’ 
‘U’ for television interviews, but the northern ‘U’ for miners’ galas, an 
ability which, far from marking him oﬀ  from other political actors, pro-
vided only one more striking example of a widespread facility to match the 
voice to the political occasion. 47 Language may shape what can be said and 
how it can be said, but it can be put on and put oﬀ  like a set of clothes. It 
does not either express some other aspect of identity, or determine it. But 
nor is that its signiﬁ cance. If a person has several languages for diﬀ erent 
settings, each contributes a part to an overall identity. Each is a public, 
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social performance, not a ‘real’, hidden, secret inner identity. Identities do 
not need either to be always the same or to be coherent, in order to be real 
and substantial. 
 Even if language related in no way whatsoever to other aspects or 
dimensions of identity, it would nonetheless be part of the overall character 
of a person or collection of people. As a mark of identity, therefore, it can 
be as signiﬁ cant, or as insigniﬁ cant, in expressing the boundaries and ter-
ritories of identity, as religion, political allegiance, dress, or diet. Signiﬁ cant 
components of identity draw their signiﬁ cance not from any inherent 
character, nor from their being an expression of some underlying single 
principle of identity, but by being accorded signiﬁ cance by the possessor 
of those components, or by others. Th e languages which form part of an 
identity can be as varied as the clothing, and wearing overalls to work and 
morning dress to the horse racing at Ascot does not denote uncertain 
identity or a division between ‘superﬁ cial’ and ‘real’. Language forms insti-
tutions and identities, and like all other dimensions of identity, is charac-
terised by both association and distinction. Languages which distinguish 
one human community from another will themselves then be segmented 
in searches for individual distinction, and linguistic solidarity constantly 
ﬁ ne-tuned to promote individual distinction. 
 What you eat (and how you eat) is what you are 
 Just as humans are clothed apes whose identity is signiﬁ cantly constructed 
and cultivated by their actions and by what and how they produce, so are 
they apes who eat and drink with a degree of sociability which both marks 
them oﬀ  from all other animals and is part of the cultivation of their public 
identity. How food is prepared, how it is served, and how it is consumed 
can all form part of the consumer ’ s identity. It is not only in tea ceremonies 
that identities are generated. Even when tea is more mundanely drunk, the 
way in which a cup is held is capable of making social statements. For one 
person to eat with another can be amongst the strongest forms of solidar-
ity, or of the expression and cultivation of common identity. What people 
eat, which people eat what, how they eat, where they eat, with whom they 
eat, and in what relation to fellow eaters they consume – all and each 
constitute diﬀ erent cultures, diﬀ erent societies, diﬀ erent individual and 
collective identities. For the Oglala Sioux, the distinction between Indian 
and non-Indian foods was an important way not just of distinguishing 
themselves from Europeans, but of distinguishing between Indian tribes, 
and even between ‘mixed bloods’ and ‘full bloods’. 48 For each of the three 
largest monotheistic religions, food and its common management has 
a major identity-sustaining role. Th e central ceremony of the Christian 
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religion is a common and communal partaking of food and drink. Th e most 
familiar illustration of the discipleship of the original twelve Apostles is a 
depiction of the Last Supper, the community of the faithful sharing a 
common meal. For Christians, both in worship and in art, the Last Supper 
of Jesus and his disciples is the most powerful statement of the bond 
between them. Th e Christian Eucharist is in turn a celebration of a meal 
taken within Judaism, where Passover plays a major role of communal and 
religious solidarity, while the alternation of fasting and nourishment during 
the festival of Ramadan is one of the Five Pillars of Islam. Th ose who 
abstain from food by fasting are cultivating an identity as surely as those 
who by partaking in the Eucharist mark their membership of the company 
of the saved or the faithful. For each faith the common conduct of eating 
provides an identity-cultivation ritual. 
 It is because communal eating is such a powerful and ceremonial expres-
sion and cultivation of social solidarity that harm inﬂ icted during eating 
is considered the worst form of treachery. To poison one ’ s guests is to 
reveal the depths of one ’ s own moral descent and one ’ s departure from the 
society of civilised or socialised humanity. Conversely, the common table 
is the stage at which the solidarity of the family is cultivated, as is the soli-
darity of both secular and religious collegial bodies, clubs, corporations, 
and professional associations. Eating together expresses and cultivates a 
shared identity, and a sharing of the material resources which surround 
and extend that identity. It is for this reason that ostentatious failure to 
share food when seated with others causes deep oﬀ ence. When Evelyn 
Waugh, at a time of great food shortage, sat at table with his family and 
consumed all the rare and hitherto unseen bananas which had been made 
available for his children, it was breach not only of courtesy but of solidar-
ity and common identity. 49 Conversely, when the common identity is main-
tained, meals can be occasions not only for solidarity but for the celebration 
of that solidarity. In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain, radical 
dining provided occasions for celebratory songs, toasts, and speeches, and 
a cultivation and consolidation of collective political identity in the face of 
a hostile dominant social and political culture. 50 When feasts become 
drunken excess they may be a custom more honoured in the breach than 
in the observance but, even then, they can celebrate and proclaim the 
character of their participants. As Martin Jones has put it, ‘the sharing of 
food simultaneously builds an “in-group” and excludes an “out-group”’. 51 
 Whilst eating around a common table is the most powerful indication 
of solidarity, membership of a distinct class of people can be exhibited 
publicly by individuals as an indication that they are not solitary or iso-
lated, but part of a community whose identity they share and exhibit. 
Advertisers are well aware of this function of food, and can declaim that 
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‘We are the Ovaltineys,’ or conﬁ de, ‘I bet he drinks Carling Black Label.’ 
To eat or drink in the street can be seen as just as much an expression of 
identity as to dine in evening wear. Th e reﬁ nement of Chaucer ’ s prioress 
in the  Canterbury Tales is marked by the fact that when she eats,
 She leet no morsel from hir lippes falle, 
 Ne wette hir fyngres in hir sauce depe. 
 Wel koude she carie a morsel and wel kepe 
 Th at no drope ne ﬁ lle upon hire brest. 52 
 Nebuchadnezzar ’ s departure from the community of normal humans, con-
versely, was marked by his eating grass: ‘he was driven from men, and did 
eat grass as oxen’. 53 
 Like all aspects of identity, food culture, though powerful and persistent, 
is not immutable, and both grows and changes slowly, and can, in times 
when identity is challenged, be altered or innovative to deal with threats 
to solidarity. Sidney Mintz has described this potent, and manipulable, 
function of food in the case of introduction of the relatively unfamiliar 
Coca Cola to United States servicemen who, during the Second World 
War, had been deprived of other familiar contextual components of soli-
darity. Troops overseas:
 have not only been stripped of almost all of marks of their individuality 
(clothings, jewelry, coiﬀ ure), but because they are in a remote land, they also 
feel bereft of those material representations of their culture that are embod-
ied in architecture and in linguistic forms (familiar buildings, signs, advertis-
ing). Under such circumstances, which can be alienating, objects that can 
‘carry’ a displaced sense of culture, such as foods and beverages, take on 
additional potential power. Coca Cola turned out to be a nearly perfect 
symbolic repository. 54 
 Mintz ’ s account of the planned promotion and provision of Coca Cola 
gives a further dimension to Marx ’ s observation that people make their 
own history, but do so in circumstances not of their own choosing. Th e 
consuming troops may not have chosen Coca Cola, but the military 
authorities did, and the circumstances were thus very much chosen, though 
in this case chosen by one group to be the circumstances of another. Whilst 
circumstances will at any single moment be the environment within which 
new choices are made or old ones sustained, they have themselves resulted 
from, directly or indirectly, human choice. 
 Just as the communal consumption and management of food culti-
vates solidarity, it provides at the same time opportunities for distinction 
or exclusion. Solidarity depends for its force on a boundary which divides 
the community from those whose identity bars them. Th e apocryphal 
Edinburgh snub to unwanted visitors, ‘You ’ ll have had your tea,’ was a 
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public denial of membership of a table. In the 1948 ﬁ lm  Th e Guinea Pig , 
the young man played by Richard Attenborough horriﬁ es the upper-class 
pupils at his boarding-school table by sopping up the remains of his 
meal with a piece of bread. It is in the same vein of observation of the 
identity-signifying role of food that, half a century later, Maggie Smith in 
the ﬁ lm  Gosford Park  spies a vulgar intrusion at the breakfast table: 
‘Shop-bought marmalade; how quaint.’ 55 For Disraeli writing of the condi-
tion of England in 1845, food was as clear a marker of social division as 
the manners or morals of ‘two nations; between whom there is no inter-
course and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other ’ s habits, 
thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in diﬀ erent zones, or 
inhabitants of diﬀ erent planets; who are formed by diﬀ erent breeding, 
are fed by a diﬀ erent food, are ordered by diﬀ erent manners, and are not 
governed by the same laws’. 56 
 Whilst solidarity is cultivated by the culture of food, so also are distinc-
tions within the group. Where one sits, whether one sits or serves, all 
construct identities and distinctions of superiority or inferiority. Th e hall 
of a college or a City of London livery company sets its members oﬀ  from 
the world outside. But, at the same time, ‘high table’ is more distinguished 
than the commoners’ table, and wily humility can conspire to achieve the 
former whilst appearing to choose the latter: ‘When thou art bidden, go 
and sit down in the lowest room; that when he that bade thee cometh, he 
may say unto thee, Friend, go up higher: then shalt thou have worship in 
the presence of them that sit at meat with thee.’ 57 Social status has been 
described with metaphors derived from placing at communal, but not 
common, tables: the lower orders are ‘below the salt’. 
 Just as there are prohibitions on what a group, or sect, or faith, or nation, 
may eat in order to mark its character as at least equal to that of its rivals, 
so there are prohibitions which, by restricting access to particular foods to 
an elite, mark oﬀ  that elite ’ s superiority to and distance from the mass 
within the larger group, whether it is a college, a guild, a society, an organi-
sation, or an entire nation. Swans in Britain are reserved for the royal table, 
whilst truﬄ  es and caviar, by their rarity and expense, can mark oﬀ  those 
who consume them from the mass of their fellows. Th e gods have ambro-
sia, a food which is not so much barred to ordinary mortals as simply not 
available to them. If they transgress that barrier, as Adam and Eve did in 
eating a fruit that, whether or not it was reserved for God, was denied to 
them, then the defensive sanction of the deity is instant and absolute. 
 Whilst the privileged may cultivate their status by monopolising food, 
they can also cultivate it by sharing food, doing so on a scale suﬃ  ciently 
generous and extravagant as to mark oﬀ  their own distinctiveness by their 
ability to provide for others what those others could not provide for 
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themselves. When the prodigal son was welcomed with feasting on the 
fatted calf, his father was at one and the same time forgiving, and express-
ing his power to forgive and to nurture. To generously provide for others 
is to illustrate one ’ s superior capacity, and to confer on them a benediction 
which they are thereby deemed to be unable to provide for themselves. 
Alternatively, the fortunate may use the generosity of their provision to 
impress those who would otherwise be considered their peers. Th e provi-
sion of food can, too, be a means of expressing gratitude for solidarity 
received from the guests.  Babette’s Feast is a culinary return of communal 
favours made even more luxuriant and elaborate when translated from text 
to ﬁ lm. 58 
 Identities are both related to and independent of the universal necessity 
to feed. If all that were involved in eating was simple and straightforward 
nutrition, then the only diﬀ erences of any signiﬁ cance between one group 
of humans and another would be the result of the availability of food, of 
climate and material habitat. But even when human society could be seen 
as closer to the natural life of foraging or hunting animals than is now the 
case, diﬀ erences can be seen which cannot be explained by the presence 
or absence of food, or by the ease or diﬃ  culty of its consumption. Closely 
located communities in the Neolithic Middle East had widely diﬀ erent 
diets, one consuming available ﬁ sh, another not consuming ﬁ sh though it 
was available. 59 Th e rituals and practices whereby social eating is carried 
out are as much a part of the identifying function of eating as the food 
itself, and are not a simple reﬂ ex of the available raw materials. Th e history 
of oysters suggests a similar social construction, and ﬂ exibility, of diet, with 
the mollusc ’ s progress from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ 
equivalent of ﬁ sh and chips to the twentieth century ’ s equivalent of caviar. 
Th e character of food culture is not determined by the material character 
of the food, and the same raw materials can, at diﬀ erent times and in dif-
ferent places, contribute to quite diﬀ erent identities. What is evident here 
is cultural distinction, not an uncultivated response to a universal, deter-
mining, physical human need. 
 Th e cultural basis of diet is part of the cultivation of identity, and of an 
identity which, in order to give meaning to itself, gives meaning to the 
surrounding world. Mary Douglas ’ s account of the food regulations of 
Leviticus is of a taxonomy of the natural world which enables individuals 
and communities to identify their environment, but in so doing cultivate 
human wholeness and holiness. 60 Such individual and collective identity is 
composed of every kind of human action, construction, and cultivation. 
An individual, ‘adjusting sights all the time, can see himself as a particular 
kind of person who would always do this sort of thing and never do that. 
“Moral style” is set collectively. At any given time the pervading cultural 
c01.indd   24 6/5/2017   12:20:58 PM
 plumage 25
environment provides moral standards aﬀ ecting every kind of resource. 
Food is inevitably brought within the moral perspective.’ 61 
 It is because the culture of food is part of the culture of identity that 
apparent slights to it can be so powerful. As Douglas puts it, ‘Whenever a 
people are aware of encroachment and danger, dietary rules controlling 
what goes into the body would serve as a vivid analogy of the corpus of 
their cultural categories at risk.’ 62 So cuisine is more than a symbol of other 
identiﬁ cations, it becomes a parallel or supporting cultivation of distinc-
tive identity, coherent with, rather than symbolic or expressive of, some 
other identity. To threaten a person ’ s diet can be a major threat to his or 
her identity. In Vichy France, alienation from the Pétain regime and support 
for armed opposition greatly increased when the regime contaminated 
wine in June 1943 as part of their policy of requisitioning wine for fuel 
alcohol. Lucie Aubrac ’ s description of vintage in defence of national iden-
tity adds one more dimension to the understanding of the Maquis: ‘More 
than any rational arguments, more than any patriotic explanation, these 
glasses of heating oil adulterating a ﬁ ne Pouilly-fuissé swung the wine-
growers of the Mâcon hills to the Resistance.’ 63 
 Whilst food culture contributes to identity and solidarity, it contributes 
also to the exclusions which bolster identity by contrasting it with that of 
others who do not share one ’ s common character. For George Orwell, food 
was an instant identiﬁ er of identity. ‘Vegetarians’ and ‘fruit-juice drinkers’ 
were badges of an alien or unorthodox identity in the same way as were 
‘paciﬁ st’ and ‘feminist’, and people who got their cookery from Paris were 
likely also to get their opinions from Moscow. Th e indigenous patriotism 
of the upper classes could be called into question by the restaurants they 
ate in, whilst the solid virtues of ordinary people were indicated by the fact 
that it was in their homes that a ‘good slice of honest Yorkshire pudding’ 
was most likely to be found. 64 For critics of Jesus, it was a mark of his 
departure from the society of the devout and the respectable that he ate 
‘with publicans and sinners’. 65 
 Just as denial is simpler than assertion, in locating others expressions of 
distaste or disgust are easier than recipes and menus. Th e insults between 
Indians and Pakistanis in Salman Rushdie ’ s  Shame are couched in terms 
of their respective diets. 66 When the supporters of the American invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 wanted to stigmatise the weak or absent European, and 
particularly French, support for their enterprise, they ridiculed ‘cheese-
eating surrender monkeys’. 67 A old insult to the English was to call them 
‘les rosbifs’, just as for Hogarth it was precisely the roast beef of old England 
that expressed so much about national character, and the hearty good 
health with which beef was popularly associated could be contrasted with 
the starved and pinched person of the French enemy. 68 
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 Th ere is only one way in which one cannot eat pork, or shellﬁ sh, or black 
bread. Th ere are, by contrast, an inﬁ nity of ways in which one can do so. 
Th e simplicity of taboo makes it an accessible and unambiguous way of 
cultivating identity. Not eating something is far more readily both employed 
and recognised than a particular way of eating something. Martin Jones 
comments that ‘Our refusal to eat certain categories of perfectly edible 
food marks us out as belonging to one particular community, and deﬁ nitely 
not belonging to another, foreign community, which in turn is character-
ized by the despicable practice of consuming that same foul foodstuﬀ  with 
relish.’ 69 So with food as with all the other aspects of human identity, the 
least diﬀ erence has signiﬁ cance for identity, and can sustain solidarity or 
diﬀ erence with a force which owes little or nothing to the material reality 
of food, but to its powerful but also humanly cultivated character and 
signiﬁ cance. Th e college or city guild dining hall provides a microcosm of 
the paradox of identity – members in association apart from the world 
outside, and distinguished amongst themselves between high or head table 
and mere members. 
 Feathering the nest 
 Th e creation and nurturing of identity does not stop with the clothing and 
the accoutrements which attach directly to the person, or with language, 
movement, or food. Whilst birds build no more than nests, humans con-
struct an architecture both grand and public, and quotidian and domestic 
– cities and cottages; patios, parks, and plazas; allotments and amphithea-
tres – which add a further dimension to identity. Humans construct not 
only their own nests but their own trees in which the nests rest – complex 
physical environments which, whilst they cater for material needs, also 
provide the setting for the cultivation of social identity. Identity is culti-
vated, and that cultivation involves and requires more than the character 
of the material person; the constructed environment is a part of the per-
son ’ s extended identity. Humans do not limit the creation and cultivation 
of their identity to the artefacts immediately next to their bodies; more 
than any other species they construct the material world in which they live 
and in so doing construct yet further their public identities. People are 
clothed by their architecture just as much as by their coats and hats. Plazas 
and palaces and houses and gardens contribute public and private space 
and scenery to the formation of identity. And just as there is an immedi-
ate and visible diﬀ erence between a swan ’ s nest and a weaver bird ’ s nest, 
so the settings humans construct can be an immediate and visible dimen-
sion of their created and cultivated identity. From the suburban villa which 
both proclaims its villadom and replaces its number with a name lest it be 
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thought to be just one more villa like all the others, to the presidential 
palace which proclaims both the grandeur of its occupant as the epitome 
of his or her people and the exclusion from that grandeur of ordinary 
subjects because of the uniqueness of that epitomisation, association and 
distinction are sought simultaneously and the inherent tension of identity 
cultivation is at work. 
 Th e built environment provides the clue to the dimension which is 
missing from accounts which present people as predominantly or solely 
the recipients of identity or the products of circumstance, training, educa-
tion, or socialisation. However distant the connection, some person or 
people created, or contributed to the creation, of built environments, and 
whether it is the direct user of or visitor to that environment seeking an 
appropriate setting for and contribution to their own identity, or a planner, 
architect, politician, or client seeking a setting to inﬂ uence others, people 
are making their own history in circumstances which are partly of their 
own choosing. 
 Th e complexity of dimensions which the built and cultivated environ-
ment introduces to an understanding of identity has led to both discussion 
and disagreement amongst commentators. Th ree broad viewpoints have 
emerged: an account of architecture as an instance of power exercised by 
elites; a denial of any simple connection between architecture and other 
aspects of identity; and an account of the built environment as a place of 
continual negotiation and change, where the physical world has no intrin-
sic meaning or function, and where both powerful and ordinary subjects 
and citizens mould, alter, ignore, or cultivate signiﬁ cance. Th is third view, 
although or because it is the most ﬂ exible and unpredictable, can be the 
most productive in apprehending the contribution to identity of the built 
and cultivated environment. 
 Th e ﬁ rst view nonetheless has great currency, if only because politicians, 
architects, planners, and reformers have frequently and eloquently 
espoused it, and there is a dimension of the history of the built environ-
ment which sustains it. Even when those who have sought to use architec-
ture and the built environment as a means of maintaining or changing 
society have been frustrated or diverted from the start, their very diﬃ  cul-
ties have conﬁ rmed the optimism of the belief in the social and political 
eﬀ ects of pavements, columns, and porticos. Th e account given by Carl 
Schoske of the development of the Ringstrasse in Vienna in the nineteenth 
century is of an extended and shifting contest between the defenders of 
military tradition, imperial conservatives, and reforming liberals to use 
the choice and location of government buildings, museums, and churches 
as part of a social and political programme of change, maintenance, or 
enhancement. When liberals succeeded in claiming former parade-ground 
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space in 1870 and replacing it with a parliament building, this could be 
seen as ‘a triumph of historical eclecticism and the most eloquent spatial 
expression of bourgeois power in the new capital’. 70 
 Th e relationship between architecture and the character of society is 
taken for granted in archaeology: the building is taken to be the expres-
sion but also the context of the civilisation, when even the merest outlines 
of a house or village can provide evidence of social hierarchy, religious 
practice, and household culture. From the dusty remains of founda-
tions, a whole settlement and its character can be rebuilt in the narra-
tive of the excavating investigator. A worn paving stone or the outline of 
a courtyard or corridor can constitute the skeletal remains of an entire 
social order. 
 In everyday life the assumptions if not the methods of the archaeologist 
are applied to discern the identity which people are cultivating. Th e small-
est artefact can constitute part of an expressed identity. A door knocker, a 
carriage lamp, or the pattern of a curtain serves as a shorthand summary 
for a lifestyle and a life; the curve of a drive or the shape of a ﬂ ower bed 
sets down a conception of order and elegance and the discernment of the 
persons who enjoy them. When the ‘women of the quality, the gentry and 
the middling sort’ described by Amanda Vickery were contemplating the 
qualities of potential husbands, a prominent part of the possible groom ’ s 
marriageable identity consisted of his house and its furnishings. 71 Th is 
was not merely a matter of assessing wealth but, equally importantly, of 
ascertaining character and culture. Th e hostesses of an emerging salon 
culture were well aware of the role and importance of domestic interiors 
in publishing their inhabitants’ identity, and the expansion of visiting, and 
hence of parlours, in the eighteenth century was part of the theatre of 
social life where what mattered was ‘the prestige of the stage, the props 
and the hostess that could stand up to the scrutiny of guests.’ 72 Furniture 
and furnishings can shape an identity as substantially as can the turn of 
a staircase or an order of rooms. Th is was well recognised by the Scot-
tish minister Andrew Boyd, who wrote in 1861 that ‘the scenery amid 
which a man lives, and the house in which he lives, have a vast deal to 
do with making him what he is’, and ‘We are all moral chameleons; and 
we take the colour of the objects among which we are placed.’ 73 Robert 
Crawford ’ s poem ‘Us’ records just such an identity at the point of its 
destruction:
 Now someone will bid for, then clear these rooms, 
 Stripping them of us. We were that ﬂ oral wallpaper, 
 Th at stuck serving-hatch, radiograms polished and broken, 
 Dogeared carpet-tiles that understood us, 
 Our locked bureau, crammed with ourselves. 74 
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 Crawford is drawing attention to the way in which houses become homes, 
part of and conﬁ rming the identity of those who live in them. Alain de 
Botton makes a similar point when he speaks of an imaginary house whose 
‘owners have returned from periods away and, on looking around them, 
remembered who they were.’ 75 Th is portrayal of a decorated and furnished 
house might seem to be countered by more austere versions of domesticity, 
the idea that a house is a machine for living in. But the modernist, rational-
ist conception of the built environment and Corbusier ’ s conception of 
building, identify only a part of what is going on. Even people who choose 
to live in what they consider to be no more than a machine are cultivating 
a distinct identity for themselves – modern, utilitarian, and functional – 
and by choosing a rational and materially functional identity for their 
domestic environment, are cultivating an identity, initially private but 
potentially public, of themselves as modern, post-Romantic, and realisti-
cally ascetic. And these material settings for lives are permanent, solid, and 
unavoidably present, however ﬂ exible may be the human interpretation of 
them. 
 Th e theatrical metaphor used by Vickery for material settings has often 
seemed neatly appropriate for talking about the role of the constructed 
material environment in cultivating identity. Buildings and the disposition 
of public space can readily be compared to scenery, a stage of public life, 
and there is an immediate illumination in describing them as a setting for 
the generation of particular public identities of citizenship, empowerment, 
or subordination, as the theatres where the public drama is acted out. So 
Richard Beacham, in a study of imperial Rome, can write that the emperor 
Augustus’s ‘reconceptualization of the city went far beyond mere beautiﬁ -
cation or monumentalization: it became an essential and highly theatrical 
expression of the ideology of the principate’. 76 But the theatrical metaphor, 
having initially illuminated, can then dazzle and confuse. Th e cultivation 
of identity is not a matter of social costume and greasepaint; the roles 
which are performed on the public stage are not hung up like an actor ’ s 
costume at the end of the day, but are dimensions of a sustained public 
persona. Bricks and mortar, stone and marble, are not like paper and card-
board, to be packed up at the fall of a curtain and replaced in the morning 
with diﬀ erent landscapes and cityscapes. Both publicly and domestically, 
buildings are there all the time, either as dwellings or as places of public 
work or assembly. In this role, they are a permanent context for the cultiva-
tion of identity. As a context, they are permanently present at both the 
public and the domestic level, and however weak or strong their inﬂ uence 
on identity, it is not switched on and oﬀ  with a cultural spotlight. Buildings 
have a solidity and permanence which gives them an advantage in longev-
ity over clothing. Th e grander and more public they are, the greater the 
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number of people for whom they form a context. Garments, however 
much they express common identity, are a part of single identities and 
attach to single persons and are individually employed, which gives archi-
tecture a potential to shape identity as well as to constitute it that is both 
thinner as an expression but potentially more powerful and longer lasting 
as an inﬂ uence. Th ere is a further diﬀ erence between the built environment 
and other elements in the cultivating context of identity. Whatever the 
degree of spontaneity in the generation and inﬂ uence of cultural contexts, 
a building is the result of a deliberate set of decisions and expectations. 
Th is is a feature of the built environment to which the theatrical metaphor, 
despite its limitation, draws attention: a play requires an author, a director, 
and a cast of performers – it does not simply happen. Architecture thus 
provides a pointer to the gap in any account which sees the person as the 
recipient but never the provider or creator of identity and its ingredients. 
Architecture both composes human character and is deliberately produced 
by it. 
 Th e assumption that social order and architectural order can sustain 
one another has been held by builders, designers, and planners in advance 
of any academic account, and later academic observation follows on from 
the working assumptions of earlier architects, planners, politicians, and 
reformers. In Augustus’s Rome, the pageantry of the living and of the dead 
was both an expression of the grandeur of the patron or protagonist and 
a communication of that grandeur to the city and its populace. In this way 
it expressed both aristocracy and the authority of the populace. Th is was 
neither accidental nor unconscious, and Vitruvius was able at the time to 
observe that ‘Th e majesty of the Empire has … been expressed through the 
eminent dignity of its public buildings.’ 77 Th e intentions and assumptions 
of the architects of Augustan Rome were not concealed, and the presenta-
tion of them to later audiences does not reveal hidden or accidental pur-
poses, but a portrayal of vernacular ones. Murray Edelman ’ s claim that the 
built public environment can be a response to ‘the need to establish or 
reinforce a particular deﬁ nition of the self in a public oﬃ  cial’ 78 was some-
thing that earlier politicians and improving elites would have applauded, 
and in describing how ‘Th e theatre of Marcellus and its seating arrange-
ments were fashioned to resemble a microcosm of society and to convey 
this hierarchy in visual terms,’ 79 Richard Beacham was theorising from the 
intentional identity cultivation of Augustan Rome. Th e grids of well-drilled 
streets set out in decorous and spacious order in New York, Philadelphia, 
or Edinburgh ’ s New Town proclaimed and encouraged a particular vision 
of social order. 80 And in describing this vision, academic commentators 
already have to hand the accounts of less theoretically ambitious contribu-
tors which can be expressed at a more general and abstracted level, and 
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then fed back into the practice and cultivation of the architectural settings 
of identity. Th e debate over the city in Britain in the nineteenth century 
took for granted that the arrangement of streets, buildings, and public 
spaces not only expressed but shaped and cultivated identity. Churches 
were crafted with the expectation and hope that their character would 
contribute to an organic and sanctiﬁ ed society, just as art galleries and 
assembly rooms were advanced as part of a campaign of rational improve-
ment of education, culture, and public life. 81 As Alexander ‘Greek’ Th omson, 
who made a distinguished contribution to the architecture of nineteenth-
century Glasgow, put it, art had the responsibility for the ‘furnishing of our 
minds with correct images’. 82 Building a city was much more than provid-
ing shelter from the weather and facilities for work, it was nurturing a 
garden in which the plants of wholesome humanity would ﬂ ourish. When 
the leading citizens of nineteenth-century Manchester were discussing a 
museum, a library, or a college, the design and shape of the building was 
as important a part of the character of the envisaged human institution as 
the contents were of the services it would provide. 83 Bentham ’ s widely used 
panopticon prison design sought to maintain order both by the central 
human supervision which the arrangement of space would make possible, 
and by the ordering of space itself, which placed people in neat hierarchies. 
Educational reformers in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Scot-
land frequently used a Benthamite panopticon arrangement of space in a 
desire to promote social order; the function of created space being no less 
powerful in civil society than in prisons. 84 In all of this, the creators of a 
material world were articulately conscious of what they intended and 
hoped for, and their testimony provides material for any account of the 
active human role in creating the circumstances within which identity is 
cultivated. Th e explanation of these intentions and these actions continues 
to inform both practice and explanation, and the social consequences of 
material environments are a commonplace of public discussion. What 
applies to the insides of buildings has been applied equally to their shaping 
of urban space, and the character and arrangement of streets, pavements, 
and open spaces. Th ree centuries after the municipal visionaries of Edin-
burgh and Manchester, the Conservative politician David Davis was able 
to speculate on ways of ‘designing out crime’. 85 
 Buildings, and the spaces which they contain and create. both state a 
social identity and shape and encourage one. Th ey are training grounds 
where people learn and practise their roles and, as Murray Edelman put 
it, ‘become the executives, the authorities, the psychotics, or the unreliable 
employees their settings tell them they are.’ 86 Th e identity may be one of 
solidarity or of hierarchy and exclusion. Shops may, with their warm blast 
of air at the front door, say ‘Come in’, but government buildings more 
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frequently say ‘Keep out’ or ‘You don ’ t belong here,’ or tell those who are 
allowed in that, compared with the possessors of the space to which they 
are given brief access, they are socially, as they are architecturally, dimin-
ished. Murray Edelman commented on such intimidatory architecture that 
it ‘reminds the mass of political spectators that they enter the precincts of 
power as clients or as supplicants, susceptible to arbitrary rebuﬀ s and 
favors, and that they are subject to remote authorities they only dimly 
know or understand.’ 87 Even when the public are admitted to public build-
ings, they may be admitted only up to a certain point and no further than 
a clear boundary, and in ways which cultivate their status as permitted 
outsiders, not as rightful occupiers. Th omas Markus makes the point 
neatly: ‘In public buildings there is a shallow visitor zone. Visitors interface 
with the inhabitants at some spatial barrier which prevents deeper pene-
tration: the counter in shops and banks, the bar in pubs, the proscenium 
arch in theatres, the gallery space of museums. … Th e person with the 
greatest power is at the tip of a tree, reached through corridors, stairs, 
outer and inner oﬃ  ces and waiting lobbies.’ 88 Th e more elevated the sought-
after identity, the grander and more extensive the stage. Just such a distanc-
ing of the apex from the periphery was constructed in the Reich Chancellery 
which Albert Speer designed for Adolf Hitler. Th e Chancellery required 
vast spaces to be traversed before reaching the Führer ’ s oﬃ  ce, though oﬃ  ce 
was a very inadequate term for the grand hall at which the suppliant even-
tually arrived. 89 Th e distance the visitor had to travel, and the removal of 
the remotest areas from ordinary public access, was a human hierarchy as 
well as an architectural progression, an instance of what Markus has 
described when he commented that ‘the number of layers of space one 
passes through from the outside of a building to reach an internal location 
… map society’. 90 A similar use of intimidatory distance was used in the 
grandiloquently choreographed spaces of the Nuremburg rallies (ﬁ gure  1 ). 
 Th ere was nothing new in the political theatre of the Chancellery. Th e 
progression of visitors to the royal presence at Louis XIV ’ s Palace of Ver-
sailles was through a series of courts, vestibules, and courtyards of increas-
ing grandeur and remoteness. To enter the Hall of Mirrors was to be 
overwhelmed by the distances and soaring heights of the royal architec-
tural presence, with vision vanishing in every direction in an ever repeated 
succession of gilt and reﬂ ected image (ﬁ gure  2 ). When the king himself 
processed through the hall to his chapel, he occupied and commanded its 
spaces, spaces in which courtiers were observers and permitted visitors, 
whilst the mirrored spaciousness of the hall served on this and other grand 
occasions to give visible form to the magniﬁ cence of the monarchy. Nor 
was Versailles anything but one instance of a long history of architectural 
cultivation of hierarchy and elevation. Charles Goodsell comments that 
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 1  Intimidatory space, Nuremburg 
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the ‘rites of governance, while usually less dramatic than religious or 
magical rites, nonetheless invoke their own sanctity. Th eir formalistic, 
solemn format reminds those who are present of the grand and even mys-
terious compulsion of state authority.’ 91 In the Mycenaean palace at Pylos, 
a ‘truly elaborate series of routes separates the inside from the outside, 
constraining access through courtyards, vestibules, pantries, storerooms, 
lobbies, and entranceways. To move from the throne room to the exterior, 
a minimum of ﬁ ve spaces must be traversed.’ 92 
 Th e architectural presence of rule and government might have its grand-
est expressions in regimes with steep political hierarchies, but is evident 
in all political systems. Th e theatre of British constitutional monarchic 
democracy ’ s rule in India was more restrained than totalitarian- or ancient-
regime high opera, but Lutyens ’ s New Delhi, completed in the second and 
third decades of the twentieth century, both proclaimed imperial grandeur 
and, by its insulating spaces, made clear the relations between rulers and 
ruled, the boundaries between the palace of government and the streets 
of mere subjects. Th e spaces between buildings were as important as the 
spaces within them in setting out inclusion and exclusion, the identities of 
 2  Reﬂ ected glory, Hall of Mirrors, Versailles 
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rulers and ruled (ﬁ gure  3 ). When, after the end of British rule, Le Corbusier 
and Jane Drew planned the government buildings for an independent and 
democratic India in Chandigarh, the state capital of the Indian Punjab, a 
quarter of a century after Lutyens, what they produced, despite being part 
of a formal democracy, said more with its ‘pedestrian-resistant’ expanses 
of plaza about the independent authority of rulers than about the rights 
or participation of citizens. 93 Just as in New Delhi under imperial rule, 
public spaces deﬁ ned the public, and deﬁ ned them as subjects rather than 
as citizens. Th e grander the identity which buildings create for rulers, the 
smaller and lowlier by simple contrast is the identity of the ruled. 
 Th e new Brazilian capital Brasilia, designed by the architect Oscar Nie-
meyer and the town planner Lúcio Costa and completed in 1960 in a 
revived democracy, was similarly constructed in a way which functions in 
‘distancing the masses from the seat of courtly power’ by the vast and 
intimidating spaces which surrounded its governing buildings. 94 Th e oﬃ  ces 
of government and legislation were viewed across acres of emptiness, 
constructing separation and distinction at the same time as they pro-
claimed superior presence. Th e very spaciousness which elevated the iden-
tity of ruling groups diminished the identity of excluded and ordinary 
subjects. 
 Th is importance of built space in cultivating identity was graphically and 
ﬁ ctionally acknowledged in Richard Loncraine ’ s 1995 ﬁ lm of Shakespeare ’ s 
 3  Imperial vistas, New Delhi 
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 Richard III , where the buildings of contemporary London were used as the 
context for an imaginative construction of a mid-twentieth-century dicta-
torship. High columns and grand staircases elevated the regal actors who 
possessed them, and raised them above the crowd. Th ose who had always 
felt that the University of London ’ s Senate House had something of a fascist 
crematorium about it had their suspicions conﬁ rmed as Ian McKellen ’ s 
Richard the Th ird strode in jackboots down its marble stairs. 95 It is not 
only political grandeur which can be cultivated in architecture. 
 All kinds of pre-eminence can be declared by built magniﬁ cence, and 
by elaborations of both structure and decoration such as those which led 
the Woolworth Building, opened in New York in 1913, to be described as 
‘the cathedral of commerce’. 96 Th e use of architecture and built space to 
cultivate social and political hierarchy is matched by their use to sustain 
it. John Nash, in planning the layout of Regent Street and its environs at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, envisaged them providing ‘a 
boundary and complete separation between the Streets and Squares occu-
pied by the Nobility and Gentry’ on the one hand and ‘the narrow Streets 
and meaner houses occupied by mechanics and the trading parts of the 
community’ on the other. 97 
 Architecture is a built and chosen setting for human life, and can be 
designed for the whole range of social and political theatre. Th e democratic 
response to the architecture of distance and superiority is the architecture 
of transparency and access. Norman Foster ’ s City Hall in London attempts 
a diﬀ erent statement from the architecture of dominance and exclusion, 
displaying the oﬃ  ces of bureaucrats and the deliberations of legislators to 
the public gaze even as they keep the public safely behind glass (ﬁ gure  4 ). 
In the same way, citizens visiting Enric Miralles ’ s Scottish Parliament 
building at Holyrood can rise above the spaces used by their elected rep-
resentatives and peer down on them from above. Th e superiority of the 
citizen, whether or not achieved in practice, is nonetheless claimed, 
expressed, encouraged, cultivated, and enacted in architectural form. 
 Th e identity-cultivating and identity-conﬁ rming function of architec-
ture is not limited to public buildings and public spaces. Within a domestic 
setting the construction and shaping of space can be part of the construc-
tion and shaping of the hierarchies, solidarities, and exclusions of the 
household. A round dwelling is more conducive to communal and egalitar-
ian relations than a rectangular one, which can more readily be divided 
into zones of privilege or exclusion. 98 Th e principal was ﬁ ctionally expressed 
in the equality within a knightly elite of King Arthur ’ s round table. It is a 
function of space illustrated by the diﬀ erence between theatrical and col-
legiate seating. A theatre audience, whilst observing, does not normally 
participate, and is ranked row on row apart from the performers. Rather 
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than being face to face, each row of observers sees only the backs of the 
row in front. Members of an ecclesiastical choir and directly participating 
clergy, by contrast, face each other on either side of a central aisle, as do 
legislators in the upper and lower houses of the British Parliament. Each 
 4  Open government 
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side is then both observer and participant, actor and witness, with each, 
by observing, registering the active identity of the other. 
 But an account of architecture as simply an exercise of power in a single 
direction misses the feature of the very solidity of buildings and spaces 
which prevents them from possessing any inherent meaning. One response 
to this is a radical denial of any coherent relationship at all between the 
built environment and the rest of society and to insist, in the words of Eric 
Monkonnen, that ‘It is all too easy to make what might be called the archi-
tectural fallacy: to read economics, politics, and society through build-
ings.’ 99 Architecture and the construction of space are distinguished from 
other elements of identity in that they are not part of the immediate physi-
cal identity of any individual, but provide identity-shaping contexts, nests 
rather than plumage. Th ey are, too, both slower and more permanent ways 
than other means of cultivating, constituting, and expressing identity. Th ey 
cannot change or mutate with the speed of clothing or language, but once 
there, they are more solidly permanent, or semi-permanent. For this 
reason, paradoxically, their social meaning can change at least as radically 
as can that of other forms of constructed identity. Th e physical presence, 
being far more resistant to alteration than clothes or conduct, must, if 
there is to be change, be either eﬀ ectively modiﬁ ed, or reassessed and re-
presented – or demolished. In all of this, the built environment displays 
that general feature of identity cultivation which is embodied in all its 
instances. Making one ’ s own identity in the face of a triumphal avenue or 
an intimidating palace or a cramping house may require diﬀ erent strategies 
from changing the way you dress, or speak, or move, but it is an instance 
of the same broad category, of the person as actor as well as recipient, 
agent as well as patient. 
 Architects and builders may have made decisions before the inhabitants 
arrive and without consulting them. Th ey may, too, have had expectations 
about the consequences of their plans which were never fulﬁ lled. Th e 
extreme version of this hope is the attempt to recreate old societies in new 
lands when, in Chris Abel ’ s optimistic phrasing, ‘people quite literally 
recreate familiar environments in alien locations, thus retaining that part 
of their identity which is their architecture.’ 100 But New York is not York, 
nor New Hampshire Hampshire, and optimism cannot clone worlds. Dell 
Upton ’ s account of the development of nineteenth-century cities in the 
United States is of a process whereby ‘through everyday experience in and 
of the material world of buildings, spaces, and people – American urban-
ites developed active sense of themselves as individuals and as members 
of a new republican society’, whilst at the same time the expectations of 
planners and reformers for the creation of calm and civilised order were 
frequently frustrated. 101 But the failure of plans is not the only way in which 
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power is modiﬁ ed or diverted. In altering the social presence of architec-
ture there are layers or levels of choice, cultivation, and creation, particu-
larly in domestic settings. Th ere are many things that can be done within 
a living space which develop its character without altering its structure. 
Th ere is nothing inherent in the concept of power which restricts its loca-
tion to the actions of an elite, and the advocacy of architecture as a means 
for more decentralised cultivation of the built environment can, in the 
support of such schemes as self-build, take and redirect an apparently 
extreme claim such as Abel ’ s that people ‘do not  have architecture, there-
fore, but rather, a part of us  is architecture. Architecture is a way of being’. 
Once the assumption of monopoly of agency is set aside, architecture can 
provide ‘opportunities for those expressions of personal and social identity 
which come from having control over one ’ s own home and neighbour-
hood’. 102 Sometimes, more substantial amendment than the choice of fur-
niture or interior decoration is feasible. Th e stark minimalism of the 
workers’ houses designed in 1923 by Le Corbusier for the Frugès factories 
in Lège and Pessac was fairly speedily transformed by their inhabitants 
with the addition of pitched roofs, shutters, and picket fencing. 103 Func-
tional sparseness was attractive to architects and clients, but jarred with 
the actual inhabitants’ idea of what a home should look like. Th e 1960s 
Bijlmermeer estate in Amsterdam was planned for an idealised average 
Dutch family, but incomers from Surinam with diﬀ erent family sizes and 
structures adapted the accommodation by knocking through both walls 
and ﬂ oors. 104 Th e negotiation, conﬂ ict, or failure of communication 
between planners and users can be more comprehensive. Margaret 
Cameron in her account of American company towns, having dismissed 
architectural accounts which take the physical built environment as both 
simple and given, and as evidence of social, political, and industrial pat-
terns and arrangements, reports results which were never the consequence 
of the ambitions of any one party, but where workers ‘actively participated 
in the struggles to deﬁ ne their living and working conditions’. 105 Th e plans 
of builders and architects are never immune to the desires of users, and 
every skip in a city street signals further adaptation. 
 Where buildings are more substantial than individual homes, such 
reclothing is less easy, and reinterpretation is the more likely outcome. 
Classical buildings, as Markus comments, ‘are as likely to be associated 
with 1930s European Fascism as with republicanism or humanism; the 
Modern Movement with democratic freedom as with doctrinaire bureau-
cracy.’ 106 Th e meaning of stone and space may be at one time and one place 
intended and clear, but meaning is a human construct, and can evolve, 
erode, or be transformed. Anthony Alofsin comments on the Vienna 
Rathaus that ‘At the end of the nineteenth century, people of the empire 
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and Viennese citizens could read it as a combinatory sign of new civic 
power, imperial fortitude, urban revitalization, and sacred grandiosity. 
Today, while it houses many functions of city government, it reads as the 
locus of bureaucracy.’ 107 Th e Parliament Building in Budapest was seen by 
its critics as Gothic and Germanic, but by opponents of Austrian power 
as British, democratic, and an expression of autonomy. 108 Th e ﬂ at roofs and 
simple lines of modernist design could be attacked by right-wing anti-
Semites as marks of alien culture when employed by Mies van der Rohe 
at the Weissenhofsiedlung in Stuttgart, or used by Mussolini as an expres-
sion of the virtues of fascism. 109 Th is mutation of meaning places the sever-
est strains on the interpretative skills of the archaeologist. It is an 
illustration, too, of the paradoxical limits by which grand buildings, or their 
architects and commissioners, are constrained in their ability to shape the 
social identities of individual citizens. Th e more removed from the daily, 
the immediate, and the domestic a building or an urban setting is, the 
greater the possibility that it can be dismissed, even by those who have to 
pass through it, as a distant display or backdrop, irrelevant to the business 
of normal life. 
 Th e immediate setting of space and structure is for the living. But the 
more grand and public and the less domestic a structure, the more it may 
express identities which outlive individuals. Some human constructions 
have no other function. Even in death, identities are cultivated, created, 
and demarcated. Th e dead can be given unique identity in the plumage 
with which they are interred. Discussing the traces of the life of early  Homo 
sapiens , Martin Jones has observed that ‘Pierced skeletal fragments, bones, 
shells, teeth, and ivory … will be strung together in necklaces and headgear 
of buried bodies, emphasizing the face and head, and sometimes arms, in 
other words, the body as communicator, as social person.’ 110 Th e collective 
solidarity of members of the armed forces is expressed in the ordered ranks 
of uniform stones in a military cemetery, just as the hierarchies of civil 
society and public life are marked out by the range of monuments, from 
elaborate miniature chapels to simple crosses, in civilian graveyards. Th e 
location and character of funerary monuments has proclaimed the virtue 
of teetotallers as readily as it has the indigent dependency of the poor. 111 
 Th e dead can be part of the identity of the living as well as of their own. 
In eighteenth-century Britain, memorial sculptures and monuments to 
radical politicians could provide ‘a rallying point for groups that stood 
outside and in opposition to constituted authority and established hierar-
chies.’ 112 Th e living can recruit the dead in support of their assertion of 
identity and their challenge to identities which threaten or marginalise 
their own. In Edinburgh, the installation on Calton Hill of a memorial to 
Scots transported in 1793 and 1794 for sedition was an assertion of a 
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contrary identity to that represented by statues of Pitt, Melville, and George 
IV in the streets below. 113 Whereas the dwellings of the living lost their 
function with the death of their inhabitants, the tombs and monuments of 
the departed, as the Viennese architect Adolf Loos observed, constituted 
an identity for as long as their fabric survived. 114 In republican Rome, the 
architectural theatre of the Forum provided an imposing setting for the 
funerals of prominent citizens which functioned ‘both as homage to an 
individual and as powerful propaganda drawing the public ’ s attention to 
the past accomplishments and future promise of the family staging the 
ceremony.’ 115 In creating and honouring the habitations of the dead, the 
living embellish and sustain their own identities. 
 Th e dead link the living to the land in which they lie and on which their 
successors live. Movements of the populations on the Sino-Russian borders 
led to the Cossacks’ reassertion of their own identity by the exhumation 
and reburial, with renewed Christian rites, of ancestors in land whose 
sacredness was proclaimed as a part of collective transcendental distinc-
tiveness. Th e ancestors made the land sacred and distinct, and the land 
made its inhabitants sacred and distinct. 116 People are in part the places 
they inhabit, and if the place is grand enough, it is incorporated in a per-
son ’ s name: ‘de’, ‘von’, or an aristocratic title which dispenses altogether 
with the pronoun and substitutes the geographical for the familial whilst 
at the same time implying a familial claim to the named territory. Th e 
individual is greater than his or her mere body, and incorporates hills and 
ﬁ elds, lakes and boulevards. 
 Th ose at ﬁ rst sight natural elements of human environment can, as the 
landed titles of aristocracy suggest, contribute one further dimension to 
human identity. Th e very seemingly prehuman source of the natural world 
makes it appropriate as a location and symbol of elements of human iden-
tity which lie beyond the immediately visible, tangible, or audible aspects 
of human bodies and human artefacts. Nature can be supernatural, but 
with a supernatural dimension that embellishes the identity of mortal 
humans. 117 Man may be made in the image of God, but the signs on earth 
of that divine casting and of other gateways to or manifestations of the 
supernatural are the result either of human cultivation, or of the attribu-
tion by humans of signiﬁ cance to aspects of the existing natural world. Th e 
sacred and magical places – trees, rivers, springs, and wells which were 
the outer boundaries of religious experience – provided both sources of 
continuing identity for those who felt the Protestant Reformation in the 
British Isles as a loss, and continuity for those who acquiesced in change 
but found sustenance in elements of continuity. 118 In cultivating sacred 
meanings in the natural world, men and women expand the dimensions 
in which their own religious identity is expressed and sustained. Th e 
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cultivation of human identity in humanity ’ s material environment does not 
stop with architecture, but grows outwards to shape an entire world. 
 Identity is everything we do 
 Woolf  ’ s call to political action illustrates the two poles of identity, whatever 
its form. At one extreme, cultivated identity is part of membership or 
association in a group, or class, or level of society. To that extent it is not 
chosen, but is the conventional appearance of who one is because of who 
one associates with; it is Bourdieu ’ s habitus. But at the other extreme, it is 
possible to choose from existing possibilities and overcome existing 
restraints, refusing uniforms and honours. And it is the inﬁ nite number of 
possible points on that scale from the domination of circumstance to the 
maximum exercise of choice that characterises the variety of actual out-
comes and the diﬃ  culty of ever predicting them all. Woolf  ’ s photographs 
also illustrate the paradox of identity, for however much the regalia of her 
elite males marks them oﬀ  from the ordinary population, at the same time 
it allows them to set themselves apart from each other, and from those 
with whom they are in splendour associated – a vice chancellor not a mere 
dean, an archbishop not a suﬀ ragan bishop, a general with more medals 
than anyone else. 
 Th e paradox of identity is that this cultivated persona is pulled in two 
directions. On the one hand identity is cultivated by association, by mem-
bership of a group, or class, or religion, or profession. On the other hand 
identity is a step back from all those who might be considered similar. Th e 
ﬁ rst pole of identity is the whole complexity of conduct, appearance, and 
speech, which can be described as received rather than chosen by the 
members of a class, group, or caste, and which constitutes a part of their 
association with others – taste, as Bourdieu has labelled it. 119 Th e second 
pole is the cultivation of individuality, a refusal to be identiﬁ ed as merely 
an example of a general cultural species but as a special or exemplary 
instance of it. 
 Human plumage diﬀ ers in one major quality from the plumage of birds: 
it can be put on and put oﬀ . But whilst this might suggest impermanence 
and unpredictability, plumage change is not usually carried out in a whim-
sical manner. Choices are made, but they are made in cultural contexts, 
and their non-trivial signiﬁ cance is often marked by rituals of transition. 
A change of plumage, whilst it is an opportunity which humans are mark-
edly more privileged than other creatures in enjoying, is not necessarily 
made lightly, and will be marked by rubrics and rituals which declare to 
others the identity choices that are happening. Choices and changes and 
their accompanying rituals can be carried out in any mode of human action 
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or production. Shifting identities can be cultivated by changing the ways 
and components of eating, just as existing identities can be consolidated 
by them. And eating as a mark of transition can be given its own rituals 
and rubric from wedding cakes to the feasts of Oxbridge colleges, the Inns 
of Court, or City of London livery companies. When George Orwell was 
welcomed into a hitherto seemingly menacing congregation of stevedores, 
navvies, and sailors in a rough lodging house with ‘‘Ave a cup of tea chum,’ 
it was as much of a culinary ritual as the grandest state banquet, and as 
little to do with the mere sustenance of life. 120 Other rites of transition from 
one professional, religious, or other social status to another will be marked 
by formal ceremonies of passage, investitures, graduation ceremonies, 
ordinations, baptisms, weddings. 121 
 One of many components of changes or embellishments of identity may 
be a change of name. ‘Christian names’ were at one time precisely that, 
and those entering monastic orders may still acquire a new name for their 
new identity. For the grandest and most publicly prominent changes of 
identity, from cardinal to pope, or heir to the throne to monarch, a change 
of name proclaims the new person. Th e Emperor of China left family and 
personal names behind, Albert Windsor becomes George the Sixth, Joseph 
Ratzinger becomes Benedict the Sixteenth, and Professor Hugh Trevor-
Roper becomes Lord Dacre. 
 In all of this, identity is negotiated in the engagement of individual 
action with social contexts, and the restraints and opportunities which 
existing identities present to individuals. Choices are continually made, 
and in being made amend and cultivate the range of identity which pro-
vides the starting point and context for any further individual decision. 
And as with every concrete event or situation, the point on the scale 
from impossible unconstrained freedom to equally impossible wholly 
determined action will diﬀ er, and the degree of circumstantial or coer-
cive and legal sanction in the cultivation of identity will be speciﬁ c to 
time and place. In the United Kingdom it is convention alone which 
leads women on marriage to change their family name to that of their 
husband. In Japan, a law of 1896 requires married couples to have the 
same surname. Convention has favoured the male partner in retain-
ing his existing family name rather than adopting his wife ’ s, but has not 
required it. And in 2015 ﬁ ve Japanese women unsuccessfully sued their 
government over what they contested was an unconstitutional violation of 
their rights. 122 
 Whilst identity is the ﬂ uid product of a negotiation between structure 
and agency, accounts and theories which aspire to universality tend to 
construct their argument around a single cause or function or source 
of identity, from a near determinism where culture is independent of 
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any individual, who is left no eﬀ ective freedom or choice, to an account 
of the constant presentation of self as a free agent. Th e most extreme 
point at the determinist end of the scale sees coercion by the state, or in 
societies with limited government by churches or other state-like insti-
tutions, as enforcers of conformity. Gary Watt has argued that clothing 
functions to ‘instantiate the power and authority of the political State.’ 123 
A milder point on the scale concentrates on convention. But the force 
of convention and the application of law are only ever single factors in 
the cultivation of identity, and no temporally or geographically speciﬁ c 
instance can be explained solely by their analytical deployment. A duﬄ  e 
coat or a pair of green wellington boots can be as much a part of identity 
as a party rosette, but the absence or presence of beards, which might 
be a fashion statement in contemporary Europe, can be coercively gov-
erned in Taleban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, while in revolutions 
outward appearance can be violently regulated and penalised. What 
might cause beams or bemusement in Kensington could evoke bludgeons 
in Kabul. 
 Conclusion: the tension between equality and inequality 
 Th e never-ending cultivation of human identity involves artefacts and 
ornamentation, culture and customs, in the creation of collective and 
individual distinction along the tense polarity between solidarity and indi-
vidual distinction. Human societies are structured around these cultivated 
identities, not at either of its theoretically possible but practically implau-
sible polls. And whilst when the search for identity through solidarity is 
focussed on a whole community or nation it becomes an aspiration towards 
equality, the politics of equality is played out along these lines of tension 
and opposition. Th e pull towards solidarity is constantly countered by the 
opposite pull towards group and individual distinctiveness and, frequently, 
group and individual superiority and inferiority. Whenever visible and 
audible character appears to express equality, there soon begins a recession 
towards rank, or hierarchy, or exclusion, or ascendancy. Th e dilemmas of 
an egalitarian society were soon apparent in revolutionary France. Th e 
passion for equality to accompany liberty and fraternity included a reac-
tion against any appearances which under the old regime had marked 
superiority or privilege. But ‘“dressing for equality” foundered in practice, 
ﬁ rst on gender and then on politics … Bodies without signs were unread-
able and therefore suspect or dangerous.’ 124 So the revolution substituted 
the distinctions of oﬃ  ce for the distinctions of rank, marking its leaders 
and cadres with the very distinctions it denied to monarchy, aristocracy, 
and clergy. 125 
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 Whenever equality is established, there are immediate eﬀ orts to make 
distinctions within it. Th e very processes which make artefacts the insignia 
for wider and wider circles of a population are both reacted against and 
promoted by the aspiration to individual uniqueness. Advertising applauds 
how products sold in the thousands will make their possessor stand out 
from the crowd, whilst brand labels become the only distinction between 
one mass-produced car, or suit, or pair of jeans and another. Mass clothing 
feeds an aspiration towards distinctiveness just as every other form of 
equality or solidarity leads to aspirations towards singularity and exclu-
sion. But it does not create it. 
 It is unwise ever to be dismissive about ‘mere appearance’. If you know 
the house, and the oﬃ  ce, and the wardrobe, and the breakfast, you are 
getting close to the whole public person. And since for most of the time, 
in order for orderly relations with the rest of humanity to occur, we need 
swift and unambiguous signals, we use them and read them. It is what 
makes us the clothed ape. Th e constructed person and the person ’ s con-
structed setting are not a representation of or a clue to that person ’ s iden-
tity; they are that person ’ s identity, whatever secret and unexpressed 
reservations or alternatives the person may have. 
 One form of social life, politics, has frequently been compared to a 
theatre, and the performances of its participants as masks. Erving Goﬀ man 
distinguishes between the performer and the performance, though once 
all the things which he describes as performance have been gathered 
together, there is nothing left to be attributed to any other identity or 
self. Either the self is the performance, which is cautiously suggested 
when Goﬀ man writes that ‘the very structure of the self can be seen in 
terms of how we arrange for such performances’ and when he refers to 
‘producing and maintaining selves’, or the self consists of awareness or 
self-consciousness, experiencing ‘fantasies and dreams’ but having no 
character. Whichever solution is employed, the identity of a person is a 
social and public thing, not some inner reality. 126 David Runciman has 
drawn attention to the complexity of the metaphor of mask and theatre in 
discussing political action and political association. 127 In his discussion of 
hypocrisy in public life, he speaks of ‘the masks of politics and what lies 
behind those masks’, and of masks as concealing ‘whom one really is’, 
though this distinction between a public front and a deeper reality is quali-
ﬁ ed when, referring to La Rochefoucauld ’ s description of hypocrisy, he 
comments that ‘the concealment turns out to be a form of amelioration … 
Hypocrites who pretend to be better than they really are could also be said 
to be better than they might be, because they are at least pretending to be 
good’. 128 But both metaphors, of theatre and of masks, when ﬁ lled out, can 
move the account towards according the dramatic presentation its own 
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reality, rather than being a pretence for obscuring a deeper, more real, 
identity. Ferdinand Mount has argued that:
 the idea that there is a  real (eﬃ  cient, useful) politics which is masked by an 
 unreal (superﬁ cial) sham show is one of the most potent delusions of our 
time … Th e myths and rituals which a regime has allowed or, more usually, 
encouraged to grow up around itself often reveal something very signiﬁ cant 
about the real nature of that regime – the essentially populist, good-
humoured, consensual nature of Macmillan ’ s Toryism, the aristocratic, activ-
ist liberalism of the Kennedys, the autocracy of de Gaulle. 129 
 It is possible to take the equal value of onstage and oﬀ stage underlying 
Mount ’ s argument further, and to insist that the show is not even ade-
quately seen as an indication of what lies beneath, but is a public reality in 
its own right. Th is is to move even further from a metaphor of masks which 
would assume or imply that in private, or in more secluded company, a 
real identity emerges and a false public identity is hung up like a selkie ’ s 
skin on a coat hanger. But whatever the disjunctures between one dimen-
sion of identity and another, a public identity is a real feature of public life, 
whatever else may be said about it. And whilst there are people, such as 
spies, who lead two lives and are in that way two people, most identities 
survive the transition from the relatively public to the relatively private 
with little damage or moderating, and serve equally well in both. Th e 
problem about the inner man or the inner woman is that they are invisible. 
Th e outside is all we have to go on. Alternatively, if it is suggested that the 
mask is permanent, then the mask is the person and the metaphor col-
lapses. And when one distinction goes, another arrives. Even when there 
is no one else about, the material construction and cultivation of identity 
goes on. Robinson Crusoe alone on his island showed himself civilised 
by means of a hat, and did so in the absence of anyone but himself to 
appreciate his wearing of it. For whilst the drama of identity is composed 
of public show, the most important member of the audience can be the 
actor himself or herself. And unlike the life of the theatre, the audience is 
ever-present, the costumes always there, and there is no dressing-room 
retreat or curtain close. 
 Th e mask metaphor may suggest the view that external actions may be 
either an expression of or a camouﬂ age net for a secret or inner self. But 
even if the visible and audible presentation of self is paralleled by some 
private, lesser, or unexpressed self, as a person living in society and relating 
to other people it is the external and acted self which is real. Th e identities 
which people create are the only ones they have, and if there are secret 
dreams, unless they receive some expression, they remain secret, and 
dreams. Quentin Crisp made the point neatly when he said that if for forty 
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years a pig farmer has been saying that really he was meant to be a ballet 
dancer, by that time pigs were his style. 130 
 Whilst any identity may be composed of many layers and aspects, all 
the layers need not be of equal importance, and people do not defend 
all dimensions of identity with equal vigour. What is missed in a one-
dimensional, plucked, account and in the search for the one true iden-
tity is the complexity and potential instability of the variegated whole. 
Identity and its cultivation provide the script and the scenery for the 
human drama, but it is not a drama with a universally coherent plot or 
a harmonious cast. People cultivate an identity not only for others, but 
for themselves, and the safest working supposition is that there is coher-
ence, rather than incoherence, between what is done in the sight of the 
audience, front of house, and what is done backstage. Rulers, leaders, and 
everyone else, in other words, should be taken at face value unless there 
are good reasons to believe otherwise. Th e drama of identiﬁ cation is not 
conducted with reference to scenery, theatrical eﬀ ects, and the construc-
tion of expressive contexts only in its more public aspects, but in its more 
secluded or private ones as well. Th e identity constructed or cultivated 
by the larger public stage set is normally consistent with, or seeking con-
sistency with, that cultivated by the more immediately personal plumage 
and scenery. 
 Human life is endlessly diverse, and once the same understandings are 
used in giving an account of it as are used in giving accounts of the rest of 
existence, the only meaning the term ‘human nature’ can have is ‘every-
thing that humans do’. Eating, speaking, moving, dressing, singing, dancing 
– all go to make up the complexity that is human identity. Accounts in 
terms of essences or essentials will always be one-dimensional or mono-
chrome, and without being untrue, will be of limited illumination. However 
comprehensive an account of the cultural setting within which, despite 
themselves, people operate, or which they may choose as a means of iden-
tity cultivation by association, the contrary pull of individual assertion and 
the possibilities of eccentric dissent and innovation create the permanent 
lurking promise of surprise, disruption, and unpredictability. Th at does not 
make the understanding of human life easy, but it prevents it from being 
uninteresting or predictable. 
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 Cultivating identity 
 Taking people seriously; what you see is what you get 
 A can of paint can be sold with the slogan ‘It does just what it says on the 
tin.’ People are more than paint, but what can be seen and heard matters 
in social life. I have made the democratic empirical assumption that feath-
ers and ﬂ ags, clothes and gestures, voice and manners, and all the other 
expressions and features of identity, are not signs of who people are; they 
are what people, as social beings, are, and constitute their social identity. 
Whatever secret thoughts people may have which they communicate to 
no one, as social persons people exist in relation to other people, and what 
they do and what others see and hear is who they are. Identity is a visible, 
audible, and tangible social creation and cultivation, and is expressed in all 
the varied actions which people carry out and all the various contexts both 
which they create and cultivate for themselves and which they ﬁ nd created 
and cultivated already by others. Identity is a complex of circumstance and 
choice, of collectivity and individuality. Th is identity and its associated 
meaning and justiﬁ cation are cultivated and expressed as a dimension of 
public action: language, dress, the choreography of government and of 
politics, and the shapes and sounds of social and public life. Th e physical, 
created dimensions of identity, from clothes to architecture, are not only 
the constructed material setting for action, but are also themselves public 
actions which cultivate, generate, and constitute social persons. 
 To say that artefacts are part of identity is diﬀ erent from attributing 
purpose, character, or meaning to artefacts. Artefacts, using that term to 
refer to anything which is the creation of human labour, do not speak. It 
is the ways in which people inhabit, wear, or use them which give them 
their meaning. So although meanings are socially embedded in created 
objects and environments, it is not always easy or even possible to read 
that meaning once the original actors are departed. Th e physical presence 
of Stonehenge may be solid and tangible, but its social meaning is obscure 
and contested, and may always be impossible to discern with any certainty. 
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Because the signiﬁ cance of artefacts is socially cultivated, new and diﬀ er-
ent signiﬁ cances can be generated around them. Th e swastika as an ancient 
Hindu symbol of well-being was reproduced in Europe on the book covers 
of Rudyard Kipling and, with quite diﬀ erent signiﬁ cance, in the regalia of 
the Nazi Party. It has no inherent meaning, but has possessed real and 
substantial social ones. Th e identities which were expressed and sustained 
by Stonehenge or by swastikas were not arbitrary or capricious. But they 
were identities created and cultivated by a particular people at a particular 
time, and for them, and for any one of them, constituted an external reality 
in relation to which their individual character and the character of the their 
collective life was formed. 
 Th e understanding that people are what they do is to be found in one 
form or another across a wide swathe of accounts of human social life. It 
is approached though not fully realised by the distinction made in survey 
studies of opinion and choice between stated preferences and revealed 
preferences, in which it is argued that people ’ s ‘real’ preferences about, for 
instance, food, are indicated not by what they say about their tastes in 
answer to questionnaires or in conversation, but by what they actually eat. 
Stated wishes, in other words, are trumped by acted wishes, the actions of 
the outward, public person. A revealed preference in this sense is part of 
the real and public cultivation of identity, a stated preference is a mere 
aspiration. But the narrative of preferences can be taken further, since it is 
possible, having made the assumption about the reality of the public, 
expressed identity, to see even expressed preference as signiﬁ cant – a state-
ment, not an intention to make a statement, revealing what it is that the 
speaker, actor, wants to be seen or heard and so creating a public dimen-
sion of that person ’ s identity. Everything that is done, in other words, is to 
be treated neither as evidence of something else, an inner or core reality, 
nor as a deceit covering ‘real’ identity, but as a component part of the public 
reality of the person, group, or society. It is an extension to the whole 
gamut of action not so much of the aphorism, ‘You are what you eat’, as of 
the claim that ‘What you eat is who you are.’ But what you say you want 
to eat is also part of who you are. Th e ‘realist’ distinction between expressed 
and revealed preferences is not realist enough. Everything that is done is 
real, and contributes to identity. Just as human nature is everything that 
humans do, so human identity is composed of all the actions, cultivations, 
and creations which humans undertake. 
 Th e apparent contrast between what people say and what they do, 
between verbal action and all other kinds of action, can be replaced by a 
distinction between the various kinds of things that they do. Th e rejection 
of the view that if there is a contrast between statements and other actions 
then only the other actions are real has a long history. Hypocrisy is not 
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just, as La Rochefoucauld put it, the compliment that vice pays to virtue. 
Th e aphorism is a recognition that even when you want to do the very 
opposite of what you promised, you have to frame your betrayal in the 
language and values to which publicly you are committed. Th is may not 
be an iron restraint, but it is a restraint nonetheless, and a restraint placed 
by one part of identity upon another. And while identity may always move 
towards coherence, it will never achieve a point where it can be expressed 
in a single statement, or deduced from a single principle or description. 
To that extent, duplicity and hypocrisy are features of the continuous plu-
ralism of identity and the dynamic stress and collision between its diﬀ erent 
aspects. 
 Th is view, or something very much like it, informs the account of public 
life given by historians. Lynn Hunt in her work on eighteenth-century 
revolutionary France argues that dress and ritual do not express some 
other or distinct reality, but are themselves an important and distinct 
element of reality. ‘Such symbols did not simply express political positions, 
they were the means by which people became aware of their positions. By 
making a political position manifest, they made adherence, opposition, and 
indiﬀ erence possible. In this way they constituted a ﬁ eld of political strug-
gle.’ 1 Th is understanding of things adds a further dimension to Robert 
Browning ’ s lament for the lost leader:
 Just for a handful of silver he left us, 
 Just for a riband to stick in his coat 2 
 A riband in your coat can be a prize as much sought after as a pig or a 
pension if it is part of a new, or enhanced, or modiﬁ ed identity. Browning ’ s 
allusion is dismissive of buttons and bows, but they can be as much a 
component of the cultivation of identity as banners or creeds. In a violent 
football crowd, the colour of a sweatshirt can be all that is needed to brand 
a person as friend or foe. Bitter, violent, and deadly religious conﬂ icts have 
been pursued over the extent of a monk ’ s tonsure, the cut of a beard, or 
the tailoring of a woman ’ s headscarf. One of the many roles assigned to 
God by his followers is as an autocratic editor of  Vogue . 
 To accept everything people do as components of who they are is an 
application of a broad democratic empiricism: a recognition of the need 
to take people seriously and to give an account of what they actually do; 
the statements they make; the manner in which they present themselves; 
the identities, both public and private, which they construct and cultivate 
for themselves. People appear to care deeply about the plumage and the 
plazas, patios, and palaces which are part of their identity and the chore-
ography and staging of their lives. But just as nothing that people do can 
be discounted as irrelevant to who they are, so statements which seem 
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contradicted by other actions are nonetheless actions themselves, which 
have to be accounted for in the description and interpretation of what, and 
who, is happening. Th ere is no such thing as ‘mere’ rhetoric. 
 Th e importance of paying attention to all the dimensions of identity 
when observing diﬀ erent people and diﬀ erent human actions arises not 
from any underlying or essential character of which the various aspects of 
identity are an expression, but because human social life is composed of 
all the aspects of its identity, each one of which contributes to the whole; 
take them all away, and nothing, no essence or founding principle, remains. 
Th at is why an identiﬁ cation of any single aspect or component of identity 
or character does not provide an adequate account, something which can 
be achieved only by observing the complex and particular whole. 
 Identity as a dimension of action; we cannot see into people ’ s souls 
 While identity is visible and audible, not secret or internal, the audience 
for it is not only other individuals or groups, but the actor or actors them-
selves. Whatever conclusions may be drawn from that, it does not under-
mine the argument that social existence is external, and that whatever may 
lie within the impenetrable corridors of the soul, identity or character is 
in the ﬁ rst place public identity or character. Th e phrase ‘external show’ is 
one I will avoid, since the suggestion of an inner reality which is expressed 
by external action is not one I have found helpful. As the advertiser ’ s slogan 
has it, ‘What you see is what you get.’ When Queen Elizabeth I declared 
that she did not wish to make windows into men ’ s souls, a brave if politi-
cally unwise reply would have been that that was not possible anyway. All 
that could be known was what people say and do, and all of that is on the 
public side of any window. 
 Th ere might seem to be in such an argument a dismissal of the subjec-
tive life, the thoughts and feelings of individuals. Th e reply to such a charge 
is partly in terms of evidence, that souls cannot be known, all that can be 
known are statements, in whatever form, about them. Th e important point 
about external action is that all external actions must be considered, and 
all the contexts of that action. If a voter is taken to the polls at gunpoint 
and coerced into voting for the government candidate, it would not so 
much be a denial of her expressed wishes to describe her as a supporter 
of the government, as a setting aside of the whole complexity of actions 
which constituted and set the context for the placing of her cross against 
the president ’ s name. A full account of her actions would be quite diﬀ erent 
from a full account of the actions of someone who had voted freely. 
 Th e cultivation of identity is the expression or communication, either 
to oneself or to others, of a narrative or description of a person, or 
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collectivity of persons. It might seem that the cultivation of an identity and 
its communication are two distinct activities, or at least two distinct stages 
of a single activity, that a narrative would be a statement about something 
beyond itself. But a narrative of identity  is the identity, and it is diﬃ  cult to 
imagine its cultivation unless it is being communicated either to the nar-
rator as expressed self-consciousness or to others as action, or to imagine 
a communication of identity which was not at the same time its cultivation. 
Th ere could not be a narration of which no one at all was aware, for in that 
case there would not even be a narrator. In telling a story – and the story 
can be told using all the modes of communication, of which language is 
one only – persons or collectivities cultivate meanings and justiﬁ cations 
whereby what they are and what they do is both explained and given nor-
mative sanction. Th is tripartite activity of cultivating identity in a way 
which provides and nurtures meaning and justiﬁ cation is a dimension of 
all human action, and is what distinguishes action from mere reﬂ ex behav-
iour. Th e cultivation of identity in this manner, involving the creation or 
attribution of meaning and justiﬁ cation, is not prior to or subsequent to 
action, but is a component or aspect of it. Identity is created and cultivated 
in being expressed, and whatever its character was before such communi-
cation or expression is modiﬁ ed or enhanced. Statement and cultivation 
are simultaneous, and jointly aspects of a single action. 
 It will be evident that this is a view of things derived from Max Weber ’ s 
deﬁ nition of ‘social action’: ‘We shall speak of “action” insofar as the acting 
individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behaviour – be it overt or 
covert, omission or acquiescence.’ 3 But I have added to Weber ’ s selection 
of meaning the cultivation of an identity which incorporates both meaning 
and justiﬁ cation. Th ere is a qualiﬁ cation, too, or a redeﬁ nition, of Weber ’ s 
‘subjective meaning’. Weber comments tantalisingly that his subjective 
meaning can be ‘overt or covert’. But if it is covert it is not known, and if 
it is overt it is subjective in the sense of being expressed by a subject, but 
not in the sense of being internal as against external. 
 Th e use of the term ‘cultivation’ avoids the two poles of claiming an 
inherent identity on the one hand, or suggesting a whimsical or unlimited 
power to construct identities on the other. Identities are both generated 
and received, a perception which the term cultivation catches since culti-
vation is the care and direction, the nurturing and the shaping, of some-
thing which already exists, but is used to secure something other than its 
original form or character. Cultivation involves both nature and nurture, 
and in the cultivation of identity people both selectively work with and 
selectively appeal to the ﬁ rst, and cultivate through nurture, the second, 
identities which are inﬂ uenced and aﬀ ected, but not eﬀ ected, by their own 
aspirations. Th e word cultivation is preferable to construction to describe 
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this activity, since the elements of cultivation, unlike those of construction, 
are dynamic and ﬂ exible rather than inert, and continue to change in ways 
which may react to the intentions and actions of the cultivators and to 
context and contingency. Th e term cultivation catches, too, the elements 
of both conservation and growth and change. Th is human intent is most 
obvious (though not obviously strongest) at times of innovation and revo-
lution. What frequently occurs at such times, as well as an attempt to 
dispense with old identities, is the rapidly perceived need to construct new 
ones whose function but not whose character is essentially the same as 
that of those they replace. 
 Cultivation catches not only both nature and nurture, but a range of 
related distinctions: between vertical and horizontal accounts, between 
action and structure, and between culture and the choices and conﬂ ict 
which inhabit all societies and prevent them from ossiﬁ cation. Not only is 
action best understood as a whole, which is not the same as homogeneous 
or undiﬀ erentiated, but the various activities which are associated with it 
– meaning, justiﬁ cation – are best understood as part of it. To describe 
myself as a Muslim or a Christian, a socialist or a conservative, is not 
simply to make a neutral taxonomic observation, but to assert my value 
and the value of the beliefs with which I construct and cultivate my iden-
tity. In speaking, I nurture my identity and enhance what, as I describe it, 
is already changed, by however so little, by my verbal or written action. 
 It is no accident that a similar perspective can be found being developed 
by political scientists studying issues such as legitimation, for when an 
identity is cultivated, so too at the same time is a justiﬁ cation or legitima-
tion of that identity. To say who we are is to say, not subsequently or later 
as a defence, but simultaneously and as part of the same statement, what 
our authority is. Th e account which I have given of government in  Legiti-
mating Identities , and which Ian Clark has given in his discussion of legiti-
mation in international society, is of external, visible, and audible practices, 
rather than of inner, inferred realities’ justiﬁ cations. 4 Government, as an 
activity, is not supported or enabled by legitimation or coercion but is 
composed of them. ‘In the same way that erosion of legitimacy does not 
lead to crisis of government, so the bestowal of legitimacy does not cause 
international stability: it is but another way of describing such stability as 
already exists. In short, legitimacy and stability are not two separate, and 
causally related, conditions.’ 5 
 To speak in this way of action as meaningful and justiﬁ ed behaviour is to 
go beyond behaviourism or materialism in either its Marxist or utilitarian, 
liberal, rationalist forms. It provides a way of saying something intelligi-
ble about the ways in which people relate and combine for public action, 
public meaning, and public identiﬁ cation, whether as members of faiths, 
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or as political actors, Hindus or Muslims, fascists or transformationalist 
socialists. 6 An account of what people do, of all the many kinds of action 
which they perform, is an account of who they are. Action, whether of 
speech, or comportment, or dressing, or dancing, is then not external or 
additional to the person, but part of what constitutes the person. Actions, 
and the motives and meanings which are part of them, are not then sepa-
rable from identity, they are components of it. In a similar way, Patrick 
Gardiner has argued that ‘to speak of a person having a motive, aim or plan 
is to make a shorthand, and often rather indeﬁ nite, statement about him.’ 7 
 ‘Mere rhetoric’ 
 In talking in this way of an identity which is cultivated with external – in 
the sense of visible or audible – forms, a stand is being taken against both 
the view that there is an inner reality which the external forms express, 
and the view that such expression is secondary or instrumental to some 
other aspect of the person or collectivity, their interests or ambitions. 
R. H. Tawney once remarked caustically that in 1918 the Labour Party had 
declared itself a socialist party, and had believed that it thereby became 
one. 8 But this eloquent criticism could lead one to ignore the contrary, or 
at least complementary, fact that a great deal of what people and organisa-
tions are as social beings is precisely what they do and that what they say 
is part of that doing. Th e question is not, therefore, was the Labour Party 
‘really’ a socialist party after 1918, but what did it mean when it declared 
itself one, what did it imagine describing itself as one involved, and how 
did this declaration relate to other actions of the party? None of this 
involves, or need involve, rejecting or bypassing the neat incisiveness of 
Tawney ’ s remark. A formal statement does not determine all the other 
aspects of a party ’ s character, and its meaning and function will not be best 
understood by relying entirely on the explanations given by the party itself. 
But claims and rhetoric will always have a signiﬁ cance, and the task is not 
to dismiss that signiﬁ cance, but to determine as exactly as possible what 
that signiﬁ cance is. Choosing to describe oneself as socialist is not insig-
niﬁ cant, and is a claim to a character diﬀ erent from that of conservatives, 
or liberals, though even that broad suggestion will need specifying in rela-
tion to who is making such a claim, where, when, and to whom. 
 So I want to dismiss the account of human life as fractured between 
ideas and interests, or between rhetoric and action. Human identity is all 
of a piece, or, rather, all of a patchwork, and if words and the material 
cultivation of identity were of no signiﬁ cance, they would not be employed. 
Th is is the importance of Marx ’ s distinction between a class in itself and 
a class for itself. If a group can be attributed with some common 
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characteristic by an observer, but does not itself express a common iden-
tity, it cannot be accurately described as a class. Th ere is a diﬀ erence, in 
other words, between a taxonomic similarity and a social identity. For the 
true empiricist, everything that exists is signiﬁ cant. But ‘signiﬁ cant’ can be 
a misleading word, since it suggests that the importance of actions is as 
signs or signiﬁ ers of something else. But they are important also in them-
selves, not as clues, but as components. 
 Action is complemented by what it creates, and so modiﬁ es 
its own circumstances 
 Cultivation, as action with already existing resources, captures the double 
dimension of structure and act, context and innovation. ‘Men make their 
own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make 
it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances 
directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.’ 9 Th is much-
repeated sentence of Marx is true as far as it goes, but it does not follow 
to their conclusion the implications of its own insight. Th e past is not very 
distant, and is composed of all that has been done, so that any action is 
immediately a part of the past and hence of the context or circumstances 
in which further action is carried out. Th e history which men make is 
instantly a part of both their identity and the circumstances in which that 
identity is cultivated. Some, at least, of the circumstances in which men 
make their own history have been made by them and chosen by them, as 
well as by others. People who express themselves by particular actions – 
whether of dress, or speech, or the use or construction of objects or built 
environment – cultivate their identity as much as they express it and, in 
acting, produce something that was not there before, rather than com-
municating a previously unheard or unspoken character. So with a group 
or nation, an expression of collective identity is never adequately described 
as such, since what is expressed is modiﬁ ed in the act of expression. 
 Equilibrium and symbiosis, coherence and consistency 
 Whilst the continual search for coherence and the making of choices – 
actions at both an individual and a collective level which pursue that aim 
and at the same time alter the circumstances in which it will be pursued 
– are a central feature of human life; there can be a tension not just 
between various actions, but between ‘actual’ action and aspiration. On 
the other hand, aspiration can be divided between ‘secret’ aspirations 
which, by their very nature, will remain secret and unknown, and expressed 
aspiration, which is a form of action. 
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 If the relation between the various aspects of human action is seen as 
symbiotic, then the ensuing account will be of a relationship which will 
seldom if ever be static, but will be characterised both by tensions, and by 
tendencies to equilibrium. Th ere will be a continual but not in detail pre-
dictable search for coherence in reaction to cognitive dissonance. Some-
thing similar is described by Mary Douglas in her account of dietary rules 
as a construction of an ordered relationship to experience for the cultiva-
tion of holiness and completeness. 10 Th e search for coherence has aﬃ  nities 
with rational, as contrasted with rationalistic, action as described rather 
diﬀ erently by Michael Oakeshott: a cultivation of coherence on the basis 
of existing resources, habits, and traditions. 11 At the same time, this search 
will be a form of dynamism, in which each choice in pursuit of harmony 
necessitates further choices. 
 In such a process, there are three tendencies at work: towards equilib-
rium to avoid incoherence, towards control of the discordant, and towards 
stability or security so that identities and landscapes are predictable. All 
three of these could be subsumed under a single category, the tendency to 
harmony. Weber ’ s punctual bureaucrat, who arrives at his oﬃ  ce on time 
each morning because not to do so would conﬂ ict with his own sense of 
himself as a dedicated professional, provides an example of such coher-
ence, or impetus towards coherence. Geoﬀ rey Hawthorn employs a similar 
conception, borrowing the phrase ‘necessary identity’ from Bernard Wil-
liams and describing ‘an identity such that someone who has it feels bound 
to act in ways that maintain their identity in the eyes of others’. 12 If the 
relationship between the dimensions of identity is symbiotic/organic 
rather than mechanical/mathematical, that does not change the expecta-
tion of possible coherence, but it does change the expectation of automatic 
coherence, and requires an expectation of the frequent possibility of non-
correspondence between one aspect of identity and another. If we are not 
dealing with ﬁ xed components in a rigid mechanical structure, then all the 
various activities in which people engage, and all the various ways of per-
ceiving and understanding those activities, may be relevant as part of the 
total phenomenon. Clothes, or plumage, can be as relevant as diet or 
dogma, and compliance or resistance as relevant as circumstance, tradi-
tion, or coercion. 
 Th e question then arises of what, if anything, can be predicted about 
the likely outcomes when there is incongruence within a population or 
territory. Is one factor in general more powerful than another? In states, 
does rulership normally have a built-in advantage, whatever its identiﬁ ca-
tion, whether religious, economic, ethnic, or cultural? One response to that 
question is that the answer is contained in the question, in that if such an 
advantage could not be identiﬁ ed, the person or persons enjoying it would 
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not helpfully be described as rulers, and that for such a description to be 
appropriate, such an advantage must be discernible. In that case this ﬁ ts, 
or at least is not inconsistent with, Patrick Dunleavy ’ s criticism of rational-
choice accounts of party competition: political leaders are Procrustean, 
and have both the capacity and the will, if not to replace reality, then at 
least to readjust it to their convenience or advantage. 13 
 Should we expect diﬀ erences in the ways in which diﬀ erent kinds of 
rulers react to incoherence? Do despots of various kinds pay less atten-
tion to telling stories to their subjects? Or does that depend on what they 
want from them? It is easier to tell an extravagant story about yourself if 
it is addressed to a limited audience. Th e greater the audience, the greater 
is the possibility of laughter. And to begin with, despots have less need to 
pay attention to large audiences. John Prescott ’ s two Jags, for which he was 
pilloried in the United Kingdom, would not have been so widely and pub-
licly derided in China, but in a democracy they were cause for merriment. 
 Th e recognition of the search for harmony or coherence raises the ques-
tion of sincerity. A charge often made against those who are seen as greedy, 
unscrupulous, tyrannical, or devious, is that they must know the diﬀ erence 
between right and wrong, must be aware of their own wickedness, and that 
therefore any account they give which reconciles their actions against their 
fellow humans with a pattern of meaning and justiﬁ cation must by hypo-
critical or deliberately intended to deceive others. But there is another 
account available, which by no means reduces the force of charges of 
oppression or greed, but does replace the charge of hypocrisy on the 
grounds that it oversimpliﬁ es to the point of distortion what is actually 
going on, and takes as the starting point the assumption that it is plausible 
or even likely that views which one person considers implausible are genu-
inely held by another person, and that incoherence is more common than 
conscious and deliberate deceit. Two illustrations from religious discourse 
may ﬁ ll out this point. Evangelical Christians can sometimes be heard 
dismissively talking of the ‘intellectual diﬃ  culties’ of those who do not 
agree with their demands, the implication being that those who express 
such ‘diﬃ  culties’ recognise the force of the evangelical claim, and are con-
structing barriers against it. It does not require one to be sceptical about 
religion as such to see the inadequacy of such an account. Similarly, Islam-
ists may attack what they describe as Western decadence for refusing to 
acknowledge the truth of Islam, again with the implication, or overt claim, 
that those in the West who are not Muslims are in some sense, as another 
discourse might put it, ‘in denial’. Again, one does not have to be an oppo-
nent of Islam to see the inadequacy of such an account. Th ere is a frequent 
tendency to assume or to argue that those whose conduct one regards as 
wrong, unacceptable, or abhorrent, cannot possibly believe that how they 
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are acting is right, and must be insincere or hypocritical. It is both intel-
lectually much more diﬃ  cult and morally and ideological disconcerting to 
start from the premise that there is a real or potential harmony or at least 
modus vivendi between people ’ s stated beliefs and the rest of their behav-
iour, and that even the most, to the observer, repellent conduct can be in 
harmony with the stated values and beliefs of the actor. Th is is one of the 
reasons why the debate amongst historians and social scientists over 
slavery in the United States has on occasion been so heated. To the oppo-
nent of slavery, it has frequently seemed diﬃ  cult not to believe that there 
must have been at least an element of hypocrisy in the justiﬁ cations which 
the beneﬁ ciaries of slavery gave for the society in which they lived. Such a 
view assumes that there must be standards of right and wrong which are 
both independent of human societies, and self-evident to all individual 
humans. One version of this view sees such intuitive or rational apprehen-
sion of moral criteria as following from the common rationality of a 
common humanity. Th e essential character of humanity transcends, or 
underlies, or is both historically and logically prior to, the values and 
practices of particular cultures or societies. Th e other version sees a uni-
versal apprehension of moral criteria as involving a metaphysical dimen-
sion which is revealed to or grasped by properly religious or spiritually 
attuned persons. 
 Th e ﬁ rst version can be queried by referring to the varieties of human 
morality, the second by the observation that whatever the alleged source 
of metaphysical criteria, they can only ever be heard, or read, in the actions 
of humans. Th is was the point satirically presented in Salman Rushdie ’ s 
 Th e Satanic Verses when, however hard the angel tried, he always found 
himself speaking not his own words but those of the prophet whom he was 
addressing. 14 
 Th e search for coherence is best understood not as people trying to 
explain or justify what they know to be wrong, since there is no knowledge 
of right and wrong independent of our knowledge of what people do and 
believe. Conceptions of right and wrong can only be conceptions of human 
beliefs, and the search for coherence is then a response to the existence of 
diﬃ  cult, contrary, or opposing views rather than of, necessarily, an attempt 
to square consciences which are either innate and independent of any 
other human action, or in direct contact with a moral realm distinct from 
and superior to the lives and actions of humans. Th is personiﬁ cation of 
morality is part of the search for a coherent or harmonious sense of self. 
For self-identity is told, unless the self is unrealistically solipsistic, in terms 
derived and developed from the narrated and acted-out identities of the 
range of knowable human actions. To act incoherently is to act in a way 
which disrupts this narrated self. 
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 But the response to this apparent dilemma is that analysis and interpre-
tation are distinct from moral evaluation, and that one is not compromised 
by the other. To explain how it was that people in the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries could believe in the existence of witches and in the need 
to torture and kill those whom they considered in league with the devil is 
in no way to make a moral judgment on their actions, nor does it prevent 
one subsequently from doing so. 
 Th e most sustained and substantial way in which coherence can be 
sought by cultivating identity is through association of the individual with 
a group, association, or collectivity of people – the observation of concrete 
identity made by Hegel using the example of war when he argued that 
physical survival was subordinated to an identity enhanced by association 
with the group or community. 15 Th ere is, however, a paradox here. Identity 
is cultivated by identiﬁ cation with a group. But at the same time identity 
requires distinction, and the drawing of lines of demarcation and contrast 
both between the person and other persons, and between the collectivity 
which gives the person a more substantial identity and other collectivities. 
Th e ﬁ rst distinction is then between a person and his or her associates, a 
distinction among friends, the second a distinction between one ’ s own 
association and competitors or even enemies. Th is is why Orwell ’ s reas-
surance to the middle classes that they need not fear sinking down into 
the mass of the population, ‘you have nothing to lose but your aitches,’ was 
historically negligent. 16 Th e desire to sustain identity by association with 
others is most commonly complemented by the desire to underline iden-
tity by distinguishing the association from which one draws support from 
other, diﬀ erent, associations. Th e point was expressed ﬁ ctionally by Philip 
Roth at the conclusion of  Portnoy’s Complaint where his protagonist visits 
Israel and ﬁ nds his sense of identity, which in New York had been deline-
ated by the presence of large numbers of people who were not Jews, shaken 
by a society in which even the muggers were Jews. 17 
 Simple accounts are simple 
 Human action can be seen as one or a series of meaningful behaviours, in 
such a way that the material and the cultural or intellectual cannot be 
separated, however much they may be analytically distinguished. Th is view 
is inimical to the kind of construction of distinct and rigid categories of 
beliefs, desires, and behaviour which characterises some recent accounts 
of rational humanity, whilst recognising the usefulness of such distinctions 
at an analytical, but not at an interpretative, level. 18 It is similarly inimical 
to an insistence on ‘parsimonious’ or single-factor explanations. Such 
explanations frequently slide into saying either that all factors other than 
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the one singled out and narrated are mere reﬂ exes, or that they are unim-
portant, and that whether or not they change with the ‘core’ dimension is 
not of signiﬁ cance or importance either to the living or the understanding 
of human life. Either conclusion is unsatisfactory and arbitrary, since it is 
deductive rather than inductive, and dismisses as proper subject of enquiry 
precisely what, either empirically or historically, is actually going on. 
 To employ the view that I am supporting means giving up the chance 
of making conﬁ dent predictions about the course of events. It is fairly 
straightforward to predict that changing one element in a historical situ-
ation will have consequences for other elements, and for the character of 
the whole. But the nature of those consequences will be formed out of the 
relations between the changed element and all the other elements, and on 
their mutual inﬂ uence. No particular or speciﬁ ed character can be pre-
dicted as a result of such a change in one element. It may well not be pos-
sible, therefore, to make predictive or explanatory accounts, but only to 
chart change. 19 Th is limitation on what can be said is presented ﬁ ctionally 
by Umberto Eco in his account of the great detective who, despite being 
surrounded by a sequence of criminal acts, never succeeds in predicting 
any of them, but only in retrospectively interpreting them. 20 Even this 
change can be diﬃ  cult to ﬁ t into easy taxonomic boxes. Th e elements of 
identity may be generalisable, but the particular combinations are fre-
quently unique in a way which makes broader generalisations diﬃ  cult or 
inadequate, and parsimonious accounts unrealistic. 
 In very diﬀ erent ways, Trobriand cricket and the Constitution of the 
Soviet Union under Stalin each illustrate this point. Cricket was intro-
duced to the Trobriand Islands oﬀ  the north-east coast of New Guinea by 
Methodist missionaries, but the islanders, whilst still retaining the English 
game and its rules as a rough framework, built on this framework an exotic 
ritual of provocation and communal celebration, with dancing, ritual 
taunts and boasting, and teams of up to sixty a side – a formalised celebra-
tion of inter-village rivalry. 21 If all that was considered were the formal 
rules and the names given to elements in the game or ritual, then what was 
played on the Trobriand Islands was cricket. But if the narration was of 
everything that was going on, a very diﬀ erent and far more deeply textured 
account of a unique ritual would be given. If one had considered the Soviet 
Union in the 1930s in the light only of its published laws, then the account 
given would have been of a working liberal democracy, albeit with methods 
of representation based on class and occupational groups, rather than on 
geographical constituencies. Th is is more or less what Beatrice and Sidney 
Webb did in their much-derided  Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation? 
Having described the administrative and constitutional complexity of the 
Soviet Union, the Webbs went on to say that ‘in each department, structure 
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and function are intertwined with each other and with a wealth of volun-
tary associations and spontaneous individual activities’. 22 Such a view 
would have been diﬃ  cult to sustain for a moment had the authors gone 
beyond the oﬃ  cial documents and the narratives of oﬃ  cials. As an account 
of those two sources, it had a degree of truth. As an account of the Soviet 
Union in the 1930s, it was largely worthless save as, and this was impor-
tant, an unwitting account of one part of the way in which the regime chose 
to present itself to outsiders. In each case, a formal set of rules, to be 
recognised by all participants, was introduced, and in each case the result 
was, whilst an adaptation or employment of those rules, not one that could 
in any way have been predicted from looking at the rules in isolation and 
trying to read from them a resulting set or pattern of actions. One response 
to this account would be to say that had the rules been followed in the way 
that was intended by those who drew them up, then the result would have 
been predictable. But that is to say no more than that had things been dif-
ferent, they would have been diﬀ erent, and that had the rules been literally 
followed, they would have been literally followed. Even that apparent tau-
tology can be questioned, since however precisely rules are drawn up, they 
are not like the bud which contains within itself all the features of the 
ﬂ ower. And even that analogy has to be qualiﬁ ed: the precise shape and 
colour of the ﬂ ower is conditioned by temperature, humidity, soil, and the 
actions of animals, birds, and insects. Actions will be composed of many 
other factors than the words of a legal or sporting document, and these 
factors will be necessary before those formal words can be interpreted, 
applied, or ignored. 
 Just as the Trobriand islanders created their own distinctive activity out 
of the imported game of cricket, practices and resources of all kinds, 
imported or imposed on existing societies or cultures, can be processed 
and employed to sustain traditional or existing ways of living. When the 
Oglala Sioux, following the Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1868, were cut oﬀ  
from their existing food source of buﬀ alo and placed in dependence on 
government rations, they transformed these alien ingredients into versions 
of their own traditional cuisine. Cattle were not slaughtered in the manner 
of white people, but cut loose and then hunted with arrow or riﬂ e, and 
renamed ‘spotted buﬀ alo’. 23 
 What this means is not that history, or social science, is ‘one damn thing 
after another’, but that there is an intermeshed and interacting dynamic of 
many things all at the same time or, if there is a chronological sequence, a 
continual and continuous movement amongst changing elements so that 
there is no artiﬁ cial stable or timeless point at which one can say that things 
now begin, and are caused by what follows rather than by what precedes 
that point. Th e constant proliferation of identities, the interplay between 
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individual and collective choice and previously cultivated circumstance, 
together with the tension between identity as association and identity as 
uniqueness and exclusion, raises the question of the relationship between 
the many aspects of identity and the extent to which it is causal or symbi-
otic. If the components are both contingent on and particular to the phe-
nomenon described, it makes no more sense to talk of changing one in 
order to change others than it does to inject warm blood into a lizard in 
order to turn it into a mammal. Th ere is a need to be sensitive to the com-
plexities of actual relationships. Certain kinds of positivist social science 
might be inclined to see a mathematical relation between one aspect of 
identity and another, of the kind that if you alter one term in an equation 
or formula, the others are necessarily adjusted: the world is like a spread-
sheet. And although numbers can change, there is an immutability about 
the components so that they can change only within their quantity, not 
their quality. But the existence of a particular component of identity does 
not necessarily indicate the existence of other features of rule, in the way 
that the presence of ‘2’ in the equation ‘2  + a  = 5’ necessarily indicates the 
presence of ‘3’ in ‘a’. 
 Th is does not mean that general analyses have no purpose. Th eir con-
tribution is to reﬁ ne the language which is then applied to speciﬁ c phe-
nomena. Human action is a comprehensive but never coherent whole. 
No one dimension is consistently a cause or treatable as an independent 
variable. All dimensions are variable, and any one of them is fully under-
stood only in its relation to others, and never independently. Conversely, 
an understanding of the whole will always depend on an account of the 
contribution of the various aspects both to each other and to the overall 
character of the phenomenon or event. Th is makes abstraction and gen-
eralisation necessary at the level of the clariﬁ cation of language (I prefer 
that way of putting it to talking of a clariﬁ cation of concepts), and makes 
history and particularity, narrative and interpretation, necessary at the 
level of actual human action. So the two secondary themes or dimensions 
of this book are analysis and interpretation, the one general and about 
the clariﬁ cation of language, the other speciﬁ c and about the narrative 
or interpretation of human action. Th is creates diﬃ  culties in the way of a 
science of human action, or even of human behaviour. Th e fullest account 
will always be a particular one, having more of the character of history 
or a novel than of a scientiﬁ c treatise. But any such account must be also 
about the manner and dynamics of change. Th e insistence on particular-
ity and the non-privileging of any one factor entails the belief that what 
is separated at the level of general analysis must be organically integrated 
at the level of interpretation. But the biological symbiotic metaphor goes 
only so far, since human action and human choice alter the materials of 
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identity in a way that a biological organism cannot alter its components. 
In that sense even a single human is more analogous to an entire non-
human species over an extended period than to any single non-human 
animal. 
 Instances of front of house: wizards, spies, hypocrites, and politics 
 Th ere is an account of action and identity which describes a very diﬀ erent 
reality from the one that I have depicted, which might be called the Wizard 
of Oz syndrome. In the ﬁ lm derived from Frank L. Baum ’ s book, the 
wizard, when ﬁ nally encountered, turns out to have a public identity utterly 
diﬀ erent from his private one. Th e public identity, maintained by tricks 
and gadgetry and reputation, is of a powerful and barely human magician. 
Th e reality, taking cover behind a screen and controlling the theatrical 
equipment, is a small and insigniﬁ cant fairground entertainer from Kansas. 
In this account, public ﬁ gures have a mask which is worn for eﬀ ect, and 
which bears little if any relationship to their actual identity. Th e ‘wizard’ 
has an identity behind the theatrical pretences, but it is quite diﬀ erent from 
the one which is created for the world to see and hear. Th e Oz view diﬀ ers 
from the theatrical metaphor in drawing attention to what the analogy of 
identity to drama ignores: the reality of the actor behind the role. But it 
moves in the opposite direction, and whilst the theatrical metaphor ignores 
the actor, the Oz metaphor ignores the role. To dismiss the wizard as 
unreal is to set on one side the clear eﬀ ect on others that the created 
magical identity had. An account of the politics of Oz which ignored the 
wizard because he was a creation of artiﬁ ce would truly be unrealistic. Th e 
wizard was a public presence, and events would make no sense without a 
presence which, whatever its relation to an actual person, was an eﬀ ective 
participant in public events, and without which the four travellers would 
never have undertaken their journey along the yellow brick road. 
 A diﬀ erent instance of disjuncture between public and private realities 
is spies, who, whilst presenting themselves as sharing an identity with one 
group, nation, or community, present themselves in other, and concealed, 
circumstances, as sharing identity with a quite diﬀ erent party, state, society, 
or community. Th e Philby phenomenon is an instance of a particular kind 
of Wizard of Oz syndrome, save that, unlike the Wizard of Oz, spies have 
a real community to whom they do not necessarily dissemble. Th e ability 
to maintain two identities in this particular way can, however, be associ-
ated with a disposition to proliferate personas, so that no group to which 
the spy professes allegiance can be sure that there is not another, or are 
not others, to whom he or she is making equal, but more reliable, profes-
sions of loyalty. 24 But the spy is only the most extreme example of a feature 
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of public life which Weber identiﬁ ed in his essay on politics as a vocation. 
Th e responsibilities which a politician takes on, argued Weber, are not 
compatible with a commitment to simple and absolute truthfulness, and 
mean that other methods are sometimes necessary to secure public well-
being. 25 Runciman ’ s discussion of hypocrisy stands in this Weberian tradi-
tion, while there are many and varied instances of diﬀ erences between 
public and other identities, from the verbal constructions of democratic 
politics to the courts of both Peter the Great and Joseph Stalin, where the 
back of house was conducted with either an informality or a ribald bois-
terousness that was not echoed at all in the public performance. 26 Discord 
between front of house and back of house is not restricted to public and 
political aﬀ airs, though it will be on a grander scale there. It may be simple 
deception, of which Jacob ’ s pretence that he was Esau in order to obtain 
his brother ’ s inheritance is only one of the earliest described instances. But 
in each case, whatever the concealments and pretences involved, the public 
face is an eﬀ ective reality; were it not so, the person who employs it would 
not bother to do so. Th e manipulation of identities involved in deception 
depends on the eﬀ ective presence of both or all versions. 
 Interests versus identity 
 One reason why what Paine called plumage has been too readily dismissed, 
and not only by Paine, is the view that whatever importance is attached 
to it, it is not the whole bird. Identity, it can be argued, is better under-
stood not as plumage or fur, which are an integral part of the beast, but 
as a coat which can be worn or discarded according to circumstance, and 
which is a means to achieving the goals and desires of the wearer, not part 
of the wearer ’ s essential character. A person or a collectivity of persons, 
it can be argued, has interests in pursuit of which identity is an external 
show, and not even an external indicator of an internal reality, but like 
the resources of an actor in a theatre, the inﬁ nitely changeable materials 
for pursuing whatever it is that the essential or substantial interests of the 
person dictate. 
 In such a view, interests and identities are distinct phenomena, interests 
are objective and unavoidably demanding, whereas identities are not only 
cultivated but constructed, and not only constructed but sloughed oﬀ  and 
replaced. Th e Vicar of Bray is the metaphor for this view of things: identi-
ties, in the sense of ways of life, religious practices, manners of living, are 
all in the last resort subordinate to objective interests, and will adapt to 
serve or defend them. Th e eponymous cleric of the song who declared that 
‘whatsoever King may reign, I ’ ll be the Vicar of Bray, Sir,’ ﬁ tted his theology 
and his liturgy to the ruling orthodoxy as determined by the monarch as lay 
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governor of the Church of England. But another view is possible, that he 
was not a man without any identity, whose character at any one moment 
was a simple cover for or reﬂ ex of some objective material character. On 
the one hand, his principal identity was as the Vicar of Bray. On the other, 
the far from merely reﬂ ective or superﬁ cial or epiphenomenal signiﬁ cance 
of religious practice is conﬁ rmed, not shown to be of no signiﬁ cance, 
by the need for the imaginary cleric to have such scrupulous regard for 
it. Religious practice is entirely real. As Jack Goody has remarked, ‘it is 
doubtful whether one can regard religion as an  expression of identity … 
Religion is not an expression or a handle so much as a major constituent 
of such identity.’ 27 
 A view of human life which distinguishes between interest and identity 
occurs in a variety of places and a variety of shapes and forms. For Marx 
the interests of the working class were objective facts, which might not be 
matched, depending on the level of correct consciousness, by a proletarian 
identity. In this view, interest comes ﬁ rst. But if interest is seen as material, 
economic, or a matter of physical survival and ﬂ ourishing, a reversal of 
priorities occurs in the distinction which is made between economy and 
culture. Work is sometimes described as the characterising human activity. 
But when work is positively described, in the way that it is by William 
Morris in ‘Useful Work Versus Useless Toil’, the conventional equation of 
work with production is displaced by work as creation, and a creation 
which can be the creation of the person as readily as the creation of objects 
or commodities. 28 Once creation becomes the creation and cultivation of 
identity, a view of human life is possible as, potentially, a comprehensive 
rather than a fragmented activity. Th e candidates for essential, true, uni-
versal, or fundamental interests which will be set against the transient garb 
of identity are themselves ﬂ exible and varied, just as are identities. 
 Th e argument for prioritising those aspects of a person which are seen 
as interests rather than identity can fall back on the modiﬁ ed view that 
identity, fully comprehended, includes what are normally termed interests, 
and that this aspect of identity takes priority over others. If to be someone 
who likes warm dry weather, freedom from assault, meat and green vegeta-
bles, and a waterproof house is to have particular components of identity, 
it can be further argued that these components will be more solidly estab-
lished, and defended, than others. If identity is described as everything that 
makes a person or a group what they are, then some aspects of that identity 
can nonetheless be given priority over others: survival, security, nutrition, 
shelter. But this argument would ignore the fact that these aspects are not 
necessarily given absolute and universal priority, otherwise people would 
never ﬁ ght or go to war, a point which Hegel ’ s parable of the slave and the 
master is intended to argue. 
c02.indd   71 6/5/2017   12:21:01 PM
72 cultivating political and public identity 
 Th ere are therefore two principal qualiﬁ cations to this concept of the 
priority of basic needs. First, the placing of such requirements above other 
requirements of identity – whether religious faith; national military asser-
tion; ascetic denial; loyal defence of friends, family, or household; or the 
acquisition of athletic or heroic prestige – cannot be predicted or assumed 
to be ubiquitous or universal. It will be contingent. Second, the manner 
of requiring even such seemingly basic goods is tailored, and conﬁ ned, by 
personal or group identities which form the manner of eating or prepar-
ing food, of housing, or of clothing as a protection against wet or cold. 
Everyone, or at least most people, will eat, but not the same things, and 
what is a delicacy to one group or person will be repulsive and inedible to 
another. Th e work people do is part of who they are. It is frequently the 
ﬁ rst dimension of their identity that is expressed to or evident to other 
people. It is, like other dimensions of identity, both a matter of opportunity 
and a matter of constraint. One may not be compelled to be a nurse or an 
airline pilot, but nor, if that is what you are, can you immediately become 
an accountant or a dentist. 
 It will be clear from what I have said so far that I am not convinced by 
or sympathetic to the view that interests and identities can be seen as 
separate features of a person or group, whilst recognising both its force 
and its prevalence. In its various forms, from Marxism to rational choice, 
it rests on a conception of human life which is utilitarian, and narrowly so. 
It is important to put things in that way, since it is possible to conceive of 
a utilitarianism which was not so constructed, but which conceived utility 
in a way which provided a place for what I have described as identity, for 
altruism, and for self-denials and self-sacriﬁ ces which a conventional utili-
tarianism might have diﬃ  culty in accommodating. So Kristen Monroe is 
able to argue, in describing those who at great risk to themselves aided 
Jews in Europe under the Nazis, that:
 For the morally commendable, the ethical values of human well-being and 
the sanctity of life had become so intricately integrated into their basic sense 
of who they were that their commitment to these values shaped the central 
core of their identities. It thus became unthinkable for altruists intentionally 
to engage in behavior that would contradict the essence of their identity. 29 
 To have turned away from the Jews would have meant turning away from 
one ’ s self. By showing us this, the rescuers remind us how important our ties 
with others are in preserving our own identities. 30 
 Th is is similar to the argument of Erik Ringmar, that:
 people act not only in order to win things, but also in order to defend a 
certain conception of who they are. We act, that is, not only because there 
are things we want to have, but also because there are persons we want to 
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BE. In fact, this latter kind of actions must be the more fundamental since 
it only is  as some-one that we can have an interest  in some-thing . 31 
 Identity constrains: that was the point made in defence of the private 
detective Philip Marlowe, played by Humphrey Bogart in Howard Hawks ’ s 
1946 ﬁ lm of Raymond Chandler ’ s  Th e Big Sleep , who had been dismissed 
as amoral and opportunist. On the contrary, ran the counter-narrative, he 
was a white knight coming to the rescue of a lonely old man. Identities are 
far more than masks, and constrain those who wear them in ways which 
they would not necessarily anticipate, but would still consider appropriate 
for who they were and what they believed in. Th e rule of law might have 
operated in general in the eighteenth century in the interests of a dominant 
or ruling class, but, as E. P. Th ompson has commented, ‘the rulers were, 
in serious senses, whether willingly or unwillingly, the prisoners of their 
own rhetoric’, and there will always be ‘men who actively believe in their 
own procedures and in the logic of justice’. 32 
 Some have argued, in a manner derived from a quote of Weber ’ s, that 
ideas and, by extension, ideas about who one is and therefore identities, 
can be seen as ‘switches’ which direct the train of self-interest along one 
railway track or another. 33 Th is seems to me to artiﬁ cially separate concep-
tions of identity from conceptions of need or interest, but also to apply the 
metaphor with insuﬃ  cient imagination. If the role of ideas or, in the case 
of the account which I am presenting here, of identities, is to be acknowl-
edged, it might be more illuminating to see them not as controlling the 
points on which the train runs, but as constructing the individual or group 
as a train rather than as a sailing dinghy or a pony and trap in the ﬁ rst 
place. Unless one perceives oneself as, for instance, a Scot, one cannot 
perceive an interest in defending Scottish interests against an English-
dominated London parliament and government. Unless people ﬁ rst con-
ceive of a class of cyclists, or motorists, and identify themselves with one 
or the other or both, they cannot have an interest in road use. 
 Because people are constituted by identiﬁ cation, it is not possible to 
say that interests cause identity, or ideas and values cause action, since all 
of these described features of human life are what compose the identity 
in the ﬁ rst place. Th e metaphor of identities as like clothes and therefore 
as secondary or superﬁ cial presents, in fact, not a clinching argument for 
those who want to assert the primacy of some utilitarian essence, but a 
trap into which their claims collapse. Th e trap was ﬁ rst set by Th orsten 
Veblen in  Th e Th eory of the Leisure Class when he argued that clothing, real 
clothing not metaphorical clothing, was used not only or even principally 
for warmth or protection: ‘the greater part of the expenditure incurred by 
all classes for apparel is incurred for the sake of respectable appearance 
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rather than for the protection of the person.’ 34 And the appearance is the 
entire social presence, so that Jones and Stallybrass discussing Renais-
sance Europe can argue that to ‘understand the signiﬁ cance of clothes 
in the Renaissance, we need to undo our own social categories, in which 
subjects are prior to objects, wearers to what is worn.’ 35 Th e observation 
need not be limited to the Renaissance. Arthur Hocart complained of those 
for whom:
 only economic interests can create anything as solid as the state. Yet if they 
would only look about them they would everywhere see communities banded 
together by interest in a common ritual; they would even ﬁ nd that ritual 
enthusiasm builds more solidly than economic ambitions, because ritual 
involves a rule of life, whereas economics are a rule of gain, and so divide 
rather than unite. 36 
 Th is is an insight which has been advanced against a narrowly material 
conception of interest in economic theory, and in economic theories of 
choice, to propose an economics of human life which is less universally 
homogeneous, and more aware of the particularities of identity. 37 
 Private identity and public gaze 
 Robinson Crusoe cultivated an identity on an island before the arrival of 
any other humans. But once there was even one other person present, his 
social identity was engaged with that other person since a social reality 
depended on a society, however minimal. In Th ornton Wilder ’ s play  Our 
Town , when a family member returns on her birthday, as a ghost, no one 
can see or hear her and in an important sense she does not, therefore, 
exist. 38 Pretence does not create something socially unreal, since even a 
deliberate attempt to present a new or ‘deceitful’ account of oneself creates 
a diﬀ erent self, which becomes at least part of who you are as a public 
reality and presence. 
 People create their own identities. But they do not do so with unre-
stricted freedom. Th ey can work only with the materials to hand, but those 
materials are cultivated both by themselves and by others, and once an 
identity is created, and the external setting for it shaped, that setting and 
that identity become themselves factors both facilitating and constraining 
further identity cultivation. Brasilia, as a city for cars, makes walking dif-
ﬁ cult or impossible. Th at does not mean it cannot be modiﬁ ed but, unless 
it is, it constrains how its inhabitants can act. But the example of Brasilia 
draws attention to the pervasiveness of human agency in the creation of 
identity. Whilst people create their own identities, identities are created 
also by others. 
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 Th is cultivation of the identity of others will in part be through the 
management, creation, or arrangement of material environments and 
resources. But it will also be carried on through descriptions of identity 
and the ways in which those with the power to do so deﬁ ne the character 
and the existence of groups and categories of people. Ian Hacking has 
referred to this understanding of things as ‘dynamic nominalism’, the view 
that a process is discernible whereby in describing a category of human 
action, one contributes to creating that category, alters the actions of those 
one describes, who are thus ‘moving targets’:
 We think of many kinds of people as objects of scientiﬁ c inquiry … Th ey are 
moving targets because our investigations interact with them, and change 
them. And since they are changed, they are not quite the same kind of people 
as before. Th e target has moved. I call this the ‘looping eﬀ ect’. Sometimes, 
our sciences create kinds of people that in a certain sense did not exist before. 
I call this ‘making up people.’ 39 
 Hacking ’ s account denies static realism, but avoids saying that there is 
nothing real but only our narratives out there. Dynamic nominalism can be 
observed whenever an authoritative account develops or calls into existence 
a social category. Marc Raeﬀ  has described the ways in which modern 
states have contributed to the creation of social classes in order to make 
the general business of government, and the particular business of raising 
revenue, easier and more successful. 40 Th e Blair government in the United 
Kingdom, following the bombings of 7 July 2005, called a meeting of ‘leaders 
and representatives of the Muslim community’, and in so doing cultivated, 
even if they did not create, that community, and gave new or enhanced 
identity to a group of middle-aged men and their subsequent ability to 
make demands on those whom they could, with increased or new author-
ity, describe as members of their community. Each of these cultivations is 
an instance of a wider process which occurs whenever accounts are given 
of others. Dynamic nominalism is not limited to language; artefacts of all 
kinds can perform in a similar way, creating new realities and new identities. 
 Th e generating of new identities, or the enhancement of existing ones, 
may involve a contrast between the deﬁ ning group or association and 
others with whom they contrast themselves. Other groups or associa-
tions may then be at best inferior, and at worst hostile or threatening. 41 In 
this way identity can be not only a positive account of the deﬁ ning group 
or association, but one which subordinates others as auxiliaries to that 
identity, or as possessed of an inferior status or quality which by its diﬀ er-
ence enhances that of the describing group. But it is not only at the level 
of groups and associations that the observer and describer can inﬂ uence 
the identity of the observed. If people are categorised by others in terms 
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of broad, general categories, their actual identity can be distorted and the 
ways in which others treat them be equally and deleteriously aﬀ ected. A 
distinction can then be made, in the way in which both Charles Taylor 
and Axel Honneth have done, between recognition which sees someone 
in their own terms, and reiﬁ cation which attributes to them a simpliﬁ ed 
and distorted identity as one instance of an ostensible real and objec-
tive category. 42 Th e concept of understanding and failure to understand 
being used here follows from a distinction made by Collingwood between 
description, which freezes an account as a series of general categories, and 
expression, which responds to the particularity of individuals or events. 
Using a graphic metaphor, Anthony Appiah has talked of the Medusa 
syndrome, a gaze which turns living matter to stone and freezes the com-
plexities of individual identity into narrow, stereotyped simplicities. 43 Th e 
direction of this way of talking about identity is to an insistence on indi-
vidual uniqueness against an approach which continually subordinates the 
particular into rigid general categories. In the arguments of David Owen, 
this tradition has moved even more clearly towards and potentially beyond 
a pluralist conception not only of identity but of the means of recognising 
diﬀ erent identities. 44 
 Th e composition of identity 
 Th e Burke and Paine exchange suggests a distinction between substantial 
identities and external and superﬁ cial ones, but if the metaphor is pursued 
even only a little way, it can be insisted that feathers do not cause birds, 
and birds do not cause feathers; rather, they are each part or aspects of a 
single, though complex, whole. Discussing changes in religious belief and 
perception, and the visual depiction of the cruciﬁ xion in medieval Europe, 
Jean Seaton asks ‘whether the image of the dead Christ, the  imago pietus , 
existed before the piety it served or whether the piety was the product of 
the pictures – or, ﬁ nally, whether the pictures were a response to a new 
need.’ 45 One further answer is that the piety was composed of such things 
as the images, and cannot be separated from them since it is a single word 
used to sum up a complex phenomenon or series of actions. In the study 
of identity it is not possible to take out one element to see what happens. 
Th ere are few, if any, randomised controlled trials, and experiments with 
human identity in its social entirety would require both unbelievably large 
research grants and unimaginable powers of imperial or possibly divine 
intervention. Th e option sought in the ﬁ lm  Help! by Professor Foot, who 
was ‘out to rule the world … if he can get a government grant’, is not 
available. 46 And even if it were, it is impossible to step into the same revo-
lution twice. 
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 An explanation which dissects something out as a cause is never quite 
what it seems. It is not saying  post hoc ergo propter hoc , but that this is an 
instance of a class of phenomena where  x follows  y , and that as a member 
of this class of phenomena, this is how it behaves. In one sense, that is a 
causal explanation, in another sense it is a tautologous redescription. Why 
does this creature have warm blood and suckle its young? Because it is a 
mammal. But it is just as accurate to say that it is a mammal because it has 
warm blood and suckles its young. So the explanation is saying no more 
than that this mammal is a mammal because it is a mammal. 
 Th e fuller the account of any set of events or circumstances, the more, 
and the less, is explained. For a full account, which is logically impossible 
and is only ever an aspiration, never an even remotely graspable achieve-
ment, would present all component elements as part of the phenomenon 
described, leaving nothing out as either cause or consequence. Paradoxi-
cally this does not mean that nothing can be explained. Each particular 
thing can be explained in terms of its immediate precedents, but things 
in general cannot be, for the reason illustrated by the chicken-and-egg 
paradox. 
 Th e fullest accounts will always be particular, even though the presup-
positions and expectations, the words and stories, from which answers are 
constructed will be derived from and will return to generalised dialogues. 
Th e manner of understanding applies both the assumptions of demo-
cratic empiricism and a preference, in the many parallel juxtapositions of 
theoretical types, of recognition over reiﬁ cation, and a sensitivity towards 
individuality over the Medusa gaze. But in order to describe particular 
identities, it is necessary to use words which refer to general charac-
teristics. A language which was entirely related to only one instance or 
identity would be incomprehensible to anyone else, even though in order 
to describe the particular it will be necessary to employ combinations 
of general terms. How else would speech be possible? Th e description 
of identity will draw on the general, though never ubiquitous, tension 
between association and distinction. Distinction will be in part composed 
of a cultivation of special or more developed characteristics within a group 
or association, whereas association will perhaps never be with one group 
or association alone, and in this overlapping of associations, further pos-
sibilities of distinction may be available. 
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 Top people are diﬀ erent: association and 
distinction in politics and religion 
 Association and distinction in the leadership of religion and politics 
 In 1521 Martin Luther, appearing before the Diet of Worms, declared that he 
was bound ‘by the Scriptures to which I have appealed, and my conscience 
is taken captive by God ’ s word, I cannot and will not recant anything, for 
to act against our conscience is neither safe for us, nor open to us.’ 1 It was 
a statement which illustrated the extreme contradictions involved in the 
cultivation of identity by both association and distinction. On the one hand, 
Luther expressed an identity which was as far as possible beyond and above 
his single person, ‘captive by God ’ s word’. Identity through association and 
solidarity could hardly go higher or further. But, on the other hand, he 
asserted his own conscience against the prevailing view of the church of 
which he was a member and by whose professed faith he also identiﬁ ed 
himself, claiming possession of a conscience which distinguished him from 
other members of the collective as a unique individual because of a particu-
lar understanding of the collective identity which all shared. While his iden-
tity was shaped around solidarity with the deity, Luther was claiming to be an 
authoritative source of knowledge of what that deity ’ s purposes or identity 
was. So having established identity through association in two directions, 
to the Christian church and to God, Luther then established a unique and 
distinguished position in relation to each. Luther ’ s claim to solidarity with 
the Word of God was an instance of a recurrent presentation of religious 
identity where solidarity is both necessarily engaged with and at the same 
time distinguished within a human community, and a transcendental, divine, 
or other worldly one. A Dalai Lama is infused with a spiritual personality 
which survives across generations; a priest in a church which asserts apos-
tolic succession is in a direct line of spiritual descent through the laying on 
of hands; association and solidarity are asserted with both worldly and other-
worldly identities. But since deities never speak save in private and in secret 
to religious leaders, those leaders will claim special insight into the mind or 
words of the deity – association coupled with distinction. 
c03.indd   81 6/5/2017   12:21:01 PM
82 cultivating political and public identity 
 Secular identity lacks the ultimate solidarity and immunity from human 
reasoning of spirituality, but it can still claim a transcendent distinction, 
rising above but not beyond the egalitarian assertion of association with 
its subjects or followers. And the grander the practice or claim of leader-
ship, the grander the expression of distinction. When Virginia Woolf chose 
illustrations of male ﬂ amboyance, her selections were from both the 
secular and the spiritual governing elites. Humanity as a whole might be 
distinguished by its plumage, but bishops, judges, generals, and monarchs 
appeared to engage with special intensity in the embellishment, in all pos-
sible ways, of the human person. An ordinary soldier might earn and wear 
a few medals, but a general will wear dozens, and a president scores. Th e 
political and social elevation of an elite is enmeshed with the elevated 
intensity with which its identity at the head of a hierarchy is cultivated. 
Th e general wears a uniform to show he is a soldier, but the grandeur of 
the uniform at the same time insists that he is not like other soldiers and 
is even more military than they. Clothes are one medium only; methods 
of transport, the way people speak, and the buildings within which and 
amongst which they move constantly tell stories about who people are. But 
whatever identity is cultivated and by whatever means, elites cultivate it 
publicly most and to the greatest number of observers. Th at is one of the 
things that characterises them as elites. Th ey are not the only people who 
do so, nor do they necessarily do so more successfully or more imagina-
tively than others. But they will do so more intensively, and in doing so 
they tell stories about their magniﬁ cence, the nature of their authority, 
their diﬀ erence from ordinary people, their knowledge and understanding, 
and their power. As religious leaders claim or assume privileged access to 
transcendent truths, political leaders will both appeal to and rise above 
those whom they lead by claiming knowledge of what the followers would 
themselves know or seek if they were fully informed or properly rational. 
All government and political leadership will to some degree rely on the 
arguments put forward in idealist political theory, that government has 
insights and understanding which will diﬀ er from the actual insights and 
understanding of the governed, but will be, as Bernard Bosanquet put it, 
‘the real Will, or the Will as logically implied in intelligences as such’. 2 
 Th e very solidarity which nurtures identity is at the same time ﬁ ne-
tuned, qualiﬁ ed, or exaggerated in order to cultivate its uniqueness. Th is 
paradox is particularly evident in the identiﬁ cation which rulers, leaders, 
and elites of one kind and another cultivate for themselves, and their 
complex identiﬁ cation of both contrasts and aﬃ  nities with the rest of a 
population. Whilst the cultivation of identity in at least two directions, 
association and distinction, is to be found in all kinds of circumstances, 
the leaders of government and religion display an exceptional distance 
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between the two forms, and one which by the scale of the claim to distinc-
tion can put the claim to association under strain. 
 Religious leadership 
 Whilst identity is cultivated in part by association with all manner of 
groups and cultures beyond the individual person, religion is potentially 
the most powerful of these because the collective identiﬁ cation is not only 
with a group wider than the individual, but with a being, dimension, or 
level which transcends all humanity and is attributed with absolute author-
ity. When identity is cultivated in terms of or in relation to religion, it 
makes the greatest possible claims of identity by association. Th e person 
or group is enmeshed with a metaphysical person or level, and thus claims 
an identity as a channel, representative, or agent of that person or level. 
Cultivation of the same kind takes place with reference to nations, castes, 
or ethnicities, but the metaphysical claim is the most absolute in what it 
claims, and as the most removed from human contingency, it is the ulti-
mate pole in the tensions of identity. 
 Whilst the authority claimed is so great, the elements of identity which 
are thereby authorised can still seem minute, peripheral, or trivial. When 
the Celtic and Roman churches were manoeuvring for supremacy in the 
seventh-century British Isles, one of the contentious issues, attributed with 
such importance that it divided the two communities, was the manner in 
which monks tonsured their hair. 3 An issue between the old believers and 
the conventionally Orthodox in seventeenth-century Russia was whether 
one crossed oneself with two ﬁ ngers or with three. But this seemingly 
scarcely visible diﬀ erence bore the weight of major theological understand-
ings about the Trinity and the nature of Christ. 4 In matters of religion, just 
as in seemingly more secular matters, a ribbon awry can be crucial. Since 
the authority claimed for such identity is transcendent, the most elaborate 
constructions and creations are employed to shape an identity as far 
removed as possible from the mundanely human. Woolf  ’ s illustrations of 
formal male ﬁ nery included a bishop clothed from head to toe in gilt and 
embroidery, with so little mere bodily person evident that only the face 
and hands were unconcealed by stitched splendour. Religion has not been 
unique in its employment of clothes, rituals, and architecture in the crea-
tion and cultivation of identity, but it has been consistent in their use not 
only across time and place, but across faiths, and has done so in great style. 
 Whilst the character of religious identity will forever be referred to an 
external, metaphysical, or divine source, the phenomenon is essentially the 
same as with all other kinds of social character. Humans cultivate all 
manner of identities, religious and secular, which provide meaning and 
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justiﬁ cation for their behaviour and are constituted by it. Even when those 
meanings and justiﬁ cations appear to be external to the person, and to 
derive from some divine source, they exist only insofar as that person 
expresses them. For people to say that they are obliged to act in a certain 
way because the doctrine of their faith requires them to is another way of 
saying that they are members of that faith, and that that membership is a 
part of what constitutes their identity, and, further, that their understand-
ing of what that membership entails, whilst speciﬁ c to them, has at the 
same time the ultimate sanction of extra-human authority. 
 Whatever the nature or existence of divinity, all that can be known is 
what people do. Th at may be one way of interpreting the opening sentences 
of the Gospel According to St John: ‘In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God, and the Word was God.’ 5 All that can be known 
is what is said, and so ‘the Word was God’ could be inverted to claim that 
God was the word. Th e perception of icons in the Orthodox church is 
similar, where it is understood that there is no necessary connection 
between the divine and its human representation and where, as Rowan 
Williams puts it, there are ‘no  natural visible symbols of the divine, in 
political structure or in art’. 6 Yet, at the same time, it is the human creation, 
not the divine inﬁ nite, which is accessible to human cognition and percep-
tion. Religion may be the word of God, but all its evident or accessible 
components are the construction of humans – a point made, and causing 
great oﬀ ence, in Salman Rushdie ’ s  Th e Satanic Verses . Since the divine can 
only express itself to humans in human form or to human perception, it 
can only ever be a human experience and communicated by human crea-
tion. Th e charge frequently made against Rushdie ’ s novel was that it 
insulted the Prophet Mohammed. But there was an additional and perhaps 
as strong or even stronger reason why the book caused such distress and 
anger. Th e angel in the novel who tried to convey divine messages to 
human leaders found that he was always speaking their words, not his own. 
Th e divine was the creation of people, who then claimed unique authority 
over others on the basis of doctrine and invocation which was presented 
not as something they had themselves created, but as a set of higher truths 
of which they were no more than a channel. Th e authority invoked when 
it is said that a person is a channel for the divine is immense. But so is the 
challenge to a person whose identity is cultivated or constructed in this 
way when the divine authority is questioned. Th is can explain the fury with 
which some religious individuals and groups responded both to the pub-
lication of Rushdie ’ s book in 1988 and to the award many years later in 
2007 of a knighthood to the author in the Queen ’ s birthday honours. If the 
transcendent or divine can never be directly known, then all statements 
about it are humanly created metaphors, shorthands, or symbols, and as 
c03.indd   84 6/5/2017   12:21:02 PM
 top people: association and distinction 85
such have no more, nor less, authority than any other human creation. For 
those whose identity depends on a diﬀ erent narrative, such a view is cor-
rosive of their public existence. 
 Th e dependence of the divine upon the human was graphically instanced 
shortly after the expression of anger over the June 2007 knighthood. In the 
summer of the same year in Nepal, a young girl who had been identiﬁ ed 
as a ‘living god’ was disqualiﬁ ed by older male religious leaders for having 
visited the United States, and having done so without permission. 7 It is 
usually perceived as an attribute of divinity that it has an authority quite 
beyond human choice or reason. For divinity to be subject to human 
reconsideration and recall in this way suggests a diﬀ erent relationship 
between religious leadership and religious authority from that normally 
presented by those leaders. 
 Th is dependence of the invoked authority on the invoker, of the exis-
tence of superhuman beings on the acts of those who say they believe in 
them, is illustrated ﬁ ctionally in J. M. Barrie ’ s  Peter Pan , where the dying 
fairy Tinker Bell is revived by the worldwide reiteration of children ’ s belief 
in fairies. 8 A similar reduction to more mundane scale of an apparently 
grand claim is brieﬂ y observed in a very diﬀ erent work of ﬁ ction, Joyce ’ s 
 Ulysses . When Stephen Dedalus takes oﬀ ence at a remark that he is 
someone ‘whose mother is beastly dead’, his companion apologises, ‘I 
didn ’ t mean to oﬀ end the memory of your mother,’ to which Dedalus 
retorts that the oﬀ ence is not to his mother, but to him. 9 
 Religious reformers generation after generation demand a return to the 
inner spirit and a stepping back from the reliance on ritual and moral 
etiquette: rend your heart, not your garments. But the cultivation of reli-
gious identity reverts again and again from human spontaneity to human 
creation, and perhaps even in its most spontaneous forms, can never be 
anything else. Th e account of Christianity given by Hegel, of a steady 
movement from inner zeal to outer conformity, could be repeated for other 
religions, since inner zeal can only be evidenced by outward behaviour 
which, to be communicable, has to take a shared form and so is already on 
its way to being institutionalised and formalised. 10 Speaking in tongues is 
a self-defeating attempt to circumvent this process, but cannot avoid com-
municating religious style and religious identity. Religious truths are 
expressed through vestments, architecture, painting, music, sculpture, and 
all the creative actions of which humans are capable. Th e expression of 
divine truth and by association of the identity of the faithful will frequently 
be acknowledged to be beyond human cognition, so that human actions 
and human creations are needed as metaphors of an inﬁ nite and unknow-
able identity. So arises the seeming paradox of a truth and an identity 
which is further removed from human life than any other, but which is 
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nonetheless approached by a fuller and more extravagant use of human 
creativity than any other more apparently mundane or material arena, both 
in the immediate garments, words, music, and movements of the faithful 
and in the artefacts which they produce. Th at is the logic of the icon lurking 
within the apparently merely strategic advice of Bishop Jewel in Reforma-
tion England, that singing by the laity in and around divine services ‘sadly 
annoys the mass-priests and the devil. For they perceive that by these 
means the sacred discourses sink more deeply into the minds of men, and 
that their kingdom is weakened and shaken at almost every note.’ 11 Reli-
gious dissension seldom remains for very long at the level of theological 
dispute. It involves rival human identities, which are expressed in human 
actions and human artefacts. Th e smallest aspect of dress or deportment, 
the shape or location of a symbol or token, can carry the weight of major 
communal antagonisms. In Poland in the autumn of 2010, following the 
death of the president and ninety-ﬁ ve others in an aeroplane disaster, the 
most immediate visual token of national mourning was the national ﬂ ag 
with a black band across its surface. But the placing of an unassuming 
wooden cross in front of the presidential palace by a group of Scouts was 
followed by a prolonged dispute between conservatives and right-wingers, 
who surrounded it to prevent its removal, and secularists, who argued that 
religion and politics should be separate in a modern state. 12 A few pieces 
of wood carried the weight of major ideological and theological disputes. 
 Th e human expression of divine truths does not rest for long at simple 
symbols, while the greater the complexity and elaboration of the words, 
the images, the music, the architecture, the sculpture, the vestments, or 
the pictures, the more distinctive becomes the role of those who can 
understand, create, manage, or orchestrate the rich profusion of human 
creation. Th e progress from direct and spontaneous religion to culturally 
embedded religion which Hegel described is also a progress which involves 
greater and greater distinction of forms of priestly elite to manage, inter-
pret, orchestrate, and explain. Th e very impossibility of a direct commu-
nication of the transcendental source of spiritual identity brings the identity 
cultivation of religious and secular leaders closer together. For both, the 
identiﬁ cation of themselves as rising above the level of understanding 
found amongst their followers and subjects can not only justify normal 
government, but can sanction the most murderous policies of destruction 
of both life and culture. Th e actions of twenty-ﬁ rst-century religious 
leaders, such as those of Islamic State, stand in a long and destructive 
tradition in both secular and religious government and attempted govern-
ment. When a person has identiﬁ ed himself or herself as a channel of 
divine truth or of human utopia, one road which opens is the physical 
destruction of all opposition, and all opponents. 
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 Privacy in the self-identiﬁ cation of elites 
 Much discussion of identity presents it as something that is more received 
than created, and whilst the recipients of tradition, education, and inﬂ u-
ence are presented as human, the sources of those shaping elements are 
given a more shadowy presence. Th e conservative celebration of tradition 
and its radical diagnosis share a common vantage point. But even the most 
passive people, by their passivity, contribute to the contexts within which 
identities are shaped, while even tradition has to be maintained and trans-
mitted. Th e poet Kathleen Jamie has chronicled the pressures imposed by 
older generations on aspiring youth to be ‘no too cliver’ and ‘no  above 
yersel ’, 13 and such traditionalists are just as much makers of the circum-
stances within which identity is cultivated as the most passionate actual 
or aspiring leader. Cultivation within received contexts can be conservative 
or radical, but it is still a human creation. Th e most vigorous contributors 
to this creation are, by virtue of their actions, political and religious leaders. 
 Elites are not only masters and mistresses of highly visible, and audible, 
identity cultivation, but exercise creative innovation and entrepreneurship 
in the identities they craft, modify, or preserve. Th e relevant coherence can 
extend beyond the merely or obviously political. Judith Herrin has argued 
that in Byzantium the success of three female rulers, the empresses Irene, 
Euphrosyne, and Th eodora in the late eighth and early ninth centuries, in 
a society and a system of rule whose mores and perceptions were struc-
tured on male authority and dominance, was assisted by the ubiquitous 
presence of high-proﬁ le and high-prestige female images both in Christian 
iconography and in pre-Christian statuary. Constantinople was full of 
statues and images of female gods, female saints such as Helena (the 
mother of Constantine), the Virgin Mary, and female empresses. ‘Th is 
striking visual presence of holy and imperial mothers also drew attention 
to the essential role of empresses in the construction of imperial dynas-
ties.’ 14 Th is context of images was one which, through the promotion of 
iconography, the empresses could cultivate as well as exploit. At the same 
time, imperial progressions, visits, and rituals, together with the founding 
of churches and monasteries, expressed the presence of the empresses: 
‘Within the urban space, it was possible to create institutions from shrines 
to monasteries with peculiarly female interests. Th ese in turn preserved 
and reproduced the record of women ’ s inﬂ uence and authority.’ 15 
 But whatever rulers and leaders may do to impress their subjects and 
followers, there is a huge swathe of behaviour which functions principally 
to impress the elite itself, and to reinforce that impression in mutual 
support. Elites are not unique in paying attention to this dimension of 
identity cultivation, and are following broader patterns in beginning with 
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themselves and those with whom they normally come into direct contact. 
All identity is both for the identiﬁ ed person and for those with whom he 
or she interacts, and the two dimensions are intertissued. But the elabo-
rateness of the private-identity cultivation of those with the greatest access 
to and control over material, cultural, political, and spiritual resources 
exceeds the private cultivation of those lower down the pyramids of status, 
wealth, and power to an extent which places it in a diﬀ erent world. Th e 
very claim to be representative has the consequence of distinction and 
separation. Lasswell and Fox in their discussion of the role of the built 
environment comment that for an elite, ‘physical distance and position are 
likely to be internalised as psychic space. Th e ruler who is remote and 
above modiﬁ es his self-image accordingly, and perceives himself as aloof 
and superior to other men.’ 16 Th e greater the claim to distinction beyond 
association, the greater the aloofness and the extent and seclusion of the 
private upper world. Th ere is a massive swathe of rituals of rule and supe-
riority in all societies, from which ordinary people are excluded not so 
much by physical restriction as by living in a diﬀ erent social context, and 
neither being involved nor invited, nor even aware of what it is that they 
are not part of. 
 Th e participants and observers are themselves part either of the elite 
or of a corresponding privileged or distinguished group or association. 
Th e degree to which this exclusive cultivation of identity will outweigh 
the more public expression of identity can range from the almost entirely 
private to a presentation of identity which comes as close to identiﬁ cation 
with the public, and with public expression of that identity, as is consist-
ent with still retaining the distance which makes it possible to talk of an 
elite at all. 
 In the National Gallery in London, the Wilton Diptych is a small item 
amongst hosts of larger, grander works. A portable altarpiece made for 
Richard II, it consists of two hinged panels painted somewhere towards 
the end of the fourteenth century. It is small and, by the standards of the 
time – and the servants available to kings, easily portable. It folds shut, like 
a laptop. Th e surfaces visible when it is closed are simple: a coat of arms 
on one side, a white hart on the other. On the inner surfaces the images 
are more elaborate and delicately detailed. On the left-hand panel, the 
kneeling King Richard is supported by John the Baptist, Edward the Con-
fessor, and Saint Edmund, king and martyr. On the other side is the Virgin 
Mary with the infant Jesus, supported by a retinue of angels, each of them 
bearing on their garments the white hart which was the king ’ s symbol. 
 What is it for? Kings might well carry around with them maps, treasure, 
and weapons. In Walerian Borowczyk ’ s 1971 ﬁ lm  Blanche , even the rosa-
ries and cruciﬁ xes of the monks attending the king were swiftly readjusted 
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to reveal the weapons of his clerical bodyguard. 17 But the Wilton Diptych 
is something else, not a concealed map nor anything to do with the mate-
rial resources of government. It makes a clear religious and political state-
ment for the king. As Lucy Freeman Sandler put it, the diptych ‘served to 
focus Richard ’ s own meditation, to re-enact his devotion, whether he was 
present or not, to proclaim to himself the certainty of his prospective 
welcome in Heaven, and ﬁ nally, to reinforce his idea of earthly kingship 
under heavenly protection.’ 18 
 Th e intricate artistry of the diptych was for Richard alone, and told him, 
and him alone, who he was as king and successor to kings, saints, and 
martyrs, and as aspirant to divine protection and blessing. Th e cultivation 
of a royal identity sanctiﬁ ed by divine grace was a private and secluded 
activity which sustained the public work of kingship, but was distinct from 
it. Th is was not an eccentricity of a single English king, but a universal 
feature of rulers and elites of all kinds. A similar function appears to have 
been served by a small album of paintings on silk of the Yongzheng Emperor 
in early eighteenth-century China. Th e pictures were not for public display, 
but presented the emperor, to himself, in a range of guises and situations 
of varying fantasy, but each representing an aspect of human worth, skill, 
dignity, heroism, or authority. 19 Th e degree of the private cultivation of 
identity, beyond any public gaze, diﬀ ers from instance to instance, as does 
its relation with the narrative presented to the world beyond the elite. But 
it is always present. 
 Th e rituals of Negara, the nineteenth-century Balinese state described 
by Cliﬀ ord Geertz, provide an example of an exceptionally high degree of 
solipsistic identity cultivation by a ruling elite. Th ere was in a very real 
sense more ritual than ruling, and the king ’ s palace was a temple rather 
than either a residence or an oﬃ  ce or useful building. Its arrangement of 
courtyards, even though it contained public spaces, emphasised the 
remoteness and sacredness of kingship: ‘It was a theatre state in which 
the kings and princes were the impresarios, the priests the directors, and 
the peasants the supporting cast, stage crew, and audience.’ But if the peas-
ants were an audience, they were an audience who sometimes saw little 
more than the trailers to the main ﬁ lm. Th eir role as an audience was an 
incidental consequence of their principal function of auxiliaries in the 
drama of monarchy. ‘Court ceremonialism was the driving force of court 
politics; and mass ritual was not a device to shore up the state, but rather 
the state, even in its ﬁ nal gasp, was a device for the enactment of mass 
ritual. Power served pomp, not pomp power.’ 20 
 Th at pomp and power infused the entire cycle of life and of death, which 
could be as elaborately marked as the mortal acts of kings. Th e peasantry 
played a necessary part in all of this, and the rituals of kingship deﬁ ned 
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ruled as well as rulers, and provided narratives for each. But the weight of 
the drama lay with the elite. Th e court life of Negara was at least as elabo-
rate as the most extravagantly expansive ﬁ ctional alternative. Mervyn 
Peake ’ s  Gormenghast 21 is a castle and a court whose every moment and 
movement is devoted to fulﬁ lling escalating traditions of etiquette and 
ritual; but it is not a phenomenon limited to ﬁ ctional fantasy, and the real 
world of the theatre of identity frequently outdoes the most fruitful and 
vivid imagination. 
 In imperial China, the emperors’ cycle of rituals was marked both by 
the elaborateness and by the privacy of those rituals. Th e most magniﬁ cent 
and extended ritual sacriﬁ ce of the year was the sacriﬁ ce to Heaven, when 
the emperor went in procession from the Forbidden City to the Temple of 
Heaven, but did so along a route entirely masked from public view. Th e 
peasantry and the rest of the population beyond the pale of the imperial 
court were neither menial supporters nor passive spectators. Th ey were 
excluded by a mixture of permanent architecture – walls and gates – and 
temporary screens and topiary. Th ey could not be seen, and they could not 
see. Th e lesser annual sacriﬁ ce, to the God of Agriculture, was similarly 
attended by oﬃ  cials, servants, and courtiers, but masked and secluded 
from public view. At the imperial banquet in the Garden of Ten Th ousand 
Trees, when the Qianlong Emperor received submission from the Khalkha 
Mongols in 1754, even the ten thousand trees were screened oﬀ  from the 
privacy of the ceremony. 22 
 Th e rituals of imperial China were given architectural support in the 
spatial seclusions of the Forbidden City, an extreme and dramatised 
example of an unmobilised society, where the mass of the population, 
though they may be a human resource for government, are not mobilised 
for war, public service, or public display as they are in most societies with 
the development of industry and the growth of towns. Societies which are 
unmobilised, and where the institutions of dominance are authoritarian or 
closed, are never closed to everyone, and to that extent the question, as 
with all systems, is one of degree not of kind. Th e Forbidden City was 
hardly even closed to the mass of the population of imperial China, since 
they were not acknowledged. Th e presidential palaces of Saddam Hussein, 
by contrast, were closed to the Iraqi population because they were acknowl-
edged, but as subordinate to a leader whose barriers against them deﬁ ned 
his situation in relation to theirs. 
 Th e identity-savouring and identity-nurturing rituals of imperial China 
were paralleled again and again in the life of imperial and monarchic 
courts. Th e splendours of Louis XIV ’ s Versailles might serve to impress 
visiting representatives of other regimes, but it was the king himself who 
was not only at the centre of the drama, but whose identity was cultivated 
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at every moment of every day by it, and who was the principal and most 
continually present audience for the theatre of royalty. Every aspect of the 
life of the court, and of the king ’ s central role in it, was choreographed. 
Th ere was no distinction between business and leisure, each of the activi-
ties which might in other contexts be so described and distinguished being 
orchestrated to exemplify the unique character of aristocracy and, at the 
same time, the transcendent position of the king within it. Even the 
masques and ballets had a role for the monarch, who by his participation 
expressed his superiority in every aspect of life. Norbert Elias, describing 
this cycle of self-deﬁ nition, comments that the ‘practice of etiquette is, in 
other words, an exhibition of court society to itself. Each participant, above 
all the king, has his prestige and his relative power position conﬁ rmed by 
others … Th e immense value attached to the demonstration of prestige 
and the observance of etiquette does not betray an attachment to externals, 
but to what was vitally important to individual identity.’ 23 Th e rituals of the 
court deﬁ ned both elite and mass, and did so for the court, but not for the 
excluded people beyond the walls of the palace, in whose case it was suf-
ﬁ cient that the court was aware of their inferiority, an inferiority which 
justiﬁ ed their not having it displayed to them, since they could be simply 
ignored. Elias summarises things neatly: ‘It was always with people and 
their positions relative to each other that they were primarily concerned. 
In their etiquette, too, they did not come together for etiquette ’ s sake. To 
enact their existence, to demonstrate their prestige, to distance themselves 
from lower-ranking people and have this distance recognized by the 
higher-ranking – all this was purpose enough in itself.’ 24 
 What the architecture of Versailles proclaimed within, the magniﬁ -
cence and privacy of the gardens proclaimed without. 25 Gardens are one 
instance of the created environment that can function largely or solely 
for the beneﬁ t of the self-identiﬁ cation of the privileged. Th e larger the 
palace, government building, or religious monument in a city, the more 
evident it is to all and the less it can be enjoyed only for the private sat-
isfaction and reassurance of the privileged. But the larger the garden, the 
greater the likelihood that it will be shielded from public gaze. Th e small 
patch of the ordinary subject or citizen can be viewed from the street, 
from the train, from the bus. Th e gardens of the wealthy are not mere 
estates, but landscapes, and functioning for the exclusive identity cultiva-
tion of their owners. Denis Cosgrove has argued that that ‘landscape con-
stitutes a discourse through which identiﬁ able social groups historically 
have framed themselves and their relations with both the land and with 
other human groups’. 26 But they do so in way diﬀ erent from that of other 
large human arrangements of the physical environment, since they do so 
behind gates and fences. Urban landscapes proclaim public identities to 
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all. Horticultural landscapes are the proclamations of an assurance which 
is largely private. 
 Th e etiquette of separation reached an absurdist extreme at the court 
of Peter the Great in Russia. Th e bizarre carnivals choreographed by the 
tsar mocked and inverted the hierarchies of Orthodox Christianity, and 
created an aristocratic version of Lords of Misrule. Th e rituals of the 
Orthodox church and of its patriarchs were paralleled in grotesque form; 
marriage processions were conducted with riders on pigs, goats, and other 
animals; and drunkenness solemnly celebrated with mock noble titles. 27 It 
was not only behaviour which marked the court oﬀ  from the population 
of Russia, nor behaviour from which they were excluded, but behaviour 
which could only have been viewed by them with a mixture of incompre-
hension and outrage. Th e cultivation of an identity which marked oﬀ  the 
elite from the rest could not have been more extreme. 
 Th e pomp and circumstance of closed systems may itself be closed, as 
with Versailles, or it may be populist, as with the papacy of John Paul II or 
the leadership of Evita Perón. But whichever it is, it will have a distinctive 
extravagance, and whether the elevation of the ruler is displayed by his or 
her seclusion from ordinary subjects, or by his or her nobility in descend-
ing amongst the masses, the message will still be that the ruler is excep-
tional. So whilst the Russian and Chinese communist regimes had leaders 
who adopted some of the appearance of ordinary citizens, with demon-
strably plain clothing, the Kremlin and the palaces of empire remained as 
the palaces of government. Whilst the Forbidden City of imperial China 
was eroded, modiﬁ ed, and inﬁ ltrated by the new regime after 1947, and 
old walls were demolished, the Forbidden City itself was not destroyed, 
and China ’ s communist rulers employed a dual strategy of both seeking to 
emulate and transcend the urban architecture of the old regime, and incor-
porate its magniﬁ cence within the new order. 28 
 In the Soviet Union the practices of the vanguard of the proletariat 
illustrated how, whatever the claims to represent the people made by 
rulers, the cultivation of an identity distinct from the mass can persist and 
ﬂ ourish within an elite. Th e protocol governing the reception of new 
ambassador would not have seemed out of place in Versailles two centuries 
earlier. Th e rubric was elaborate and rigid:
 Th e Ambassador, together with the diplomatic personnel from the Embassy 
and the Soviet oﬃ  cials, enter the hall: the Head of the appropriate geographi-
cal Department of the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs stands on the right of the 
Ambassador, on the left is the Head of Protocol Department. 
 Simultaneously, the Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet 
enters through the opposite door in the hall; on his right is the Secretary of 
the Praesidium; on his left the Deputy Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs. Th e 
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Ambassador stops one or two paces short of the centre of the hall, opposite 
the Chairman of the Praesidium, and greets him with a slight bow. Th e Head 
of the Protocol Department presents the Ambassador to the Chairman of 
the Praesidium. 29 
 Th e transition from mobilisation of the masses under the tutelage of an 
elite to mobilisation with democracy, or democratic aspirations, has not 
dulled the cultivation of elite exclusiveness, and from an early date the 
leaders of the new state of America made sure that, however representative 
they were, they were also diﬀ erent. When George Washington, establish-
ing his role as President of the United States, received local dignitaries with 
his hat in one hand and the other hand resting on his sword, to prevent 
them getting above themselves by attempting to shake the president by the 
hand, he was making a very clear claim. 30 However much he might repre-
sent them, speak for them, ﬁ ght for them, and care for them, he was both 
like and not like them. Th e president was set apart from the multitude. 
 Even the most apparently practical matters of comfort and convenience 
can, at the same time that they ease the strains of a life in oﬃ  ce, underline 
the privileged character of the oﬃ  ce bearer. When President John F. 
Kennedy of the United States visited the United Kingdom in 1963, a memo 
from Prime Minister Harold Macmillan ’ s private secretary, Philip de 
Zulueta, a few weeks before the presidential arrival on 29 June, reports 
that one of the president ’ s aides had accepted the oﬀ er of Macmillan ’ s own 
room at Birch Grove, and would place his valet next door. However, it 
seems that the prime minister failed to take account of the presidential 
preference for a double rather than a single bed. Mr Zulueta reported that 
‘Th e only complicated arrangement for the house is that the President likes 
a double bed and brings his own mattress and pillows (I suppose it is for 
his back). Th ey [the White House] will let us know and the Foreign Oﬃ  ce 
will get one.’ 
 Further documents reveal that Whitehall was clearly taken aback by the 
extent of the preparation for the president ’ s arrival at Gatwick Airport. A 
Rolls-Royce was to be provided for the president ’ s use, along with a heli-
copter, an ambulance, and an unspeciﬁ ed quantity of blood matching his 
type at the nearby East Grinstead hospital. Th e communications centre to 
be set up at the Grand Hotel in Brighton, twenty-ﬁ ve miles from Birch 
Grove, was to include 150 telephone lines for the press corps; 50 secure 
lines including permanent connections between the White House, the 
president ’ s Boeing 707, the helicopter pad next to the Red Lion pub; and 
5 to the president ’ s bedroom. 31 Louis XIV could hardly have had sleeping 
arrangements more elaborate. 
 Th e relative privacy of the identity cultivation of elites does not make 
their members any less sensitive when they feel their status is not being 
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properly sustained. Th is can occur in any manner of settings. A diplomat 
at a formal banquet in Australia turned his plate upside down in protest 
when he felt he was not suﬃ  ciently grandly placed at table. But, com-
mented Lord Carrington who was high commissioner in Australia at the 
time, ‘he was extremely greedy so he only did it for the ﬁ rst course’. 32 
 Leaders and followers, rulers and subjects 
 Despite the immediate attention which is paid to the cultivation and main-
tenance of identity, even the most insulated elites make some demands 
of the mass of the population, both to express their own distinction and 
to nurture it by contrast with a subordinate identity amongst the rest of 
the population, though the extent to which they do so, and the manner in 
which they do so, change as rule moves from unmobilised to mobilised 
populations. A part of the identity of an elite is the identiﬁ cation of others 
– the led, the ruled, the followers – all those who are not part of the privi-
leged group. To identify oneself as part of an elite is to describe others who 
are not so privileged, for if one ’ s character were shared by everyone, elites 
would dissolve in universality. Th e creation of identity is, for leaders and 
other elites, an identiﬁ cation which is both self-relating and contrasted 
with a diﬀ erent identity for the mass of people. To depict a distinct gov-
erning identity is, even if only by contrast, to identify a distinct governed 
one. Uncontested inferiority sustains distinction, but it does so in diﬀ erent 
ways and with diﬀ erent degrees of attention by elites to the mass of the 
population. Even when a sense of distinction does not draw strength from 
popular acceptance or acknowledgment, it can be threatened by aspects 
of popular identities, a threat which will be countered both by more vigor-
ous cultivation of elite identities, and by elite cultivation of the identities 
of subordinates. 
 Whilst all government and all leadership involve hierarchies of identity, 
the relation between rulers and ruled, and the character of the ruled, diﬀ ers 
sharply between mobilised and unmobilised societies. Th e manner of elite-
identity cultivation and the extent to which others are recruited in its 
promotion diﬀ er as part of the presence, extent, and nature of mobilisation. 
Th e distinction between mobilised and unmobilised societies is one of two 
major distinctions when considering the cultivation of elite identity, the 
second being the distinction within mobilised societies between democra-
cies and various kinds of elite rule without democracy. Th e ﬁ rst distinction 
is between the extent of public as opposed to private identity, the second 
is between a passive and dominated and an active and assertive public 
identity. All democracies are mobilised societies, but not all mobilised 
societies are democracies, though the portfolio of possible features of 
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mobilised societies is sometimes listed as ﬂ aws uniquely of democracy, as 
in Michael Mann ’ s  Th e Dark Side of Democracy . 33 Th e ﬁ rst feature of the 
modern world is not that people become democratic citizens, but that they 
become a direct concern of government, which deals directly with them 
and sees them as the foundation of both the resources and the identity of 
the state. Democracy may follow, but it has generally had to be wrested 
from the hands of those currently enjoying power. Modern societies are 
mobilised societies in which the mass of the population becomes pos-
sessed of a greater public identity. But this identity is not necessarily a freer 
or more diverse one. 
 In unmobilised societies, the inhabitants lack not only the identity of 
citizens, but even that of subjects. People are human resources, on a level 
with all the other resources, animal, vegetable, and mineral, at a govern-
ment ’ s disposal. Premodern governments did not mobilise the inhabitants 
of their territories, and dominated rather than ruled them. Th omas Bisson 
has argued that terms suggesting rule or government are inappropriate 
for societies which were simply coerced. 34 Th e privileged made occasional 
demands on the people for taxes or foot soldiers, and even the taxes and 
the foot soldiers could be garnered indirectly. Th e population was occa-
sionally raided rather than regularly ruled. In such societies, dominating 
elites contribute to the identity of the mass of the population only by 
neglect. In such systems, it can be misleading to speak of the mass of the 
population as subjects, since their distance from the ruler is so great that 
they do not have even that restricted but at the same time identifying 
status. If they are ruled, it is by those far lower down the hierarchy than 
the king. Before populations were mobilised, the ordinary inhabitants of 
a territory were not only not citizens, they were hardly subjects. Feudal 
and other forms of rule which took cognisance only, or predominantly, of 
a proportionately small ruling class, also had only that class as their sub-
jects. Th e lower orders were resources under the control of these political 
contractors, not themselves directly part of the polity. In such a society 
it would not necessarily cause friction or the apprehension of diﬃ  culty if 
the ruling elite were culturally or linguistically distinct from the mass of 
the population. Th ey frequently were. A diﬀ erence between mobilised and 
unmobilised societies is that in the latter the rulers may well tell ordinary 
people what they may  not be, but will not try to control or positively to 
cultivate what they  are . Th e populace may be kept in its place in unmo-
bilised societies, but that requires little more than keeping them out the 
elite ’ s place. 
 Th e distance from the ordinary life of the population of elite identity 
and its cultivation has been universal in unmobilised societies. Th ere are 
two ways in which this distance is expressed: one where the seclusion of 
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the rituals of rule constructs the separation of rulers and ruled and the 
qualitative superiority and diﬀ erence of rulers, the other where the very 
representativeness or superior representativeness of the leader is both 
displayed to and elevated above the mass. In either case, there can be both 
separation from and (rare and symbolic) contact with, ordinary inhabit-
ants. Th e ritual application of the royal touch to cure the king ’ s evil by 
monarchs such as Louis XIV is a dramatised breach of the normal barrier 
which separates and insulates rulers from ordinary inhabitants, a secular 
epiphany. Suzanne Cawsey ’ s account of the kings of Aragon from the thir-
teenth to the ﬁ fteenth centuries is of rulers who, whilst they did not neces-
sarily present themselves to the ordinary inhabitants of the territories that 
they ruled, frequently and eﬀ ectively did so in verbal and visual persuasion 
to those who were most immediately their subjects, and on whom they 
relied for taxes and soldiers. 35 Th e diﬀ erence between the use and charac-
ter of the Forbidden City in unmobilised China and that under commu-
nism is that in the former it was forbidden to the mass of the population 
because they were outside the entire world of government; it was alien to 
them and they to it. 36 In a mobilised China the ordinary population might 
not be excluded, but the even greater magniﬁ cence of the city under revo-
lutionary transformation not only proclaimed the triumph of socialism, 
but provided a setting for the distinguished performance of leadership. 
 Rule in an unmobilised society needs to assert its identity to itself and 
to others, but the range of those others will be, in the normal course of the 
ruler ’ s activity, limited to the wider circles of the governing elite and if the 
identity cultivation goes beyond this, it will be sporadic. Mobilised socie-
ties, by contrast, cultivate the identities of both elites and masses, which 
they take a ﬁ rst step in doing by putting their armies into uniform, though 
armies are wearing the livery of the state as servants of government, not 
the livery of subjects. If they are mobilised autocracies, they move on to 
putting everyone else in uniform as well, distinguishing organised nations 
by colour and insignia, plumes and braid. In mobilised societies, even if 
the masses are being used as infantry, unless they are directly in battle, 
they are clothed and plumed, not camouﬂ aged, since as important as their 
role as coercers is their demonstrative expressive role as auxiliaries to the 
splendours and dominance of their rulers. Th ere is every reason not to hide 
them with the cover of Burnham Wood or its subsequent forms of camou-
ﬂ age in combat dress, which fades warriors into grass and shadow. Just as 
an aristocracy proclaims its splendour through the livery of its servants, so 
the emerging mobilising state proclaims it through the livery of its troops. 
 Th e arrival of democracy is one aspect only of the arrival or mobilisation 
of the people; the people can appear and be mobilised before democracy 
appears. Hobbes ’ s  Leviathan has as an illustration on its title page of the 
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sovereign as composed of his subjects, and they are the masses not simply 
the magnates (though they are entirely adult and entirely male). In unmo-
bilised societies, the mass of a population is largely excluded from the 
regular attention of government, or from systematic involvement in the 
business of the state or of its rulers. Mobilised societies, by contrast, 
involve their population regularly and systematically in the public aﬀ airs 
of the state: as taxpayers, as soldiers, or as industrial and agricultural 
human resources. Mobilised societies include democracies, but also most 
other modern societies, from totalitarian regimes to theocracies. And 
whilst collective public identities vary by place and time, a broad distinc-
tion can be made both between the public identities of populations of 
mobilised and unmobilised societies, and between the identities of the 
rulers of the two types of society. 
 Mobilised nations are an accommodation between the authority of gov-
ernment and the redescription of subjects as the people, the nation. Th e 
population are constructed, choreographed, dressed in a way which is a 
part of the choreographing of the system, which presents them as members 
of a nation whose identity depends not on autonomous citizens or demo-
cratic action, but on membership, mobilisation, and orchestration. And as 
soon as the nation is described, it is also prescribed, and the prescriber, 
not the nation, is taking control. Th ere may not be an exact point at which 
a totality of inhabitants of a territory becomes a mobilised populace, or at 
which the places where a mobilised populace lives become a territory, but 
the ends of the scale are clear enough. 
 Mobilisation, and democratisation as its further stage, places identity 
problems for government in a way which is not present, or not present in 
the same way, in unmobilised societies. If the mass of the population are 
part of a nation, then their common identity becomes relevant in a new 
way. Pre-mobilised societies impose cultural or religious uniformity on the 
governed majority, but mobilised societies have a new dimension of need, 
since a mobilised population is public, visible, and active. In responding to 
this situation governments can seek to cultivate a common identity; or 
exclude, expel, or kill those who do not ﬁ t the chosen image; or accept an 
identity which is political but contains cultural, religious, ethnic, or other 
diversities – a choice described by Liah Greenfeld as ‘civic nationalism’ 37 . 
Th e most extreme instance of the second is the ethnic cleansing of which 
the actions of the Nazi regime in the middle of the twentieth century were 
the most ruthlessly pursued. Client regimes, such as the Vichy regime in 
France, provided constitutional euphemisms for exclusion, removing 
110,000 Algerian Jews from the category ‘citizen’ to the category ‘subject’. 38 
 Th ere is no simple binary distinction, however, between mobilised and 
unmobilised societies any more than there is between religious and secular 
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leadership and governance. Th ere are instances of societies which would 
certainly be thought of as both premodern and unmobilised, where sub-
stantial sections of a population were either driven out or killed by a new 
ruling group in order to achieve homogeneity not merely within the elite, but 
across the whole population of the conquered or governed territory. Th ere 
may be a material dimension to this, but there may also be one of identity, 
most clearly in the case of religious identity. Th is might, however, be more 
likely when the new arrivals were not simply a ruling caste who sought 
to remove cultural disparity, but a new community who sought land and 
capital. Th e study of medieval ethnic cleansing by Len Scales is both of rulers 
or conquerors purging newly acquired territories, or the territories to which 
they have succeeded by killing or expulsion, and of dissident groups, either 
popular or elite, objecting to what were seen as foreigners either capturing 
too much trade or unduly inﬂ uencing rulers or universities. 39 If that is the 
case, then the conﬂ ict is not directly over identity, but over possession, with 
identity used as an exclusionary mark to gain or increase property or inﬂ u-
ence, and to limit by exclusion the numbers who might share in it. Th ere is 
thus a diﬀ erence between an attempt to sustain distinction or solidarity by 
enforcing a particular identity, and using or creating an identity in order to 
reduce the numbers of people who enjoy some material beneﬁ t. But in this 
case too, identity is the language of solidarity and conﬂ ict, whether an elite 
or an aspirant elite seeks to consolidate its own security by distancing itself 
from the mass of the population or by incorporating the mass of the popu-
lation to its own cultural, linguistic, or most commonly religious identity. 
Th is form of identity cultivation of the population by its rulers is the major 
exception to the otherwise broad indiﬀ erence of rulers and elites in unmo-
bilised societies to the identity of populations within their territories. It is 
an instance which illustrates the limitation of both the idealised distinction 
between mobilised and unmobilised societies and that between religious and 
secular leadership. Religious orthodoxy has been enforced by secular leaders 
in both mobilised and unmobilised societies, and more frequently in the 
latter than in the former, suggesting that even the most culturally insulated 
identities can be unsettled if the religious practices beyond the boundaries 
of their estate are uncongenial or unfamiliar. 
 Th e understanding of actual instances and societies will be further 
removed from these ideal types in that whilst extremes of mobilisation 
or its absence will occur, much social life will be found at some point 
in between the two poles, whilst the degree of mobilisation will not be 
uniform across all forms of social life. People may be mobilised for war 
but not for religion, or vice versa. Medieval society, which might appear 
as unmobilised, was characterised by a high level of organisation of the 
religious practices of its members, whilst leaving their economic activities 
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largely unattended, and their political ones non-existent in times of stabil-
ity. Elizabeth I of England, who said that she did not wish to make windows 
into men ’ s souls, was perhaps departing less radically from previous prac-
tice than appears. She insisted on public conformity to a prayer book and 
a liturgy that were imposed on all by secular law. What mattered was 
conformist behaviour. 
 Th e terms ‘mobilised’ and ‘unmobilised’ have only a limited usefulness, 
since they refer to degrees of involvement and exclusion which are neither 
neat nor uniform. Other terms, and other ways of talking of the character 
of a society, can be equally illuminating: the distinction between ‘open’ 
and ‘closed’ societies; the extent, character, scope, and power of elites; 
the extent of open or public politics; the existence or extent of a public 
sphere or of civil society; the degree of visibility or public participation or 
activity of the mass of the population or of those outside obvious elites or 
dominant groups. Even so, it is still useful to employ the distinction, not 
in order to ﬁ t entire societies into tight taxonomic boxes, but to consider 
the various features found, in diﬀ erent forms and with diﬀ erent intensities, 
in particular instances. 
 A major diﬀ erence between unmobilised and mobilised populations and 
societies lies in the relation between the identity of elites and identity of 
the rest of the population. Whatever the diﬀ erences in power, prestige, or 
material prosperity in mobilised societies, the identity of the mass of the 
population is an essential part of the identity of the elite. Under all other 
systems, the feathers of the people matter only insofar as they do not chal-
lenge those of their rulers. 
 Tom Nairn in his examination of the monarchy suggests that there is an 
organic coherence, which he calls Ukania, to the whole social and political 
system of the United Kingdom, so that the monarchic tip shapes and sus-
tains the vernacular iceberg. 40 Coherence may be too strong a term, but 
whatever the dissonances and tensions, each social or political stratum is 
in part deﬁ ned by the others. But though all forms of elite-identity cultiva-
tion involve a related cultivation of the identity of the rest of the popula-
tion, there is a major diﬀ erence between the character of this relationship 
in mobilised and unmobilised societies. 
 Th e trick is for an elite in a mobilised society to be neither too close to 
nor too distant from the identity of ordinary people. Th is is diﬀ erent from 
saying either that subjects reﬂ ect the character of rulers, or that rulers 
reﬂ ect the character of subjects. Rather it is saying that there is a symbiotic 
relation between the two, such that it is possible to learn a lot about the one 
from studying the other, and that the character of each is a matter not of 
autonomous identity, but of relationship. A polity is a holistic arrangement 
or phenomenon, and each part or dimension is as it is partly in relation to 
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the other parts. Th is is the A sharp/B ﬂ at phenomenon, whereby a musical 
note gains meaning not in isolation, but in relation to the other notes with 
which it is associated. It is also an application, to a polity, of the concept of 
legitimation as a feature of a relationship, rather than as a one-way transfer 
of consent. And if it is a relationship – of law making and enforcing, and 
compliance, or of political activity and response – then each party to the 
relationship has a social identity that arises from that relationship, and that 
would not exist without it. 
 Any such judgment must be cautious and qualiﬁ ed. Whole societies are 
neither simple nor uniform. On the other hand, even in the most varie-
gated societies, the elements take some of their character from each other. 
A religious sect in a secular society will diﬀ er from a sect with apparently 
similar theological doctrine in a religious society, a monarchist movement 
in a republic from one in a constitutional monarchy. 
 Mobilised and democratic societies are not without elites 
 Even unmobilised society calls for some attention from elites, both to their 
own appearance in the face of the population and, particularly in the char-
acter of religion, to ensuring that the population provides a congenial 
background to the lives of the privileged. Th e mobilisation of populations 
which accompanied both democratic and autocratic government was cel-
ebrated, in the democratic case, by a rhetoric of representation. Nor did 
autocracies of one kind or another renounce the powerful justiﬁ cation of 
claiming to speak for the people. In a democratic or mobilised system there 
is identiﬁ cation with the masses. But even in such systems, there is a 
degree of diﬀ erence. Th e elite presents itself as representative rather than 
separate and diﬀ erent, but nonetheless representative in a distinctive way. 
Th ere remains a distance between identity as association and identity as 
distinction. Whilst an elite might present itself to itself and to others as 
representing the qualities of the rest of society, it must also present that 
representativeness as concentrated, elevated, or in some sense diﬀ erent 
from mere reproduction of the normal or the vernacular. Were that not 
the case, the elite would dissolve in the mass. 
 Th ere is a paradox in that the more an identity is cultivated which is 
diﬀ erent from that of the majority, the less able an elite may be to under-
stand and hence to dominate that majority. At the same time, the domi-
nated, whilst they will acquiesce in being dominated by those whose 
identity appears to be like their own but more so, are less likely to acquiesce 
to domination by those who appear alien. Th at is one of the reasons why 
colonialism is unstable. Th e key to both acquiescence and revolt is identi-
ﬁ cation, as it is to electoral success. 
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 Diﬀ erent systems will have diﬀ erent degrees of separation between 
leaders and led, diﬀ erent identities, and leadership identity sustained by 
diﬀ erent mixes of distinctiveness and representation. Th e degree of simi-
larity, or of diﬀ erence, between elite and mass will be a feature of the 
political system and, accordingly, as it diﬀ ers between aﬃ  nity and distance, 
so will the rest of the system between open, mobilised, democratic, and 
closed, authoritarian. 
 But whatever the system, an identity is in the ﬁ rst place that of a person 
or group, and one which functions to tell them, rather than others, who 
they are. Th at narrative is conﬁ rmed in the recognition of others, but 
nonetheless it starts with a subject, not with an observer. Once there is 
more than one person, personal identity, whilst it is cultivated by its 
subject, is entangled with the recognition, rejection, or indiﬀ erence of 
others. Robinson Crusoe had an identity which was both conﬁ rmed and 
changed by the arrival of Friday. But he was not without an identity even 
when he was alone, and even when that solitude was ended, identity began 
with its subject and whilst it was aﬀ ected by the presence of another, was 
not created by it. 
 Th is superiority is no less important if the justiﬁ cation is super-
representativeness, and no more important if the justiﬁ cation is a great 
breach of identity between rulers and the rest of the population. In either 
case, rulers need to know and to celebrate their special identity. If the wider 
population is to have a clear role in public life, the maintenance of the 
distinction of elites needs special eﬀ ort. Once there is a public presence of 
layers of the population beyond an elite, elites begin to take a new respon-
sibility for the identity of those from whom they continue to distinguish 
themselves. Even if the masses are only an audience for superior persons, 
attention needs paying to them. 
 Elites cultivate their own identity, but they cultivate also that of the rest 
of humanity, and in each case they are energetic and resourceful. Because 
government, politics, and religion as societies become more mobilised 
involve, potentially, entire populations, the actions and identities of their 
elites cannot be insulated from the public presentation of the identity of 
everyone else, and are a part of public life to an extent which marks them 
oﬀ  from other fragmentary, particular, or local cultures of identity. 
 Th e scenery which people, whether rulers, politicians, or some indi-
vidual or group amongst the variety of less powerful subjects, construct, 
is a part both of how they live and of how they aspire to live. Th e formal 
order of the New Town in eighteenth-century Edinburgh was a calm and 
deliberate alternative to the disorder of the old town, just as Bentham ’ s 
panopticon prison or proposed school was an image and expression of 
order, hierarchy, and deliberate rational regulation. 41 And in each case, the 
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identity was being cultivated, or being attempted to be cultivated, by a 
small group for a larger swathe of the population. 
 Th e character of this cultivation will diﬀ er according to whether the 
population is mobilised, and according to the identity which the elite cul-
tivates for itself. In a mobilised society, whilst the elite will still distinguish 
itself from the mass, there is a degree of homogeneity between the culture 
which the elite cultivates for itself and that which it seeks to achieve for 
the masses. A nationalist elite will seek linguistic and cultural homogene-
ity, a theocratic elite uniformity of dogma and religious practice. Each of 
these forms of identity can make absolute demands on the masses, the 
theocratic particularly so since theocratic rule not only claims divine jus-
tiﬁ cation, the ultimate unquestionable absolute, but seeks the application 
on earth and to all peoples of the divine will. But here too there will be 
diﬀ erences between mobilised and unmobilised societies. Th e elite of an 
unmobilised society will be content with, will indeed seek, a level or mode 
of compliance from the masses which distinguishes it sharply from the 
culture of the elite: the masses must comply with the religion of the elite, 
but need not, indeed should not, engage with it with the sophistication, 
active participation, or understanding which characterises elite devotion 
and theological understanding. Latin will remain the secular and religious 
language of the distinctive few, mass will be performed behind a rood 
screen, the conversions of humanity will simply be the conversion of kings. 
 Harold Lasswell and Merritt Fox contrast autocratic separation, the 
Forbidden City or the Kremlin under both tsars and communism, with 
popular government in the United States:
 Th e sharpest contrast to despotism and autocracy is a well-established 
popular government. Th e oﬃ  cial meets the citizen on a common level and 
the chief of state lives with an insigniﬁ cant physical barrier separating him 
from his fellows. Th e White House in Washington expresses the basic rela-
tionship that connects the transitory holder of the presidential oﬃ  ce and the 
rank and ﬁ le of the nation. Th e White House is neither remote nor exalted; 
it has the approachability of a private home. 42 
 But the White House is clearly far more ‘exalted’ than the average Ameri-
can home, and signiﬁ cantly less approachable. Th e citizens of the United 
States may visit and be impressed by the White House once or even several 
times in a lifetime, but the president can be impressed by it, and what it 
says about the incumbent of the presidential oﬃ  ce, every day. As Murray 
Edelman puts it:
 Th at a man meets with his aides in the Oval Oﬃ  ce of the White House 
reminds him and them and the public to whom the meeting is reported of 
his status and authority as President, just as it exalts the status of the aides 
and deﬁ nes the mass public as nonparticipants who never enter the Oﬃ  ce. 43 
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 Whatever message of solidarity or equality the stage of the White House 
may present to ordinary citizens, to the president and his aides it presents 
a message of political superiority and spatial exclusion. 
 Both superior and inferior identities are necessary for there to be an 
elite at all, since each deﬁ nes the other. When the ﬁ rst fails, the elite col-
lapses inwardly, abdicates, or dissolves. Th ere are many accounts of the 
revolutions which took place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from 
1989. But one crucial aspect in the collapse of managerial communism was 
not an assault from without, but a loss of meaning and justiﬁ cation within. 
Rulers ceased to believe in themselves as rulers. One part of the disappear-
ance of the regimes in Romania, East Germany, Poland, or Czechoslovakia 
was abdication by elites which no long saw themselves as marked oﬀ  from 
their subject populations by unique insight or skill. 
 When the second, the identiﬁ cation of a mass of ordinary and subordi-
nate, less privileged, or less talented humanity, fails, the elite is merely 
play-acting, since the deﬁ ning others have evaporated. It is an internal 
instance of the crisis of identity which occurs when an enemy vanishes just 
as surely as when a people vanish. 
 A king in exile is not even half a king. Th e paradox of the private world 
of identity cultivation is that whilst it appears self-suﬃ  cient and closed 
within a private world, if the public world beyond is no longer there, then 
the private world can no longer be deﬁ ned by its seclusion from it, and 
descends into mere fantasy. It is a fantasy performed whenever a regime 
collapses and its former leaders survive, in exile, privacy, or peregrination 
from hotel to hotel. But it is a fantasy which can be desperately sustained. 
R. K. Narayan recalls an evening in New York: ‘Other guests for the dinner 
were an ex-Maharaja from India, whom everyone deliberately “highnesses” 
much to his delight. Royalty in exile is generally very exacting.’ 44 Royal 
weddings are forever attended by self-proclaimed monarchs not only from 
monarchies which no longer exist, but from countries which no longer 
exist. When Prince William and Kate Middleton were married in West-
minster Abbey in 2011, the guests included King Michael of Yugoslavia. 
 Two messages and two audiences; avoiding indiﬀ erence 
 Th e published and expressed identity of an elite has two audiences, the 
ruler and the ruled, the elite and the subordinate. Th e identiﬁ cation of 
elites is partly a matter of identifying themselves to themselves, partly of 
identifying themselves to those whom they govern. Elites cultivate an 
identity which both gives meaning and justiﬁ cation to themselves and 
enables them to distinguish, both for themselves and others, their diﬀ er-
ence from the mass of humanity. Plutarch observed of Pompey that he 
‘sought to surround his presence with majesty and pomp, believing that he 
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should keep his dignity free from contact and familiarity with the masses.’ 45 
But in so doing he was cultivating an identity not only for the included, 
but for the excluded. 
 Because the identity of elites involves a dominant relation with the mass 
of their fellow humans, whilst the cultivation of identity is powerfully 
pursued in a solipsistic manner, the recognition of an elite by others has 
an importance which is absent from the identity cultivation of ordinary 
humanity. Public indiﬀ erence in open or mobilised societies is disastrous 
for an elite, for whom the one thing worse than being talked about is not 
being talked about. 
 So there are two audiences, and two messages: the audience of the mass 
outside the elite, and of the elite, and a message about the identity of the 
insiders, and another, complementary, message about the identity of the 
outsiders. Each message is relayed to both audiences, but in diﬀ erent tones 
and with diﬀ erent intensities. 
 Th e environments which polities construct for themselves will diﬀ er 
between ones with a ruling class and ones with a ruling person, the former 
having many statues of great men and some women, the latter having 
either lots of statues of the same person, for instance Atatürk or Louis XIV, 
or lots of statues of idealised representative persons, workers, peasants, 
and soldiers in their heroic Soviet apotheoses. By the end of the Napole-
onic wars, St Paul ’ s Cathedral was ﬁ lling up with the memorial statues of 
generals and admirals. 46 
 Conscripting others as supporting casts of identity; religion and 
politics as coercive identity cultivation 
 Identities are cultivated and expressed across the whole range of human 
creativity: speech, manufacture, consumption, movement. But because 
identity is constructed and cultivated not just in the external presentation 
of the person, but in that person ’ s social and material setting, it is not only 
buildings and artefacts which are created and colonised. Other people can 
be seen not as the bearers of autonomous identity, but as human resources 
for the cultivation and creation of someone else ’ s identity. Th is can take 
the form of an apparently benign concern for the life of others. George 
Bernard Shaw ’ s analysis of philanthropy and reform described just this 
when he wrote that:
 the poverty of those we rob prevents our having the good life for which we 
sacriﬁ ce them. Rich men or aristocrats with a developed sense of life – men 
like Ruskin and William Morris and Kropotkin – have enormous social appe-
tites and very fastidious personal ones. Th ey are not content with handsome 
houses: they want handsome cities. Th ey are not content with bediamoned 
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wives and blooming daughters: they complain because the charwoman is 
badly dressed. 47 
 But this desire to make the world a congenial context for one ’ s own char-
acter can equally take the form of an attempt to compel others to have an 
identity either like one ’ s own, in order to give one support, or subordinate 
to one ’ s own in order to enhance one ’ s own sense of esteem, distinctive-
ness, and superiority. 
 Whilst Shaw ’ s fastidious reformer can seek to raise everyone else to his 
own culture, an aristocratic class can insist that only its own members may 
dress in a distinctive way. In pre-revolutionary France, only nobles with the 
right to be present at court might have red heels on their shoes. 48 In Renais-
sance Florence, sumptuary laws restricted the clothing of the lower orders 
and marked social diﬀ erence with the visible distinctions of vestments. 49 
Th e attempt to keep people in their place could operate within the ranks of 
the more fortunate just as readily as between them and the masses. Tudor 
sumptuary legislation could discriminate between students of law and 
others above the level of the common people as readily as it could mark the 
appropriate territories of gentry and populace. 50 Too many buttons could 
be a transgression of the social order resisted and suppressed by the force 
of the law. 51 One of the earliest contentions in the Estates General which 
met in France in 1789 was over the distinctive seating and dress of the 
diﬀ erent estates. 52 In less formal or overtly prescribed ways, diﬀ erences of 
dress, speech, and manner are used in a range of political and governmen-
tal assemblies to marginalise newcomers, or women, or members of ethnic 
minorities. 53 Quentin Bell has observed the class dimension of clothing, 
though class is not the only invidious distinction:
 the history of fashionable dress is tied to the competition between classes, 
in the ﬁ rst place the emulation of the aristocracy by the bourgeoisie and then 
the more extended competition which results from the ability of the prole-
tariat to compete with the middle classes … while many political events leave 
fashion unaﬀ ected, those which alter the class structure do inﬂ uence the 
course of fashion … the schism between masculine and feminine dress takes 
its place naturally as part of the same process. 
 Class and social status are joined by gender and age as identities to which 
distinctive clothing contributed. 54 
 Th e point has been made precisely in relation to clothing. Th orstein Veblen 
in  Th e Th eory of the Leisure Class introduced the term ‘vicarious con-
sumption’ to describe those whose ﬂ amboyant expression of their own 
wealth was conducted not through their own person but through their 
economic dependents. Quentin Bell ’ s application of this observation in  On 
Human Finery half a century later illustrated the point with the egregious 
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abundance of useless and impeding clothing for dependent wives and 
children, and of archaic ﬁ nery for servants. 
 But what each of these alternatives, of demanding that others be like 
oneself or demanding that they be diﬀ erent from and inferior to oneself, 
illustrates is the construction and cultivation of identity by constructing 
and cultivating a dramatic setting for oneself which is composed not only 
of material constructions and creations, but of other people. It might seem 
that a cultivated identity which depends upon others being identiﬁ ed as 
inferior is more oppressive of those others than one which depends on 
their being identiﬁ ed as the same. But each treatment of people as the 
supporting cast of identity subordinates them, and denies them their own 
autonomous creation and cultivation of their identity. To be compelled to 
shape one ’ s identity in support of that of someone else is a denial of auton-
omy. In its most extreme form, this subordination of others can involve 
their killing. So called ‘honour’ murders are justiﬁ ed either because the 
victim refuses to adopt a subordinate identity or because he or she refuses 
to adopt an identical identity. Women are killed because they refuse to 
act as part of the patriarchal identity of fathers, just as they or men can 
be killed because they do not accept the religious practices of the killer. 
 Th is is the paradox of identiﬁ cation through the construction and cul-
tivation of human and material environments. By treating the external 
world – human and material – as a theatre for the enactment of an indi-
vidual ’ s drama, the individuality of others can be denied. Others may be 
coerced to play a part in a drama not of their creation, or destroyed if they 
undermine the dramas of others, who may invoke their own ‘honour’ to 
justify the destruction of artefacts and the murder of people. 
 Th e enrolment, or conscription, of other people in support of one ’ s own 
identiﬁ cation occurs with particularly authoritative justiﬁ cation in the case 
of religion. To say that a person ’ s church requires them to act in a certain 
way is a diﬀ erent kind of statement from saying that it requires anybody 
else to act in that way. Th e second is an attempt to press-gang others as 
extras in the dramatic construction of self, a self which, whilst it appears 
to be justiﬁ ed by divine external authority, is itself the only location or 
evidence of such authority. But whilst religion may be the form most abso-
lutely invoked for this mobilisation of others as auxiliaries in someone 
else ’ s identity, political causes can make claims almost as loud and intem-
perate. Th e obliteration of one person ’ s autonomy in the service of someone 
else requires the most grandiose justiﬁ cations. 
 Th e salience of religious identity and of the cultivation by both religious 
and secular leaders of congenial and conformist settings for their own 
sense of identity has neither been wholly absent nor uniformly dominant. 
It may have had a more sustained presence in unmobilised societies as a 
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form of ensuring that the population was quiet and orderly. But it has been 
a major element in public life from the end of the twentieth century. 
 Religious identity can be expressed and constituted in part by clothes, 
both to the wearer and to others. Th e argument at the start of the twenty-
ﬁ rst century about headscarves in France and in Turkey, and about the 
jilbab and niqab in the United Kingdom, is about who people are, both for 
themselves and for others. It may be religious faith which expresses some 
particular obligation, but the form of the compliance with that obligation 
is social, not private or spiritual. And as with other socially constructed 
identities, distinctions construct an identity for each person which is not 
autonomous or separate, but comprehensible only in relation to the identi-
ties of others. Th e use of and argument about the clothes worn by female 
Muslims illustrates the extreme ﬂ exibility of material or evident compo-
nents of identity. Th e same clothing can have very diﬀ erent signiﬁ cance 
for both wearers and audiences in mobilised and unmobilised societies, 
democracies and autocracies. Controversies and practices around clothing 
can involve the persuasion or coercion by leaders for whom the appearance 
of their followers or subjects becomes an important component or sup-
porting environment for the cultivation of their own identity. It illustrates 
too that the distinction between political and religious leadership is an 
ideal type, and that religious practices can be a part of the coercive rule of 
government as readily as of the voluntary or socially sustained activity of 
subjects or citizens. 
 Th ere are many ways, whose meaning is part of the circumstances in 
which they are used, of cultivating the distinctiveness of identity, and 
ﬂ amboyance is one way only. When the world is decked in ﬁ nery, ascetic 
simplicity can be a way of standing apart from the masses. Religious dress 
may in its plainness, lack of adornment, and subdued colours proclaim the 
equality of all believers, the inequality asserted by the authority of the 
ascetic or the idiosyncratic choice of individuals, and in its variety pro-
claim hierarchy, gender division and subordination, a denial of oppressive 
gendered stereotypes, an assertion of individual choice or gradations of 
holiness, or a repudiation of extravagance which is, by its very evident 
severity, extravagant. It may be an assertion of religion or a secular asser-
tion of identity. 
 Coerced identity is more a feature of religious than of secular leadership. 
Th is may be in part another aspect of the diﬀ erence between political and 
religious proselytising. Religious faith has been seen by those who possess 
it as a desirable dimension of life which should be communicated to, and 
if necessary imposed on, as many people as possible. Th at is not uniformly 
the case with political faiths, and democracy, for instance, is more fre-
quently regarded as a good, like material sources, which its possessors have 
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no burning desire to share with others, and which they may actively prevent 
or hinder others from enjoying if it is not consistent with their own per-
ceived well-being. 
 Th is feature of religious faith co-exists with a distinction which can 
allow religious elites to dismiss or exclude much of a population from the 
fullness of religious experience, either as laity restricted on the concealing 
side of a rood screen, or as beyond the ﬁ ner points of theological under-
standing. Such a faith will seek external compliance, and see secular law 
as an appropriate way of achieving it. Bede ’ s record of the progress of 
Christianity in the British Isles is a record of the conversion of kings and 
lords – the rest of the population was assumed to follow. 
 Th e manner of presentation to the crowd indicates something of the 
rulers’ conception of his or her subjects. But, in addition, it is not just formal 
legitimation claims that constitute the legitimation activities of rulers. Eve-
rything they do can have a legitimating dimension. Messages about legiti-
mating identities are being conveyed all the time. Plumage is an indicator 
of some part of self-image, some conception of legitimating narratives. It is 
not an infallible indicator of all aspects of a regime or government, but it is 
to be seen both as something which will be in a coherent relationship with 
other aspects, and also a contributory dimension of the whole. Ferdinand 
Mount has argued eloquently for the importance of the most visible and 
audible aspects of government: ‘Th e myths and rituals which a regime has 
allowed or, more usually, encouraged to grow up around itself often reveal 
something very signiﬁ cant about the real nature of that regime – the essen-
tially populist, good-humoured, consensual nature of Macmillan ’ s Toryism, 
the aristocratic, activist liberalism of the Kennedys, the autocracy of de 
Gaulle.’ 55 And they are not simply clues to some underlying or undeclared 
reality. Th ey are a substantial part of that reality. George W. Bush was a 
president who enjoyed dressing up as if he were a ﬁ ghter pilot in ways which 
did not involve his actually going to war. Th is was not a clue to the identity 
of the president, it was part of that identity. 
 Two bodies: the person and the personage 
 Religion is one human activity where the tensions of identiﬁ cation are 
most evident. Th e other is government and politics. Th e distance in reli-
gion between the human and the divine, supernatural, or metaphysical is 
paralleled in the secular world by the distance between the public iden-
tity and the biological person, what Kantorowicz has termed the political 
body and the natural body. 56 In both cases it is the material, visible, tangi-
ble, and audible actions and artefacts which constitute identity, in the case 
of religion of the faithful in the absence of any possible direct manifestation 
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of the divine or the supernatural, in the case of government, of rulers, presi-
dents, leaders, and princes, despite the mere corporeal presence around 
which identity clusters. Th e deep social gap which separates the naked 
ape from the created person has frequently been used for comic eﬀ ect. 
Th e distinction between the public person and the private bearer of the 
public identity is visually caught in Th ackeray ’ s cartoon of Louis XIV. Th e 
reference of the cartoon is to Hyacinthe Rigaud ’ s grand formal portrait of 
the king, heavy with royal regalia and posed before a setting of theatrical 
grandeur. A carved column is draped with a huge and heavy red and gilt 
curtain, whilst the king ’ s spreading robe, embossed with gold ﬂ eurs-de-lys, 
comes to rest on a stool bearing his crown. A massive sword hangs from 
his side, and from amongst all this material display Louis gazes with toler-
ant condescension (ﬁ gure  5 ) Th ackeray ’ s visual comment consists of three 
drawings – one of a set of robes; one of a small, bald, and elderly man; and 
the third of the two combined to create Louis – with the caption: ‘You see 
at once, that majesty is made out of the wig, the high-heeled shoes, and 
cloak … Th us do barbers and cobblers make the gods we worship’ (ﬁ gure  6 ). 
 Th e relation between biological and social persons was recognised by 
politicians as diﬀ erent as Joseph Stalin and Arthur Balfour. When Stalin ’ s 
adopted son replied to a reprimand over exploiting his father ’ s name that 
he was a Stalin too, Stalin is reported to have replied: ‘You ’ re not Stalin 
and I ’ m not Stalin. Stalin is Soviet power. Stalin is what he is in the news-
papers and the portraits, not you, no not even me.’ 57 Discussing his career 
possibilities with Margot Asquith, Balfour observed, with rather more 
qualiﬁ cations than Stalin, ‘I do not think you quite realize what a small 
fraction of what we call personality can really be said to depend upon the 
person. Personality, as you use the word, really means the power of striking 
the popular imagination: and this is in every case as much due to favour-
able accident as to inherent capacities.’ 58 But the signiﬁ cance of these 
apparent breaches between bald king and regalia, private Stalin and public 
Stalin, and house-party Balfour and parliamentary Balfour, is not that the 
ﬁ rst is ‘real’ whilst the second is a mask or a mere display. Either there are 
two identities, or there are levels of identity, or diﬀ erent degrees or intensi-
ties of identity. One is no more, and no less, real than the other. Th ere may 
have been moments when King Louis, not the cartoon image but the 
monarch, was without his regalia. But they were the smaller part of his life. 
Whatever the human individual did, whether with or without regalia, as a 
person he existed in exactly the same way as any other person, through 
what he wore, where he wore it, and how he acted. Th at the clothing, the 
scenery, and the actions were not everywhere the same does not alter their 
constituting role in who the person was, whether that identity was single 
or plural. So with Stalin, the public father of the nation might have diﬀ ered 
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from the private father or the domestically located ruler, but they were all 
real cultivated people. In no case did the mere physical organism to which 
the name Louis or Stalin attached constitute the whole or only person. 
 Th ackeray ’ s cartoon makes a point which was well appreciated by those 
who celebrated and maintained monarchy in medieval Europe, and was 
recognised in funerary and monumental art. Th e clothes might express the 
king, but they expressed at the same time something that was more than 
the mortal body who wore them. Th e king, as Kantorowicz put it, had two 
bodies, one political and one natural, and each real and each an existence 
of which the mundane world needed to take account. 59 Nor were secular 
rulers the only ones with more than one identity; the church ’ s rulers could 
be equally segmented, and the distinction was expressed in the ritual and 
statuary of funerals, where the separation of the mortal body from the 
continuing role of public person was portrayed by two eﬃ  gies: one cor-
ruptible and passing, the other formal and continuing. Th e tomb in Can-
terbury Cathedral of Archbishop Chichele contains two life-sized carved 
ﬁ gures, the ﬁ rst of the prelate in full episcopal regalia, the second of an 
emaciated cadaver (ﬁ gure  7 ). Th ey are two identities born by a single bio-
logical person, the dead priest and the living, because having lived, bishop. 
When Frederick William I of Prussia is reported as having replied to the 
cleric telling him that naked we come into this world and naked we depart 
from it that no, he would die in his uniform, he was missing the point of 
 6  What makes the king 
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kingship. Even if the king did indeed die in his uniform, there was, at the 
point of death, a separation. Th e mortal king was entombed, the uniform 
continued, and the museums of royal Europe were endowed with the cloth-
ing which expressed the continuation of the oﬃ  ce of monarch long after 
the death of any particular incumbent. Politics, like religion, is frequently 
conducted by metonymy, and crown imperial can, like the Stalin who is 
distinct from the natural Stalin, both hover about and transcend a mere 
temporary person. 
 Th e gap between the ordinary human and the extraordinary role is 
potentially greatest in hierarchies, whether secular and sacred. Th e king ’ s 
two bodies, like the prelate’s, were a feature of circumstances where the 
mantle of sovereignty was almost too heavy for an ordinary mortal to bear. 
In monarchies and empires, as in papacies, new names indicate the several 
dimensions of identity of new incumbents, a more comprehensive expres-
sion of a perception which still, in the United Kingdom, gives the sovereign 
an oﬃ  cial birthday which is diﬀ erent from and unrelated to the chrono-
logical birthday of the incumbent. But what the Chichele tomb expresses 
is the understanding that both bodies are real. 
 Tension between association and distinction in open societies 
 Th e tension between representativeness and superiority appears in every 
aspect of governing identity. It is most striking in language, as language 
 7  Two bodies 
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is the most active medium of recognition. A governing elite may seek to 
impose or cultivate a language on those whom it dominates to charac-
terise them as its special subjects, or to reserve a language for its own 
particular use in order to characterise its diﬀ erence from ordinary people. 
It is language, as W. J. M. Mackenzie has pointed out, which is the funda-
mental and essential characteristic and condition of collective identity. 60 
Whichever it is, the cultivation of the identity of the elite has as a neces-
sary aspect a narrative about the identity of the mass of ordinary people. If 
the elite bans or persecutes the use of the language of a group or caste or 
community whom it wishes to assimilate under its control or inﬂ uence, it 
uses language as a missionary tool. If the elite, conversely, sets itself apart 
from the mass by its use of cultivated French, or ecclesiastical Latin, or 
European English, then language becomes a mark of both superiority and 
subordination. Th e Norman French who seized power in England in 1066 
felt no desire or need to amend their language or culture to that of those 
whom they now ruled, or to transform the language or culture of their 
subjects. Th e practice of the British Empire in India, by contrast, illustrates 
a very diﬀ erent, if complex and uncertain, relation between a ruling and 
a ruled culture. 
 In mobilised societies rulers must be suﬃ  ciently like those whom they 
govern not to appear alien, but unlike them suﬃ  ciently to be justiﬁ ed in 
being in command. Th ey need, in order to maintain their position, to 
create a public identity with which the mass of people can associate or 
which they can accept as at one and the same time familiar and superior, 
unless that mass is so unmobilised as to be of no signiﬁ cance. Ernest Jones 
observed that a ruler ‘just as a hero, can strike the imagination of the 
world in one of two ways. Either he presents some feature, or performs 
some deed, so far beyond the range of average people as to appear to be a 
creature belonging to another world … Or, on the contrary, he may capture 
the imagination by presenting to us, as it were on a screen, a magniﬁ ed and 
idealised picture of the most homely and familiar attributes.’ 61 One way of 
claiming the distinction which marks a person or group oﬀ  from the mass 
is precisely to claim that, whilst representative of everyone else, they are 
by the intensity of their representative character, special, and above the 
crowd. Th is paradoxical claim can arise in all kinds of mobilised regime, 
not only those with claims to be democratic. Adolf Hitler is reported as 
having said of the daunting vistas of the Reich Chancellery, ‘I stand here 
as representative of the German people. And whenever I receive anyone in 
the Chancellery, it is not the private individual Adolf Hitler who receives 
him, but the Leader of the German nation – and therefore it is not I who 
receive him, but Germany through me.’ 62 Th e apparent obliteration of the 
self as a mere representative is at the same time the elevation of the self 
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as embodying the whole people. Not just  l’état , but nation and folk as 
well,  c’est moi . Hitler ’ s remark would have resonated with Vitruvius who, 
dedicating his treatise on architecture to Augustus, praised his patron by 
whose beneﬁ cence ‘the majesty of the Empire’ had been ‘expressed through 
the eminent dignity of its public buildings’. 63 
 Th e intense identity culture at the top of social, political, and religious 
hierarchies presents in dramatic form the tensions present in all identity 
cultivation. Th is is particularly so in mobilised societies where the need to 
create solidarity with the population conﬂ icts with the desire to cultivate 
an exceptional identity. In the case of government and rulers, this tension 
is not only a feature of identity dissonance, but a potential source of gov-
ernmental failure. Th e greater the uniqueness of a ruling elite and its 
heightened sense of worth, the greater the potential for a fatal rupture of 
the relations necessary for eﬀ ective government. 
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 Caps of liberty: the oddity of democracy 
 Th e oddity of democracy 
 In the third year of the French Revolution Louis XVI, having put his sig-
nature to a new constitution, was shown in a variety of popular prints with 
a cap of liberty on his head (ﬁ gure  8 ). It may have been an uncongenial 
identity for the king, but it graphically presented the unique paradox and 
oddity of democracy. Th e head of state was one of the people and a subject 
like everyone else, and, by inversion, the subjects were also sovereign. 
Louis XVI was not a typical inhabitant of France, but this image symbol-
ised the duality of democracy and the unique duality of its population, 
where government by the people existed together with government of the 
people, where the people had two aspects to their identity, both as sover-
eign and as subjects. 
 For much of the twentieth century, whilst few aspiring politicians would 
have questioned the desirability of democracy, however much they might 
have sought to evade, undermine, or destroy it in practice, this formal or 
merely compliant accord obscured rather than addressed the problems of 
democratic government and politics. For there to be government, by the 
people or by anyone else, there has to be someone to be governed. Even 
‘self-government’ by an individual depends on there being a divided self, 
the rebellious id and the controlling super-ego. Th ough democracy is gov-
ernment by the people it is also government of the people, who are simul-
taneously sovereign and subjects, and in any population larger than a 
household, there will be institutions and persons who manage the collec-
tive business of society, enforce its rules, and formulate and administer its 
policies. When the people is everyone, or at least all adults, in order for 
there to be government, the people have at one and the same time to be 
sovereign and ruled, like plays in which one actor takes many parts. Th e 
oddity of democracy is that government by the people means that the same 
group who are sovereign are, at the same time, the subjects. Th ere is a 
continuing tension between democracy as rule by the people and 
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democracy as rule of and for the people. All other forms of government 
start with the rulers. Long before the rights of man or of woman, let alone 
universal human rights, right was something claimed by the few against 
the many. ‘ Dieu et mon droit ’, which still stands under the coat of arms of 
the monarchy of the United Kingdom, is a claim to territory and to domi-
nation, an assertion of divine sanction for royal exercise of power over a 
population. Democracy, by contrast, makes sense only with a demos whose 
people, whilst they are governed, are also sovereign and possessed of pre-
cisely that right which was formerly claimed as a royal monopoly. So the 
obverse of the identity of the elite in hierarchies is the identity of the demos 
in democracies. 
 Th e dual role of a democratic population creates unavoidable tensions 
and contradictions of identity, and has called forth many proposals for 
dealing with or explaining them. Two solutions to the problem of reconcil-
ing the people, the demos, as both sovereign and ruled are represented in 
diﬀ erent ways in the accounts of Joseph Schumpeter and George Bernard 
Shaw. For the ﬁ rst identity of democratic citizens, as members of the sov-
ereign demos, there needs to be equality; for the second identity, as ruled 
citizens, a distinction is necessary between providers and provided, those 
whose principal occupation is to govern, and the remaining majority for 
whom government is carried on but who are subject to its legislation and 
administration. Th is distinction is presented theoretically by Schumpeter, 
and graphically by Shaw. Schumpeter described as democratic elitism a set 
of arrangements and practices which were elitist because small groups 
governed, and democratic because these governing groups were chosen by 
democratic competition, and as a result of choices between alternative 
governing identities presented to, rather than constructed by, the elector-
ate. 1 Shaw ’ s more picturesque metaphor preceded this account by some 
years. Government, he suggested, was like the theatre, and the people were 
the audience. Th ey did not write the play, but they could applaud, boo, or 
walk out, and the success of the theatre depended, therefore, upon both 
the presentational skills of the dramatist and the players, and the support 
of the audience. 2 
 In a democracy the people are still governed, but they are at the same 
time the government, or at least the owners or shareholders, and this gives 
them a potentially unique relationship with governing oﬃ  cials and institu-
tions. Schumpeter goes some of the way to describe this relationship, but 
Shaw ’ s metaphor is fuller and more illuminating: Schumpeter ’ s version is 
closer to people as customers, in which relation only buying or not buying 
of favoured and desired or uncongenial and unwanted human goods occurs, 
though even there it does not take the economic analogy further and see the 
demos not only as a customer but as an employer. Shaw ’ s metaphor covers 
c04.indd   119 6/5/2017   12:21:04 PM
120 cultivating political and public identity 
not only the commercial, self-contained, and completed action of buying a 
ticket, but the sustained and open-ended action of cheering, booing, and 
throwing rotten tomatoes. If people ’ s identity goes no further than being 
customers, only money talks; if they are an audience of citizens, the people 
talk, and talk in many voices, in many ways, and on many occasions. But a 
duality remains, since as subjects, people are not the equal of the personnel 
of government; as the sovereign demos, they are. 
 Th e implication of each of these accounts is that the population of a 
democracy has some kind of ownership of government, or that govern-
ment acts on behalf of a demos, or that government acts subject to the 
cheers or boos of the populace. Whichever version is accepted, the popula-
tion of a democracy stands in a very diﬀ erent relationship to the persons 
and institutions of government from the relationship of a population to 
any other form of political arrangement in either mobilised or unmobilised 
populations. Th ere is no necessity for unthinking or unavoidable deference 
to the institutions or persons of government, for they are agents of the 
population, and the title ‘public servant’, with emphasis on the noun, 
describes a unique feature of this relationship. A mobilised society, if it is 
no more than that, is an attempt by government to achieve predictability. 
But if the society is also a democracy, one of its characteristics is unpre-
dictability. Th e population of a democracy is governed, and some of its 
number have the task of carrying out that government. But at the same 
time the people rule, and in their political actions behave with a freedom 
and an unpredictability which marks them oﬀ  from the merely mobilised. 
Th ey may not even go to the play, or visit the theatre at all, but spend their 
time and energy in quite diﬀ erent ways. 
 Any relationship contributes to the identity of the parties to it, and the 
identity of the population of a democracy is in that way constituted as 
independent and critical. Th ere is a broad range of activities and potential 
activities which constitute such a demos and which, even if some of them 
are found amongst the populations of other kinds of system, are not carried 
out in the same way there. In a monarchy, rights are rights of government. 
In a democracy they are rights against and over government. Th e character 
of a democratic population is correspondingly unique, and an essential 
part of the polity in a way that the character of the population of no other 
system is. 
 Democracy depends not only on good government or good 
governors, but on the political role of a demos of active citizens 
 Identity can be cultivated in solitude, by hermits or by castaways; Rob-
inson Crusoe did not lack visible character. But the cultivation is most 
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sustained and elaborate when it is conducted in the presence of other 
people, and in engagement with them. Flourishing identity cultivation is a 
public activity, and in the comprehensive public activity of governing and 
being governed, it ﬂ ourishes vigorously. But the extent to which the mass 
of people is actively engaged in the cultivation of political identity diﬀ ers 
with the character of the polity under which the people live. Not all forms 
of human government have much place for the majority of those whom 
they govern, and conversely the more open and democratic a polity, the 
greater the likelihood of broad engagement in public political identiﬁ ca-
tion. Th e distinction between being somebody and being nobody is one 
that fades as more and more of a population achieves public status as 
opposed to public subordination or private exclusion or marginalisation. 
Once the rulers and the ruled are one, identity cultivation enters a new 
dimension. 
 Rulers pay great attention to their own distinctive identity. Th ey do so 
in all political systems, but in democracies they do so in a unique way. 
Democracy is marked oﬀ  from all other systems of government and poli-
tics by the fact that rulers and subjects are the same people. In mobilised 
societies, the identity cultivation of rulers can no longer ignore, or pay 
only sporadic attention to, the identity of the mass of the population. Once 
that popular majority has achieved democratic status, the continuous and 
public cultivation of identity becomes something in which both rulers and 
ruled play an active part, a part made unique by the novelty of the ruled 
being also the rulers and the political employers of those who exercise 
governmental power. 
 Th e paradox of people who are both sovereign and ruled is the root of 
a series of oddities and tensions within all democracies, tensions which 
can never be wholly resolved. Whilst the people both rule and are ruled, 
for them to be ruled there are institutions, oﬃ  cials, and governors as in 
any other system of government, who are distinct from the rest of the 
population, and who cultivate an identity which constitutes that distinc-
tion. And because the people, the demos, are the source of authority, they 
at one and the same time rule in the most general sense, and frequently 
and constructively conﬂ ict with the actions, policies, and ambitions of 
rulers in particular matters and in the day-to-day conduct of their lives. 
Th e demos is ruled, but the people ’ s response to that rule is unpredictable, 
takes many forms, and is an essential component of their democratic status 
just as much as is their choice of government through voting and all the 
activities which surround and sustain a system of free election. Th ere are 
tensions within democracy between the cultivation of the good citizen as 
sovereign and the cultivation of the good citizen as subject, supporter, and 
contributor. But that is not necessarily an undesirable thing. Clockwork 
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depends on tension to tell us the time and the string which restrains a kite 
also enables it to ﬂ y; release the tension and the kite falls. 
 Schumpeter ’ s account of democracy is of occasional or regular choices 
by the electorate between competing political elites, but with implied qui-
escence in the long times between those exercises of choice, a periodic 
Hobbesian contract agreeing to be ruled. It is an account which has been 
followed by and has sustained a view of voting as a rational choice much 
like the purchase of food or consumer goods. But there is more to voting 
than this. In voting, the population of a democracy is acting out its sover-
eign identity, an action independent of any calculation of the likely further 
consequences of its choice, of parties successful or policies implemented. 
Voting is much more than a rational purchase, as the civil rights movement 
in the United States dramatically demonstrated, when to cast a vote, 
whether or not that vote inﬂ uenced a ﬁ nal result, was an assertion of 
citizen right and citizen identity. 3 Every ballot cast is a component of the 
democratic identity of the voter and of the whole polity. Were voting no 
more than a calculated pursuit of material advantage, or of any advantage 
at all consequent on the victory of a particular candidate or party, there 
would be many circumstances where a rational citizen would not bother 
to leave the house to put a marked slip in a box. Th at citizens none the less 
do so is illustration of how much more there is than this to the ballot. 
Citizens act out their identity in voting, as they do in their use of the 
streets; in their use of universal provision of public services; in demonstra-
tions, petitions, protests, and free association with each other. In their role 
as active citizens whose agent government is, the people of a democracy 
will not curtail their political activities once they have cast a vote. Th ey 
will organise, demonstrate, argue, agitate, lobby, protest, and act not just 
as Schumpeter ’ s choosers between elites or even as Shaw ’ s audience 
restricted to the theatre, but as continual critics, connoisseurs, and audi-
tors of public life in the streets, in public places, and at any time. 
 Democracy, if it is to be an active debate over the work of government 
and not merely a homogeneous and occasional consent to rule, is charac-
terised by uncertainty and unpredictability, and unpredictability expressed 
not just in narrowly or conventionally political activity, but in the whole 
range of actions which characterise public or social identity. Th e necessary 
unpredictability of democracy requires an absence of uniformity with a 
presence of accepted and practised rules and restraints. Th e boundaries 
between the two are always and necessarily ﬂ uid. Is a law against blas-
phemy an imposition of religious uniformity, or the acceptance of rules of 
public discussion? Th ere is no universal and simple answer. It depends how 
blasphemy is understood to begin with. Is a ban on the wearing of distinc-
tive religious clothing by pupils in schools an assertion of the fact that all 
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citizens are equal and that there are no special distinctions or social credit 
points, or is it an interference with the right of every citizen to dress as 
she pleases? Th e uncertainty of the answer, and the absence of a single, 
authoritative, imposed, and universal orthodoxy, is what makes for the 
constant uncertainty of a democratic society, but is also the mark of its 
necessary freedom and vitality. It is also a mark of this freedom that not 
only can there be many and conﬂ icting opinions, but that any single 
opinion can be changed, as the French feminist Christine Delphy has 
described in relation to the debate in France and elsewhere over head-
scarves worn by female Muslims, where discussion has been marked by 
sophisticated shifts from criticising the covering of heads as an oppressive 
threat to a secular society and gender equality, to supporting scarves as a 
free choice of women. 4 Th e dependence of any material dimension of 
identity for meaning on cultivated context and signiﬁ cance enables Gary 
Watt to argue that throughout ‘its long history, the veil or mask worn by 
females has challenged and disconcerted predominantly male authority’. 5 
 Th e duality of the people as rulers and the people as ruled means that 
there is a distinction between a democratic society and a democratic state. 
Each is a necessary component of the whole, and for the whole to thrive, 
each must have a degree of both autonomy and continuity. Th at is evident 
in the case of a democratic state, less so in the case of a democratic society. 
But a democratic society requires something not only greater than but 
distinct from regular and free elections. Whilst the people may be sover-
eign, the business of making and operating laws and policies is done by a 
minority. A democratic polity thus requires both an active citizenry and 
an active but representative and responsive government and administra-
tion. Th ey are two aspects of a single but complex political and social 
phenomenon, and the one can, to that extent, be read oﬀ  from the other. 
 A way of telling one kind of political system from another, and gaining 
an initial clue about what one is confronting, is provided by the character 
played by Bernard Miles in the 1948 Boulting brothers’ ﬁ lm,  Th e Guinea 
Pig , who charms his son ’ s supercilious public-school teacher by telling him 
that from his own army experience he had learned to tell the calibre of the 
oﬃ  cers from the quality of the soldiers, and so he knew what the man 
would be like before meeting him, having already been impressed by his 
pupils. 6 Th e same applies in politics; it is possible to tell a lot about one 
segment of a group by the conduct of another segment. It will frequently, 
even normally, not be necessary to look at both ordinary people and the 
formal machinery of government: in mobilised societies, the one will 
reveal a lot about the other, and a great deal about the form of government 
can be induced from the actions of ordinary subjects. A polity is all of a 
piece, which is very diﬀ erent from being homogeneous. English boarding 
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schools, whatever their other virtues, may be mobilised societies but are 
certainly not democracies, and Miles ’ s parent with military experience 
knew a well-run regiment when he saw one simply by meeting the troops. 
 It is possible to read oﬀ  one aspect of a democratic society from another 
because to say that a society is democratic and mobilised is to identify a 
feature which is not conveyed at all by titles such as ‘oligarchy’, ‘despotism’, 
‘dictatorship’, or ‘theocracy’. All these other words describe who it is that 
rules. It is possible to give an account of any one of them without giving 
an account of ordinary people, the inhabitants of the land. Nothing follows, 
from the nature of these systems of government, about the character of 
the subjects, which can vary widely. If, on the other hand, they can be 
described also as mobilised, and even more so if they can be described as 
a democracy, then the nature of rule and the nature of the ruled are inex-
tricably engaged with one another. In that sense there is as much diﬀ erence 
between a mobilised theocracy and a premodern theocracy as between a 
theocracy and a military dictatorship, and an equally great diﬀ erence 
between a constitutional monarchy in a society which is mobilised but not 
democratic and a constitutional monarchy with a democratic population. 
It may not always be possible to tell from studying ordinary people whether 
they live in a theocracy or a military dictatorship. But if they are in mobi-
lised states, there will be much to be learned about the character of their 
government from the lives of ordinary men and women. And democracy 
is distinct again, since while all the other forms of government can exist 
in either mobilised or unmobilised societies, democracy is, by its very 
nature, mobilised. 
 Th e identity of a democratic society: acting out citizen identity 
 Th e roles of sovereign citizens as proprietors or clients of government go 
far beyond conventional democratic politics, and can extend in a quite 
diﬀ erent direction, apparently away from politics altogether and towards 
indiﬀ erence to it. Th e ﬁ rst role is the action of well-behaved mobilised 
democrats, the second of badly behaved democrats, who nonetheless 
exhibit a form of behaviour which is essential for the health, vitality, and 
survival of democracy. A democratic citizenry is identiﬁ ed not only by its 
self-assertive approach to government, but by its frequently behaving 
towards government and politics exactly as it pleases. 
 Oscar Wilde ’ s alleged complaint that the trouble with socialism was that 
it did interfere with one ’ s evenings so dreadfully might appear to be a 
dismissal of democracy and the demands which meetings and all the other 
participations in public aﬀ airs made on one ’ s time, but it is, on the con-
trary, an assertion of it. Th e democratic citizen may be well advised to pay 
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attention to public aﬀ airs, but is under absolutely no obligation to do so, 
any more than a potential theatre audience is obliged to go to the theatre, 
or a browser in a bookshop obliged to buy. Th e populations of mobilised 
autocracies may be required to attend parades, but the populations of 
democracies may do as they wish, when they wish, how they wish. Writing 
shortly after the end of the Second World War, Quintin Hogg delivered 
what seemed a witty put-down to active democrats when he wrote that 
conservatives ‘do not believe that political struggle is the most important 
thing in life. In this they diﬀ er from Communists, Socialists, Nazis, Fas-
cists, Social Creditors and most members of the British Labour Party. Th e 
simplest among them prefer fox-hunting – the wisest religion.’ 7 But the 
typical conservative was not, as Hogg supposed, preferring old authority 
to new radicalism, but making the kinds of choices which are only fully 
available to a democratic populace. 
 Th e word ‘democracy’ can be used too loosely, to apply to anything from 
an election to a decision on what to have for breakfast, replacing Stalin ’ s 
‘socialism in one country’ with ‘socialism in one coﬀ ee bar’. But it is diﬃ  cult 
to have a society where in their formal, constitutional, legal, and political 
relations people are equal, but in their economic or social ones they are 
not. A ﬂ ourishing democratic polity requires a ﬂ ourishing democratic 
society, what David Owen has termed a ‘common consciousness’. 8 It is for 
this reason that John Dryzek has argued that because ‘movements for 
democratization almost always originate in insurgency in civil society 
rather than the state, a ﬂ ourishing oppositional civil society is the key to 
further democratization’. 9 Th e deference described in di Lampedusa ’ s  Th e 
Leopard , where the newly enfranchised electors wait to see how the prince 
is going to vote before exercising their own democratic right to decide, 
vitiates the formal democracy of institutions and laws. 10 Deference is dif-
ferent from respect, and while the unpredictable freedoms of a democratic 
society require the latter, they preclude the former. Th e politician, not as 
prominent as he thought himself to be, who arriving at a theatre in a uni-
versity town without a ticket and being denied admission by the student 
on the door and demanding, ‘Do you know who I am?’, was met with the 
call to the foyer ‘Is there a doctor in the house? Th ere ’ s someone here who 
doesn ’ t know who he is,’ was being met with humour but without defer-
ence. It was an application of the historian and socialist R. H. Tawney ’ s 
advice that it was the mark of an egalitarian society that you could tell 
anyone to go to hell, and they would not be under the slightest obligation 
to do so. 11 
 A democratic culture is not only broad, varied, and unpredictable, but 
diﬃ  cult to deﬁ ne within a narrow deﬁ nition of politics. Th is is well illus-
trated in Tom Paulin ’ s inclusion of quietist or anti-political poems in his 
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anthology of political verse, for instance Derek Mahon ’ s ‘A Disused Shed 
in County Wexford’, with its allusive use of snails to suggest lessons about 
civic freedom. 12 Th e relevance of snails is not immediately obvious, but the 
unpredictability and loose frontiers of democracy involve just such sur-
prising ﬂ exibility. 
 Th e deﬁ ning political character of democracy is the equality of all 
persons. But that equality extends beyond the most obviously political 
aspects of identity to the whole social identity of the population; an identity 
which, while not immediately political, is an essential component of the 
freedom and equality on which a more conventional conception of democ-
racy places value. 
 Th e deﬁ ning messages about public life can often be conveyed by many 
more means than simple words. Th e importance of how you look – the 
sight, the sound, the movements, all combine to compose the public 
person. And all of this is conveyed, not by a constitutional document or a 
treatise on law or a political manifesto, but by appearance and behaviour, 
by voice and clothing. A democratic people has a character which is not 
derived from laws or constitutions, but which is in symbiotic relationship 
with them. 
 Just as democracy is characterised by a tension between a sovereign 
people and a ruling elite, so it is further characterised by the contrary 
demands of democratic solidarity and individual freedom, the stress 
between association and distinction. When a mobilised society becomes a 
democracy, the tension between the solidarity and equality of action, 
which characterises mobilisation and deﬁ nes in one way the demos, and 
the equality of individual choice which characterises democracy begins. 
Both ends of the spectrum can be played at the same time: liberty caps 
were a part of the people ’ s liberty during the French Revolution, and to 
wear one was part of one ’ s identity as belonging to a free people. At the 
same time, not to wear one, and more particularly to display expense or 
extravagance in dress, was taken as a mark of treason or subversion, in 
which case one ’ s freedom was curtailed or attacked by those who saw 
democratic freedom as a feature of the population as a homogeneous 
whole, not as the sum of the freedoms of its individual members. Th e 
sentiment of aversion to the visible extravagances of wealth expressed in 
Robert Burn ’ s ‘A Man ’ s a Man for a’ Th at’, which became a political theme 
song for many Chartists, 13 received often more brutal application in France. 
Th e ‘man o’ independent mind’ only ‘looks and laughs’ at ‘yon birkie, ca ’ d 
a lord’ with his ‘ribband, star, and a’ that’ in Scotland, 14 but visible aristo-
cratic splendours were not always and everywhere safe from everything 
but mockery. Yet if the term democracy is to have a distinctive meaning 
when applied not to the government of a territory but to its inhabitants, 
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the actions and identities of those inhabitants can be prescribed only by 
themselves, and by all and each of them, not simply by a majority. So, to 
the tension of identity and status between a sovereign people and its rulers 
is added the tension of identity between a sovereign people as possessed 
of a collective identity and a sovereign people whose sovereignty is consti-
tuted by the self-government and self-identiﬁ cation of each of its members. 
Th e paradoxical tension in identity between association and distinction is 
nowhere more clearly expressed. 
 Clothing and physical appearance are the ﬁ rst evidence of identity, 
before an opinion is expressed, an accent heard, or a manner of behaviour 
observed. A class-divided society can be identiﬁ ed by the appearance of 
its members without any other evidence. One mark of a democratic society 
may be a democracy of appearance, dress, and the public presentation of 
persons. Citizenship has frequently been seen to be appropriately expressed 
not only by the proprietorial behaviour of those who own their own polity, 
but by forms of dress, whether Mao jackets or liberty caps, which made 
citizens as distinguished, or as undistinguished, as those who managed 
public matters on their behalf. In a society which is divided by class or 
caste, the aspiration to equality has a sartorial dimension. Th e desire for 
simplicity and a refusal to ﬂ aunt one ’ s identity at the expense of others is 
an ancient and venerable tradition: take no heed for what you shall eat or 
what you shall wear, consider the lilies of the ﬁ eld. 15 Monasticism and 
Puritanism alike attempt to reduce clothing to a functional level, but 
cannot avoid at the same time using it to proclaim both an egalitarian and 
ascetic message and the distinctiveness of the wearer. John Moore, visiting 
Paris in 1789, observed that ‘in a short time a little black cloak on a brown 
thread-bare coat became respectable; and afterwards, when the cloaks 
were laid aside … a great plainness or rather shabiness of dress was … 
considered as a presumption of patriotism.’ 16 Democracy as the rule of all 
entails the abolition of visible distinctions between categories of persons: 
Mirabeau, at the start of the meeting of the Estates General in France in 
1789, objected to the enforced distinctions of dress between the three 
estates. Yet it was not long into a revolution which set out to abolish 
inequality, that new distinctions were being insisted on, created, and intro-
duced. 17 Identity has both an associative and a distinguishing dimension, 
and in a society with a substantial degree of equality, diﬀ erences of dress 
will contribute to individual identities both by departing from egalitarian 
similarities and by employing them in heightened or exaggerated form, 
aspiring both to identity by association and distinction by exemplary forms 
of common or shared characteristics, seeking simultaneously both equality 
and superiority. Th e challenging of the uniformities of caste and class by 
the paradoxical varieties of democratic equality has provided a continual 
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issue for both theorists and practitioners. Equality could go, in the eyes of 
some, too far, and it was not long before the revolution was planning ways 
of acceptable distinction, between oﬃ  cials and ordinary citizens, between 
national representatives and mere articulate adults. By 1798, deputies had 
a coat of national blue, a tricolour belt, a scarlet cloak, and a velvet hat 
with a tricolour cockade. 18 
 Th e American Revolution followed the French in its choice of homespun-
appearance in clothing in, ‘conscious opposition to British corruption and 
luxury’, and the direct domestic preparation of cloth and garment ‘through 
a chain of tasks mobilizing the entire family, rehearsed the republican 
credo of propertied independence. When yeomen then donned the coarse 
products of their home industry they embodied an equally republican 
frugality.’ 19 Th e cultivation of the simple and egalitarian in clothing applied 
both domestically and abroad in the formal presence of the new nation. 
James Buchanan, American ambassador to London, was in 1854 unable to 
attend the State Opening of Parliament because he declined, in line with 
American practice, to wear ceremonial dress. He wrote home to the Sec-
retary of State that ‘A minister of the United States should … wear some-
thing more in character with our democratic institutions than a coat 
covered with embroidery and gold lace’. 20 Half a century later, in a photo-
graph of the court of Edward VII in 1903, the US ambassador still stands 
out, by wearing a mere formal black suit. 21 
 Th e trade unionist and Labour MP Will Th orne, in the early years of the 
twentieth century, when invited to dinner with Lady Astor and the Prince 
of Wales, replied that he would come only if he could wear his ‘everyday 
clothes’. 22 In a democracy, if the workers were to dine with aristocracy and 
monarchy, they would not do so by wearing the marks of privilege. It was 
a similar sense of democratic solidarity expressed in ‘everyday clothes’ 
which led the historian R. H. Tawney to wear for many years after he had 
ceased serving in the army the sergeant ’ s jacket which had marked him oﬀ  
as a common soldier rather than an oﬃ  cer during the First World War. 23 
Th e use of clothing to cultivate solidarity with the ordinary citizen can, 
too, involve an identity which rejects a location low down in a social or 
economic hierarchy. ‘Zoot suits’ adopted by American workers have been 
understood as sartorial compliance with capitalism, but they can equally 
be understood as a rejection of the subordinate status of waged employee. 24 
But the common dress of democracy can be a perilous trap for the politi-
cian who too obviously attempts an uncharacteristic ordinariness. Shortly 
after succeeding John Major as leader of the Conservative Party in 1997, 
William Hague appeared in public wearing a baseball cap, and was met 
with widespread derision as much amongst his own supporters as amongst 
political opponents. 25 
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 Whilst rulers or leaders may wish to establish distinctions between citi-
zens and oﬃ  cials, there is a contrary belief that all people should be, and 
should appear to be, equal. Hence eccentric, ﬂ amboyant, or unsettling 
action, appearance, or behaviour can be stigmatised. Once again, the 
tension inherent in the democratic aspiration obtrudes. If democracy is 
rule by  the people , and the demos is seen as culturally, socially, homogene-
ous, then rule by  people is debarred, since individual citizens are expected 
or constrained to conform to a common identity. If on the other hand rule 
by  the people not only allows but is characterised by varieties of identity, 
then rulers or leaders cannot establish or publish a representative identity, 
and any identity they do publish will distinguish them from large numbers 
of their fellow citizens. Th is dilemma emerged early on in the French 
Revolution, when an attempt was made to ban distinctive religious garb at 
the same time as freedom of dress was being applauded. 26 Th is might seem 
to say that in theory democracy is impossible. But even if it does not work 
in theory, it works in practice, and does so as an element in a polity with 
other elements, with which, when the modus vivendi works, it conﬂ icts, 
jars, compromises, and accommodates. 
 Th e visibility of a sovereign democracy has been located in streets, in 
dress, in the courtesies of everyday life. Arriving in Barcelona in 1936, 
George Orwell reported that ‘Waiters and shop-walkers looked you in the 
face and treated you as an equal. Servile and even ceremonial terms of 
speech had temporarily disappeared.’ 27 From a diﬀ erent political direction, 
Herbert Morrison, reﬂ ecting on his experience of London politics and the 
change from horse-drawn to petrol-powered buses, commented that:
 the old horse-driver in his front seat on the top of his vehicle would chat and 
joke with City clerks and stockbrokers – the seats near him being a privilege 
place. He rode in distinguished company. From what I learned in my youth 
I would say that the bulk of horse-bus drivers voted Tory. With the motor-
bus driver it was diﬀ erent. His vehicle was a new-fangled device appealing 
to the young and forward-looking. Th ere was a call for a sense of adventure. 
Th e drivers were isolated from the passengers. Th e bulk of the motor-bus 
drivers, as a consequence of their diﬀ erent way of life, voted Labour, and by 
the 1920s a few of them communist. 28 
 Morrison could have added to this account that the origin of the name of 
this form of transport was the Latin ‘omnibus’, meaning for everyone. Th e 
freedom to move wherever one wishes and a suspicion of any apparent 
restrictions on this freedom have been a continual feature of democratic 
self-assertion. In Britain, the Kinder Scout trespass of 1932, when 400 
protestors attempted to walk on land in the Derbyshire peaks closed oﬀ  as 
grouse moors, was a mixture of new democratic assertion of rights of 
public access with claims to traditional rights which had been eroded or 
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subverted. 29 In the United States the road plans of Robert Moses in New 
York were criticised for being designed to restrict bus access and hence 
keep the black and the poor out of Jones Beach Park. 30 Th is claim has been 
disputed, but public access, and the identity of those who enjoy it, persists 
as a contested element in the politics of identity. In the public provision of 
health and education, services available equally to all members of a popula-
tion express an egalitarianism which is conversely rejected in selective 
availability and diﬀ erent levels of access or quality according to status or 
ability to pay. 
 In the spaces within which people move, and the buildings they use and 
inhabit, equality or hierarchy can be found. Collegiate inward-facing 
seating, as in the British House of Commons or the choirs and chancels of 
older churches, contrasts with the arrangement of meetings where oﬃ  cers, 
leaders, or representatives are raised on platforms facing the rest of the 
assembly or community who are, as mere spectators, spatially separate. 
Th e palaces of presidents and monarchs are met in democratic Glasgow 
by the public tea rooms and galleries of the People ’ s Palace. 
 Neither the conﬂ ict between the sovereign identity of the people and 
the governing identity of their rulers, nor that between the collective iden-
tity of the sovereign people and the sovereign identity of each individual, 
is readily, if ever, resolvable. An ultimately unsuccessful solution to the 
ﬁ rst, with implications for the second, is to present either the state or the 
ruler as the highest form of the identity of the subject/citizen, so that in 
exercising authority over the citizens, the ruler/state is not in conﬂ ict with 
their self-creating authority, but developing it to its fullest extent. Th is was 
Rousseau ’ s account of the General Will. But such a solution denies variety 
or individuality, and proposes a comprehensive and orthodox common 
identity. Even if it does not do this, but locates individuals in categories 
which constrain their equal freedom, the result is what Anthony Appiah 
has termed the Medusa syndrome, whereby individual identity is smoth-
ered and ossiﬁ ed by the categories into which people are slotted by others. 31 
 Th e individual diversity which democratic equality entails draws atten-
tion to the second paradox of democracy. If a democratic society is a 
society of equals, its solidarity must rest on some set of common values 
or characteristics. But the more precisely those values and characteristics 
are speciﬁ ed, the greater the numbers of individuals and groups who will 
not match the pattern. On the one hand is the argument, as put by David 
Miller, that ‘if we aspire to a form of democratic politics which extends 
beyond the machinations of a few elected representatives, then a shared 
nationality is an essential precondition.’ 32 On the other hand is the argu-
ment that if the people are sovereign, then each individual has a share in 
that sovereignty and a role and a right to cultivate his or her own, rather 
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than a common, identity. One proposed solution is a political identity for 
the sovereign population but a cultural, religious, and social identity for 
its individual members. Th is has been described as civic nationalism by 
Liah Greenfeld, and as a common national narrative and civil contract by 
the former chief rabbi of the United Kingdom, Jonathan Sacks; the inten-
tion being that it will provide a container but not a constrainer for diversity, 
at the same time as cultivating the sovereign identity of the whole people 
in matters of common concern. 33 Such a solution diﬀ ers from proposals 
for multiculturalism, which does no more than replace the Medusa gaze 
of a uniform demos with the Medusa gazes of a variety of community 
leaders or representatives. 
 Democratic audit: satire 
 In democratic or open societies, the leadership is open to constant scrutiny 
and criticism, and also to praise and commendation. Its continuation in 
oﬃ  ce depends not on universal and unqualiﬁ ed approval, but on free elec-
tion, and the certainty that however ﬁ rm its hold on oﬃ  ce, it is on approval 
until the next vote. But whilst the mandate to govern is not revocable from 
day to day, and a government with a working majority can expect to survive 
hostile scrutiny, the sovereign people exercise their sovereignty not only 
by the irregular and occasional act of voting, but by all the actions which 
they take from day to day, in assessing, commenting on, and passing judg-
ment on the conduct of government. Criticism, protest, condemnation, 
and satire are essential aspects of the popular sovereignty which justiﬁ es 
the existence of democratic government. And such free voicing of criti-
cism, enquiry, and dissent is necessarily both variegated and changing. 
Th ere is no one unfaltering voice of the people, but a medley of voices and 
views. And in such exercise of continuous sovereignty, nothing is oﬀ  limits: 
any aspect of the public order and its inhabitants may be praised or pil-
loried, often with passion and frequently with magniﬁ cent disrespect. No 
part of the state, head of state, oﬃ  cial religion, armed forces, politicians, 
administration, or bureaucracy is or can be immune. 
 Caveat emptor is a respectable principle in commerce. It applies equally 
in political life, and the very rhetorical switch which transforms citizens 
into customers rebounds to assert the right to choose, ignore, praise, or 
ridicule. Distrust is not only a recurring but an inherent feature of democ-
racies and open societies. Democratic distrust can be vigorously expressed, 
and ridicule is no more than its vigorous form, as Vivienne Hart has argued 
in  Distrust and Democracy , addressing the fears of those who thought that 
when citizens, voters, became discontented and disillusioned this was bad 
for democracy, and that a healthy state depended on rulers, politicians, 
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leaders, being held, if not in awe, then at least in respect bordering on 
deference. 34 
 In such a view satire is dangerous, and subversive of the respect that is 
necessary to make government and orderly public life possible. Th is was 
the argument of those North American conservatives who in the 1970s 
argued that there could be too much citizen participation, and that an 
obedient citizenry was to be sought rather than an active one. Samuel 
Huntington in 1975 argued that:
 [the] essence of the democratic surge of the 1960s was a general challenge 
to existing systems of authority, public and private. In one form or another, 
this challenge manifested itself in the family, the university, business, public 
and private associations, politics, the governmental bureaucracy, and the 
military services. People no longer felt the same compulsion to obey those 
whom they had previously considered superior to themselves in age, rank, 
status, expertise, character, or talents. Within most organizations, discipline 
eased and diﬀ erences in status became blurred. Each group claimed its right 
to participate equally – and perhaps more than equally – in the decisions 
which aﬀ ected itself. 35 
 Democracy could only be saved, it seemed, if there was a lot less of it, and 
distinction carried an elite of citizens to heights where they were scarcely 
visible to their distant but inferior associates. 
 Th e diﬀ erent view, which Hart presented with great clarity, is that dis-
trust is an expression of a gap between citizens’ expectations of what 
democratic politics requires, and their perception of how it is in fact being 
conducted, between the expected and actual identities of rulers. Respect 
has to be earned, it is not a perk of oﬃ  ce. Whilst total alienation may lead 
to the collapse of social order and good government, and a total disregard 
for all conventions and rules would dissolve society, unqualiﬁ ed respect 
and total deference will corrupt a political order in the other direction, and 
allow very bad government indeed. Th ose who see themselves as both 
commanding and enjoying an existing order can sometimes have diﬃ  culty 
distinguishing between criticism and a lack of deference, and insurrection 
and revolution. One or many critical or satirical voices may not be com-
fortable, but they do not call the entire basis of rule into question. Such 
actions by the people may be critical and sceptical, but they are not sub-
versive or revolutionary. It may even be the case that there is only one thing 
worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about. In a 
democracy, government may be able to live with only a certain degree of 
indiﬀ erence, and require at least a minimum of public presence, in however 
hostile a gaze. 
 Th e urge to assess and scrutinise is a response to the otherwise stultify-
ing demotion of the sovereign people to the position of mere subjects. Th e 
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democratic citizen acts in a range of ways which constitute his or her role 
as sovereign. But at the same time the regular and daily business of rule is 
carried out by specialists, oﬃ  cials and politicians of various kinds, for 
whom there is a continual momentum to distinguish themselves from 
ordinary citizens, and cultivate a unique and monopolistic governing iden-
tity. In this relationship the citizen is subject, not sovereign, but as a demo-
cratic subject he or she is nonetheless assertive, sceptical, and unpredictable. 
Th e citizen will argue, advise, criticise, complain, and protest, and employ 
all the forms of opposition which are both made possible by democracy 
and are a corrective feature of it. 
 Th ere is a range of dramatic actions where citizens may express a scepti-
cal distance from those in positions of formal authority: carnival and the 
various forms of festivals of misrule, in which conventional authority is 
inverted; satire and the heckling of politicians; derisive or humorous elec-
tion candidatures, such as those of the Monster Raving Loony Party in the 
United Kingdom. Each of these says to government, in eﬀ ect, we are 
keeping an eye on you, and we won ’ t necessarily accept without question 
what you tell us, or approve without enquiry what you do or propose to 
do, or the seriousness with which you take yourself. Th e citizen will not 
only criticise, assess, complain, and protest, but will also laugh. Th e refusal 
to take seriously the actions of public servants, and the willingness to 
subject them to satirical review, provides a powerful auditing tool for 
democrats. Satire draws attention to real or alleged incongruities of iden-
tity: the evangelist who preaches morality but takes bribes, the politician 
who assumes grand and heroic postures but is unimaginative and prosaic, 
the aristocrats who disdain their fellow humans but are uncouth and igno-
rant themselves. Satire is about identity, the relationship between its layers, 
and the incongruities and absurdities of its composition. It is most eﬀ ective 
when most widely published, and is therefore a feature of democratic and 
open societies. In closed or autocratic societies, it has to be disseminated 
covertly and often at great risk. 
 Th e freedom to laugh in public about public matters is a freedom of 
democratic societies. Laughter may not be the most obviously fearsome 
weapon in the hands of governments or citizens, but it is one which politi-
cal leaders seem to dislike to a surprising degree. Th is raises the question 
of why public ﬁ gures are so sensitive to satire, and whether there are public 
ﬁ gures who are not. In 1954 the two Houses of Parliament of the United 
Kingdom commissioned Graham Sutherland to produce a portrait of the 
by then aging prime minister, Winston Churchill. Th e image of Churchill 
was not a grand or heroic one, but a picture of an elderly and slightly 
grumpy-looking man slumped in a chair. Th e identity portrayed is not one 
of a charismatic leader in either war or peace. Churchill so disliked the 
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painting that it was destroyed once it was in his possession, on the orders 
of his wife, Clementine. Th e powerful can be surprisingly thin-skinned. A 
man who had been through the Boer War as a reporter, and two world 
wars as a minister, was wounded by a picture. 
 In 1991 after the ﬁ rst Gulf War, northern, Kurdish, Iraq was eﬀ ectively 
an independent region. One of the fruits of this independence was a broad-
casting system free from the control of Baghdad and its ruler, Saddam 
Hussein. An embellishment of that freedom was a satirical ﬁ lm about the 
Iraqi dictator, written and directed by the comedian Mahir Hassan Rashid. 
It was not long before a CD of the programme arrived in Baghdad, and the 
alleged response of Saddam Hussein was to send a team of assassins north 
to eliminate the entire cast. Th ey were not successful, though the actor/
comedian who played Saddam Hussein then had six attempts on his life in 
the next four years, and went into hiding. 36 Paintings may not always be safe 
under democracy, but in general painters are. So are writers. In 2014 Hilary 
Mantel published a short story which imagined the assassination, in 1983, 
of the prime minister and Conservative leader Margaret Th atcher. 37 Th ere 
was some criticism from those who regarded such a speculation as in bad 
taste, a criticism which became louder when the BBC broadcast the tale as 
part of their  Book at Bedtime series the following year. Mantel was accused 
of producing a ‘sick’ product of a ‘sick mind’, and the interesting claim was 
made that if the BBC ‘really was independent it would avoid doing things 
that were provocative’. 38 But statements of dismay and disapproval were the 
extent of the reaction. Meanwhile, Sony Pictures in the United States was 
about to release a satire which imagined a plot to assassinate the North 
Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Th e government of North Korea responded 
with accusations of an act of war, and made loud if unenacted threats of 
‘merciless’ retaliation. 39 Satire might not threaten the power of autocrats, 
but it can damage their self-esteem whether or not their subjects have 
access to it. Th e knowledge that you are being laughed at is enough, and 
the desire or need of rulers for the cultivation of grand and noble identities 
can trump all other calculations of power or advantage. 
 If satire can be so disconcerting to despots who apparently dominate 
their population without any need to obtain its assent, it is not surprising 
that in democracies laughter can be an even more powerful weapon in the 
hands of the opponents or critics of rulers. Th e freedom to laugh is an 
important privilege of democratic societies, and an important component 
of their power. Th e workings of that power are given ﬁ ctional examination 
in Umberto Eco ’ s  Th e Name of the Rose. Th e novel revolves around a 
mystery in a library, and it emerges that at the centre of things is a book 
that is both sought by some and closely guarded by others. When the secret 
is ﬁ nally revealed, it is that those who guarded the secret were afraid of 
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laugher. Th e thing which the monk Jorge, the defender of the status quo, 
most feared and set out to suppress was Aristotle on humour. Laughter 
may not be the most obviously fearsome weapon in the hands of citizens, 
but it is one which, like the mouse proverbially alarming the elephant, 
unsettles the complacence of power. 
 Being in either coercive physical or legitimate democratic control seems 
never to be enough, and rulers, at least in mobilised societies, fear the voice 
of the small boy who cries out that the emperor ’ s clothes are not as sub-
stantial as claimed. To suggest this is an extension into an account of 
identity of Weber ’ s argument that the fortunate ‘is seldom satisﬁ ed with 
the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to know that he has a 
 right to his good fortune.’ 40 Th e need to cultivate and defend a comprehen-
sive identity which celebrates and justiﬁ es one ’ s status is hugely powerful. 
Satire undermines identity by ridiculing its inconsistencies, limitations, or 
pretensions; it not only says that the emperor has no clothes, but that it is 
possible to laugh at the ones that he does have. Th e cartoonist Low ’ s 
regular characterisation of the Labour and then national government min-
ister the railway trade unionist Jimmy Th omas, who had a predilection for 
the high life, as ‘Th e Rt Hon Dress Suit MP’, was not unkind, but was 
certainly eﬀ ective, and concentrated on the alleged social ambitions of a 
man who in his own presentation of himself was a straightforward and 
blunt trade-union politician (ﬁ gure  9 ). 
 9  Dress-suit MP 
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 In autocracies, satire undermines how rulers see themselves. In democ-
racies it undermines both the self-esteem of elites and the deference of 
citizens. Th at is why rulers of all kinds react so violently, not only to the 
laughter, but to the fact that someone doesn ’ t take them seriously, or rather 
is seen and heard not to take them seriously, and to be out of their control. 
It is not just what the small boy says, but the fact that he can say it. 
 A part of the discomfort that satire can cause governments may lie in 
the disparity between the vernacular language of satire and the oﬃ  cial 
language of government. Satire is vernacular politics rather than elite poli-
tics. Th is does not mean that it is ‘the true voice of the people’. But it can 
be another voice, the vulgar, untutored voice of the small boy or the 
peasant. It means, too, that it can be sometimes oﬀ ensive, tasteless, and 
not always successfully funny. Satire against Queen Victoria and Albert in 
the nineteenth century, or the elitist snobberies to be found in  Private Eye 
in the twentieth, can be crude and oﬀ ensive. Such unpredictability and 
freedom from the constraints of good taste is the price to be paid for 
Internet sites such as the Onion from the United States, and magazines 
and newspapers such as  Private Eye in Britain or the Portadown News  from 
Northern Ireland, which was so eﬀ ective, or oﬀ ensive, according to your 
tastes, that it managed to enrage both unionists and nationalists. W. C. 
Fields remarked that no one who hated children and dogs could be all bad. 
One might say equally that no one who manages to infuriate both Ian 
Paisley and Gerry Adams can be wholly without merit. 
 Rulers dislike satire because it can call them to account, and does so not 
in their own terms or on their own ground, but by means of one of the few 
political devices which they are unable eﬀ ectively to use themselves. Satire 
both illuminates and excludes them. Because satire comes from below, and 
attacks precisely the things that are settled, established, digniﬁ ed, and in 
control, it is necessarily subversive. When it is not, when it is attempted 
from above, it can too easily appear tasteless or triumphalist. Political 
leaders can be witty and amusing, particularly at each other ’ s expense but 
also, amongst the most skilled, at their own expense. In the United 
Kingdom, Tony Blair told a audience which greeted him with applause to 
calm down because he hadn ’ t gone yet; Margaret Th atcher joked about a 
ﬁ lm poster announcing ‘Th e Return of the Mummy’; Neil Kinnock appeared 
as a nuisance political canvasser in a 1984 pop video for a song by Tracy 
Ullman. But on a larger stage, government is not good at humour, and 
frequently lacks the light touch or the imaginative vulgarity which fuels 
vernacular satire. Oﬃ  cial cartoons are solemn or vindictive, and when 
political parties satirise or stigmatise, they are more often vituperative or 
fanatical than amusing. British government cartoon posters of the First 
World War, or Nazi propaganda in the years leading up to and during the 
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second, were unpleasant, but not usually funny. But the further they move 
towards artistic responsibility, and the more stages there are between them 
and their oﬃ  cial patrons, the more amusing and undeferential cartoons 
are capable of being. Th e heavy hand of oﬃ  cial humour – ‘Chemical Ali’ 
or ‘Doctor Germ’ – lacks the easy zing of ‘the toxic Texan’ or ‘Blairforce 
One’, and the denunciations of their opponents by totalitarian regimes, as 
traitors, running dogs of capitalist imperialism, or subverters of the nation ’ s 
heritage, almost always lack any style or wit. Since the essence of satire is 
to deﬂ ate those persons and institutions who take themselves over-seriously 
or with great gravitas, gravitas is not the best place from which to generate 
or direct it. A ‘real’ or ‘grass-roots’ satire can do it without the malice which 
seems to sit more easily with ‘oﬃ  cial’ satire. Th e diﬀ erence between rulers 
and the ruled can be the diﬀ erence between satire and demonisation. 
 But rigid distinctions are usually too simple. If there is a scale, with the 
solemnity of ‘oﬃ  cial’ humour at one end and the lightness of ‘vernacular’ 
humour at the other, there is too a distinction between the humour associ-
ated with closed systems and that associated with open ones. Britain 
during the First World War could produce the cartoons of Bruce Bairns-
father who, despite his semi-oﬃ  cial status, could present the life of the 
ordinary infantry soldier in humorous rather than heroic terms. 41 In the 
Second World War, posters warning that ‘careless talk costs lives’ could, as 
well as taking the dramatic form of lurking spies and deadly gossip, portray 
the Nazi leadership, Hitler and Goering, as cartoon characters sitting on 
a bus eavesdropping on the gossip of two passengers. 
 Political humour and satire, despite their frequent capacity to discon-
cert, are still instruments of limited eﬀ ect. ‘Take the toys from the boys’ 
was eﬀ ective feminist deﬂ ation of military gravitas in the campaign against 
the siting of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom. But when John Hum-
phrys, interviewing Tony Blair on the  Today Programme , suggested that if 
the military threat from a Middle-Eastern nation were ever again used by 
the government as a reason for the UK to commit its troops abroad, 
everyone would laugh, the prime minister was disconcerted but no more. 
George Orwell was equally optimistic when he predicted that fascism with 
goose-stepping militia could never succeed in Britain, ‘because the people 
in the street would laugh.’ 42 If Humphrys and Orwell were right, it was a 
real check, but laughter has a short memory. 
 Even open societies limit speech by laws of libel and slander, but there 
is a frontier here which the smugglers of political information can some-
times cross to the advantage of citizens. Satire can enable things to be said 
which cannot be said. It enables messages to be passed in code which could 
not be passed directly.  Private Eye was able to communicate information 
about what became the Profumo scandal before anything could be said in 
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the more mainstream media, writing, for those who could read the code, 
about the antics of ‘gay, fun-loving Miss Gaye Funloving’. 43 
 Th ere is something of the relation between overdrafts and creditwor-
thiness in the prevalence of satire: the only people who can get them are 
those who don ’ t need them. Humour is only an eﬀ ective weapon against 
regimes and governments which, whilst they do not like it, do not ﬁ nd it 
intolerable, or are constrained by their espousal of freedom and democracy 
not to try to prevent it. Satire is an instrument of democracy, and one 
which will work only in democracies. So, paradoxically, whilst it may be a 
defence against bad government and an incitement to good government, 
it works best where government is already at the good end of the scale, 
and hardly works at all where it is most needed. Th ere is, therefore, for 
those who seek satire as the secret weapon of democrats, a problem, in 
that satire is most eﬀ ective in regimes against whom it is least necessary. 
Satire is a resource of citizens, rather than of those who are deprived of 
citizenship. Its presence is in part a symptom as much as a cause of open 
and intelligent politics. 
 Doubt is cast on the political relevance of satire by those who claim 
that it is not serious politics. Th is was the objection of some on the left to 
George Bernard Shaw, that by laughing at evils, people accept and come to 
tolerate them. In this view satire functions in a similar way to sour grapes, 
as a suﬃ  cient response to what is feared, despised, or disagreed with, and 
laughter necessarily not only ridicules, but trivialises. Satire can also be 
seen as an alternative to conﬂ ict. Th e late nineteenth-, early twentieth-
century German social theorist George Simmel claimed that some degree 
of discord could be a source of stability in society, the lords of misrule being 
a way of expressing resentments whilst making their causes acceptable – 
lords of misrule being the alternative to alternative lords, and rebellion. 44 
 So can satire be a diversion, a kind of bread and circuses to keep the 
intellectuals happy? It can certainly be an alternative to wounding attacks. 
In the House of Commons, William Hague as Conservative leader was 
consistently witty and often devastatingly satirical at the expense of the 
prime minister, Tony Blair. But this did not markedly help the party in 
opposition in either hampering or embarrassing the government, or in 
advancing their own electoral fortunes. It may be that, to be eﬀ ective, satire 
has to come from outside the circle of the powerful, otherwise it appears 
to ordinary citizens little more than a private ﬁ ght. 
 John Stuart Mill argued that ‘Th e amount of eccentricity in a society has 
generally been proportional to the amount of genius, mental vigour, and 
moral courage which it contained,’ 45 a concise advocacy of creative distinc-
tion. Th e point applies equally to sceptics and satirists. One mark of the 
position of a state on the scale from despotism to openness and democracy, 
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and of the corresponding degree of popular sovereignty, is the absence or 
presence of open satire, and the response of rulers to ridicule, as is their 
attitude towards free expression in general. Secret satire can exist in 
oppressive regimes, but its very secrecy is an indication of the lack of 
freedom. Conversely, one mark of the character of a body of subjects or 
citizens is the authority with which its members say and do whatever they 
please. Th ere are many reasons to be sceptical about the eﬀ ects of the 
World Wide Web, but even so the number of Internet cafés in a country 
is probably a better rough guide to the reality of its freedoms than are the 
formal clauses in its constitution. 46 
 Satire has been described as the canary down the mineshaft of political 
power. Th e problem with this metaphor is that if there is gas down there, 
the canary is dead. Laughing at a government to test its liberality can be 
a dangerous exercise in political testing, since the satirist may end up just 
like the canary, if not gassed, then at least caged. Even within democracies, 
would-be autocrats of one kind or another will assume that violence is jus-
tiﬁ ed in responding to their critics. Th e choices for the sceptical citizen at 
the two extremes of the spectrum are clear enough. No one would hesitate 
to publish satires of their rulers in Europe or North America. It would be 
unwise in China or Zimbabwe. But it is precisely where the atmosphere 
needs to be tested, and where there is an unstable mix of democracy 
and autocracy, liberty and control, in twenty-ﬁ rst century Turkey or Iran, 
that whilst the test may be of the greatest value, the danger to the brave 
canary is greatest. Wherever there is a conﬂ ict between the desire to laugh 
and the belief that one ’ s own identity is privileged and must not be chal-
lenged or ridiculed, the satirist and the citizen are in danger. In France in 
2015 that conﬂ ict, between aspirant authoritarians and a free press, led 
to murder. We may not think of comedians or cartoonists as the front-
line troops in the war for liberal democracy and popular sovereignty. 
But they can often be the forward patrols who test the terrain, with all 
the dangers that entails. Th ey deserve support and gratitude, as well as 
just laughter. 
 To be able to laugh at others and at oneself requires a level of critical 
reﬂ ection and awareness of identity which is not achieved if life is guided 
entirely by habit and deference. Unpredictability is a characteristic of 
democracy. Just as Mill gauged cultural vigour by the numbers of eccen-
trics, so the extent of a democratic society and the existence and vitality 
of a demos can be gauged by the extent of unpredictability and variety of 
identities. Th is raises a paradox, since if a vigorously democratic demos 
must expect not simply variety but eccentricity, troublemaking, and 
bloody-mindedness, one of the characteristics which some of its members 
may well display will be a disinclination to engage in politics at all, but to 
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pursue whatever private activities they choose. A single public identity is 
the last thing that a healthy demos will exhibit. 
 Satire provides one of many audits of government in a democracy. In 
that sense it is, whilst a feature of democracy, a road test on its healthy 
operation rather than a constituent part of its everyday life. Th at everyday 
life is composed of the multifarious details of public life, including what 
Ferdinand Mount has described as the ‘myths and rituals which a regime 
has allowed or, more usually, encouraged to grow up around itself ’. 47 A 
prime minister on a bicycle is diﬀ erent from one in a limousine, just as a 
citizen who is treated with courtesy by a public servant is diﬀ erent from 
one who is patronised or ignored. In a society where the rulers are also the 
ruled, the servants the masters, it is as true as elsewhere that if you have 
seen the servants, you do not need to see the master. 
 Carnival and masking, the lords of misrule: the people ’ s last resort 
before revolution 
 When laughter is dangerous, it can be presented in a form so outrageous 
that, as a brief departure from the manners and conventions of daily life, 
it can, at one level, be dismissed as a brief but temporary excess, a reversal 
of the normal but not, by that very fact, a threat. Th at is the character of 
carnival and of the various festivals in medieval and later Europe, where 
lords of misrule of one kind or another parodied the normal hierarchies 
of church or state, and the normal identities of rulers and ruled, if only for 
a day. Carnival can be threatening if erupting from below, or eﬀ ective at 
diverting threats if inspired from above, since it visibly subverts existing 
identities, and the more carefully they have been cultivated, the more 
elaborately they are subverted. Th e inverted order of carnival sets up boy 
bishops, not boy cobblers. 
 In Coventry in 1480, traditional rituals and practices were employed by 
groups of citizens in an extreme way in order to defend what they saw as 
their established rights against the claims and actions of the prior of St 
Mary ’ s. Th eir actions neither sustained the order nor challenged it, but 
engaged in politics within its general landscape by pushing its practices 
close to their limits, in one case by blocking the entrance to the priory with 
dung and rubbish. 48 Th e limits had been pushed further in Norwich in 
1443, when traditional Shrove Tuesday processions were anticipated many 
weeks early as a means of protesting against a ruling by the Earl of Suﬀ olk 
in a dispute between the city and the abbot of St Benet ’ s Hulme over water 
mills. 49 But such a form of cocking a snook at authority can be unstable; 
either it is so bizarre but so harmless that it does indeed serve to contain 
resentment and justify the continuation of the existing order of things, or 
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the resentment which it brieﬂ y masks is so intense that, as in Romans in 
southern France at the end of the sixteenth century, it becomes the vehicle 
and springboard for rebellion. In Romans in 1579, the Feast of St Blais, the 
patron saint of drapers, provided the occasion for an armed parade. Th ere 
was, too, a  reynage , the election of a ‘king’ of the celebrations. Th is may 
not have inverted the existing social and political order, but it provided a 
brief parody version of it. But in 1579 the assembled craftsmen, plough-
men, and other citizens elected not just a king of misrule, but a long-term 
leader for their political campaign of grievances against taxation and privi-
lege. In 1580 at carnival, the chosen popular leader, Paumier, regularly 
went around dressed as the Candlemas Bear, a symbol also associated with 
St Blais, bringing together both political and religious authority, and a 
parody of both. Th e events of February 1580, culminating in a coup and 
massacre by the old elite of the town against the leaders and members of 
the popular movement, was also conducted through the organisation of 
carnival, feasting, processions, and dancing, the latter providing the context 
within which the organisation and the carrying out of the attack on the 
popular forces took place. 50 In Romans, the authorities used carnival, a 
carnival of their own, as a mask for something much more bloody. But this 
was unusual. It was in France too, over two centuries later, that fear of what 
carnival and misrule might be about to become led once again to repres-
sion. In revolutionary France, the authorities banned the wearing of masks 
and carnival cross-dressing as concealing counter-revolutionary or royalist 
intent. 51 Carnival may be the last resort of an excluded population, a 
feature of a society not only far from democratic but only partially mobi-
lised, but it may also be the last resort of a dominant class to avoid revolu-
tion and allow discontent to evaporate into popular circuses. 
 Th e problem of professional rulers and the tension between 
sovereign democrats and their agents 
 Active citizens will not be indiﬀ erent to the identity of their leaders and in 
a democracy, and in a particular manner, the expressed identity of rulers 
and leaders is crucial, since citizens, whether they see rulers as leaders or 
as instruments, will expect to see in them a fuller expression of their own 
identity. Th e permanent tension within democracy means that the people 
are the players, and therefore expect those who are full-time players to 
be like them, whilst at the same they expect them to be exceptional ver-
sions of themselves, themselves as they might be, themselves transformed 
and elevated, yet still in touch with their roots. It is always an impos-
sible paradox. Th e logic of liberal representative democracy is that its 
leaders will be superordinary, though Ian Buruma has suggested that the 
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limitations this can place on ambitious self-presenters causes democratic 
leaders to strut on the world stage because they cannot strut at home. 52 A 
monarch or a theocrat has no constraints in publicly proclaiming his or 
her superiority, special insight into divine law, high breeding, or outstand-
ing qualities of understanding and leadership. Democratic leaders must in 
one sense believe themselves to be superior, but in a system which even 
formally and occasionally is described as government by the people, there 
are strong incentives for them to describe themselves as pretty ordinary 
guys or gals. Th ere are striking instances of this even in the modiﬁ cation 
of monarchies, which, far from being their transformation or abolition, 
are adaptations to democratic expectations in nations from the United 
Kingdom to Japan. 53 When Marie Antoinette dressed as a peasant at the 
Petite Trianon, it was for the entertainment of herself and her courti-
ers. When democratic leaders do it, it is to entertain and to entice their 
citizen subjects. 
 Conclusions 
 In democratic states there is a confusion and a tension between the equal-
ity which all people share as rulers, and the distinction which exists 
between the same people in their identity as ordinary subjects of the state 
and the specialised groups who carry out the day-to-day business of gov-
ernment. Th ere is a continuing tension between democracy as government 
by the people, which means that the people rule, and democracy as govern-
ment for the people, a tension which economic liberals have attempted to 
resolve by replacing or overlaying it with a consumer sovereignty in which 
the people are the customers but not the shopkeepers. 
 If the people are both rulers and ruled, then in some aspects of their 
lives they must be subordinate to others, oﬃ  cers or servants of the state. 
Th e pull towards association and equality on the one hand is met by the 
pull towards distinction and authority on the other. Th is is evident in every 
aspect of life in societies which claim to be democratic. On the one hand 
there can be an advocacy of democratic and egalitarian plumage, on the 
other a continual striving for distinction. Mao jackets and the universal 
title ‘comrade’ arrive to cultivate equality and solidarity, and the egalitarian 
title is rapidly qualiﬁ ed by the suﬃ  x ‘chairman’, ‘general’, or ‘manager’. Th e 
French Revolution of 1789 was wracked by just such stresses, apparently 
about little more than clothing, but in fact about the whole character of a 
democratic society and state, and part of the ambivalence of people as 
simultaneously rulers and subjects. In universities that seek the common 
identity of teachers and scholars, ‘professor’ is the title for all, but is simul-
taneously qualiﬁ ed by the preﬁ xes ‘full’, ‘associate’, or ‘foundation’. 
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 Th e greater the degree of democracy, the more it matters what feathers 
the demos wears, as well as what leaders wear. Th e identity of the citizen 
is an essential component of a democratic society. But government in 
whatever form attempts to acquire, patronise, regulate, and customise 
appearances and ritual for purposes which it leads and guides. Th e cultiva-
tion of all the aspects and dimensions of identity is a vital dimension of 
the ordering and management of political life, and a recurring aspiration 
of political leadership. In revolutionary France, a society compelled to 
include the masses, and hence to abolish the distinctiveness of a class of 
rulers, reintroduced order and predictability by constructing or cultivating 
other distinctions of both oﬃ  ce and gender. 54 In seventeenth-century revo-
lutionary England, the rebellion against royal autocracy transmuted into 
the repression of leveller and digger egalitarianism. 
 Being governed is being subject to rules and hence to uniformity and 
solidarity. Governing, on the other hand, is or can be dynamic and unpre-
dictable. Th is is why the term democracy refers to a form of life which 
is diﬀ erent from that of all other regimes. Since the people are not only 
governed, but the governors, they too are unpredictable and dynamic. 
It is, though with diﬃ  culty, possible to imagine a state with civil society 
and a free, variegated, and unpredictable populace which is nonetheless 
not a democracy. It might be argued that empires can be like this, but 
in fact if empires are a form of pluralist government of governments, 
then the population is not free from particular rulers, but is simply not 
directly subject to the overall imperial sovereign. Alternatively, civil 
society in a homogeneous centralised empire will be intolerant of local 
civil society. 
 Th e tension in identity between association and equality, and distinction 
and inequality, is reproduced in the paradox of the push and pull between 
the perennial ambitions of government and the continual impetus to polit-
ical inequality, and the continual assertion of democratic identity, the 
continual stress between the urge to govern and the democratic tempera-
ment, between the stubborn, sometimes bloody-minded, sometimes brave 
and enduring insistence from within the people of their sovereignty, and 
the sustained, relentless impetus of rulers, governors, elites, and managers, 
to preside, and to preside with presiding identities. Within the sovereign 
identity of the demos there is a further paradox, a never-resolvable stress 
between the desire for solidarity and homogeneous identity, and a forever 
renewed resistance to the freezing stare of Medusa and an insistence that 
if the people are sovereign, then each one of them has an inalienable right 
to cultivate his or her own identity, and to resist either the inclusion or the 
exclusion which is an unavoidable feature of the bear hug of one great all-
enveloping national character. Th e tensions and paradoxes of democratic 
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identity are inherent and inescapable. And they are crowned by the over-
arching paradox that they are the source both of democracy ’ s instability, 
and of its vitality and survival. 
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 Reformations, revolutions, continuity, 
and counter-reformations 
 Why revolutions are so sartorially perilous 
 In Robert Wise ’ s 1962 ﬁ lm  Two for the Seesaw , Shirley MacLaine reassures 
besuited middle-class lawyer Robert Mitchum, arriving at a Greenwich 
Village ﬂ at, ‘Take oﬀ  your hat, and no one will know you ’ ve come to the 
wrong party.’ 1 Th e colour of a pair of socks or the style of a shirt in settled 
times are matters of social recognition or at the worst mundane snobbery. 
In unsettled times, they can be matters of physical safety or even survival. 
When people are most uncertain or insecure in their identities, normally 
trivial items or actions can become evidence of friend or foe, and justiﬁ ca-
tion for alliance or attack. Because the costumes and scenery with which 
humans construct and cultivate their identities constitute their social exis-
tence, diﬀ erent costumes and scenery, diﬀ erent identities, have the capac-
ity to disconcert or antagonise, and to be the soil of conﬂ ict, just as readily 
as they can construct, cultivate, and conﬁ rm social existence and security. 
Even if other people are not treated as auxiliaries to a person ’ s identity, 
those people ’ s recognition of that identity plays an important role in the 
conﬁ dence with which its many elements are worn by its possessor. Con-
versely, the very existence of a diﬀ erent identity can seem to challenge the 
validity of the life constructed by the observer by calling into question its 
uniqueness, or by valuing a diﬀ erent form of life, and the apparently small-
est and least signiﬁ cant of diﬀ erences can be taken as evidence of an exis-
tential challenge. In Tehran in 2007, men and women were accused of 
attempting a ‘soft revolution’ against the regime, having been arrested for 
haircuts which were deemed to ﬂ out Islamic dress codes. 2 For young men 
in England in the 1950s, simply to wear a Teddy-boy jacket and haircut, 
or in the 1960s to ride a motorbike in a leather jacket or a moped with a 
short haircut, could be seen, however calm and law-abiding their behav-
iour, as announcing a threat to decent and orderly society. 3 
 A heightened sensitivity to the smallest digressions is not the only 
response to challenges to familiar identities. A despondent conviction that 
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nothing can be done and that attempts either to change things or to resist 
change will be both futile and onerous can seek security in acquiescence. 
As the headmaster played by John Cleese in Christopher Morahan ’ s ﬁ lm 
 Clockwise put it, ‘It ’ s not the despair, Laura. I can stand the despair. It ’ s 
the hope.’ 4 Th e burden and uncertainty of change or resistance can lead to 
defensive passivity. But when change is either actively promoted or ﬁ ercely 
resisted, all the dimensions of identity achieve prominence, and every 
aspect of identity becomes part of the politics of transition and revolution 
or of the defence of identities which until that point had been tacit, unob-
trusive, and mundane. Human plumage, like the quills of the porcupine 
or the hair of the cat, is ﬂ aunted and ﬂ ared not in moments of calm but 
in moments of crisis, and personality and identity are most attended to 
in times of transition. In the controversies within the Christian church in 
England in 603, the simple failure of Archbishop Augustine of Canterbury 
to rise to greet the bishops of the Celtic church was enough to indicate 
to them the invalidity of his entire theological and organisational claims. 5 
When in 1670 the archbishop of Mexico failed to lower the train of his 
robe in the presence of the viceroy, the gesture was deemed to threaten 
and was intended to threaten viceregal authority and that of the Spanish 
colonial regime. 6 In 2012 the reported burning of copies of the Koran by 
United States troops led to riots and death in Afghanistan. 7 During the 
French Revolution the allegation that royalist troops had trampled on 
tricolour cockades was a suﬃ  cient occasion for protest marches from 
their republican opponents. 8 Protest marches were not the only possible 
consequence of the choice and treatment of clothing. Th e wrong cut or 
the wrong colour could be enough to prove treason or counter-revolution. 
Every aspect of human clothing, conduct, and culture from the colour of 
a garment to the shape of a shoe could be seen as both a sign and a com-
ponent of an allied or an alien loyalty, and be the occasion for solidarity 
or hostility, fraternity or assault. 9 In revolutionary France, a police agent 
warned of the need to ‘survey carefully all those who seek to distinguish 
themselves from others; these are not true republicans’. 10 Comte Horace 
de Viel-Castel commented that ‘the crime of  lèse-costume , if one can so 
describe it, was a crime expiated on the scaﬀ old’, while Abbé Grégoire 
in a report to the Convention complained of the stigmatising of what he 
termed proper clothing and even ‘cleanliness and decency’ as ‘counter-
revolutionary crimes’. 11 And just as familiarity and similarity with associ-
ates can become a mark of security and solidarity, so the distinction within 
a group or nation of exceptional status or more intense representativeness 
can become an indication of hostility or threat. When the call is for ‘ les 
aristocrates à la lanterne! ’ the tension which is always there between 
association and distinction becomes deadly, and it becomes perilous to 
c05.indd   148 6/5/2017   12:21:06 PM
 revolution, (counter)reformation, continuity 149
mark yourself out as a distinguished or exceptional representative of 
the nation. 
 In China in the twentieth century, periods of revolution and insta-
bility were marked by the stigmatising of supposed enemies identiﬁ ed 
by their dress. Young red guards attacked in the street people whose 
dress infringed political etiquette, treating clothing as both a sign and 
an active pursuit of counter-revolution. 12 Th e meaning of appearance is 
ﬂ uent and ﬂ exible, arising not from material qualities but from social 
narrative and perception. As the narratives changed, dress could be con-
demned as insuﬃ  ciently modern, insuﬃ  ciently Chinese, or revealing a 
bourgeois and counter-revolutionary deviation. 13 But the ﬂ exibility of the 
signiﬁ cance of dress did not diminish the potential violence of its con-
sequences. Whilst it may be possible to get away with no more than 
condescension or humour by going to a funeral in brown boots, small 
pieces of fabric can be the bearers of overwhelming signiﬁ cance. 14 In the 
United States in the twenty-ﬁ rst century, the possibility that opponents 
of the Bush administration ’ s foreign policy might burn the national ﬂ ag 
caused such outrage that a law to make ﬂ ag-burning a speciﬁ c crime was 
in June 2006 defeated in the Senate by only one vote. 15 It was not the ﬁ rst 
time the Stars and Stripes had been prominent in the politics of protest 
and outrage. In Boston in 1976 its use as a weapon against a black lawyer 
by a white opponent of bussing as means of educational desegregation, 
caught on camera by Stanley Forman, concentrated and intensiﬁ ed politi-
cal passions. 16 To attack a fellow citizen with a pole was assault; to attack 
him with a ﬂ agpole to which the nation ’ s ﬂ ag was attached was secular 
sacrilege. 
 An even more powerful component of identity in times of conﬂ ict, 
uncertainty, and transition is the one which is the most unavoidably public 
and social: language. Whilst it is possible to talk to no one but oneself, lan-
guage – unlike clothing, architecture, or eating – normally requires more 
than one person, one to speak and one to listen and understand, and the 
listener needs to be present or able to hear before the speaker begins. For 
language to do its job of conﬁ rming association, there has to be compre-
hension between the speaker and at least one other person. Th is privileges 
language as a dimension of shared identity, making it uniquely dependent 
on recognition by others. Th e identity function of language may also be 
quite the opposite where the language of the elite is privileged, where the 
mass of people do not understand it and thereby have their inferiority 
or cultural subordination cultivated and sustained. Failure to understand 
in this instance is as important as ability to understand in the other. In 
each case, others beyond the speaker, who can be assumed to hear either 
directly or indirectly, are necessary. 
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 Because language has a special place as a component of identity, its 
denial can be the occasion for the most resolute and violent political 
action. Th e uprising within Pakistan which resulted in the creation of the 
new state of Bangladesh was fuelled by the attempt of the government in 
the west to establish Urdu as the national language, and the resistance of 
those in the east whose identity was vitally sustained by their use of Bengali. 
One of the celebratory days of Bengali assertion was the ‘Language Day’, 
commemorating 21 February 1952 when four students were shot in Dhaka 
during a protest over the promotion of Urdu. 17 
 How a person speaks is frequently even more vital to their security 
in unsettled times than how they dress. Th e origin of the term ‘shib-
boleth’ illustrates the potential importance of vocabulary and pronun-
ciation. Th e Book of Judges recounts that in ﬁ ghting between the tribes 
of Gilead and Ephraim, ﬂ eeing Ephraimites tried to pass themselves oﬀ  
as members of the tribe of Gilead, so were asked to pronounce ‘shib-
boleth’. Th ose who could only manage ‘sibboleth’ were killed as enemies 
posing as friends. 18 A similar turnpike for murder or survival occurred 
in England during the peasant uprising of 1381, when those who said 
‘case and brode’ instead of ‘bread and cheese’ were allegedly killed as 
foreign Flemings. 19 In the Dominican Republic in 1937, the pronuncia-
tion of names was equally fatal in the so-called ‘parsley massacres’, when 
President Trujillo ’ s policy of clearing the frontier areas of Haitians by both 
expulsion and killing was pursued by his troops with requests aimed to 
detect whether or not a Spanish ‘r’ was used in the words  perejil (parsley) 
or  tijera (scissors). 20 Saying serviette rather than napkin was never so 
perilous. 
 Th e distinction between private and public is particularly ﬂ uid and 
uncertain in revolutions 
 Identity is cultivated both by association with others and by distinction 
from others. It is thus impossible to separate a threat to a collective identity 
from one to the identity of an individual, or to exclude individual identities 
from the assertion of new or altered collective ones. ‘Honour’, ‘repute’, or 
‘reputation’ is far more than a matter of personal vanity, and continually 
expands to enrol others in the identity of the individual, or recruit the 
individual to the identity of the collective. When new identities are being 
attempted or old ones attacked, one aspect of the ﬂ uidity involved is uncer-
tainty as to the boundaries between public and private, or even of the 
meaningfulness of the two terms. When transformation is hoped for or 
feared, every aspect of identity becomes potentially contested, and the 
apparently smallest component of personal identity can be taken as a 
c05.indd   150 6/5/2017   12:21:06 PM
 revolution, (counter)reformation, continuity 151
litmus test proclaiming the identity of the whole person or group. Th is 
leakage of meanings was a cause of continual uncertainty during the revo-
lution in France, and the distinction between personal insult and political 
challenge dissolved as every aspect of individual life could constitute mem-
bership of a greater political grouping. 21 Th e choice of playing cards or the 
design of a plate could reveal loyalty or treason. 22 
 Th e unsocial individual who acts without any reference to the values 
or conventions of the society which he or she inhabits is in peaceful and 
conﬁ dent times treated with a range of reactions from suspicion to satire. 
A whole school of humour depends on just that judgment. But what 
is a matter for no more than tolerance or derision in stable times can 
be responded to with a passionate perception of deviance or danger in 
times of uncertainty or transition. Whilst alternative identities, however 
unobtrusively or privately they are displayed, provide threats to moral or 
religious reformers who seek to recruit all members of their society as 
auxiliaries to their own identities, they are even more threatening to the 
most ambitious of all cultivators of auxiliaries – governments and those 
who seek governmental power for religious or cultural strategies. Th e more 
ambitious the attempted transformation, the more intrusive the policing 
of every aspect of behaviour, whether in a public space or in the seclusion, 
but no longer the privacy, of the household. Books read, songs sung, jokes 
told, can all be treated as symptoms of dangerous opposition. It is precisely 
because a Bolshevik after 1917 believed so passionately that the world is 
secular and material, and because that belief was part of who he or she 
was, that religion was suppressed and oppressed in the new Soviet Union. 
It might have seemed a more practical and altogether easier route, if simple 
power were all there was to it, for the new regime to recruit Orthodox 
Christianity to its retinue of support, or simply ignore it. But that would 
have been inconceivable. A Marxist materialist could not take seriously the 
claims of religion any more than an Orthodox Christian could treat the 
doctrines of Bolshevism as much more than a cover for materialism and 
the greed for goods and power. To allow an alternative set of assumptions 
about the nature of the world and its human inhabitants, assumptions 
which were visibly and audibly nurtured in the religious worship of Ortho-
dox Christians, would have been to admit that communism and dialectical 
materialism were no more than possible options amongst many ways of 
living. At the other end of the twentieth century, the rulers of communist 
China harassed and suppressed the Falun Gong movement not because 
it actively opposed the communist identity, but because it ignored it. It 
is not only ambitious socialites for whom there is only one thing worse 
than being talked about, and that is not being talked about. For ambitious 
states, being ignored is one of the most humiliating forms of opposition, 
c05.indd   151 6/5/2017   12:21:06 PM
152 cultivating political and public identity 
and one of the most damaging threats to the conﬁ dence with which they 
cultivate their identities. 
 Four responses and strategies in circumstances of transition 
 Th e greatest attention is paid to the costumes, culture, and scenery of 
public life when change is being attempted, accommodated, or resisted. A 
settled and uncontested identity does not need robust expression; a hoped-
for one does, and like a resisted or resented one is the occasion for attempts 
both at creation and assertion and at undermining and destruction. In 
times of actual or attempted transition and change of identities, four prin-
cipal strategies can be detected: the introduction of new forms of identity 
or the adoption by individuals or groups of diﬀ erent identities – new 
plumage; the attempt to destroy or discredit current practice as one part 
of the creation of new identities – plucking the old plumage; the attempt 
to eﬀ ect change by presenting new identities as continuous with or reas-
sertions or developments or fulﬁ lments of old or existing manners and 
customs, which manners and customs may be real or invented, reclassify-
ing or redeﬁ ning, arguing that the old was always pointing in the newly 
desired direction – grafting the new onto the old; and the assertion or 
reassertion of existing customs and ways of life – defending. Th ese four 
ideal types, creation, destruction, grafting, and defending, provide the span 
within which the most robust assertions of public identity occur. Th e min-
gling of these ideal types will in the actual world be a means of cultivating 
change, or adapting to change by domesticating it, or of resisting change 
or subverting or avoiding it. 
 Creation 
 When an attempt is made to create a new world either by rulers or by 
revolt against rulers, every aspect of human identity ﬁ nds a place on the 
revolutionary agenda. Whilst attempted transformation from above diﬀ ers 
in many ways from insurrection from below, each seeks to create new 
identities, and may do so across the whole range of human culture. Th ere 
are both destructive and creative dimensions to such campaigns. In their 
extreme form, they involve the attempt to completely replace one way of 
life with another by replacing one set and kind of people with another. 
Th is, though gradually and selectively, was what England attempted in 
Ireland after 1652, following Cromwell ’ s seizing control of the country at 
the conclusion of a dozen years of rebellion and unrest. Th e Down Survey 
of land, its ownership, use, and inhabitants which William Petty organised 
in Ireland after 1652 was to be the basis of a transformation by selective 
c05.indd   152 6/5/2017   12:21:06 PM
 revolution, (counter)reformation, continuity 153
resettlement of human life in the island. Each year, 10,000 Irish women of 
marriageable age were to be exchanged with the same number from 
England. Th e latter would raise families of English culture or household 
economy – food, clothing, manner of life – the former would be widely 
distributed and absorbed in English culture. 23 But the attempted Anglicisa-
tion of Ireland was one instance only of a history of ambitions to transform 
identity, ranging from compulsory changes in religion, or dress, or lan-
guage, through expulsion and colonisation, to mass killing. Attempts to 
destroy peoples, both by the killing or expulsion of their members, or by 
destroying their government, their language, or their cultural practices, 
occur throughout human history. English ambitions in Ireland had many 
precedents, and the killing of Danes in Britain in 1002 or the expulsion of 
Jews in 1290 exempliﬁ ed a recurring desire for familiarity, uniformity, and 
the elimination of diﬀ erence. 24 
 Th e revolutionary regime in France changed not only the divisions of 
the calendar and the names which described them, but the titles of profes-
sions and the names of tasks. Lawyers who had been  procureurs and 
 avocats under the monarchy were rebranded as  hommes de loi under the 
new order. 25 Th e French Revolution was not unique in this respect. 
Twentieth-century communist revolutions in Russia and China, which 
claimed to have introduced socialist equality, entitled all their members as 
comrade, though hierarchy continued to ﬂ ourish as the egalitarian title 
became an adjective in front of ‘general’, ‘chairman’, or ‘leader’. Nor were 
revolutions original in their use of language, clothing, or the other attrib-
utes of visible and audible identity. In 1892 the imperial government of 
China argued that political and administrative reform required not only 
the adoption of Western ways of conducting public business but the adop-
tion of Western dress, a policy which was subsequently spelled out in detail 
with distinctive etiquette for morning and evening wear. 26 
 Just as people and jobs can be given a new identity with a new name, 
so can places. Colonists arriving in unfamiliar lands will seek the recon-
struction of their homeland by old names, or rituals of home archi-
tecture, cooking, or festivals: New Amsterdam, New Hampshire, New 
York. Th reat or attack strengthens this reconstruction, and transforms 
the smallest details into icons of identity. In the colonial conﬂ ict with 
the indigenous people of New England at the end of the seventeenth 
century,
 English possessions were, in a sense, what was at stake in the war, for these 
– the clothes they wore, the houses they lived in, and the things they owned 
– were a good part of what diﬀ erentiated the English from the Indians. Th ese 
were not simply material diﬀ erences, they were cultural, for every English 
frock coat was stitched with threads of civility, each thatched roof rested 
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on a foundation of property rights, and every cupboard housed a universe 
of ideas. 27 
 Th e ambitions of rulers have again and again been to transform their 
populations, to change, as Peter the Great sought to change in Russia, their 
people from ‘beasts into human beings’. 28 When Kemal Atatürk began the 
construction of modern Turkey, the creation of a new nation involved a 
comprehensive revision of identity, and clothing and headgear were not 
excluded from the agenda; the wearing of the fez was forbidden by law. 
New regimes could be introduced and sustained by new identities, reli-
gious as well as secular. Th e emperor Constantine constructed his unique 
identity by the adoption of a new religion, and in consequence the Chris-
tian church became the oﬃ  cial religious body of the Roman Empire. 
 New worlds can be built from the human inside with the clothing, lan-
guage, and habits of new identity, and from the outside with new towns 
and cities, new secular and religious public buildings. New building is a 
manner of stating a new, revised, or ascendant identity. Pippin, father of 
Charlemagne, inaugurated a massive programme of cathedral and church 
building, the import of saintly remains and relics, and new or elaborated 
ceremonies and anointings. It was a use of ecclesiastical scenery and liturgy 
which was to be frequently repeated, and discussing the later church build-
ing of eleventh-century Europe, Diarmaid MacCulloch commented that 
‘each new church was a reform in stone.’ 29 
 Utopia has always been well inhabited by architects, and the plans for 
improved or transformed humanity have again and again been drafted in 
street plans and elevated homes and public buildings, and allocations and 
distributions of space which embodied and embedded social hierarchies 
and distinctions. As Th omas Markus has argued:
 A characteristic feature of utopian town and building plans is the high degree 
of zoning, classiﬁ cation and functional deﬁ nition. Each person, group and 
activity has its speciﬁ cally deﬁ ned and ﬁ xed location. Th ese locations repre-
sent the classiﬁ cation system of the society and its activities which the 
designer assumes in his or her universal scheme. Th e most evident expres-
sions of this drive to perfect order can be seen in organisations or institutions 
where there is the largest gap between controllers and the controlled. Institu-
tions for the physically or mentally sick, for the criminal, and for the young, 
hospitals, asylums, prisons, workhouses and schools display all the features 
of elaborate classiﬁ cation. 30 
 When the industrialist Titus Salt wanted his Yorkshire mill to be not just 
the centre of a thriving economy, but of a wholesome and reformed popu-
lace, he built the modestly entitled Saltaire on the River Aire with orderly 
clear streets, and buildings for the promotion of learning, religion, and 
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health. Political leaders ambitious for the character of their new nations, 
or the new character of their nations, have constructed new capital cities 
and frequently done so in new places: Washington in the new nation of 
the United States, Canberra in Australia, Ankara in Turkey, Brasilia in 
Brazil, St Petersburg in tzarist Russia, Astana in Kazakhstan, or Naypyidaw 
in Burma/Myanmar. 31 Just as those who seek a new or an improved society 
can build grand cities for improved humanity, so those who want only to 
remedy the ﬂ aws which mar existing humanity look to the arrangement of 
urban spaces to design out crime. 32 
 Existing and new components of identity can be used both by 
and against elites 
 Th e subordination of others as auxiliaries or extras in the drama of one ’ s 
own identity has as its obverse the cultivation and assertion of identity as 
resistance to domination or oppression, and the eﬀ orts by all manner of 
religious and political movements, sects, and parties to create new worlds 
by means of language, dress, music, and every aspect of human behaviour 
and creativity in place of societies whose character or controllers they 
repudiate or wish to transcend. 
 When people who have lived under coercive rule demonstrate against 
it, they are cultivating a diﬀ erent identity as active citizens, democrats, 
members of an oppressed nation, religion, or ethnic group. What happens 
is similar to the transformation of identity in war as described by Hegel. 
Whatever conception or perception of external circumstances there may 
be, there is also, and of equal importance, a conception of identity which 
is formed and shaped in relation to those circumstances, and in particular 
in relation to the conception of others who constitute the social, human, 
dimension of those circumstances. People who see themselves as both part 
of and an expression or instance of a national insurgency are not the same 
people as they were when they saw themselves as isolated, albeit in no 
sense unique, underlings in a tightly controlling autocracy. ‘ Aux armes, 
citoyens ’ is not only a call to citizens, it is a call which creates citizens. 
Language as the creation and cultivation of identity was dramatically 
depicted in Arnold Wesker ’ s 1958 play  Roots , where in beginning to talk 
as a radical, a person becomes a radical. 33 Whilst subjects can become 
citizens through speaking out, nationalists can oppose alien rule or the 
remnants of alien rule by renaming their land and its cities. Bombay 
becomes Mumbai, Madras becomes Chennai, and Calcutta reverts to its 
earlier, indigenous pre-anglicised title of Kolkata. 
 Attempts to create a diﬀ erent public order will frequently be pursued 
through movements which themselves cultivate new public identities for 
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their members, followers, or supporters. Music is but one of the ways 
in which new identities can be cultivated, or existing ones enhanced or 
strengthened. 34 For many English Protestants in the reign of Edward VI, 
music in church was initially regarded with suspicion because of an asso-
ciation with the Catholic mass, for what a people will not do can be 
as important a part of their identity as what they will. 35 In nineteenth-
century Britain, Chartists paraded in their thousands with music, banners, 
and song. Processions, rallies, concerts, and feasts were a collective and 
identity-sustaining activity, acting for political movements as marching 
music acted for military formations; playing musical instruments was 
widespread, and singing involved everyone. 36 Th e cultivation of new iden-
tities in movements seeking new political and social orders could display 
many of the same features as religion, with a sense of transformational 
goals and values and resources beyond the limitations of an inadequate 
or ﬂ awed present, providing the faithful with a sense of transcendent col-
lective personality which gave individuals a perception of both belonging 
and meaning. For members of the Communist Party in the ﬁ rst half of 
the twentieth century, the collective mission of creating a new social and 
political order, and the separation from society as it existed which pur-
suing that goal provided, gave a sense of identity in a common purpose 
analogous to that which a believer gained from a church or religious 
crusade. 37 On the right of the political spectrum, fascist movements both 
presented themselves as the true expression of their nation ’ s culture and 
destiny, distinction within association, and created extensive and elabo-
rate rituals, regalia, and activities as components of a new, distinctive, 
and radically separate identity. So on the one hand the British Union of 
Fascists could attempt to incorporate the rituals of Armistice Day into 
its own public image by holding fascist commemorations complete with 
wreaths, dipped colours, and bugle calls, or the rituals of familiar Christi-
anity with ‘fascist baptism’, whilst on the other hand uniforms, invocation 
of new dawns, and denunciation of existing society laid claim to a new and 
radical identity. 38 
 Th e careful use of clothing can be a way of asserting particular identity 
against a homogenising imperial state or a dominant group or class, as 
readily as it can be the instrument of a state, class, or group which wishes 
to recruit more eﬀ ectively the loyalties of those whom it treats as subordi-
nates. Identity is attributed to appearance, not inherent in it, and clothing 
shares in this ﬂ exibility. In 1960s Britain a characteristic outer garment 
of the radical young, much seen on demonstrations by the Campaign 
for Nuclear Disarmament, was the duﬄ  e coat. Th e same garment, in the 
recent past, had been the characteristic outdoor wear of military ﬁ gures 
in ﬁ lms celebrating Britain ’ s heroic moments in the Second World War. 
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 A similar ﬂ uidity in the signiﬁ cance of clothing occurs in religious iden-
tity. In medieval and Catholic Europe, simple dress was part of the identity 
of monks, friars, and nuns, and if there was colour, it was often black or 
brown. Th e Protestant reaction in and after the European Reformation 
distanced itself from what it saw as the excesses of the Catholic church by 
adopting its own version of the very visual signs of Catholic monasticism: 
simple clothes, absence of colour, preference for black. Similarly, in 
eighteenth-century Britain, the equality of all the faithful was promoted 
by religious leaders through an advocacy of simple clothing for all, a sarto-
rial politics common to Quakers and Methodists. 39 Th e materials of iden-
tity have ever been ﬂ exible, deriving meaning from the contexts in which 
they are employed. 
 Destruction 
 Change can be attempted by destruction as well as by creation, and one 
tactic amongst many is the obliteration of aspects of identity which are 
depicted as hostile, antisocial, treacherous, or alien. Th ere is a metaphor 
for an important element in the understanding of identity in the stories of 
witchcraft ’ s harming real people through dolls which represent them, and 
the idea that somehow the ‘real’ person is contained in a manufactured 
object. In at least one ﬁ ctional account of witchcraft, the physical survival 
of a person depends on, is indeed embedded in, a series of manufactured 
objects. Th e seven horcruxes in J. K. Rowling ’ s Harry Potter series of books 
contain the physical life of the opponent, and their destruction destroys 
him. But this is not only fantasy. Th e conduct of individual and national 
self-assertion, where it involves the destruction of the social existence of 
an enemy, involves precisely this destruction of the material embodiments 
of the enemy ’ s life. Th is is the stuﬀ  of fairy stories, but it reﬂ ects something 
far more real about human identity. 
 Th e Nazis, in destroying the physical structure of Jewish culture in 
Poland, planned to remove selected artefacts to museums, thus simultane-
ously preserving a record but, by so doing, denying the real continuing 
existence of those whom they sought to destroy by assigning the remaining 
fragmentary components of the material and artistic dimension of identity 
to an exhibition of the past. 
 Th ere was nothing new in such identity warfare conducted by the 
destruction of culture. Th e Reformation in Europe was conducted in part 
through image breaking, the destruction of objects. Nor was such politics 
conﬁ ned to speciﬁ cally religious zealots. During the revolutionary con-
ﬂ icts of eighteenth-century France, a resurgence of the cult in Toulouse of 
Notre-Dame-la-Noire, the Black Madonna, was countered by secular 
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opponents burning the revered statue. 40 Iconoclasm is not restricted to 
societies thought of as religious, nor is it foreign to societies thought of as 
secular. Flags and the images of leaders and presidents can accumulate 
reverence similar to that accorded to sacred images, and can correspond-
ingly be vulnerable to equally extreme hostility. Th e toppling and smashing 
of Saddam Hussein ’ s statue after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was treated 
by the press and television as a transformative act, evidence of a new politi-
cal culture and an end to the old regime. Th e destruction two years earlier 
by the Taleban regime in Afghanistan of the 1500-year-old statues of the 
Buddha in the Bamiyan valley and of a Palmyra temple by Isis in Syria in 
2015 were accorded similar status by the image breakers, acts which both 
symbolised and constituted the Islamic orthodoxy of the country and the 
removal of anything which contributed to an alternative and hence hostile 
human life. Statues and monuments have always been vulnerable to the 
ambitions of those who want to establish or consolidate new orders, though 
not always by means of destruction. Th e government of Germany had 
plans in 1940 for Nelson ’ s Column, after a successful invasion, to be trans-
ported triumphantly to Berlin. 41 Statues are destroyed, or captured, not 
only as symbols but as constituent parts of cultures which are alien to their 
destroyers. 
 Detainees at the United States’ prison camp at Guantanamo Bay allege 
that when interrogators were attempting to extract information, they 
defaced copies of the Koran in a prisoner ’ s presence. 42 Th is was not con-
ventional torture, though physical coercion and torture were used as well. 
But it was threat to the identity of the prisoner. Children who chant ‘Sticks 
and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me’ describe 
an indiﬀ erence to the potential threat to identity that is bold rather than 
realistic. Insults and taunts may be shrugged oﬀ , but threats to an existing 
identity, to the very essence of what makes people who they are, can be as 
fearsome as threats to their physical security and survival. Guantanamo ’ s 
Koran occupied the same family as Orlando ’ s housekeeper ’ s wedding ring. 
Similarly, books are burnt not just to prevent their being read, but symboli-
cally to destroy the culture which they express. Archives, libraries, and 
museums, as well as churches and mosques, will be targets for the destruc-
tion or scattering of identity. A charge made against the actions of Israel 
in its military conﬂ ict with Palestinians in Nablus, and after the establish-
ment of the state of Israel, was that records of identity had deliberately 
been destroyed in order to obliterate historical evidence of the identity of 
the Palestinian nation. 43 
 Th e revival of real, imagined, or repackaged pasts is not only a presenta-
tion of positive narratives, but also of the remembrance of deﬁ ning hostili-
ties and an attempt to pursue, or repursue, old enemies. Among the features 
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of a revived Scottish nationalism at the end of the twentieth century was 
a renewed interest in the highland clearances which had depopulated large 
parts of northern and western Scotland to the proﬁ t of the aristocracy. One 
focus of this political retargeting was a memorial to:
 one of the traditional villains of this tragedy, the ﬁ rst Duke of Sutherland. In 
1994, an unsuccessful campaign was waged to remove the statue of the Duke 
from the place it has occupied on a 100-ft pillar on Ben Bhraggie, near 
Golspie. Comparisons were made with the removal of statues in the former 
Soviet Empire, but opinions were divided, and there were those who wished 
to retain the statue precisely because it served ‘to remind the people of the 
iniquities that took place and of the continuing absurdity of how land is held 
and who has power over it’. 44 
 Th ose seeking to create an identity frequently put a great deal of eﬀ ort into 
destroying the physical context of other identities. From Carthage to 
Armenia, from Palestine to Tibet, the conquerors destroyed the physical 
constructions and contexts of those whose present, future, and past they 
sought to remove and deny. Th e more evident the material expression of 
a conquered or colonised group, class, religion, or culture, the more likely 
the physical destruction of that expression by the conqueror. 45 Heinrich 
Himmler commented on the destruction of Warsaw, begun with the initial 
invasion in 1939 and accelerated with the 1944 rising, that ‘Warsaw, the 
capital city, the brain, the intelligence of this Polish nation, will have been 
obliterated.’ 46 During the civil wars in the territories of the former Yugo-
slavia, churches and mosques were destroyed, not as military targets but 
as cultural ones, as constituents of the identity of opponents. 47 
 Th e dimensions of identity during conﬂ ict and transition extend to the 
entire constructed human environment. But the more substantial the arte-
facts, the more diﬃ  cult is swift change or new construction. Cockades and 
shirts can be changed – statues, monuments, and buildings are rather less 
malleable; destruction is easier and swifter as an assertion of dominance 
by conquerors, colonists, or new regimes. Just as buildings can convey 
messages, so can their demolition and the depiction of their destruction 
be a means of destroying one identity and asserting another. Robert Bevan ’ s 
account of the demolition of buildings in sectarian and national conﬂ icts 
is appropriately named  Th e Destruction of Memory. Th e Twin Towers of 
the World Trade Center in New York, destroyed in a terrorist attack in 
2001, served both for attackers and attacked as an expression and a con-
stituent part of US economic, and global economic, power and prestige. 48 
In Paris in 1871, the communards demolished the Vendôme column with 
the statue of Napoleon on top of it, an action far more readily possible than 
the construction of an alternative polity and society. 49 Th e human eﬀ ort 
devoted to such destruction is inexplicable in narrowly utilitarian terms. 
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But as part of the bitter conﬂ icts of identity it provides a destructive 
product at a price the destroyers of identity are happy to pay. 
 Th e most powerful elements of an identity reside in the physical pres-
ence of the person, and after the artefacts have been destroyed, the destruc-
tion of the body is the ﬁ nal counter-assertion. Th e execution of kings and 
presidents has an identity-denying or identity-destroying function far out-
weighing any merely utilitarian military or political strategy. Th e killing of 
symbolic opponents, whether witches or opposition journalists, serves to 
dramatise a victory of one identity over another, just as it dramatises heroic 
deﬁ ance and murderous oppression. But whilst the symbolic killing of 
leaders may be part of a limited destruction of human life in the search to 
establish new identities, the killing can be far more extensive, seeking 
change not by altering the identity of a people, but by obliterating it. 
 Grafting and excavation 
 New identities can be formed either by recycling old ones, or by presenting 
innovation as continuity with overlooked precedents or by the discovery 
or rediscovery of traditional customs and practices. Th e presentation of 
continuity is a strategy which can serve several purposes. It may be a 
means of lubricating the mechanisms of change, or a partly cosmetic exer-
cise by the agents or initiators of change. 
 Th e presentation of continuity in order to facilitate change is an ancient 
strategy. Ever since Pope Gregory the Great, the Christian church has 
known how to introduce new religion on old foundations. Gregory had 
advised Augustine, whom he had sent to establish Rome ’ s jurisdiction in 
England through the archiepiscopate of Canterbury, to graft his teaching 
and his worship onto the existing beliefs and practices of his potential 
ﬂ ock, building new churches on old pre-Christian sacred sites, not in order 
to obliterate those sites but to secure continuity with existing religious 
loyalties. Th e Christian church when it began proselytising in South 
America, followed the same practice. 50 Both clergy and laity in Reforma-
tion and post-Reformation Europe employed similar devices of continuity 
with sacred sites in nature, although the cultivation of continuity between 
new Protestantism and old Catholic popular pieties was as much an unra-
tionalised search for the securities of old habit in ameliorating engagement 
with new doctrines as a deliberate justiﬁ catory tactic. 51 It was not without 
ancient precedents. Th e historical books of the Old Testament record 
discovery after discovery of old and neglected tablets in the temple when-
ever a secular or a religious leader wanted to reform religious observance. 
Th e church in Europe throughout the Middle Ages employed similar 
devices, manufacturing ancient doctrinal and devotional identities as sanc-
tion for new ecclesiastical practices with a series of forged papal, royal, and 
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imperial decrees.  Th e Protocols of the Elders of Zion was no more than one 
of the more unpleasant additions to an ancient practice, paralleled in the 
narratives of cultural nationalism by the alleged ancient poems of Ossian, 
fabricated in eighteenth-century Scotland by their supposed discoverer, 
James MacPherson. 52 
 Nationalist assertion in places where the nation is not the state and the 
government is culturally diﬀ erent from the culture which nationalists seek 
to create is frequently composed in part of a distinctiveness in dress, and 
an attempt to spread, develop, recover, or rediscover distinct nationalist 
forms of clothing. In Hungary in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, there was an attention to early or original Magyar forms of appear-
ance and decoration, and the incorporation of designs and motifs from a 
supposed Magyar origin into the fabric, literally, of everyday life. 53 Iconic 
images from folk art became embedded in a national identity cultivated in 
costumes, in architecture, and even in confectionary. 54 
 As well as nationalist assertion within an existing state, political asser-
tion which does not challenge the national identity can involve contests 
over the scenery of public life. In Britain during the nineteenth century 
there was what has been referred to as ‘statue mania’, 55 and whilst the ﬁ rst 
surge of creation and placing was of establishment ﬁ gures, dissident identi-
ties also laid claim to their own environment with the installation of statues 
to radical leaders. After the death in 1855 of the Chartist leader Feargus 
O’Connor, statues were erected in a number of British towns, in what Paul 
Pickering has described as ‘part and parcel of the Chartists’ assertion of 
their rights as citizens’. 56 
 Nor has the identity signiﬁ cance of food ever been neglected. Creative 
eating can be used as a means of sustaining, restoring, or introducing 
particular social arrangements. Sir Benjamin Heywood described the 
Christmas dinner held in Manchester in 1835 as designed to promote 
social solidarity across classes:
 for the purpose of receiving and preserving, with the hearty old holiday 
customs of our forefathers, the social and joyous feelings with which they 
were accompanied; that our kindly and benevolent sympathies might be 
awakened, and that with us, as with our forefathers on these occasions, there 
might be hospitality in the hall, and charity in the heart. 57 
 Defence: assertion, reassertion, and discovery in times of stress 
and uncertainty 
 Celebrants of settled order have frequently been aware that changes in the 
visible and external character of men and women can be corrosive of exist-
ing ranks, conventions, and culture. At the end of the sixteenth century in 
England, Philip Stubbes complained that:
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 it is very hard to knowe, who is noble, who is worshipfull, who is a gentle-
man, who is not: for you will have those, which are neither of the nobylitie 
gentilitie nor yeomanry, no, nor yet anie Magistrat or Oﬃ  cer in the common 
welth, go daylie in silkes, velvets, satens, damasks, taﬀ eties and such like, 
notwithstanding that they be both base by byrthe, meane by estate, & servyle 
by calling. 58 
 In the eighteenth century, Daniel Defoe deplored the poor dressing, or 
trying to dress, above their station. 59 Even more disconcerting than simple 
boundary challenging by those lower down the social and political hierar-
chy is novelty, variety, and unpredictability. A Chinese journalist in 1912 
complained that ‘Chinese are wearing foreign clothes, while foreigners 
wear Chinese clothes; men are adorned like women and women like men; 
prostitutes imitate girl students, and girl students look like prostitutes.’ 60 
For just as cultivated character is expressive of one order of social life, it 
can be also a challenge, a deﬁ ance, or an abandoning of that order. Th e 
minutiae of tangible, visible, and audible character are never so carefully 
marked as when they appear challenged or in ﬂ ux. In twentieth-century 
Bhutan, one way of attempting to preserve what was seen as a distinctive 
way of life was to insist, both by social pressure and by public law, on a 
distinctive Bhutanese form of dress. 
 Th e defence of language, and a corresponding hostility to what are seen 
as foreign inﬂ uences on or imports into spoken and written identity, 
becomes more energetic and more conservative when identity is believed 
to be threatened. A contributor to  Le Monde warned readers in 1979 
‘Beware! If the French language recedes all we who speak it are threatened 
in our identity and being.’ 61 
 At times of social or national stress or uncertainty, the construction of 
the public stage can be used to reassure by asserting or reasserting public 
identities. Th e commemoration of the dead is also a sanctiﬁ cation of the 
living, and the memorials to those killed in war can be statements about 
what is hoped for as well as about what has been lost. Th e Slav architect 
Dušan Jurkovi č designed thirty-seven cemeteries for the dead of the First 
World War. Describing one of them, Anthony Alofsin writes that ‘a square 
with a polygon forming a truncated arrow, is outlined by a perimeter fence 
made of a pair of massive logs laid ﬂ at over rough rubble. On top of the 
logs sits [ sic ] cross members and a double-layered roof characteristic of 
Slovak folk architecture. Jurkovi č applied the same roof treatment to the 
entry gate.’ 62 
 Th e mixture of innovation and tradition as the form in which new 
or adjusted identities are crafted can be pursued by the most seemingly 
traditional of regimes. Th e presentation of continuity can also be a way 
not of facilitating change but of surviving it. In Japan following military 
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defeat, American occupation, and the imposition by the occupying power 
of constitutional change, the imperial family, whilst not being able formally 
to resist the alterations to its legal status, nonetheless acted in order on 
the one hand to maintain the regard and respect in which it was held, and 
on the other to ﬁ nd new and additional ways of nourishing that regard. 
Th e emperor began making public visits and tours, and the media began 
to present aspects of the life of the imperial family which expressed their 
ordinariness as well as their imperial status. Kenneth Ruoﬀ  comments 
that ‘Traditionally the monarchy had been described as being “above the 
clouds.” In the post-war era, the palace worked hard to bring it, if not 
to ground level, then at least to an altitude where it could be seen from 
the ground.’ 63 
 Deception is another defensive identity response, of or near the last 
resort, to challenges to existing practice. If the challenge is overwhelming, 
if resistance to it by asserting existing identities appears futile, then accep-
tance of new practices whilst covertly continuing old ones is sometimes 
resorted to. Jacobites in England might raise their glasses to toast the king 
whilst holding them over vessels containing water, so that the toast was, 
though only to those who knew the secret, ‘Th e King, over the water’. In 
Spain after the Catholic monarchy began its imposition of religious uni-
formity in the fourteenth century, there were Jewish and Muslim com-
munities who adopted Catholic worship for the public gaze, whilst at the 
same time continuing covertly their own religious practices. Th e extent of 
this covert and overt religious observance by  conversos , Marranos, and 
Moriscos may not have been as great as the Inquisition supposed, but it 
clearly occurred. 64 
 Identity, like fashion, is both disseminated and monopolised 
by minorities 
 Revolutions are carried through by minorities either from above or from 
outside or below, and are attempts to construct the character of public life 
in a way which sustains the cultivated identities of the revolutionaries. Th e 
constraints within which identity is cultivated, if they were the only ele-
ments in that cultivation, would prevent any change to an existing order. 
Alternative or altered identities will sometimes seem unrealistic or utopian, 
but they are advanced and replace, in various degrees, those of their oppo-
nents, which is why Michael Rosen argues that there is a necessary recog-
nition of the role of the visionary, the passionate, or even the deluded in 
making possible mass participation in circumstances where despair seemed 
ubiquitous. 65 Th e plumage and scenery of change or resistance are con-
structed and cultivated, not spontaneously generated; even spontaneous 
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combustion needs a detonator. Th is view of change was prefaced by Pareto 
in his image of circulating elites and by Lenin in his image of the vanguard 
party. Th e essence of all such arguments, which is most clearly expressed 
by Rosen, is that choice is possible even if it is made against apparent 
obstacles and restraints, and in deﬁ ance of what might seem rational. Th is 
does not set aside the force of circumstance and convention, but insists 
that it is one element only, even if it is commonly the most powerful. But 
it also insists that whilst identities may be shaped by the circumstances in 
which groups and persons exist, those circumstances are themselves the 
results of human action. 
 In mobilised societies, one aspect of the identity of any elite is likely to 
be its claim to be representative of the wider population. In transition the 
initiative may be taken by a few, but its success can depend on at least its 
acceptance by the many. Just as an excessive distance between the identity 
through association of a population and the distinction which elites culti-
vate within the context of that association can lead to a range of stresses 
from indiﬀ erence to insurrection, so a successful replacement of one order 
by another involves the cultivation of an alternative which can be both 
distinctive in its leadership and recognisable and desirable amongst its 
associates and potential associates. 
 In all cultivations of identity, whether sustaining or challenging existing 
orders, none of the evidence for a particular identity is inherent, and any 
artefact or human production can be given radically diﬀ erent interpreta-
tions and signiﬁ cance. Th e examples of Trobriand cricket and Aztec Chris-
tianity illustrate the dependence of artefacts and all the creative activities 
of humanity on humanly derived signiﬁ cance. Th is dependence is not 
limited to inanimate objects, but extends to human action itself. Language 
may embed meanings and values, but its status can shift and mutate 
according to the aspirations of those who use it. In pre-revolutionary 
France, French was the language of the elite, and marked them oﬀ  from 
the many who lived through their own languages and dialects. With the 
revolution, conversely, French became the language of enlightenment, 
rationality, and radical progress, and was actively promoted, just as Basque, 
Breton, and other minority languages and dialects were actively discour-
aged. In the twentieth century, Breton suﬀ ered after the Second World War 
by being associated with the Vichy regime, whilst by the century ’ s end it 
had moved from right to left to become associated with radical decentral-
ised democracy and popular choice against centralised conservatism. 66 
 Th ere is a tension between the eﬀ ectiveness of habitual identity and the 
lure of novelty. Transformations of public identity of a whole nation or 
society are neither easy nor straightforward, and there is a substantial 
capacity of old identities and characteristics embedded in habit to survive 
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the most vigorous and sustained eﬀ orts at change, and to re-emerge, like 
streams in limestone reappearing miles further on from their last visible 
surface presence. Trobriand cricket is a neat example of the resistance of 
existing identities to innovation, and their ability to absorb and recharac-
terise it. Th e conquistadores from Spain who thought that they were 
importing Christian monotheism into the culture of their Aztec subjects 
failed to notice that the European deity was simply being added to the 
existing indigenous ones, a divine fraternity which was to survive into the 
twenty-ﬁ rst century. 67 Th is is at the same time an illustration of why it is 
perilous to dismiss actions which people treat as important as frivolous, 
whimsical, or unimportant. Anything from the pronunciation of a single 
word to the way in which a shirt is closed at the neck can, especially in 
times of uncertainty or transition, be a matter of solid signiﬁ cance for those 
involved and therefore of essential signiﬁ cance for those who wish to 
understand what is going on. However triumphant the establishment of 
new worlds and new identities may seem, there is a ubiquitous recessive 
persistence of old ones. Catholicism in Ireland and Orthodoxy in Russia 
each survived the eﬀ orts of determined governments to replace them in 
the identity of their nations. Government can transform, and  cuis regio , 
 eius religio [whose realm, his religion] worked across Europe in the years 
of Reformation and Counter-Reformation, but English rule in Ireland 
bypassed or dispossessed the indigenous ruling class without replacing it 
with a settled and unalienated alternative. If tradition is simply persecuted 
or undermined, there is no control over the identities which will replace 
it or which will respond to the persecution. And if the leaders of change 
seek to identify themselves as leaders of a nation, or faith, or culture whilst 
at the same time, by the claim of leadership, distancing themselves from 
ordinary humanity, they both illustrate the ambivalence of identity cultiva-
tion and its constant tension between association and separation, and 
render potentially insecure their own control of it. Th e complexity of 
change and resistance makes universal patterns or predictions fragile, and 
whilst it is never the case that anything and everything is possible, nor is 
it the case that everything is determined and predictable. 
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 Th e plumage of Britannia 
 Th e variety of British identity 
 In 1951 the poet Laurie Lee wrote a commentary for the Lion and the 
Unicorn Pavilion at the Festival of Britain. Th e intimation of the pavilion ’ s 
presentation was of a homogeneous British character, but Lee ’ s Britain was 
diverse not monolithic, characterised by its variety rather than by some 
pervasive essence, and he observed that ‘the British do not simply leave 
the development of language to the professionals of literature’, and that 
the ‘Cockney has added a local vocabulary to the national one; and every 
British county has contributed a proverb, or a telling phrase’. 1 It was not so 
much a case of the British language as of the languages of Britain. It needed 
a poet to make the sensible empirical point that the only meaning that can 
be given to the phrase ‘the British people’ is an account of the identities of 
all the people who live in Britain at the time to which the statement refers. 
Vocabulary and accent are not homogeneous, but are particular to place 
and not only to geographical but also to social location and character. And 
just as language changes from one part of the population to another, so it 
does from one time to another. Shaw ’ s complaint that the ‘English have no 
respect for their language, and will not teach their children to speak it’ rests 
on a misapplication of a correct observation. 2 Th ere is no single or one-
dimensional English language, and even less so a single British one, but a 
rich collection of ways of speaking that, whilst in their totality constituting 
language in the British Isles, no more have a single version which is, could 
be, or should be used by everyone than a meal can be reduced to a single 
ingredient or an orchestra to a single instrument. 
 What applies to language applies to every other aspect of identities 
within the British Isles. Time is important because not only will the answer 
be diﬀ erent at diﬀ erent times, but so will the meaning or even accuracy of 
the term ‘Britain’ and the titles of the governed territory, from England 
at the beginning of the modern period, to the Kingdom of Great Britain 
in the eighteenth century, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in 
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the nineteenth century, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland in the twentieth, each title referring to greater or lesser propor-
tions of the islands of Britain, and to diﬀ erent combinations of those 
territories. During 400 years the geographical distribution of government 
within the British Isles has shifted many times, from two kingdoms with 
a single monarch under James I and VI after 1603, through a union of 
Scotland and England in 1707, and between the Scottish–English kingdom 
with a Welsh appendix and Ireland in 1800, to a territorial redistribution 
of government with the establishment of a new state in Ireland in 1921. 
Th e geographical extent of the various governed territories has grown and 
contracted, so that over three centuries a state centred on London has 
moved from England, Wales, and Ireland, to England, Wales, Ireland, and 
Scotland, to England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Nor have the 
shifts, expansions, and contractions been limited to the islands of Britain. 
Kings thought of as English have governed territories in continental France, 
and kings thought of as French have governed what is now thought of as 
England. Very shortly after John had conﬁ rmed what is frequently pre-
sented as the quintessentially English Magna Carta, in Latin, London and 
substantial sections of eastern England were under the control of Louis of 
France. So I do not apologise for telling a story from an early twentieth-
century perspective; there is no ﬁ xed territorial foundation or vantage 
point, but nor is there a possibility of narrating from nowhere. I hope to 
avoid making any imperial claim for ‘England’ in so doing and, on the 
contrary, question the idea of a single homogenous English, let alone 
British, identity. Th at is not the only story that could be told, but any story 
has to be told from a vantage point, and the choice is just as contingent 
on circumstance as are the shifting combinations of governed territory 
about which, from one particular perspective, the story is told. 
 Th e ﬂ uid borders of hard territory are not the only shifting strands of 
the story. To talk of ‘the people’ is itself to use language which has meaning 
at one time but not at another, and to mean something quite diﬀ erent from 
the world alluded to if the adjective ‘common’ is added. Th e title which 
Bede gave to his history in the early eighth century is normally translated 
as ‘A History of the English Church and People’. But  Historia ecclesiastica 
gentis Anglorum could as readily be translated as ‘A History of the Church 
and People of England’, which has very diﬀ erent implications. A nation and 
a people are a perception of a relatively late time in the life of the British 
islands, and a perception of a nation which was equally represented by all 
its adult inhabitants an even later phenomenon, and one which was always 
a direction taken, rather than a point arrived at. A tomb to ‘A British 
Warrior Unknown by Name or Rank’ which was dedicated in Westminster 
Abbey in 1920 would have been puzzling or incomprehensible to the 
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generation which celebrated heroism by means of grand memorials to 
military leaders in the wars against Napoleon. Even as part of an undif-
ferentiated military mass, the common soldier had to wait for acknowledg-
ment until after the end of the Crimean War in 1856, when regimental 
memorials ﬁ rst appeared in St Paul ’ s Cathedral alongside the memorials 
which admitted only oﬃ  cers to the rank of hero. 3 It is not that a word or 
a concept – nation, people -changes, or that the terms used to describe an 
unchanging human phenomenon alter, but that diﬀ erent concepts, terms, 
and perceptions are the currency of discussion at diﬀ erent times, and dif-
ferent human phenomena, people diﬀ erently perceived, categorised, and 
evaluated, are similarly described at diﬀ erent times. Th e concepts and 
perceptions, and the people to whom those concepts and perceptions refer, 
are historically speciﬁ c, and relate to speciﬁ c worlds of understanding and 
meaning. Identity is a human cultivation, and meaning and narrative are 
not only accounts of identity, but components of it. Whilst there are con-
tinuities, they are continuities within ﬂ ux, growth, and decay. An unchang-
ing character of an unchanging nation is a feature of narrative, not of the 
phenomenon to which the narrative allegedly refers. Tradition, as Eric 
Hobsbawm has argued, is invented. 4 Such a narrative may characterise a 
time, a place, and a people, but it is the narrative, not the alleged object of 
the narrative, which is real, and present, and which is also a moment in a 
pattern of understanding which is always changing. Th e narratives of 
national character and national history are themselves components of 
identity, and frequently contribute a dimension of homogeneity and con-
tinuity which is lacking in the shifting world to which the imagined descrip-
tions attempt to refer and which they claim merely to reﬂ ect. 
 Even if presenting an account of ‘Britishness’ were a simple matter of 
declaring who, legally, is British, and how nationality is in law determined, 
there would be changes over time, a history of frequent uncertainty, ambi-
guity, and disagreement. Not only has legal status moved from subject to 
citizen, but the conditions to be met for each status have been matters 
of contest and amendment. Women were not fully citizens in the basic 
sense of all having the right to vote until 1928, while simple legal equality 
between males and females in other aspects of public identity continued 
slowly to be approached throughout the twentieth century. Citizenship 
even in law was not necessarily blind to either parenthood or gender, 
and until the passage of the 1981 British Nationality Act, women, unlike 
men, did not enjoy the right to transfer their citizenship to children born 
outside the UK. 5 Even then, there was an unsuccessful move by MPs 
working with Enoch Powell to distinguish between men and women when 
determining rights to citizenship. 6 And beyond the law are perceptions 
which are brought to bear when the law is formed and when its rulings are 
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contested, of ‘ways of life’, ‘national values’, ‘culture’, ‘origin’, and ‘ethnicity’. 
Th e alleged gasp of astonishment in the dining room of the Savoy Hotel 
when the results of the 1945 general election were coming through – ‘But 
this is terrible –  they’ve elected a Labour Government, and  the country 
will never stand for that’ 7 – may be apocryphal, but neatly illustrates the 
familiar speciﬁ city and insularity of perceptions of ‘us’, ‘ordinary people’, or 
‘the country’. As greater and greater layers of the population became in one 
way or another part of a public social space, the distinctiveness, peculiarity, 
and separateness of remaining realms of exclusivity – imperial governance, 
and espionage in all its dimensions both at home and abroad – became 
more and more pronounced. In the case of parts of the government such 
as MI5 and MI6, these two worlds could be strikingly insulated from one 
another not only by the assumption that how one lives is how everyone 
else lives, but by the ﬁ ltering and insulating screens of secrecy. ‘Pig stick-
ing’, which was listed as a pastime by a surprising number of MI5 oﬃ  cers 
between the wars, was not a characteristic or common British weekend 
hobby. 8 Diﬀ erent stories are not alternative interpretations of a single and 
independent historical reality, but are themselves diﬀ erent components 
of diﬀ erent realities, each of which is a dimension of something larger 
than itself. 
 While the character of the governed territories has mutated since the 
dual crown linked Scotland and England in 1603, so did the identities of 
the governed people, with a slow extension ﬁ rst of mobilisation and then 
of democratisation. Whilst not a transformation, or a disappearance of 
caste, class, or hierarchy, there was a slow shift in the relative weights of 
family origin as against other aspects of identity, and a narrowing, though 
not a vanishing, of the distances between various rungs in the social ladder 
and of the privileged and penalising diﬀ erentiations of gender. If distinc-
tions, exclusions, and privileges remained, they nonetheless increasingly, 
if unsteadily, did so within a common forum, rather than in a society rigidly 
even if not impermeably divided between the classes and the masses. At 
every stage, clothing, manners, speech, diet, and religion have been part 
of those identities. And so also are the accounts, claims, and challenges 
about these components of identity. A selective account of ‘Englishness’ by 
a right-wing movement such as the English Defence League, or a moral 
condemnation of social mores by a puritanical zealot, does not provide an 
accurate account of the world its advocates inhabit. But they do form a 
part of that world, and their ideology is a component of the shifting and 
variegated whole, of which a comprehensive account must take note. In 
seeking to give a dominant account of the world in which they live, such 
accounts do something very diﬀ erent: they add further evidence of that 
world ’ s complexity. Challenges to an account of Britishness as no more, 
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and no less, than the sum of everything and only at any one particular time 
serve only to sustain such an account by attacking it and providing imme-
diate evidence of diversity. Th e retort that there is an essential Britishness, 
or Englishness, the essence of which is then delineated in terms of religion, 
taste for cricket, diet, household ethics and conventions, or skin colour, 
serves only to provide one more example of the contingency of any account 
of the world, British, English, or anywhere else, and the absence of a single 
homogeneous uniformity. 
 Whatever conclusions are reached about the identity of the population 
of the British Isles or parts of that territory, they will account for identities, 
and varieties of identity, which are continually shifting, changing, and 
argued about. Even if the territory and the population can stay still for a 
moment, the variety of terms to describe them refuse to settle in to a single 
agreed title, as Krishan Kumar has minutely demonstrated. 9 Th ose identi-
ties are composed of both private and public actions, the latter comprising 
both organised and spontaneous or informal actions and events with a 
more or less ritual dimension. Th e twentieth century saw numerous public 
celebrations of national identity, but many of them were semi-unoﬃ  cial or 
completely unoﬃ  cial, or possessed of an identity-cultivating role which 
was not a part of the actions of planners of the event: the Oxford and 
Cambridge Boat Race, Wimbledon, the Last Night of the Proms, but also 
the growing crowds receiving the coﬃ  ns at Wootton Bassett of returning 
British dead from the war in Afghanistan, or throwing ﬂ owers at the 
funeral cortege of Diana Princess of Wales. 10 
 Th e history of the population within the changing borders of the politi-
cal communities of the British Isles is of continuous conﬂ ict and shifting 
relations between a democratic identity and a ruler ’ s identity, with the 
latter slowly and unevenly distinguishing itself increasingly by its excep-
tional exempliﬁ cation of the associative identity shared with those whom 
the ruler aspires to lead. It will illustrate the dual nature of identity cultiva-
tion, whereby on the one hand distinctiveness from other countries or 
nations is cultivated, whilst on the other the distinctiveness of groups, 
classes, or strata within the UK is formed by adopting or adapting foreign 
or other practices. And in all of this, identity is crafted and cultivated by 
what is done as much as by what is said, and with reference both to tradi-
tion, or how things are, and to rights, justice, and claims of how things 
should be. So a state and a political society about which it is frequently 
claimed that, unlike its continental neighbours, it enjoys stability and con-
tinuity, is at the same time characterised by continual ﬂ uidity, adaptation, 
innovation, and shifting variety. 
 Th e broader assumption on which an account of shifting national 
identity rests, and which is sustained by the plurality of identities both 
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temporally and geographically in the islands of Britain, is that national 
identity can never be fractal, with each individual reproducing an instance 
of a universal character. Th e identity of a nation or a whole society can 
never be reproduced in that of any one of its members. Th e identity of the 
inhabitants of any governed area is, whether there is overall harmony or 
cacophony, still orchestral rather than fractal, though it will be fractured 
by fractal claims, both radical and conservative, about what a national 
identity should be. Th e description of any individual or group as ‘British’ 
or ‘English’, unless it is a description of legal status, can never be more 
than its locating as one component part of a whole, even though its 
character may have features which the observer believes to distinguish 
everyone, or most people, or a dominant group. Descriptions of English 
or British character can never be more than guides to aspects of iden-
tity which may be found in the islands of Britain. It is always possible 
to describe the character of a whole population because such a descrip-
tion is orchestral; it is never possible to describe the character of all the 
people who live in the islands of Britain because such personal identity is 
never fractal. Th e abbreviation of diﬀ erences and the dramatic ordering 
and simpliﬁ cation which any description or narrative involves, can give 
an impression of a single English character. But even when religious uni-
formity was managed by coercive law, not each and every person could 
be ﬁ tted to a single template, whilst the islands of Britain throughout 
their history have been the recipients of invaders and immigrants from 
continental Europe to sustain and contribute to the varieties of faith, class, 
and culture. 
 Subjects, citizens, and human resources 
 Social bonds and group identities will not always and in all places sit neatly 
within the borders claimed by governments, and may either divide the 
inhabitants of a territory or sustain bonds across territorial state bounda-
ries. When they have corresponded to territorial boundaries in the islands 
of Britain it has been in part because the sea has provided a permanent 
and enduring frontier which has enclosed human communities and made 
diﬃ  cult, though not impossible, the generation of such communities across 
political boundaries, though even the sea has not prevented just such 
refusals to be accommodated within governmental boundaries, a refusal 
which has divided the island of Ireland. 
 Whilst the identity of government and governors is one part only of the 
identity of an entire population, it is government which, through its 
command of territory, sets the context within which it is possible to speak 
of a people, a society, or a population. Th e relationships between rulers 
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and people are a major ingredient of who those people, and those rulers, 
are. Governments create nations, rather than vice versa. 
 Identity is never restricted to an individual, and if there is not a desire 
to secure others to share an identity ’ s components, there will be a contrary 
desire to ensure that other identities, either by subordination or appropri-
ate contrast, sustain an individual person ’ s identity. In either case the 
identity of an individual is sustained by the auxiliary identities of others. 
When one of the parties to that engagement is an elite, dominant, or gov-
erning person or group, the identity of the other party will again and again 
need to be asserted, worked for, and cultivated in order to resist or limit 
domination. And whilst elites may circulate, the very exceptionalness 
which legitimates an elite in a democratic society fortiﬁ es the distance 
between elites and the populations within and beyond which their identity 
is cultivated. For leaders, the dilemma is as ever whether to see where the 
people are going in order to lead them, or to see where they ought to be 
going in order to direct them. For the people the problem is how to culti-
vate the identity they wish for against elites who are constituted by their 
advantages in material, social, and political resources and whose identity 
agendas, whilst they may correspond, so far as their distinguished version 
of identity permits, with the aspirations and aversions of the rest of the 
population, cannot be relied upon to do so. 
 Within the shifting territorial boundaries of the islands of Britain, a 
series of transformations have moved the population from one divided 
between an aristocracy or lordship and a subordinate mass, through a 
population increasingly mobilised and included in the interests of both 
economic and military ambitions, to one which, in its formal political 
life, was steadily more democratic. Th e move to mobilisation and then 
democratisation presented choices to governing or dominant elites. Once a 
substantial section of the population had a public and political status, there 
was a new and enhanced need to deﬁ ne who, legally, they were. Once citi-
zenship became a dimension of adulthood, questions about, for instance, 
the status of prisoners or of those in receipt of public relief, which had not 
existed before, required answers. Prisoners or the poor, in an unmobilised 
society, needed no further designation. But as either recipients of public 
beneﬁ ts, or objects of punishment or restraint, those who had previously 
been occasional and anonymous subjects became active ingredients of 
a mobilised society whose status was both public and recorded. Once 
they were part of a mobilised society, and even more once they were 
part of a democratised one, individuals had, or had potentially, legal and 
constitutional identities which required clariﬁ cation in the light of other 
accounts of who citizens were. Individuals were increasingly both human 
resources and active and hence unpredictable participants in the life of 
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the political community, so that the multifaceted debate over the political 
rights of prisoners was one of many which continued unresolved into the 
twenty-ﬁ rst century. 
 Th e move through mobilisation towards democracy was neither neat 
nor harmonious, unimpeded, or steady. Th e public and legal identity of 
persons living in those parts of the British Isles governed by the Crown 
was in the ﬁ rst place simply a distinction between those who were and 
those who were not subjects. National identity as distinct from subject 
identity was a further step, and citizenship a step further still. It was not 
until 1914 with the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act that the 
statutory deﬁ nition of nationality was set out. But the measure was passed 
not in order to either accord or recognise an element of the identity of 
adult inhabitants of the country, but to enable aliens to be deﬁ ned with the 
approach of war. It was not so much a declaration of who was British, as 
a declaration of who was not, though its wording and eﬀ ect was to pro-
claim both. Th e qualiﬁ cations and entitlement to citizenship were still 
being clariﬁ ed at the end of the century when, for the ﬁ rst time, tests of 
familiarity with various aspects of British life were incorporated in the tests 
of ﬁ tness for admission to the body of citizens. 
 Civil society as a public dimension of life outside the household or the 
workplace but below government can be seen not so much as changing, 
as coming into existence. But while a progression from people as human 
resources to people as subjects and then as citizens can be sketched, no 
changes are either simple or incremental and irreversible. People, insofar 
as they had a public identity as distinct from a private or economic one, 
were to begin with identiﬁ ed by the person of whom they were subjects, 
and their public identity was an aspect of the identity of royal government. 
Identity in relation to a nation or a territory came later, and citizenship, in 
relation to a political community of equal persons, later still. A population 
is mobilised to make it a more eﬀ ective human resource, and the treat-
ment of persons as resources does not disappear with their emergence as 
democratic citizens. It may even develop in new forms, and by the end of 
the twentieth century both public and commercial organisations felt no 
sense of irony in renaming their personnel departments ‘human resources’. 
It is not only prophets who care for their people as shepherds care for 
their sheep. 
 A society generated by the mobilisation of a population, and a civil 
society, have been ones in which varieties of identity which previously had 
been obscured or private gained greater and greater public presence. Th ese 
identities could either be suppressed in an active policy of cultural uni-
formity, or accepted as an aspect of a society which, whilst it might be 
equal in its political laws and to that extent uniform, was in its culture 
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varied, many faceted, and unequal. Th e unsteady progression through 
mobilisation towards democracy involved both proliferations and erosions 
of visible and evident diﬀ erence. Conspicuous consumption ceased being 
the deﬁ ning feature of a relatively small segment of the population and 
became, if not democratised, then popularised. And whilst more and more 
people had access to clothes and goods which those selling them declared 
were the marks of great distinction, the signs of wealth, privilege, or good 
fortune became increasingly subtle, as the heel colours of royalty had been 
in previous centuries. When the poor no longer go barefoot, the mere 
possession of shoes is no longer suﬃ  cient to proclaim superiority, and 
brand names, stitching, colours, and the smallest detail of construction 
become the heralds of identity. Th e styles and manners which are part of 
the public identity of an elite continue as one model for wider and wider 
circles of consumers in an increasingly popular – though not necessarily 
or incrementally democratic – society. But there is a contrary develop-
ment, in that the more segments of a population develop their identities 
as part of public society, the more possibilities there are for plural or mul-
ticultural identities, which may be simple alternatives to prevailing identi-
ties or, like punk in the 1970s, a deliberate eschewing of expensive or 
dominant style. Th ere was a movement from a horizontally diverse to a 
vertically diverse society, a development with several possible conse-
quences. One possible consequence is that resentments arising from dis-
satisﬁ ed emulation which previously would have been against ‘society’ or 
‘the system’ will now be more parochial, and will be felt against a com-
munity or subculture. Th is in its turn can make resentment either more or 
less likely to lead to violence, insurrection, rebellion, or unrest. Witch-
hunts were local, parochial, neighbourhood events, as were the ‘paedo-
phile’ vigilante episodes of the twenty-ﬁ rst century. 
 At the beginning of the eighteenth century, most people would recog-
nise someone with whom they were not in daily or frequent contact solely 
by their clothing, equipment, and bearing. By the middle of the twentieth 
century, photography, cinema, and television meant that the face was as 
important, and the proclamation of rank or profession by clothing was of 
declining relevance. Whilst the privileged and the powerful still proclaimed 
and cultivated their status by clothing and cars, much presentation became 
a statement of allegiance or membership, rather than of what Veblen called 
the invidious distinction of superior wealth. 
 As a mobilised society became more democratic and the formal distance 
between elite and mass became both smaller and less mined with obsta-
cles, the identity of rulers shifted in engagement with the shifting identities 
of the ruled and the growth of a culture of citizenship. Th e changing public 
presentation of the people was complemented by a shift in that of 
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monarchy, military, judiciary, legislature, church, and executive. Th e iden-
tity of government from London moved from monarchy to constitutional 
monarchy to representative government. As each element changed, the 
balance between them changed also. Th e components of the polity were 
very diﬀ erent in 2010 from those in 1700. Not only were there diﬀ erent 
components which were not present before, but even when there was 
continuity, the character of a component, and its relation to other compo-
nents, had changed. 
 Th e economic, social, and legal subordination of women meant that 
what appeared to be the creation of a public society of adults was initially 
a society of males, and this exclusion was only slowly and incompletely 
altered. Th e place of women in public life (as opposed simply to activities 
outside the household) and the development of a distinct, independent, 
or autonomous female dimension to the public sphere in deportment, 
dress, and speech grew more slowly than those of men. Under the 1914 
nationality act, whilst men conferred their nationality when they married, 
women lost theirs. A man with British nationality conferred it on a non-
British wife. A woman who married a non-British male forfeited her 
British nationality. Although women had consistently been engaged in the 
movements and campaigns which had slowly and with diﬃ  culty and delay 
grown mobilisation into citizenship, the acknowledgment of gender equal-
ity lagged behind the pursuit and cultivation of democracy, and whatever 
their contribution to democratic advance, the gains to women themselves 
were consistently less substantial. Th ose who sought a fractal account of 
the identity of the inhabitants of the British Isles could still speak of the 
typical Englishman. 
 Rulers and elites, political, governmental, and social: 
the monarchy – Tudors to Windsors 
 Th e relations between privileged and unprivileged, rulers and ruled, gov-
ernment and subjects, have moved from an unmobilised population with 
a ruling monarchy and aristocracy to a mobilised population moving in a 
democratic direction. In this process the governing functions of monarchy 
have steadily shifted to career politicians and administrators. But whilst 
monarchy is no longer a central component of government, its changing 
character illustrates the wavering path through and beyond mere mobi-
lisation. Paradoxically for an institution whose deﬁ ning claim is that it is 
not representative, but autonomously authoritative, ‘ Dieu et mon droit ’, 
the narrative of monarchy represents, or at least draws attention to, the 
narrative of the nation. As the population became more mobilised, and 
slowly democratised, so too the identity of the governing elite mutated 
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as upper and lower levels of public life became more engaged with each 
other. By the time that Ireland had been added to the legal state of Great 
Britain in 1800, government in the British Isles had already moved away 
from rule by monarchy in a constitutional frame towards parliamentary 
negotiation and ministerial collaboration or coexistence with a monarch 
who, whilst still exercising power, did so with decreasing prominence 
in the government of the country. As the monarchy became less of a 
political pinnacle, and ministerial government encroached on the govern-
ing functions of royalty, whilst a society outside the world of monarchy 
and aristocracy grew in public prominence, so the monarchy developed 
a new role as a social pinnacle, contributing more to public identity as it 
contributed less to the exercise of government. And whilst the domestic 
political role of monarchy continued to decline, its formal and rhetorical 
role at the head of an empire survived into the second half of the twen-
tieth century. Th is transition was supported across the principal political 
parties, and accepted by left and right, so that in 1947 Staﬀ ord Cripps, 
chancellor of the exchequer in the ﬁ rst majority Labour government, was 
able vigorously to defend expenditure on the monarchy, albeit by suggest-
ing that the ‘pomp and ceremony’ in Moscow was ‘vastly greater’ than 
in London. 11 
 Britain has a complex history of monarchy (though not an instance, 
since history is not simply a series of expressions of universal essences) not 
only because its geographical extent has ﬂ uctuated, but because it gradu-
ally acquired, and then lost, an empire. Th e pageantry of empire, and 
particularly the pageantry of Indian empire, was distinct and spectacular. 
Between the two world wars Edwin Lutyens created splendid architectural 
images for the British Empire in India long after the imperial crown had 
ceased to exercise political rule. At the same time, a relationship between 
government and governed which for most people most of the time had 
been local and parochial was slowly shifting to engage a state which had 
been largely remote with a public social life which was becoming increas-
ingly active and evident. As the governing role of the monarchy faded, its 
public presence grew. 
 Th e change had been neither simple nor steady, but the distances tra-
versed both in the identity of the monarch and in the identities of the 
governed population, as they were cultivated, qualiﬁ ed, or changed in 
engagement with the monarchy, were substantial. Th e ﬁ rst audience for 
the monarch had been the monarch, and beyond that the court. Th e iden-
tity which was cultivated and expressed was one of lordship, and any chal-
lenge to the incumbent of the throne was an attempt to seize lordship. 
Richard III was ousted in 1485, like many of his predecessors, in a struggle 
for dominance and spoils. Religious leadership had engaged secular rule 
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when its other involvement in the life of the population was limited. Th e 
irruption of religious dispute into government in the sixteenth century at 
a time when secular rule was itself being extended gave a dual dimension 
to the identities of monarchs. In the tumult of reformation and counter-
reformation, monarchs identiﬁ ed themselves not solely in terms of royal 
splendour, but, as they had always done, in terms of religious faith. When 
the population was largely unmobilised, the cultivation and maintenance 
of religious orthodoxy had been the principal regular involvement of gov-
ernment with the lives of its subjects. Th e Reformation and Counter-
Reformation conﬂ icts within European Christianity merely intensiﬁ ed this 
involvement. A young Henry VIII, before he broke with the papacy, earned 
the title ‘Defender of the Faith’ from the pope in recognition of his tract 
against Luther. Religion still followed the monarch rather than vice versa, 
but though there was no novelty in religious dispute under Henry and his 
successors Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth, a conﬂ ict between the reli-
gious identity of the sovereign and that of subjects would frequently be 
resolved by imprisonment, death, or exile. 
 Th e civil wars of the seventeenth century revealed how far a clash of 
religious identities, and the other aspects of identity with which religion 
was interwoven, could threaten the loyalties of powerful subjects and the 
lordship of the sovereign. Th e dispute in England (and Scotland and Wales) 
in the seventeenth century over the monarch ’ s religion was not simply a 
matter of what went on behind the windows into men ’ s souls. It was in fact 
not about that at all, but about the structure of authority which corre-
sponded to diﬀ erent conceptions of the church, and of authority and struc-
tures of government within both the church and society. Protestantism was 
not necessarily either tolerant or egalitarian, but Catholicism was – not 
necessarily in essence, but in that time and place – hierarchical, absolute, 
authoritarian, and paternalist. So while the royal presence of Henry VIII 
had been composed of kingship as a unique identity sustained by no char-
acteristic other than royal grandeur and divine sanction, with purple and 
cloth of gold denied to all but the royal family and with a richness of dress 
which set him apart, 12 that of Charles II after the English Civil War and 
the execution of his father had a religious dimension which engaged, or 
attempted to engage, with the demanding religious aspirations of at least 
the mightier of his subjects. For Charles I to ﬂ irt with Rome was to ﬂ irt 
with absolutism. For James II to do so was to attempt an absolutist coup 
and risk rejection by powerful subjects. Th e restored monarchy after 1660 
operated in a kingdom where the religious identities of subjects, or of 
powerful subjects, were a constraint on the public identity of the king. 
Charles II tempted Louis XIV with the possibility of his own conversion 
to Roman Catholicism and a return of Britain to the Roman church, but 
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could do so only in secret, whilst the increasingly evident Catholicism of 
his brother, James, was an identity clash which threatened the regime in a 
way it would not have done for the Tudors. Charles found it expedient to 
instruct uncharacteristically fervent attendance at communion by whole 
swathes of his court and household in order to display the pious adherence 
of his regime to the Anglican church and the security of at least his power-
ful subjects from the threat of Rome. 13 Th e Glorious Revolution of 1688 
was indeed a revolution if it marked the transition from  cuius regio ,  eius 
religio , to  cuius religio ,  eius regio . 
 Attempts by monarchy to, if not mirror the identities of its subjects, 
then at least to modify itself in such a way as to appear recognisable even 
if not familiar, could sometimes dismay as much as they reassured. George 
III ’ s perambulations around Windsor in the undistinguished country dress 
of the upper classes or even the gentry was the subject of some ridicule. 
Nonetheless, a king who attempted to place himself if not on an even 
level with his subjects, then at least within reach of them, was very diﬀ er-
ent from one who, like Charles II, touched thousands of suppliant sick in 
the healing ritual of the king ’ s evil, an identity which, if it did not claim 
a divine dimension for monarchy, claimed powers beyond the capacity 
of ordinary humanity. By the reign of Charles ’ s niece Anne, the numbers 
touched were only in the hundreds, and the practice was not continued 
by her successors. Th e fading of any magic or mystery other than social 
and political distinction in the monarch was a feature of the shifting of 
the monarchy ’ s expressed identity from divine ruler to leader of the ruling 
class, and to the epitome of an ‘Englishness’ which was ostensibly classless 
but became increasingly class and culture speciﬁ c in a society which was 
more and more diverse. 
 In this process monarchy was active in the invention of its own identity, 
and in cultivating its presence in this way it has been ingenious, imagi-
native, and ambitious. George III ’ s perambulations as a rural gentleman 
may have jarred, but his granddaughter ’ s appropriation and transforma-
tion of rebel attire was theatrically successful. Th e tartan, which in the 
eighteenth century had been associated with Jacobitism and the rebellion 
of Prince Charles Edward Stuart and was hence banned, became in the 
nineteenth century an expression of royal aﬃ  nity with the monarchy ’ s 
Scottish subjects. When in her northern kingdom, Queen Victoria chose 
architectural and human surroundings which were visibly and distinc-
tively Scottish (ﬁ gure  10 ). When Victoria and Albert visited their northern 
kingdom, they wore a courtly Scottish fancy dress with as much dedica-
tion as Marie Antoinette played the role of picturesque peasant around 
the Petit Trianon in the previous century. 14 Th e long reign of Victoria 
was a transitional monarchy, creating new forms of both public presence 
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and privacy, a public presence which, after the death of Albert, was 
demanded from a monarch for whom privacy was a sought-for response to 
personal loss. 
 Th e accommodation of royal identity to a public, popular one could 
engage all aspects of royalty. Names not only described character, they 
could compose it, and the change of the royal family name from Saxe-
Coburg Gotha to Windsor during the First World War illustrates how 
the monarchy had come to be deﬁ ned by the nation, rather than vice 
versa. Th e monarchy drew its identity from the culture, language, and 
names of those whose state it symbolised, and so if its name associated 
it with a hostile nation, it was the name of the monarch, not the charac-
ter of the nation, which had to adapt. A monarchy which attempted to 
amend the religion or dress of its subjects to its own tastes transmuted 
slowly towards public concessions to what was seen as the culture of 
its subjects. 
 Th e move from a ruling monarchy, whose rituals were principally for 
the governing elite, to a social and symbolic monarchy in an open and 
mobilised society was slow and fragmentary, but steadily proceeding 
through to the stage which Frank Prochaska has described as the ‘welfare 
monarchy’ 15 . Royal weddings, unlike coronations and royal funerals, con-
tinued throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century to be 
important contracts of state, but of a state which stood above and apart 
from the mass of the population, and what was necessary was that they be 
contracted with appropriate solemnity in the presence of representatives 
of social and political power and privilege. As David Cannadine puts it, 
‘great royal ceremonials were not so much shared, corporate events as 
remote, inaccessible group rites, performed for the beneﬁ t of the few 
rather than the ediﬁ cation of the many … not so much a jamboree to 
delight the masses, but a group right in which the aristocracy, the church 
and the royal family corporately re-aﬃ  rmed their solidarity (or animosity) 
behind closed doors’. 16 Not until the wedding of Prince Albert, later to be 
George VI, and Lady Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon in 1923, was a royal wedding 
staged as a theatrical event for public appreciation, and therefore held not 
in the secluded elegance of St James ’ s Palace, but in Westminster Abbey. 
Th e groom ’ s father, George V, though not a radical monarch, was aware of 
the claims that a democratising society might make on the family which 
provided its formal headship, and of the beneﬁ ts for public satisfaction 
with the social and political order which might ﬂ ow from the pomp and 
glamour of ecclesiastical and state theatre. Royal weddings thus followed 
the example of public spectacle already set by royal funerals. But it required 
the growth of swift and easy transport by rail, followed by the dramatic 
expansion of communication with radio and cinema, together with a 
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steady shift of population from country to town, to make possible a degree 
of familiarity with the public face of monarchy which an earlier local and 
face-to-face society could not provide. 17 
 Th e changes in the cultivation of monarchical identity both reﬂ ect and 
are part of changes in government and politics within the British Isles, 
and in the composition of the public identities of both subjects and politi-
cal participants. Monarchy in a mobilised society is a diﬀ erent institu-
tion from monarchy in a merely ruled society, whilst developing aspects 
of democracy are accompanied and either sustained or obstructed by 
the changing identity of monarchy. Th e audience for the presentation 
of monarchical identity has changed from the small and elite occasions 
of the middle ages, through the grand and festive coronation of George 
III, to the popular festival of the coronation of Elizabeth II in 1953. 18 Th e 
funeral of Diana, Princess of Wales, would have been inconceivable even 
half a century earlier. 
 Th e transition since the Stuarts has been from the king ’ s evil to the 
welfare monarchy. Th e relics of the former survive in the rituals of the 
latter, but nonetheless the essential move is from enchantment to secu-
larism, and from divine right and grace to feudal or patriarchal care and 
philanthropy. Th e move from a reigning monarch to a caring monarch, 
from ruling splendour by right to a monarchy which donates time and 
resources and encourages others to do so, parallels the development of 
a representative rather than a hereditary power in government, despite 
the perseverance of a hereditary power in legislation. 19 Such a monarchy 
presents an unceremonial public face rather than an enchanted one. It 
is not only more on public display, but can perform that function more 
conveniently, less stiﬄ  y, and with less diﬀ erence of identity between itself 
and its subjects. It is easier for a patron to visit a hospital in more or less 
ordinary clothes than for a divinely touched sovereign to do so. But the 
transition over the years has often been diﬃ  cult, and the coils of protocol 
have tangled the path to a monarchical culture less alien to the culture of 
subjects and citizens. Bridging the divide between the life of royalty and 
the life of more ordinary subjects and citizens could frequently be a nego-
tiation by means of minute and prosaic detail. One issue which the debate 
over the monarchy became contained within or diverted to, following the 
coronation of George VI in May 1937, was whether or not MPs could wear 
lounge suits to royal garden parties 20 . Tom Nairn has presented an account 
of the monarchy as exercising a residual and unobtrusive power, not to 
intervene in society or politics, but to sustain its hierarchies. In a mobilised 
society that power is exercised at every point of royal contact, just as much 
as it was when monarchs cured the king ’ s evil, and so the importance of 
lounge suits lies in the fact that they can be thought to be important. In 
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that case royal garden parties can be seen as a minor instrument of class 
dominance, a small burnisher of deference. 
 Insofar as the identity of monarchy contributes to the identities of its 
subjects, that contribution can range from a conﬁ rmation of distinction 
and privilege to a conﬁ rmation of loyal-subject status in a legitimised 
hierarchical society. Th e circle of people for whom the monarchy provides 
an element of their identity has extended as the governmental power of 
the monarchy has shrivelled. Th e extension of a citizen public has been 
met by a monarchy which, whilst it still performs to small and privileged 
audiences, increasingly does so in a private capacity, while its formal activi-
ties are on public display, and to a public which all may join and consider 
themselves a part of. Th e shift came late, and whilst it followed the slow 
increase of mobilisation into democracy, it lagged behind it. Th e presenta-
tion of young women to the sovereign as the starting gate of an upper-class 
‘season’ had ended well before the close of the twentieth century. But at 
the start of the twenty-ﬁ rst century the British monarchy still practised 
male primogeniture. 
 Th e transition from dressing room and private life to stage can be a 
feature of any kind of regime, but its character is part of the regime ’ s char-
acter, and so diﬀ erent regimes can be observed to have diﬀ erent relations 
between back and front of house, and diﬀ erent styles of identity in each 
place. Politicians in the United Kingdom, certainly since the advent of 
television, do literally step from the dressing room onto the stage, being 
made up before they perform in front of the cameras, and this can be true 
of any form of government and politics where television is used. But the 
freer or more democratic a society, the greater the openness of private lives 
– even the lives of rulers, presidents, and monarchs – to public scrutiny. 
A democratic politics, requiring a degree of representativeness in its rulers, 
and unfriendly towards too great a visible distance between the lives of 
monarchs and presidents and the lives of ordinary people, will pressure 
monarchy to close the gap both between its front of house and its back of 
house, and between both of these and the perceived identities of ordinary 
citizens. As the monarchy loses power, its members become, in that 
respect, more like other members of the population. But at the same time 
the symbolic role of their oﬃ  ce continues, and so there is a potentially 
growing tension between their public and their private lives. Th e monarchs 
of Britain by the nineteenth century had a front of house and a back of 
house. Royal progresses, both within the country and around the world, 
are diﬃ  cult for a monarchy which rules a centralised state, but are a feature 
of one which is on display. So what matters is not only how the monarchy 
displays itself, but to whom it displays itself. It may be the case that the 
Wizard of Oz scenario, prosaic behind the curtain and ﬂ amboyant in front 
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of it, is more frequently found in purely formal roles than in eﬀ ective ones, 
in monarchies where the monarch is merely a constitutional symbol than 
in monarchies where the monarch rules. In that case, one strand in the 
cultivation of the monarchy from Tudors to Windsors will be the move 
towards a responsibility to display in public which, because it is liturgical, 
places fewer constraints of coherence on private life. 
 Th e monarchy, like other institutions and other persons, has cultivated 
its identity under the two justiﬁ cations of tradition and change, appealing 
to and often creating ancient precedents for current practice, while adapt-
ing existing forms of identity to perceived changes in the society within 
which it lives. Prince Charles crafted a subtle harmonisation of these two 
justiﬁ cations when he made known his intention to be not ‘Defender of 
the Faith’ but ‘Defender of Faith’, adapting a 500-year-old title to a contem-
porary variety of religious practices and loyalties. 21 Th e royal family associ-
ated the monarchy with faiths beyond Anglicanism and Christianity in the 
celebrations of the Queen ’ s golden jubilee, and its members, including the 
Queen, visited a wide range of faiths throughout the year. 22 Th e service 
commemorating the ﬁ ftieth anniversary of the coronation in Westminster 
Abbey in 2003 was attended by representatives of the Baha’i, Muslim, 
Zoroastrian, Hindu, Jewish, Jain, Sikh, and Buddhist faiths, in addition to 
those of the principal Christian denominations. 23 Th e royal identity was 
crafted both by association with a religious community wider than tradi-
tional Anglicanism, and by distinction within that community in fulﬁ lling 
a special role of responsibility and guardianship. 
 Th e slow transition from a feudal and governing to a social and public 
monarchy has been the subject of much description and interpretation. 
Th e role of the monarchy in public life has been critically and closely 
examined, its contribution to national or public identity dissected, praised, 
and condemned. Nairn ’ s account of monarchy sits alongside Bagehot in 
arguing that it maintains social order through rituals and rhetoric which, 
whilst they do not involve the exercise of power or privilege by the sover-
eign, mask and maintain the work of those who do in fact govern or enjoy 
social, political, or economic domination. 24 But there is perhaps another 
function of monarchy in sustaining a particular British identity. Monarchy 
can be regarded not as a model of decorum and taste, or an expression 
and justiﬁ cation of deference and hierarchy, but as a distinctive and eccen-
tric feature of a nation which can thereby mark itself oﬀ  from others who 
can, by contrast, be portrayed as lacking tradition or venerable features of 
public life. None of this means that those, like Nairn, who condemn the 
monarchy are mistaken in a way which would cancel their antipathy, but 
it does mean that the consequences which they oppose are not suﬃ  ciently 
described in the account which they give of them. If events such as the 
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1953 coronation can be seen, as Shils and Young have described them, as 
occasions when common values are ‘re-aﬃ  rmed and fortiﬁ ed’, it is not 
necessarily the case that those values are ones of deference or subordina-
tion. 25 Coronations have provided an occasion for street parties as well as 
collective watching of still far-from-universal television, a peaceable paral-
lel to Hegel ’ s going to war in associating people with something broader 
than their isolated identity, and owing at least as much to the radical and 
subversive traditions of carnival as to loyal address, and not at all neces-
sarily subservient to class hierarchies. Both for conservative supporters 
and radical opponents of the government, politics, and privileges of Britain, 
the monarchy plays an important part, so that simply to describe that part 
is, without further aspirations or aversions, neither to approve nor condemn 
it. Th e crowds outside Westminster Abbey who applauded critical com-
ments within the building at the funeral of Princess Diana were not evi-
dently being cultivated in class subordination. When, in 2012, the year of 
the Queen ’ s diamond jubilee, IPSOS/MORI asked people what aspects of 
the country ’ s life made them most proud to be British, 28% named the 
monarchy, but 37% named the National Health Service. 26 It might be as 
accurate to see even that 28% as supporting a hereditary republic as much 
as inherited privilege. 27 
 Oﬃ  cers of state 
 Th e changing of the balance of power and functions within government 
has been accompanied by a shift of public political attention from mon-
archs to prime ministers, while the interest in the public and private 
conduct of monarchs as social phenomena has grown. As power rumbled 
from monarch to ministers, so it moved too from the Lords to the 
Commons. Lord Salisbury, the last prime minister from the Upper House, 
left oﬃ  ce in 1902. As political attention shifted increasingly to ministers, 
so their public identity developed, from councillors to statesmen, and from 
statesmen to public ﬁ gures – politicians representative of an increasingly 
democratic society. But at the same time there was a countermovement of 
identity. Th e move towards equality was matched by a reaction in the 
contrary direction in order to distinguish leaders from led, and if leaders 
were more ordinary, they were ordinary in a way which still marked them 
oﬀ  from those whom they represented and led, out of the ordinary in their 
distinguished representativeness. 
 During the nineteenth century, political leaders could be given an ele-
vated status which at the same time strengthened the status or identity of 
the person who conferred it. Mugs and plates celebrating politicians such 
as Gladstone with images and exhortations were both saying that the user 
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or owner supports or admires Gladstone, and that he or she is a person 
who is to be associated with Gladstone, a Gladstonian. Th e cultivation of 
identity was two-sided. But by the end of the twentieth century, such a 
form of identiﬁ cation was rare for domestic politicians, jarring as it did 
with a suspicion of deference and an equation of democratic politics with 
sceptical distance from political leaders. Such hero worship was limited to 
international politics and, ironically, to radicals who spoke the language of 
transformative equality. Che Guevara was a more familiar face on tee shirts 
and posters than was Margaret Th atcher. 
 Securing a convincing harmony between representativeness and dis-
tinctiveness was never easy, and a visible excess in either direction could 
lead to ridicule. Michael Foot, when leader of the Labour Party, was criti-
cised for not dressing suﬃ  ciently formally at the Cenotaph on Remem-
brance Sunday, and Tony Blair was considered by his critics to be overdoing 
his play-acting vernacularism in claiming to be ‘a pretty straight kind of 
guy’, 28 whilst his lord chancellor Derry Irvin was ridiculed for the opposite, 
the alleged grandiose ambitions in his material surroundings and his 
choice of wallpaper. 
 But whatever the balance between ordinariness and extraordinariness, 
a public identity becomes a far greater dimension of a politician ’ s life with 
the development of a public. One account of this describes a theatrical 
division between public life and private life, even if the latter is generally 
diﬃ  cult and frequently impossible to veil entirely from an inquisitive 
media. Tony Blair, whose public image was that of ‘a pretty straightforward 
guy’, religious but not excessively so, an ordinary family man with ordinary 
family interests, took steps in 2007 to remove from the published diary of 
his former press aide Alastair Campbell passages which portrayed him as 
bad-tempered and foul-mouthed, and further ﬁ ne-tuned his popular iden-
tity by avoiding wearing spectacles in public. 29 Harold Wilson ’ s preferred 
nicotine was not from a pipe, but for public visibility a pipe was his pre-
ferred image; 30 the Conservative leader and prime minister David Cameron 
might cycle for public consumption, but could not conceal the fact that 
with friends and colleagues he preferred stirrups to pedals. 31 Even so, the 
distance between the two identities was in each case qualitatively diﬀ erent 
from the gulfs which made tales of princes disguised as paupers plausible. 
Each instance suggests a publicisation of the hitherto private aspects of 
political leaders, or rather of a public version of the private. Th is was a 
style possibly ﬁ rst employed by Attlee in the presentation of him as the 
man next door. 
 Th e entanglement of private and public, and the continual leakage of 
the one into the other, was neatly encapsulated in the function of Number 
10 Downing Street, a house where the prime minister might not live, so 
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that there is a house which is not a house where the prime minister acts 
out his public role (but not in public) and a ﬂ at in the house next door 
where he is the private person who happens to ﬁ ll that role, though where 
he also conducts business relevant to that role. An awareness of the confu-
sion, and a willingness to accept it, is breached only if the politicians 
themselves fail to perform as the duality of roles requires. Th e oﬀ ence 
caused by Andrew Mitchell ’ s alleged description of police oﬃ  cers as ‘plebs’ 
was not that he held himself, if he did, above ordinary voters, but that he 
was believed to have said that he did. 
 Th e ‘private’ lives of public ﬁ gures are relevant in a democracy in a way 
they are not in autocracies, and ‘private’ actions and tastes are taken as an 
indicator of distance from or closeness to either the people, or the assumed 
character of the people. Th e more a population is mobilised, the greater 
the relevance of private lives to public oﬃ  ce, since the greater and more 
widespread the desire that rulers and leaders be both typical of the popula-
tion and distinguished within it. 
 Th e military 
 Before government does anything else, it wages war. It wages war even 
before it becomes a government, and does so both against other communi-
ties and against those over whom it seeks to govern. Subject populations 
are the ﬁ rst to understand this foundation of ruling, and soldiers have 
consequently been frequently and persistently regarded with a mixture of 
suspicions ranging from scepticism to hostility. One strand in popular 
sentiment has been a hostility to a standing army as an instrument of 
excessive state power, another a suspicion of soldiers, and particularly 
soldiers, as potential troublemakers when on leave and on the streets. Th is 
was the sentiment described by Kipling in his poem ‘Tommy’, with the 
sting in its tail against a public view which turns its sympathies and antipa-
thies through 180 degrees when national security is felt to be militarily 
threatened.
 For it ’ s Tommy this, an’ Tommy that, an’ ‘Chuck him out, the brute!’ 
 But it ’ s ‘Saviour of ’is country’ when the guns begin to shoot; 32 
 Th e presentation and perception of the army, navy, and air force have 
been part of the presentation and perception of themselves by the various 
strands which make up the population. Kipling ’ s polarity recurs again and 
again, and ‘Saviour of ’is country’ has many versions, from Kipling ’ s, to 
Churchill ’ s ‘Never in the history of human conﬂ ict has so much been owed 
by so many to so few.’ When the security and safety of the population are 
felt to be threatened then armed bodies with whom ordinary people can 
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identify are looked on with solidarity. But whilst armed forces may in those 
circumstances be seen as a special part of the community of ordinary men 
and women, that perception, whilst strengthened by external threat, needs 
other sources as well. Before the mobilisation of the population, armed 
bands were no more likely to be welcome because they fought for the king 
than if they fought for one of the king ’ s rivals, and could be seen as at best 
an incursion or a pest, at worst a menace to life and property. Identiﬁ cation 
between warriors and citizens can be strengthened by real or supposed 
enemies, but it requires some prior perception of common identity, some 
sense of common participation and membership of a governed commu-
nity. Soldiers of the king may not necessarily be regarded as anything less 
alien than soldiers of invading warlords, and whilst the successor to the 
Royal Flying Corps in the twentieth century has a monarchical preﬁ x, it 
was known only as the ‘RAF’, an acronym which relinquished any claims 
to aristocratic or monarchical legitimation. 
 If there is there a real move from soldiers of the king to soldiers of the 
country, it depended on a move in a democratic direction suﬃ  cient for not 
just generals and admirals, but ordinary soldiers and sailors, to be regarded 
as citizens, spouses, parents, or children in uniform. Once that happens, 
and the population as a whole is involved in and aﬀ ected by a war, hostility 
can be replaced by a benign scepticism, and cartoonists such as Bruce 
Bairnsfather can mock the military life with the recommendation that ‘If 
you knows of a better ’ole, go to it.’ 33 When that happens, a heroic construc-
tion of ﬁ ghting life can no longer enjoy a monopoly of public sentiment, 
but suspicion of members of the armed forces can transpose into sympathy 
and support. 
 Th e celebration and commemoration of the military parallels the history 
of deference in the rest of society. Up until the end of the eighteenth 
century, kings were commemorated in public display, and aristocrats in 
private memorials, but the celebration of military prowess stopped there. 
Th e Napoleonic Wars, despite the fact that they were fought under the 
banner of king and tradition against not only tyranny but also revolution-
ary equality, were marked by a slight move away from war being expressed 
as the king ’ s alone. Admiral Lord Nelson was given a state funeral with 
rituals adapted from those used for royalty, and although in the celebration 
of heroism in the war against France no one below the rank of captain in 
the Royal Navy or major-general in the army was represented in funerary 
sculpture, though ordinary soldiers were displayed around their podiums 
in various poses of admiration, nonetheless the monopoly of single leader-
ship had been eroded. 34 Th e ﬁ rst regimental memorials were placed in St 
Paul ’ s after the Crimean War, and by the time of the Great War, the 
common soldier was precisely the person who was represented on war 
c06.indd   190 6/5/2017   12:21:08 PM
 the plumage of britannia 191
memorials, and the names of all those killed were listed, the only order in 
which they were ranked being alphabetical, the public successor to the 
former celebration of hierarchy in both life and death. 35 
 Th e public identity of the armed forces of the crown increased both as 
the mobilisation of the population increased, and as the country was seen 
to be threatened by outside violence. But whilst mobilisation and democ-
ratisation eroded the remoteness of armed forces, they did not do so in 
any single or uniform way, and the nature of perceived threats and the 
extent and location of danger were a component of popular perceptions, 
responses, and degrees and character of identiﬁ cation with ﬁ ghting men 
and women. During the Second World War, when the threat to life and 
security was felt by the whole population and all adults could be regarded 
as part of the conduct of the war, members of the armed forces were family 
members on special duties as much as they were members of a distinct 
and separate set of organisations. If on the other hand ﬁ ghting was limited, 
involving the armed forces but not the population as a whole either as 
producers of war materials or as conscripts, then whilst popular support 
for the armed forces might be as strong, it was support for a distinct and 
separate element in the national community, rather than solidarity with 
men and women who were part of a single national mobilised war eﬀ ort. 
In the case of the returning soldiers, sailors, and air-force personnel from 
the Falklands War, it was celebration of a popular assertion of identity 
against an attempted alien incursion; in the case of respect paid to the 
returning dead from Afghanistan, the popular response had the added 
element of sympathy for men and women who were being sent to a conﬂ ict 
for which popular support was rapidly being replaced by sceptical bewil-
derment and anger as to what British armed forces were still doing there 
and why their lives continued to be placed at risk. Armed forces can be 
seen as a constituent part of a nation and its identity when the bulk of the 
population are not involved in war or when the ﬁ ghting is geographically 
remote, but only once the population has moved substantially in the direc-
tion of mobilisation or democratisation. Before that, ‘the King ’ s wars’ are 
no more than a remote tale, like dragons and mermaids. 
 Toﬀ s and the survival record of hierarchy 
 ‘Society’ as an object of public interest, admiration, and gossip was replaced 
during the second half of the twentieth century by performers and enter-
tainers and sportspeople, with the retention in the public eye of members 
of the royal family and growing attention, though not in the front rank, 
paid to politicians. Th is did not necessarily mean that society, with a lower-
case ‘s’, had levelled out or become more egalitarian, but it did mean that 
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the character of the peaks had changed, as had their relation to ordinary 
people and distance from or closeness to them, and the possibility, or 
perceived possibility, of ordinary people scaling those peaks. It took a very 
elaborate set of expectations to see oneself as king or queen, but only 
energy and talent to aspire to the top ten or the premier football league. 
Th e public images with which ordinary people could identity and about 
which they could listen, watch, or read were simultaneously accessibly 
ordinary, and aspirationally diﬀ erent. 
 Th e markers of hierarchy and the character of hierarchy can change 
without a society becoming any more equal. Language, which used to 
distinguish sharply a socially and economically privileged minority, did so 
less and less after the ﬁ rst half of the twentieth century. 36 George Orwell 
had assured ‘the sinking middle class’, fearful of the proletariat below, that 
‘we have nothing to lose but our aitches’. 37 But very shortly afterwards the 
upper classes began acquiring their consonants. Whilst a single accent lost 
its privileged dominance and found itself mildly ridiculed instead, varieties 
of speech became components of a popular identity which, whilst it was 
not egalitarian, was not formally hierarchical either. 
 Th e common people: subjects and citizens 
 When Bede in the eighth century wrote his history of the church and 
people of England, the protagonists were kings, princes, and priests, and 
their actions, decisions, successes, and failures were presented as suﬃ  cient 
evidence of the history of all. Th e normal invisibility of the greater part of 
the population changed little over the following centuries. Popular irrup-
tions into the world of secular and ecclesiastical lordship in the middle 
ages were just that, invasions from outside or below which might shake or 
damage the structures of political, social, and religious order, but were not 
part of them. By contrast, an account of a mobilised society, and even more 
an account of a democratising society, cannot pause at the borders of the 
elite, but must describe the culture which exists beyond those limits and 
which encroaches on those boundaries, and hence stretches and thins 
them and renders them more permeable. Each move in a democratic direc-
tion makes it more diﬃ  cult to sustain accounts which either describe a 
uniformity of identity or, by not transgressing the boundaries of domina-
tion, give no account of the identity or identities of the mobilised. Th e 
greater the progress along the serpentine road through mobilisation to 
democratisation has been, the greater the potential variety of identities, 
and the greater their potential public salience. Th e social and political 
emergence of the mass of the population has been uneven, contested, and 
partial. Th e advance has taken many forms and has ascribed many titles 
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to the participants: the people, the public, the working class, and, as the 
electorate has expanded, the voters and, more selectively, taxpayers. Each 
of these terms is more than simply a label, since it has contributed, by 
shaping perceptions, to shaping the things perceived, a broad-scale instance 
of dynamic nominalism. 
 A distinction of fundamental importance in this uneven process has 
been between mobilisation from above and mobilisation from below. On 
the one hand, governing and controlling elites have mobilised as human 
resources for economic or military ends those who previously were mar-
ginalised or anonymous. Such mobilisation has involved not only the 
enrolment of those who previously were excluded from or socially invisible 
in the exercise of political, economic, or social power, but, in the act of 
recruiting them, the creation of new or amended categories whereby the 
identity of the mobilised is itself amended, cultivated, or created. Mobilisa-
tion creates the raw materials for a public world. But whilst that public 
world is mobilised, it is not democratised, and the initiatives from above 
are to enrol rather than to enfranchise, to modify the identity of the popu-
lation as a whole, but to do so in a way which maintains its subordinate 
position. On the other hand, demands from outside the governing elite, by 
no means all of them from the least privileged, have slowly and with mixed 
success increased the numbers of those who, by extending their identity 
into social visibility or social power, cultivate and become a public society. 
 Mobilisation from above 
 Elites in a society whose population is becoming mobilised begin to accom-
modate their identity to the growing presence of the wider population. But 
they do so both by increasingly including that population in the commu-
nity by association with which they identify themselves, and at the same 
time by distinguishing themselves as exceptional instances of that com-
munity ’ s character. Evolution of identities has accompanied evolution of 
the relations of leaders to subjects, and to subjects who were increasingly 
becoming citizens. Th e mobilisation of a population from above has been 
carried out to serve taxation, production, and war, and has involved both 
a greater public presence and identity for the mass of the population, and 
an extension of the institutions of government which regulate them. A 
major aspect of identity, religion, while it has always been a concern of 
government, has not been treated from above in a way which increased 
the public identity of the mass of the population, but rather in a manner 
which cultivated, with varying eﬀ ectiveness, their docile compliance. 
Attempts to regulate, promote, or prohibit the various forms of religious 
observance, whilst they required government to engage with the mass of 
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the population, did so in a way which maintained and strengthened the 
gap between rulers and ruled, and constrained rather than promoted a 
greater public identity and presence for the mass of the people. Taxation 
required people to pay, production required them to work, and war 
required them to arm and train, but religious compliance required no more 
than silent presence in churches. In the interests of taxation, production, 
and war, by contrast, government not only extended its regulation and 
organisation of the population but, by this action, shaped the social con-
tours of its territory and cultivated and created collective identities. 38 
 New or enhanced public identities had many aspects, but one of the 
most immediately apparent features of greater social visibility is the actual 
visibility of dress. Th e mobilisation of the population, or sections of it, 
created or enhanced public roles which acquired a distinctive dress that 
indicated the public function as distinct from the social status of the 
person ﬁ lling it. But the boundary between clothing as indicating public 
function and clothing as indicating social superiority has frequently been 
permeable and imprecise. Ecclesiastical, judicial, and military dress have 
long, though not unbroken, histories of distinctiveness, but ones which 
moved from individual distinction to collective identity as government 
expanded and the population was increasingly mobilised lacked such a 
clear resource of traditional costumery. Medieval warriors distinguished 
themselves with heraldry, but they also disguised themselves, if kings, with 
duplication, an early response to the lethal or potentially lethal conse-
quence of the extremes of identity distinction. Heraldry says who you are, 
uniform, like livery, says whom you serve. Th ere have been times when 
senior clergy dressed not distinctively as clergy, but distinctively as rich 
and powerful members of a superior layer of the population. Uniforms are 
a feature of societies where identity is validated by association with a 
group, person, or institution. As long as a society is uniform and hierarchi-
cal, with a recognisable elite, livery serves to cultivate the identity of those 
outside the elite who serve its members and draw a part of their identity 
from that service. Th e role of uniform is diﬀ erent from that of livery in 
that only subordinates wear livery, whilst leaders can and do wear uniform, 
even though they do so in a way which indicates their elevated status as 
distinguished individuals within the broader association. Whole sections 
of society move into uniform as a public space becomes created and occu-
pied by the adult populace. Th e mobilisation of a population from above 
moves from an elite which has put its servants and supporters in livery, to 
a state which puts its population in uniform. Livery is part of subordination 
to an employer, uniform of both subordination to a state or eminence in 
the exercise of the state ’ s power. Th ere is a wide range of public functions 
for which a mobilised or mobilising society may provide uniforms, but the 
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two functions which involve the greatest numbers and in the most visible 
way, are the police and armed forces. 
 Th e slow shift from an agricultural to an urban and industrial popula-
tion was associated with a new salience of the identity of this population, 
not only or principally because of the diﬀ erent ways of living and working 
which this involved, but because new ways of living required deﬁ nition, 
organisation, and identiﬁ cation in a way which existing ones did not. As a 
categorised resource in the social planning and management of industrial 
reformers – Owen, Salt, Lever, and Cadbury – ‘the people’ or ‘the working 
classes’ were given a new prominence in towns and suburbs built to model 
and cultivate a social order. Th is was not a neat or uniform movement and 
has had uneven and fragmentary progress. Th e incorporation of ‘the 
people’ into military consciousness became a part of government with 
the introduction of conscription in the First Word War from 1916, and the 
celebration after it of all adult combatants as equal in the anonymity of 
the unknown warrior. Incorporation into ‘Britishness’ develops with pass-
ports in something approaching their contemporary form from 1855 and 
in a more standard produced form with the British Nationality and Status 
of Aliens Act in 1914, before further mobilisation into citizenship. 
 Th e shift of power away from the monarchy enhanced the public status 
of those, however limited as a proportion of the adult population, whose 
electoral mandate supplied the members for one of the two chambers 
of parliament. Th e move to add an active and public dimension to the 
status of ‘subject’ drew a society in its wake, and is accompanied by a 
growing public identity of people outside the circles of the political and 
governing elite. 
 Whilst changes in public identity and the emergence of a slowly 
expanded and diversiﬁ ed public have had a multiplicity of causes, govern-
ment has been active in the process. In late twentieth-century Britain, the 
ascendancy of market and economic liberal ideology was accompanied by 
a further twist in identity cultivation from above, with the renaming of a 
clutch of previously distinct roles as ‘customers’, a title eclipsing the speciﬁ c 
and distinguishing descriptions: clients, patients, audiences, passengers. 
Th e linguistic strategy of narrowing the scope of politics and widening the 
scope of commerce as far as it was possible to do retained only two desig-
nations beyond the embrace of cash transaction: voters, and worshippers. 
 One aspect of the cultivation of an identity of customers rather than 
citizens meant that identity by association and by distinction redeﬁ ned the 
associated population in such a way as to marginalise substantial layers of 
it, heightening the distance in identity between those people and the dis-
tinguished minority. If the customer is always right, the customer is also 
always to blame since all outcomes are the result of free consumer choice, 
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and inequality is simply the result of lack of aspiration or lack of determi-
nation. Whole sections of the population could be stigmatised as chavs, an 
identity which Owen Jones has presented as serving to justify inequality. 39 
But it functions also to maintain the identity of the more privileged as 
rooted in their association with the population as a whole, while at the 
same time sustaining their distinction and diﬀ erence from that population 
by marginalising a section of it. 
 Mobilisation from below: economic discontents in the public arena 
 Th e slow, irregular, and obstacle-strewn progress from a mobilised popula-
tion towards a democratic one was constituted by the emergence ﬁ rst of 
subjects, then of civil society, then of citizens. Whilst a formal political 
identity has grown for wider and wider sections of the population, a con-
verse desire to control and limit the vigour or potential vigour of citizen 
politics – cultivating a quiet, orderly, and uncomplaining citizen identity 
rather than an active, unpredictable, and assertive one – has been a per-
sistent feature of government and politics. It is feature of citizen identity 
which, conversely, has been continually challenged, and principally from 
below. At the same time as the political identity, through citizenship, was 
slowly extended, so too the economic identities of the population, which 
if they had impinged on government had done so in an invasive manner 
with riot, sabotage, or disorder, became a part of the political public world, 
and the concerns of ordinary workers became a part of their enhanced 
public identity. 
 By the eighteenth century, a new or greater public identity for sections 
of the adult population had been achieved sporadically and outside the 
established rubric, by demonstration as in support of Wilkes, or riot as in 
support of Lord George Gordon. But in the nineteenth century there were 
also movements of a more sustained nature, on the one hand advocating 
political reform and campaigning for the Charter, on the other demanding 
improved conditions and wages for employees, not only – as with Luddism 
and protests by workers in such domestically based forms of production 
as weaving – in defence of old systems, but increasingly by those employed 
in the new expanding factory-based forms of production. Whereas the ﬁ rst 
was a contribution to the cultivation of a purely political and constitutional 
element in developing public identities, the second was an extension of the 
identity of sections of the population from an economic world which still 
remained private, into a public dimension of economic claims and eco-
nomic grievances. 
 Th e movement towards democracy has never been completed. A demo-
cratic constitution requires a democratic society to give it substance, and 
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the degree to which this has been achieved has been uneven if democratic 
politics are to extend beyond freedom at election times. A population with 
a limited franchise had few peaceful entries into politics beyond demon-
strating, lobbying, and heckling. Th e carnivalesque possibilities of the last 
of these at election hustings where candidates were nominated, and at 
the election meetings where politicians met not only the electorate but 
those who were excluded from the electorate, were frequently vigorously 
exploited not only before but after the extension of the franchise towards 
formal democracy. As late as 1959, Robin Day, standing in Hereford, 
had his platform taken over and his microphone broken by not always 
sober citizens. 40 
 Carnival is never something leaders welcome unless they have already 
tamed and organised it. When it is unpredictable, uncontrolled, or spon-
taneous, even in well-established democratic polities, professional politi-
cians resent and resist such democratic inroads from the population 
outside. In London in the twenty-ﬁ rst century, Brian Haw, a single protes-
tor camped on the grass outside the Houses of Parliament, caused unusual 
annoyance to professional politicians, and provoked laborious attempts to 
remove him wholly out of proportion to any actual political impediments 
his posters and placards caused. 41 Th e prodigious legal and political ener-
gies directed against Haw were a striking illustration of the thinness of 
political skins. A similar sensitivity was revealed at the 2005 Labour Party 
Conference when a cry of ‘Rubbish!’ from Walter Wolfgang, an elderly 
party member, during a speech on Iraq by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw 
resulted in a rush of security guards and the forcible expulsion of the dis-
sident pensioner from the hall. 42 Lack of predictability or uniformity is a 
component (which is much stronger than an indicator) of democracy and 
civil society. It is both the necessary vital energy of democracy, and a phe-
nomenon which can ﬂ ourish only in a democratic state. 
 Th e slow loosening, though not disappearance, of the divisions between 
the terrace levels of a relatively homogeneous social hierarchy has been 
associated not with growing uniformity of identity, but with greater diver-
sity. Th e horizontal divisions of an earlier mobilised population have been 
complemented by vertical ones. Th e identities of class have been joined 
by, amongst others, more substantial and numerous identities of religion. 
At the same time there has been a decline of a popular or working-class 
political identity – no more banners or brass bands; the miners’ dispute 
of 1984–85 was the last grand occasion for this instance of political cel-
ebration and collective ritual proclamation. But the assertion of citizen 
identity from below, in however fragmented ways, has persisted as both 
an active contribution to and an active component of the identity of a 
democratic demos. 
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 Mobilisation from below: clothing 
 Th e mobilisation of the population from above was conducted in part by 
putting people into uniform. Th e mobilisation, and democratisation, of the 
population from below was similarly conducted in part by the cultivation 
of styles of clothing and of uniforms which challenged explicitly or implic-
itly the monopolies of the state and the hierarchies of fashion. Th is was 
done in two ways: by adopting the modes of dominant groups and hence 
transgressing social borders and challenging the monopolies of stylistic 
identity, and by ignoring dominant conventions and dressing in ways 
thought, at least from above, as improper, slovenly, or stylistically subver-
sive. In the case of the ﬁ rst challenge, a common complaint about the 
clothing of the lower strata of society had frequently been that they sought 
to dress like their ‘betters’, often with cast-oﬀ s or cheap imitations. Th is 
was a matter of alarm for the more privileged at a time when clothing could 
be an immediate sign of social status and a swift way of distinguishing 
between acceptable or admissible, and unacceptable or inadmissible 
persons. But whilst innovation or disruption might come from below, elites 
were able to develop their own reﬁ ned versions of the vernacular, dealing 
with the challenge by assimilating it and raising it to a level of expense or 
sophistication where exclusivity was re-established. In the course of the 
eighteenth century there was an apparent shift from the lower orders 
seeking to dress like the upper, to elite fashion following and glamorising 
the popular in a mode at least as widespread as, and perhaps more so than, 
Marie Antoinette and her entourage dressing as peasants in the Petite 
Trianon. 43 Similarly, in the twentieth century the paper clips as earrings of 
punk were assimilated by the gilded, plated, and bejewelled versions of the 
prosaic interloper. 
 Dressing in deﬁ ance or simple disregard of convention could, if nothing 
else, cause great disturbance with little eﬀ ort. Political and constitutional 
democracy had still advanced to include only a minority of the adult popu-
lation by the beginning of the twentieth century. Social democracy was 
similarly restrained. Class remained a physical and sartorial dimension of 
visible public life, and whilst by the 1920s the boundaries were being 
breached, those who breached them risked being seen, at least by those 
into whose territory they climbed, either as ‘impostors’ or as hooligans. 
 Th e Times reported with outrage that the participants in the Kinder Scout 
mass trespass of 1932 were a ‘mob of young men and women – hatless, 
raucous, yellow jerseyed, slung with concertinas’. 44 
 But in a class society which recognises but does not admire horizontal 
divisions, there can be a radical politics which makes a point of dressing 
in ‘King ’ s couture’, if that is the equivalent of the King ’ s English. In the 
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1930s there were radicals who took care to avoid the kind of appearance 
which had so shocked  Th e Times on the occasion of the Kinder Scout 
trespass. Th e Communist Party allegedly instructed its sometimes bohe-
mian members to adopt ‘smart’ dress, so as not to give the impression of 
being outside the social pale. 
 Gillray ’ s cartoon of George III traumatising an agricultural worker by 
dressing across social borders illustrates the sartorial cultures of the eight-
eenth century existing within horizontal divisions of class. Th ose of the 
late twentieth and twenty-ﬁ rst centuries do not have such clear distinc-
tions. Th e change was slow but substantial. Writing in the middle of the 
twentieth century, Richard Hoggart was able to observe that:
 Cheap mass-produced clothing has reduced the immediately recognizable 
diﬀ erences between classes, but not as greatly as many think. A Saturday-
night crowd leaving the cinema in the city centre may look superﬁ cially one. 
A closer glance from an expert of either sex, from a middle-class woman or 
man particularly conscious of clothes, will usually be suﬃ  cient even nowa-
days for them to ‘place’ most people around them. 45 
 Anthony Crosland, at the same time, was able to argue that:
 diﬀ erent social classes can be instantly distinguished by their dress (espe-
cially men ’ s clothes; though only a very insensitive person can share the now 
popular view that one cannot tell a woman ’ s background by her clothes), 
eating (and even drinking) habits, taste in furniture, type of house, style of 
entertainment, sporting tastes, and leisure activities generally. 46 
 But by the 1960s class no longer existed as an immediately visible physical 
and sartorial dimension, although there was a range of subcultures. Teddy 
boys had already presented an image which seemed to have little to do 
with class, either as a snub to convention or a ﬂ amboyance of expenditure. 
Duﬄ  e coats, initially associated with naval heroism, illustrated the ﬂ exibil-
ity of the meanings attached to dress, as they were adopted as the costume 
of frequently politically demonstrating radicalism. As the twentieth century 
progressed into its second half, Britain increasingly moved from a society 
stratiﬁ ed by dress, demeanour, and physique to a variegated bazaar. Extrav-
agance in dress or appearance continued, indeed ﬂ ourished, but was no 
longer the expression of class or caste, but only of either eccentricity or 
ﬂ amboyant wealth. 
 Th e state of clothes by the end of the twentieth century 
 Th e assertion of public identities from below, or from outside the circle of 
elites, has regularly caused concern and sometimes attempts at regulation 
from above. Th e more mobilised a society, and the greater the potential 
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variety of associations and of possible conﬂ ict between them, the greater 
the likelihood of attempts to regulate, restrain, or prohibit livery. Th e livery 
of servants to the wealthy, the aristocratic, or the powerful does not 
threaten social peace or social cohesion. Th e livery of mass political organi-
sations may, in contrast, challenge existing hierarchies or the peaceful 
coexistences of public life. Th e 1936 Public Order Act asserted and enforced 
the state ’ s monopoly of uniforms, save when they could not be conceived 
as challenging political or public uniforms – the Salvation Army, Girl 
Guides, Boy Scouts. 
 Th ere is the possibility of a less obvious but more substantial dilution 
of government initiative and control through the fading or erosion of dis-
tinctions as a result of the proliferation of uniforms – armed forces, post 
oﬃ  ce, police, ﬁ re brigade, prison service, transport staﬀ , traﬃ  c wardens, 
community support oﬃ  cers, or private security staﬀ  – in a way which 
partly dissolves the boundaries between the crown and society, so that 
a uniformed person may be a constable, but is nonetheless recognisably 
also an ordinary citizen and householder, and may be a private security 
guard either under contract to the crown or displaying the authority of 
his or her uniform for a proﬁ t-seeking commercial organisation. Th e more 
people are mobilised, the greater the possible blurring and fading of the 
diﬀ erences between livery, uniform, and fashion. But the resulting distri-
bution of clothing between livery, uniform, and fashion is both ﬂ exible 
and malleable. In a state where the dominant, or aspiring, ideology places 
a high value on markets and proﬁ t-seeking, the authority of dress may 
be extended well beyond the frontiers of public service and public oﬃ  ce. 
A regime which replaces a variety of functions – passenger, audience, 
client, patient – with the single title of ‘customer’ has also been marked 
by a privatisation of uniform, whilst livery has become a mark of corpo-
rate rather than of domestic employment. At the same time, the service 
role of the liveried servant in domestic employment has been transferred 
to service roles in the market and in the collective provision of service 
roles. Road sweepers, coﬀ ee-shop assistants, and postal-delivery workers 
will wear company livery; their managers will not. Rather than assert its 
monopoly of uniform, government has cultivated a gradual progression 
from the uniform of public service to the uniform of private employment, 
diluting thereby the unique authority of public service, but potentially 
enhancing that of proﬁ t-seeking. Th is is a shift of emphasis, not a unique 
or novel innovation. Th ose employees of railway companies who dealt 
directly with the public wore company uniform in the nineteenth century. 
But with a shift of public functions to proﬁ t-seeking organisations, exer-
cisers of coercive functions which had formerly been the monopoly of 
government were marked by uniforms which on the one hand laid claim 
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to governing authority or public service but on the other marked a loyalty 
not to the state but to commercial organisation: prison oﬃ  cers, security 
guards, postal-delivery workers. 
 As clothing became less and less eﬀ ective as a way of proclaiming privi-
lege, extravagance by the end of the twentieth century was increasingly 
expressed in jewellery and cars, rather than in clothes. When aﬀ ordable 
clothing was not available, the mere fact of having anything more than the 
functional minimum of ‘ordinary’ dress, with the possibility of Sunday best 
for special occasions, could proclaim wealth. Once mass-produced cloth-
ing makes the constituency of purchasers the larger part of the population, 
so that ‘Sunday best’ is universalised and diversiﬁ ed, distinction becomes 
a choice of style which indicates, not wealth, but dissent, or religious aﬃ  li-
ation, or social group. Abstemiousness in clothing had always performed 
this function, and the sombreness of Puritanism was continued into the 
eighteenth century with Quaker and Methodist admonishments for the 
faithful to dress simply. But now not only simplicity but extravagance was 
widely available. In all these changes in clothing, the broader identity 
paradox ﬂ ourishes. On the one hand it is a search for individual distinctive-
ness, on the other a cultivation of identity by means of association, the 
brand or label being more important than the quality or character of the 
product. Th e visible identity of dress proclaims both identity as part of a 
wider constituency and identity as unlike anyone else. 
 Walk 
 Lear ’ s fool ’ s advice never to walk if you could ride was aimed at social and 
political success and survival, not at weight reduction or health. Th e devel-
opment of the railways and later of the public tram and omnibus created 
a society in which riding rather than walking was not something necessar-
ily and obviously enjoyed only by a few, or by small numbers, of the privi-
leged in an expensive carriage, but was, as the title omnibus indicated, a 
possibility if not for all then for large sections of the population. Th e device 
of retaining hierarchy within mass transport by the division into ﬁ rst, 
second, and third class did so within a system which nonetheless ended 
the privilege of the minority to be the only ones who habitually did not, 
or need not, walk. Nor is social distinction ever simply a matter of wealth 
or expenditure. In the early years of the twenty-ﬁ rst century, cycling ﬂ our-
ished not as a cheap alternative for those who could not aﬀ ord a car, but 
as a lifestyle choice. At the same time, privilege and the advantages pur-
chased by greater wealth were in some areas concealed rather than ﬂ aunted. 
Whilst railways and airlines retained the complimentary title of ‘ﬁ rst class’ 
to reassure the fortunate of their good fortune, second-class and lower 
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designations and facilities were veiled in titles such as ‘standard’ and 
‘tourist’, ensuring that whilst the privileged were assured of their distinc-
tion, the less privileged were not stigmatised, since, whatever their lesser 
wealth, they were still necessary as customers. Th e use of titles in this way 
to assure the larger proportion of travellers that they were not discrimi-
nated against was an illustration at one and the same time of the tech-
niques available for the maintenance of privilege, and of the need to avoid 
alienating the majority. 
 Talk 
 What was expressed in clothing and transport was expressed equally 
clearly in speech. Like visible appearance, audible evidence contributes to 
public identity, and so gives an impression of permanence, whilst being as 
ﬂ uid as fashion, and of as little signiﬁ cance in itself until combined with 
all the other aspects of identity. Playwrights have always been aware of this 
ﬂ uid power of speech, and have been adept at employing it in portraying 
the complexities of character and identity. Edgar in Shakespeare ’ s  King 
Lear is able to move swiftly between one identity and another simply by a 
change of accent. At the start of the twentieth century, in Shaw ’ s  Pygmalion 
an East-End ﬂ ower seller could, by no more than a change of accent, pass 
as an aristocrat.  Pygmalion is a satire on both the importance and the 
superﬁ ciality and conditionality of speech. Th e transformation of Eliza 
Doolittle into an aristocrat was accomplished without altering one jot of 
the substance of what she said. Th e role of speech as a badge of social 
position continued long after Shaw ’ s mockery of it, and at the mid point 
of the twentieth century Anthony Crosland could remark on ‘the most 
supremely unmistakable of all symbols of social standing – diﬀ erences of 
accent and vocabulary. In no other country is it possible in the same way 
to assess a person ’ s class standing the moment he opens his mouth.’ 47 Cro-
sland goes beyond Shaw, in suggesting that whilst what is said may not 
change with class, not just the accent but the words used may. He was 
writing at the same time that Nancy Mitford, with tongue in cheek, was 
describing the diﬀ erences between elite and popular words which she 
termed U and non U, and of the signiﬁ cance of saying napkin rather than 
serviette. But by then language had none the less moved a long way beyond 
the King ’ s English of Shaw ’ s 1912, and from his manipulative linguist Pro-
fessor Higgins who, in the musical  My Fair Lady derived from  Pygmalion , 
and at the same time as Crosland and Mitford, demands in exasperation 
‘Why can ’ t the English learn how to speak?’ But the English – and the 
Scots, the Welsh, and the Irish – had always known how to speak. What 
had already changed by the time of Crosland, Mitford, and Lerner and 
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Loewe was that they had increasingly gained conﬁ dence in the manner in 
which they did so, as part of their public identity. Th is development marked 
the end of the King ’ s English in the Queen ’ s Britain, and the emergence of 
a multilingual and multiaccented populace. Localised language became a 
component of social decentralisation and the departure of any single 
national linguistic hierarchy. Th e growth of pride in diversity accompanied 
the public presence of a substantial range of accents in the British Isles. 
Nor is any one accent found, and only found, with other aspects of identity. 
People of diﬀ erent religions and ethnicities may speak with similar accents, 
and inhabitants of the same city with diﬀ erent voices. Th e proliferation of 
publicly established accents provides, in shifting combinations with other 
aspects of identity, a population which is far more diverse than the term 
‘multicultural’ can encompass. 
 ‘Posh’ remains as a national rather than a local style, and you cannot tell 
where a posh person comes from by his or her voice. Ross McKibbin has 
argued that a distinct upper-class manner of talking began to be eroded 
and dissolved after the First World War, being replaced under inﬂ uence 
from the upper middle class by phonetic pronunciation which no longer 
ignored consonants or telescoped words. 48 But whilst the tones of hierar-
chy might mutate, and even fashionably imitate or parody tones from other 
social regions, just as with Marie Antoinette in the pastures of the Petit 
Trianon an aristo dressing as a shepherd was still very obviously not a 
horny- handed daughter of toil, so a politician or a banker adopting an 
accent from the outer fringes of London still could not pass as a man or 
woman of the people. 
 Language as exclusion was not a preserve of those at the top of the scale 
of class, status, or advantage, and could be used with equal force and 
eﬀ ectiveness by those challenging the social order from below or from the 
margins. Members of the Young Communists League in the 1930s reported 
how they sang songs on trains in German and Russian, not knowing what 
the words meant, but that it was ‘real sectarianism’ because the other pas-
sengers couldn ’ t understand it either, whilst assuming that the young revo-
lutionaries could. 49 Distinction could work against existing hierarchies as 
well as in support of them. 
 Eating British, eating English, but also eating Scottish, eating Welsh, 
and eating Irish 
 Food is not only one of the principal components of identity, but an apt 
metaphor for its complex, contingent, and cultivated character. Cuisine is 
always a combination, mixture, and juxtaposition of ingredients, methods 
of preparation, ways of presenting, and modes of consuming. It cannot be 
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reduced to some single principle or essence, and in this respect is like the 
identity of a whole society – the sum, consequence, and interaction of its 
parts. Like other dimensions of identity, food serves both to distinguish 
one population from another, and to distinguish groups and individuals 
within a population from each other. Food both unites and divides. 
 For an emerging professional and commercial middle class resentful of 
the restraints and inequalities it felt in a society which still retained heavy 
layers of aristocratic privilege, feasting provided far more than just suste-
nance. By the end of the eighteenth century, a ‘traditional’ celebration of 
Christmas by the middling classes who both honoured traditions and did 
their duty of hospitality towards the poor was being contrasted with the 
eﬀ ete, dissolute, or negligent treatment of the festival by an aristocracy 
which failed in its obligations to charity and the less fortunate and to the 
honouring of a tradition of which its critics claimed, and ate to prove the 
case, to be the true maintainers and cultivators. 50 So long before Dingley 
Dell or Scrooge, Christmas was being celebrated, and charity and enter-
tainment dispensed, as an active contrast with the dissolute and failed 
life of the upper classes. Celebrating Christmas both within the family as 
convivial fellowship and outside the household as charitable social respon-
sibility cultivated identity both by contrast with the irresponsible and 
less traditional privileged, and by the exercise of a culture of one ’ s own 
which asserted distinctiveness and claimed the legitimacy of tradition. 
Food took its place in the assertion of public identity and the waging of 
class competition. 
 Th e ways in which people eat have changed and developed, and are the 
culinary dimensions of a population for whom the term ‘multiculturalism’ 
is inadequate or simply misleading. Multiculturalism suggests a range of 
autonomous and comprehensive cultures whose members will share 
common characteristics in all aspects of their identity. Th e condition of 
the people of the British Isles is far more complex, varied, and ﬂ exible than 
this and oﬀ ers far more opportunities for the creative and innovative cul-
tivation of identity. 
 Eating, like other dimensions of identity, cultivates both association 
and distinction through a range of practices which are, or are presented 
as being, foreign, traditional, rational, or esoteric. As with identity culti-
vation by other means, identiﬁ cation through food both associates with 
a broad category of others, and reﬁ nes that same category to distinguish 
individuals within it. I eat, therefore I am. Th e upper classes, and those 
who cultivated a distinction from the mass, ate in French, or at least did so 
in restaurants and on formal public or corporate occasions. In the popular 
public sphere, away from the culture of the elite, foreign food, let alone 
foreign names, was disdained, and insofar as it was considered to display 
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precise and excessive concern with the preparation and consumption of 
food, was contrasted with the plain fare and no-nonsense cuisine of the 
British Isles. Even the term for elite cuisine was foreign –  haute cuisine 
not high cuisine. But a softening and diversiﬁ cation of social ranks in 
the second half of the twentieth century involved a change in the use of 
foods whose origin, or alleged origin, was in other parts of the world. Th e 
end of empire and the withdrawal of the British state to the British Isles 
was followed by the arrival of cuisines from around the world, and not 
only from places whose maps had previously been coloured red. Menus 
in French continued to signify a claim to distinctive reﬁ nement, but the 
arrival of Chinese, Indian, Italian, and Asian restaurants and takeaways 
was part of a growth of popular eating which eroded and transcended the 
former class distinction between eating in English and eating in French. 
Curry had had a place on some dining tables much earlier, but as an exotic 
sauce added to conventional dishes, initially in the homes of those who 
had brought the novelty back from India. Empire in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries had surprisingly little impact on this pattern. Curry 
may have represented the culinary lessons of India, but those lessons, or an 
appropriately processed version of them, did not become a signiﬁ cant part 
of eating in the British Isles until the end of empire was followed by the 
arrival of the children of former imperial subjects. Actual foreign menus, 
or versions of them accommodated to current popular tastes in Britain, 
were brought directly by those from whose cultures the cuisine derived. 
Th e new arrivals in British high streets sold both at their own tables and for 
takeaway, joining the prepared-food market at its most popular level, and 
sharing company with ﬁ sh and chips. Foreign eating, which had previously 
marked oﬀ  those at the top of the social and income scale, like clothes, no 
longer served to distinguish, or easily distinguish, privilege. 
 Th e popularity of Indian, Chinese, and Italian restaurants from the 
1950s was paralleled, or at least accompanied, by a heightened interest in 
indigenous British cuisine, and the works of Th eodora Fitzgibbon or Gary 
Rhodes were a small antiphonal response to the arrival of foreign tastes. 
Th e assertion of culinary identity responds to innovation, diﬀ erence, and 
the challenge of the unfamiliar or the foreign. Th e English did not discover 
that they had a cuisine until the arrival of Chinese and Indian restaurants 
and French cookery books. And, paradoxically, the search for roots and 
tradition in the tables of the nineteenth century or the kitchens of the 
eighteenth or seventeenth, whilst recovering earlier ways of eating, recov-
ered also the fact that menus are the result of choice, change, invention, 
and innovation. Th e Christmas turkey was an import from the United 
States, the Burns Night haggis a nineteenth-century invention rapidly 
exported south across the border. 
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 For this reason the presence of ways of eating which have been imported 
does not signify that there is no indigenous cuisine. Th e cuisine is the 
whole complex, and is necessarily and always made up of distinct ele-
ments, many of which, taken by themselves, will be recent and foreign, 
or will appear to be so. Distinction depends on and is nurtured by con-
trast. It would not make sense to go to a café for a full English breakfast 
before the arrival of croissants. It is not chips, but chips with everything, 
that distinguishes a particular identity for both the observer and the con-
sumer, and the celebration of the chip shop had to wait until rival food 
outlets were on the street. Th e history of chips illustrates the ﬂ exibility 
of meaning. Chips with everything could be regarded with horror from 
above as a sign of the cultural poverty of the masses. Fish and chips by the 
seaside could, at another time, be the elites’ application of the games of 
Mary Antoinette, or the cultural patriots’ celebration of the uniqueness of 
British popular cuisine. 
 Eating and drinking, both what is consumed and where it is consumed, 
have carried both assurance and stigma. A combination of consumption 
in public and consumption by people whose identity jars with dominant 
modes provides occasion for elite dismay and disapproval. Coﬀ ee houses 
in the eighteenth century provided forums for radical and oppositional 
politics, and coﬀ ee bars in the second half of the twentieth century attracted 
distrust as havens of loud music, unorthodox clothes and hair, and unpre-
dictable juvenile exuberance. Th ey were each seen, both by those who 
frequented them and by those who abhorred them, as part of a culture at 
one remove from the normal, for the frequenters one remove up or out, 
for the abhorrers one remove beyond. Th e coﬀ ee house, the pub, the ﬁ sh-
and-chip shop, all stand halfway between the privacy of the household and 
the publicness of the street. Th e human traﬃ  c of this public eating and 
drinking ebbs and ﬂ ows, and by the start of the twenty-ﬁ rst century had 
spread to even more public and visible forms as urban midday meals were 
sold at a busy turmoil of temporary street stalls. Eating in the street, which 
had long been considered amongst the socially aspiring as the mark of the 
uncouth, became the lunchtime sophistication of busy workers of all kinds. 
Cuisine, like all the other components of identity, carried no inherent 
signiﬁ cance, but was ﬂ exible to the point of reversal in the associations 
and distinctions it announced. 
 Public and private spaces 
 An Englishman ’ s home may be his castle, and an Englishwoman ’ s commune 
hers, but public identity, whilst nurtured in the household, is cultivated 
and created in the spaces between households, the public spaces which 
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architecture deﬁ nes and which practice and custom can reinterpret. Public 
space, and the architecture which shapes and occupies it, is more perma-
nent than clothing, or diet, or language, and rather more diﬃ  cult to alter 
or remove. But its meaning is not solid and ﬁ xed in the way that its struc-
ture is, and even its most blatant or vociferous symbols and statuary can 
fade from the notice of later generations, or be seen by them in new and 
surprising ways. 
 Th e use of space is both an assertion of a right derived from identity, 
and the cultivation or announcement of identity. People who have access 
to a restricted space say both that their identity entitles them to the privi-
lege, and that they are to be identiﬁ ed as people who occupy such a privi-
leged space. Occupying the space is both an entitlement of privilege and a 
component of it, a claim to a privilege and a public display of a privileged 
identity. Th e use of space in a hierarchical or an unmobilised society is 
critically diﬀ erent from its use in mobilised or democratising ones. In an 
unmobilised society there is no public space. Space is the monopoly of the 
dominating elite, and the mass of the population has access to it only by 
permission, and in a subordinate role. 
 Th e absence of public space is not the same as the absence of any form 
of collective space. In an unmobilised society, or more precisely a popula-
tion in which there is no society in the sense of a comprehensive collective 
identity, there will be social territories, patches of collective, private, space. 
Th ese are spaces where private activities are carried out – streets, markets, 
bridges. But unless use is necessary to a particular purpose such as market-
stall trading, an elite will claim privileged use whether by the actual exclu-
sion of the majority of the population, or by the assertion of various forms 
of preference in use and access. Where members of the population at large 
do exercise rights of access and use, they will be most likely to do so as 
sharers in an association with local common rights. 
 Public space is more than space outside the privacy of a household or 
workplace, and the term ‘public’ indicates more than that the ground is 
simply in potential sight of other people; it indicates a dimension which is 
common to a whole population, or to a suﬃ  ciently large part of it to 
deserve being treated as comprehensive. In that sense, a social space 
outside households and workplaces which excludes children might still be 
considered public; one which excluded on the basis of gender, ethnicity, 
language, or religion not at all, or in only a limited and compromised way. 
Th e adjective ‘public’ indicates universality, the whole population, and not 
only universality, but equality. 
 Even where public spaces exist, there is continual negotiation and contest 
to deﬁ ne who are the public, and who are to be considered marginal or 
alien – who may properly be in public spaces, and who should be regarded 
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as interlopers. Th ere is a constant search for distinction, one aspect of 
which is the narrative of aliens – the excluded, the threatening, the rabble 
– contrasted with ordinary decent folk. Th e language of social hierar-
chy is never very far from the language of social demonology. Accounts 
in the early twenty-ﬁ rst century of chavs, whose dress and demeanour 
made them seem, to some, unwelcome and inappropriate in public places, 
were an instance of a recurring theme, and the alarms and disapprovals 
recorded by Owen Jones echoed the report by Mass Observation of the 
celebrations in Glasgow of George VI ’ s coronation in 1937. Th ere was a 
delicate hint of distant disapproval in the description of crowds:
 running about with no aim or purpose. Th ere are a great many drunks. 
Women in shawls and girls are rubbing their faces with ‘make-up’ that is used 
for branding cattle in the market. Streaked with blue or red they look like 
Maoris, or painted savages in a war-dance. Th ey seem capable of anything. 
 Small gangs in side streets are lighting ﬁ res that may become deﬁ nitely 
dangerous in congested areas like these. Th e atmosphere is electric. Th e 
people seem to feel that to-night the police are powerless. Th ey can do what 
they like. 51 
 A society in which all may in principle use public spaces will be, unless 
it is characterised by an unusual degree of cultural uniformity, one in 
which the consequent varieties of human public identity will forever 
provoke complaints, dismay, and attempts at regulation and exclusion. But 
such a society will be one in which identity, which might be regulated or 
constrained from above, will at the same time be asserted and cultivated 
from below. 
 Space is deﬁ ned by the ways in which people use it, and by who uses or 
may use it, and who does not or may not. At the same time, people are 
deﬁ ned by their use of space, and rights over space are a dimension of who 
people are. Whilst public space appears within a mobilised society, and 
expands in a democratic one, the boundaries between public and private 
are ﬂ uid and shifting. Th e enclosure of common land in Britain over 
several hundred years from the sixteenth century redeﬁ ned both those 
who proﬁ ted from enclosure and those who were excluded by it. To enjoy 
rights over land, to be a landowner, is to cultivate an identity which is 
marked in part by the contrast with those who enjoy no such rights. In the 
cities which grew with rational town planning and orderly squares from 
the eighteenth century, the status of householder and property owner was 
enhanced by exclusive access to the parks within the squares, land publicly 
visible but not publicly accessible. Th e key square followed into the new 
spaces of enlightenment cities the monopoly and exclusions of space which 
parks, grouse moors, and enclosed commons constituted in the country. 
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In the use of space to cultivate identity, other dimensions contribute. 
Whilst access to space is itself a dimension of identity, it can be further 
regulated by stipulated forms of dress, so that one dimension of identity 
sustains another. Kensington Gardens in the eighteenth century, whilst 
open to ‘gentry’, were barred to those who were ‘meanly dressed’. 52 Glynde-
bourne requires evening, and the private spaces at Ascot morning, dress. 
Space is occupied not only by those who are distinguished by their right 
to occupy it, but by the attire which both permits their occupation and 
enhances its distinction. 
 Common land, whilst never the property of those who enjoyed its use, 
was a resource used and a space acted in by particular agricultural com-
munities. Th e enclosure of common land and its creation as private space 
illustrates how the creation of public spaces was not a homogeneous or 
unqualiﬁ ed linear progress. Whilst some forms of public space were 
emerging in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, others were being 
destroyed by enclosure. A public space precedes or accompanies or con-
tributes to the creation of a public, so that phrases such as ‘members of 
the public’ or ‘the public’ have meaning only as a social category emerges 
of people who – whilst not part of a ruling elite – are, aspect by aspect 
and in a growth which is neither simple, nor irreversible, nor necessarily 
coherent, more than mere subjects. Th e emergence of the public, of civil 
society, of ‘the people’ is the result in part of the broadening downwards 
of the politically visible and active, and in part of demands upwards from 
the aspirant but excluded. Th is was not only a demand to join a world from 
which they had been barred, but also for the creation of a world in which 
they played an active, visible, and prominent part. Th e mass trespass on 
Kinder Scout in 1937 was an attempt, eventually successful, to shift bound-
aries and to make public what had previously been private, or what was 
seen as having been improperly appropriated as private. A claim for a new 
world could readily be married with an appeal to ancient rights of the 
people. 53 Th e boundary between public and private remains mobile; the 
number of key squares has steadily fallen as they have become public 
parks, but gated estates have slowly appeared in British cities, as one form 
of privacy is succeeded by another. 
 Th e boundaries between private and public are equally mobile between 
government and people. By the close of the twentieth century, Buckingham 
Palace could be visited, as could, though only after decommissioning, the 
royal yacht  Britannia . Members of the public were no longer classiﬁ ed as 
‘strangers’ when visiting the House of Commons, and the new premises of 
the Greater London Authority had glass-walled passages which enabled 
the people to look down on their representatives. On the other hand, 
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Downing Street, where the oﬃ  cial residence of the prime minister is one 
of a short terrace of houses, was closed to the people, and in the early 
years of the twenty-ﬁ rst century the Blair government moved to limit 
public use of public spaces, in terms of both access and what might be 
done, in an extended area around the Houses of Parliament. Whatever the 
reasons for these measures, their eﬀ ect was to visibly accentuate the dis-
tance between elected rulers and the populace. 
 Riot is the most evident incursion into public spaces of either new par-
ticipants or participants behaving in new and disruptive ways. Disorder 
and destruction, frequently a mixture of spontaneous and organised 
actions, have occurred in towns and cities at all times, from before the 
Gordon Riots of 1780 to the poll-tax riots of the twentieth, and the riots 
throughout English cities in 2011 in the early years of the twenty-ﬁ rst 
century. Th e streets are the resort of those who do not or cannot exercise 
power or cultivate identity in legislatures, government oﬃ  ces, courts, or 
the media, and riot the actions of those who, by the very act or rioting, are 
excluded or outlawed. Riot is a raid on public space, not an occupation or 
extension of it, and is an incursion from outside the boundaries of the civil 
and political order. Riot diﬀ ers, therefore, from another form of law-
breaking in public and private spaces – civil disobedience. Th eatrical law-
breaking, with an intention and assumption that the law will be enforced 
and penalties imposed, identiﬁ es those who carry it out as placing them-
selves clearly within the existing political and legal order, whilst presenting 
their dissent from some of the policies pursued there, and at the same time 
challenging the existing conventions of both public and private space. 
When women demonstrating against the situating of American cruise 
missiles at Greenham Common entered the base and picnicked on the 
missile silos, they were both redeﬁ ning governed space as citizens’ space, 
and using active satire to ridicule and call into question the identity and 
policy of those who deployed nuclear weapons. 
 Where civil disobedience employs the law against itself, other uses of 
public places to question policy and extend the public identity of the pro-
testors remain within the law. Th e use by radicals and trade unionists of 
processions, banners, assemblies, demonstrations, brass bands, and the 
street theatre which these provided was not only a claim to inhabit an 
existing social space, but the creation of a new space. It was the assertion 
and cultivation of a public identity by those who took part, a vigorous 
demonstration of a claim not only to occupy an existing space, but to 
do so in a way which showed new identities of the population and new 
dimensions of the public space which it now used. Th e public space thus 
created or claimed was part of an authoritative, secure, and permanent 
change, in contrast with the temporary gesture of misrule in rioting. As 
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Mansﬁ eld puts it, at a time ‘when radicals and others outside the formal 
political nation had limited access to the public sphere where permanent 
monuments were erected, banners provided an important means, not only 
of ideological declamation, but also of commemoration and memorial.’ 54 
 Th e protocols of public spaces are in this way a measure of the protocols 
of society. Who is seen in public spaces; what distinctions of class, age, and 
gender are visible; and how, if at all, these distinctions change are a part 
of who has a public identity, or claims one, or is denied one. Th e hostile 
responses of male politicians and journalists to early twentieth-century 
demonstrations by female suﬀ rage campaigners was not only a disagree-
ment with their policies or demands, but an attempt to deny their claim, 
expressed in the act of demonstrating, to be public persons and citizens 
on at least the same terms as men. Later in the same century, feminist 
campaigns to ‘reclaim the streets’ were similarly propaganda by the deed; 
the act of walking at night and in collective conﬁ dence in public places was 
an expression of a right claimed and exercised, and an expression more 
visible and forceful than the wording of a pamphlet or a placard. Th e dress 
which is thought appropriate or inappropriate in public spaces, the persons 
who wear it, and the identity which they thereby express, are important 
components of the identities by which society is constituted. 
 Th e various uses of the street are mixed and muddled, and real events 
do not ﬁ t exclusively into one category to the exclusion of all others. Th e 
unruliness of the coronation crowds in 1937 was a middle point between 
the misrule of riot and the authoritative assertion of marches, banners, 
placards, and demonstration. But whatever the character of the actions 
and behaviour in streets and places public or private, they will both declare 
and cultivate the identities of those involved, both in their own eyes and 
in the eyes of those who, with reactions ranging from enthusiasm to 
outrage, will observe, hear, and report on them. If homes are people ’ s 
castles, streets are their terraces and pleasure grounds. 
 Religion, churches and faiths; the return of God, and of 
religious controversy 
 In 1750 Charles Edward Stuart travelled incognito to London and received 
Holy Communion in the church of St Mary le Strand. 55 Five years earlier, 
his Jacobite army had been massively defeated at Culloden Moor, after he 
had failed to raise any signiﬁ cant or eﬀ ective support for his claim to the 
throne once he had crossed the border into England. Th e political opposi-
tion to a Roman Catholic on the throne had been given legislative expres-
sion in the 1701 Act of Settlement, and the monarch was required to be 
in communion with the Church of England. So Bonnie Prince Charlie was 
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maintaining an option, however precarious, on the crown which his grand-
father James II had relinquished or been expelled from. Th e sacrament of 
Holy Communion was an instrument of dynastic ambition alongside the 
secular weapon of highland armies. Th e course of most forms of identity 
in Britain has, whilst never approaching uniformity, moved away from 
rigid and ostentatious distinctions of rank, class, or wealth. Religious iden-
tity has moved in diﬀ erent directions, and whilst there was never uniform-
ity, equality in variety was only approached in the twentieth century. It 
might be responded that religious identity is something occasional, active 
at the passage rites of birth, marriage, and death, but dormant for much 
of the rest of life or the rest of the week. Yet a decline in regular attendance 
at Sunday worship in Christian churches has not been paralleled by a 
decline in the salience of religious identity in public life. 
 Th e Vicar of Bray is a much more important ﬁ gure than suggested in 
the satirical song which records a succession of opportunistic changes of 
theological and liturgical loyalties. Changes in the character and preva-
lence of religious observance which had, for much of the twentieth century, 
been dismissed as of little public importance, had returned by its end to 
be treated as an essential strand in the social weave. And approaching 
religion from the human rather than the divine side, it is the cultivated 
identities which are most salient. But the other signiﬁ cant fact about the 
Vicar of Bray is that he is untypical in the severance of religious actions 
from other aspects of his identity. For much of the period being reviewed, 
the intractability rather than the ﬂ uidity or mere convenience of religious 
faith and religious identity is what is striking. But whilst religious obser-
vance is a component of identity, its relation with other aspects of identity 
is ﬂ exible and unpredictable; in worship and religious practice and ritual, 
people may parallel, challenge, reject, or transcend other aspects of who 
they are. 
 Religion is the ultimate identity by association with another or others, 
since it is identity with the ultimate other, an identity which has the poten-
tial to deny all self-interest. It therefore has a continuing power in relation 
to other aspects of identity, and the twentieth century, insofar as it can be 
described as a secular century, was untypical, and the revival of religion, 
or of awareness of religion, by the century ’ s end is a return to a more usual 
human practice. 
 Th e severity of puritan dress was an expression of a larger identity, but 
its casting oﬀ , and the reaction against it, after 1660 was not simply and 
solely a symptom of something else. It was itself part of, a dimension of, a 
cause and a reﬂ ection of, a fuller, more many-textured set of actions. 
People rejected drab because it was Puritan, but they at the same time 
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rejected Puritan because it was drab. Severity of dress was not a reﬂ ection 
of an inner Puritanism, but a part of what it was to be Puritan. It is for this 
reason that ‘external’ actions and expressions are as much constituents of 
identity as are ‘internal’ values, thoughts, aversions, or aspirations. What 
is signiﬁ cant is not simply how people construct their public, social, politi-
cal selves, but what diﬀ erences, if any, there are between the constructions 
in one circumstance and another. Th ere is a further dimension to Puritan-
ism: it followed from the priesthood of all believers, in that any one of the 
faithful could, and should, express his or her faith through appearance. 
 Th e eighteenth century, whilst frequently seen as a time of fading reli-
gious enthusiasm whose character was simply emphasised by the contrary 
zeal of Methodism, began with legislative assertion of religious identity at 
the pinnacle of public life. No one could ascend to or occupy the throne 
who was a Roman Catholic, and the monarch must be in communion with 
the Church of England. To be English was to be Anglican, and below the 
monarchy communion with the established church was a condition of 
admittance to the universities or the professions. Th is legally maintained 
uniformity of national identity became more diﬃ  cult to sustain the greater 
the number of the country ’ s inhabitants who were included as part of its 
public life. Within an elite, uniformity is more readily achieved than with 
larger numbers of the population, where the two most accessible alterna-
tives are either toleration and diversity, or coercive orthodoxy. Th e more 
a population is mobilised, the greater the potential diversity of religious 
identity. At the same time, greater mobilisation increases the likelihood of 
mobilisation within any particular faith. Th e authority of priesthood is not 
undermined of necessity in a mobilised society, and can survive and ﬂ our-
ish there. But the possibilities of its being qualiﬁ ed by greater lay participa-
tion are increased, as are the diversity of forms it may take. In the eighteenth 
century, as Methodism set out to increase the numbers of those incorpo-
rated in the life of the church, it began to assign to the newly mobilised a 
role which had previously been reserved for the priesthood. Local preach-
ers were laymen and laywomen, who extended their public identity from 
their existing familial and occupational roles to include that of the preacher 
and leader of a congregation in worship. 
 But whilst religious belief and practice may be intense at the start of the 
twenty-ﬁ rst century, it is both fragmented and a series of minority identi-
ties, rather than a comprehensive national identity. Th e disputes which 
took place in the sixteenth century over religious identity took place in a 
society where religious practice, in its smallest particulars, deﬁ ned a whole 
people and where government sought, and needed for its own security, 
orthodoxy of religious practice enforced by law.  Cuius regio ,  eius religio 
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was not only a description of general European practice in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, but a recognition of the dependence of govern-
ment on agreement between the religious loyalties of princes and those of 
their subjects. Hence not only physical behaviour, but the meaning to be 
attached to that behaviour was a matter of deep concern and controversy. 
Th e so-called ‘Black Rubric’ of the 1552 and 1662 Books of Common 
Prayer described what people were doing, and what they were not doing, 
when they knelt to receive Holy Communion. Th e controversy surround-
ing the comings and goings of this descriptive paragraph was part of a 
society whose identity was cultivated by religious actions and religious 
beliefs in the smallest particular. 56 
 Th e diversity of Britain was presented as regional rather than as class 
or cultural in the oﬃ  cial handbook to the Festival of Britain in 1951, 
which nonetheless told its readers, ‘Britain is a Christian Community. Th e 
Christian Faith is inseparably a part of our history. It has strengthened all 
those endeavours which this Festival has been built to display.’ 57 But the 
identity of the population was neither homogeneous nor unchanging. On 
the one hand distinctive tastes in working-class life may have been slowly 
eroded by the greater availability of ﬁ lms and lending libraries, but at the 
same time cultural and regional diversity became more pronounced. 58 
Heresy makes sense only in a uniform population, and the charge of blas-
phemy is a feature of a homogeneous society, or of an attempt to create 
one. Although the last blasphemy trial in the United Kingdom was as 
recent as 1992, and blasphemy was not removed from the criminal law 
until 2008, religion in a democratising state no longer created homoge-
neity. On the one hand was a growth of indiﬀ erence, on another a move 
within patriarchal Christianity towards greater lay participation, with lay 
participation in the Roman Catholic Mass. Th e tension between patriar-
chal churches and a society which was edging towards gender equality 
further broadened the range of beliefs and practices within the popula-
tion, and the diversity of religious, and non-religious, identities. Within 
other faiths, particularly Islam, there was both a reassertion of patriarchy 
and a questioning of male privilege and of the orthodox relations between 
the sexes. 
 By the twentieth century, clothing had long ceased to be signiﬁ cant 
for religious identity in the Christian churches. Diﬀ erent conceptions of 
church and faith were still cultivated in part by diﬀ erences in dress, which 
not only distinguished between genders, but assigned diﬀ erent roles, 
responsibilities, and duties to them. A priest in clothes indistinguishable 
from those worn by ordinary members of the public creates an identity 
distinct from that of a colleague wearing a cassock, whilst a biretta contrib-
utes to yet another identity. But by the end of the century the importance 
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of clothing within elements of Islam had become publicly apparent and a 
matter not just of personal identity but of collective doctrine and contro-
versy. Where in the vestments controversy of the sixteenth century it was 
the clothing of priests that was the issue, in the twentieth century contro-
versy within and beyond Islam, the clothing of laywomen was the issue, 
both for Muslim women wishing to wear distinctive clothing and for Chris-
tian women wishing to wear distinctive ornaments. Th e identity of the 
ordinary faithful in a mobilised and democratising society had achieved 
an importance which in less mobilised times was most heavily evidenced 
in concern over the identity of the religious elite – priests, ministers, 
and pastors. 
 Conclusion 
 Appearance may not be the most important aspect of identity at times 
of revolution, uncertainty, and transition, but its importance is most fre-
quently discussed at such moments. Th e French Revolution throughout its 
course was the occasion for intense discussion of everything from hats to 
sashes, from playing cards to crockery. Th e course of events in the British 
Isles has been less churned about by revolution, but the role of appearance 
in constituting that change has been no less important, if not always so 
evident. At times of transition and uncertainty, the concern for presen-
tation and display can be intense, demanding, and uncompromising; in 
settled periods it is likely to be assured, conﬁ dent, and resistant to change. 
By the ﬁ nal quarter of the twentieth century in the British Isles, uncertainty 
had intensiﬁ ed both the assertion of varied identities and the demand for 
at least recognition, and at most auxiliary status, in others. At the point 
furthest away from governing elites, this took the form of the demand for 
‘respect’ in teenage gangs. A mark of the uncertainty with which iden-
tity is cultivated can be the ferocity with which demands are made on 
others to acknowledge it. And while debates over the place of religion in 
public life and over the identities which doctrine and tradition required 
or made possible were not violent, they were conducted with intense and 
divisive passion. 
 One contribution to the passions which were aroused in the politics 
of identity was the fact that familiar comprehensive packages, while they 
had never been as universal or as neat as some hoped, no longer provided 
easy keys to identity. Whilst the smallest aspects of identity may be taken 
as indicative of an entire personality, there was increasingly no simple, 
rigid, or universal correspondence between one aspect and another. It 
is a measure of the fragmentation of identity by the end of the twen-
tieth century that these apparently predictable correspondences were 
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dissolving, and that following the hounds said nothing about views on 
nationalisation or nuclear deterrents, or tweed suits about knowledge or 
ignorance of contemporary pop. 
 What the experience of the British Isles illustrates is that the ways in 
which identity is cultivated shift and mutate, and that a dimension of 
identity which is important at one time can be marginal at another. Cloth-
ing can be more important than language, language than clothing. But the 
shifting and turbulent course of public identities also undermines any 
account of social character which argues or assumes that change is linear, 
simple, irreversible, predictable, or along a single track from which no 
deviation occurs. Even the attempts to reverse changes or impose allegedly 
traditional uniformities bear witness to the certainty of continual ﬂ ux. 
 Th e British Isles contain a vertically diverse as well as a horizontally 
stratiﬁ ed population. Th ere is ironic truth in Margaret Th atcher ’ s remark 
about the abstractness of the idea of ‘a society’, for a single homogeneous 
culture, ‘society’, was exactly what she valued, but not only had this never 
existed, but ‘society’ at the time of her remark was moving towards growing 
cultural and individual variety and unpredictability. Voices protesting 
against multiculturalism, whether in Olympic ceremonies or varieties of 
faith, as alien to British tradition illustrate, by their own particular narra-
tives, the prevalence of that very cultural diversity which they denounce, 
and the role of constantly asserted and innovated identities in its creation 
and cultivation. Th e identity of the people of the British Isles has always 
been shifting and vigorously varied; by the start of the twentieth century 
it was ﬂ ourishing, a full orchestra of identities producing both polyphony 
and cacophony. 
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 Conclusion 
 Masks and faces: what you see is what you get 
 Shakespeare ’ s King Lear appears to complain that the artefacts with which 
people clothe, house, and surround themselves conceal their true nature: 
‘robes and furred gowns hide all’. 1 But the public performance is at least as 
real as any private one. It is conducted in relation to other people, and is 
the one which aﬀ ects them and with which they have to deal. It is not secret 
selves, but active, overt, social selves that constitute the human environ-
ment. When Lear tore oﬀ  his clothes he was not revealing a true nature 
which lay beneath the robes and furred gowns, but cultivating or dramati-
cally bringing to birth a diﬀ erent, additional, or diﬀ erently stressed nature. 
His denunciation of authority can be read as an analysis of authority, not 
as a revelation of a reality beneath the surface:
 Th ou hast seen 
 a farmer ’ s dog bark at a beggar? 
 … 
 And the creature run from the cur? Th ere thou 
 Mightst behold the great image of authority: a 
 dog ’ s obeyed in oﬃ  ce 2 
 Th e robes and furred gowns which constitute the human dogs against 
whom Lear roars are part of, not props to, the social identity of rulers and 
command givers. A dog in oﬃ  ce is still, amongst other things, a dog, but 
not merely a dog. 
 To observe that human identity is cultivated in this way is the very 
opposite of saying that it is a mere mask. A mask can be put on and put 
oﬀ  at will, whereas human identity is the face, the reality which is seen and 
heard, and the more it is cultivated, the more it is composed of many ele-
ments, each one of which constrains at the same time as it identiﬁ es. In 
that sense, ‘cultivation’ is a more illuminating word to use in relation to 
social identity than ‘construction’ or even ‘creation’, since what is cultivated 
begins with but is not constrained or determined by already-existing 
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components; it grows and becomes entrenched, and develops as the 
context and condition of its own existence and future growth. Th e com-
plexity and potential dynamism of human nature are such that art – 
whether as ﬁ ction, poetry, painting, sculpture, music, or ﬁ lm – can often 
express or indicate what bare theory can only point at from a great dis-
tance. Cultivation provides, too, an alternative description to an account 
of people as trapped in a choice between intentionality, where everything 
that is done is part of a plan, and spontaneity, where actions burst suddenly 
from nowhere. 
 Th e irresolvable paradoxes of cultivated identity and 
the possibilities of autonomy, action, and choice 
 Feathers are part of the bird. But the bird ’ s plumage will change only with 
the shifts of evolution. People choose their own plumage, but they choose 
it in circumstances not of their own making; human feathers are chosen, 
or chosen within limits. Th at is one of the enduring tensions of identity. 
We may cultivate our own identities, but they are at the same time culti-
vated for us. 
 Th ere is another paradox to add to the conﬂ ict between human agency 
and the unavoidable role of circumstance and social situation: we make 
identities by association with collectivities, whilst at the same time seeking 
to distinguish ourselves from others – the two dimensions of what Veblen 
called invidious comparisons. 3 Veblen does not develop this tension, but 
it is a part of a dynamism which means that identity is never ﬁ xed, but is 
always shifting and adjusting. Identiﬁ cation is cultivated by association 
with a real or imagined group, whilst at the same time negative contrasts 
are devised which distinguish one group from another. Th e impetus for 
distinctiveness does not stop at the boundaries between groups, but oper-
ates within the group as well, so that whilst in relation to other groups an 
individual cultivates an identity as a group member – a Christian, a Muslim, 
a German, an Italian – within the group the cultivation of individual iden-
tity distinguishes one Christian from other Christians, one Italian from 
other Italians. Identity is pulled in two directions, towards association and 
towards distinction. Identity is subject to continual adjustment, both to its 
own internal contradictions since no identity is ever wholly coherent or 
internally consistent, but is composed of competing and potentially con-
ﬂ icting elements, and to the inherent contrasts and comparisons with 
others and the tension between association and singularity. And while the 
individual is not sovereign nor autonomous in this continuous ﬂ ux, he or 
she nonetheless has possibilities of action and choice, however those may 
be shaped and constrained by circumstance. Such action is composed of 
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both emulation and distinction, following examples, and distinguishing 
oneself from them. Association with others cultivates equality; individual 
distinction cultivates inequality. Both for individuals and for groups and 
associations of individuals, equality and inequality are forever exercising 
their contrary gravitational pulls. 
 One feature in particular of identity and its cultivation enhances the 
potential for signiﬁ cant human action. Th e more a person cultivates and 
enhances his or her identity by collective identiﬁ cation, the greater the 
complexity and plenitude of that identity. And therefore the greater its 
individuality, since the more aspects there are to an identity, the more 
unique it becomes. Th is means that it makes good sense to talk of human 
action and human will. Whatever the constraints, what humans are is what 
they do, and every action therefore conﬁ rms, develops, departs from, or 
transcends their identity as it was up until that point. Th is claim allows for 
human agency including, crucially, the agency of the self, of an individual 
who is, in however restricted a way, making decisions and pursuing choices. 
Identity is constructed out of many circumstances and many actions and 
events, and whilst that means there is no single lever which can steer eve-
rything, any single change will alter the character of the whole, not neces-
sarily radically, but in reality nonetheless, and such change is always a 
possibility for human innovation, invention, reform, and even transforma-
tion. How identity is at any current moment does not determine every-
thing that follows. However small the openings for identity-shaping action, 
they are always there. Consequently all the things that people do can be of 
signiﬁ cance, and giving an account of them is far more than simply stating 
that that is how things are, since the qualiﬁ cation must always be an 
acknowledgment of the ways in which things can be otherwise through 
the continual response to tensions and contradictions. Such an account, 
far from being merely descriptive, is an identiﬁ cation of the ﬂ ux and ﬂ ex-
ibility of human identity, and of the perpetual possibilities of change, both 
benign and corrupting. 
 Such changes in identity can be slow and imperceptible, or sudden and 
dramatic. Michael Rosen has discussed the latter in examining the circum-
stances in which signiﬁ cant numbers of people may reject the orthodoxies 
within which convention, convenience, or coercion have constrained them. 
Such can be the force of convention, or of a rational calculation about the 
likely success and possible penalties of individual as opposed to collective 
dissent, that it may require what can appear as irrational or even deranged 
dissent by a minority before a larger number will together act in a way 
which they would previously have been deterred from but can now pursue 
because circumstances have been altered by eccentric or irrational indi-
viduals. Eccentric irrational individual heterodoxy may be the necessary 
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detonator for collective change with which an individual may then associ-
ate, shifting identity from passive or powerless subject to active citizen or 
insurgent. 4 But such instances not only require a revision of conceptions 
of rationalism to accommodate the rationalism of eccentricity, they also 
require a broadening of the perceptions of identity and interest which are 
the starting point for any rational action, whether conscious and reﬂ ective, 
or instinctive. 
 Th e description and prediction of human nature and 
the limitations of universal theory 
 Whatever metaphor is used, whether of fauna or ﬂ ora, all appearances and 
all aspects of appearance are relevant in an account of identity. By their 
fruits ye shall know them, but by their fur and feathers as well. And one 
element in cultivating identity, which the biological metaphor points up, 
is the environment within which an identity is cultivated. But the function 
of conditions beyond an individual in cultivating identity does not mean 
that there is an absence of choice. All factors are dependent upon each 
other, but they are not determined. Choices can be made, but their out-
comes cannot be predicted. Th ey are still worth making. Th is creates dif-
ﬁ culties in the way of a science of human action, or even of human 
behaviour. Th e fullest account will always be a particular one, having more 
of the character of history or a novel than of a scientiﬁ c treatise. Th at does 
not mean that general analyses have no purpose. Th eir contribution is to 
reﬁ ne the language which is then applied to speciﬁ c phenomena. Nor does 
it mean that, in any particular circumstances, predictions cannot be made 
about what might happen next. But they will be predictions in terms of 
the particular and unique situation about which they are made, and will 
always be tentative since any one general consequential relationship is 
likely to be qualiﬁ ed by others, so that its contribution will be just that, a 
contribution, not a determinant. 
 Th is makes a universal science of human conduct unlikely or unreliable, 
and predictions dangerous. It is better to expect unexpected and creative 
identities. Th is limits the usefulness of both Marxism and utilitarian 
rational-choice accounts. Th e jibe has been made that social history was 
no more than the history of the crinoline. But that underrates, entirely 
misses, the character of identity both individual and social or political. 
People will die for an article of clothing, a word, or a culinary detail. Th is 
is not to dismiss materialist or rationalist accounts of history, past, present, 
or future, but to insist that humans are more than physical survivalists, 
that the purposes which are a dimension of their identities, without being 
arbitrary or transient, are varied and not readily predictable, and that 
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generalisations can never go beyond setting out the range of expectations, 
and limitations on expectations, which can be brought to the understand-
ing of actual instances, actions, and situations. 
 Th e role of elites in the cultivation of identity 
 Identity is cultivated rather than created insofar as creation suggests 
making something from nothing, and unless actions or initiatives are taken 
spontaneously by large numbers, they will be taken in the ﬁ rst instance by 
small numbers or by individuals. In that sense, action is always the action 
of elites if the term ‘elites’ is used to indicate minorities. But the law of 
small numbers is also a claim which is justiﬁ ed only if the eﬀ ects of indi-
vidual or small-group actions are evident in the eventual actions of large 
numbers. While it can be claimed that identity is cultivated, and is most 
actively cultivated by elites of one kind or another, the reverse statement 
may be more accurate: those who devote most energy to the cultivation of 
identity constitute an elite. It is the initiative in cultivating identity which 
makes the label ‘elite’ appropriate. Nonetheless, a dominant or powerful 
role in the cultivation of identity is one of the characteristics of groups who 
are in this and other ways marked oﬀ  from the majority and enjoy a privi-
leged position in relation to that majority. Once again the image of a mask 
is misleading, however contrived actions, constructions, and ritual and 
rhetoric are. Asking whether the cultivation of identities by an elite is a 
deliberate manipulation of identity to serve other ends is to fragment 
human action unrealistically. Th e celebration of military heroes in the 
statuary of St Paul ’ s Cathedral was part of the cultivation of a narrative of 
national virtue and glory. 5 One of the many accounts given by those whose 
eﬀ orts placed the memorial statuary was that national character, national 
achievement, and national aspiration were thereby expressed and recorded. 
But whilst this contributed to a public imagination of empire, it is inade-
quately understood if it seen as only and entirely a conscious and manipu-
lative strategy to promote that imagination. Th e conscious strategy may be 
there, but it is part of a wider action, and an action which both cultivates 
and constitutes the identity of the actor. Th e imagination was already there 
in the character of the memorialists. Th ere may have been an expectation 
that the celebratory statues would promote national pride and deference 
to heroic leaders, but the pride and the deference were also there in the 
act of artistic creation and the concepts which drove artistic intentions. 
 If, as Herbert Morrison remarked, socialism is simply what Labour 
governments do, so is human nature what humans do. 6 Th at is not an 
observation which goes very far, since it is qualiﬁ ed both by the limita-
tions of contingent context and by the possibilities of human action, but 
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it can exclude the need to spend time on biological or social determin-
ism, or on the concept of untrammelled agency. It identiﬁ es both con-
straints – humans cannot ﬂ y unaided or spend long periods underwater 
without artiﬁ cial breathing apparatus – and opportunities – human nature 
is not conﬁ ned to what can so far be observed. Th e observation is morally 
neutral in that it has both liberating and corrupting implications: nothing 
that humans do and no aspect of human identity can be dismissed as 
unnatural. Nor are any aspects of human identity excluded from critical 
appraisal. Democratic empiricism does not preclude ethical judgment, it 
rather requires it. 
 Talking the world into existence 
 Because human identity is cultivated, the cultivators are both the posses-
sors of the identity and those amongst whom they live. Th ere is not there-
fore a single identity for any person, since the identity as perceived by one 
will be diﬀ erent from that perceived by another. And since all we can ever 
know are accounts of identity, it is misleading to seek a true or real identity 
beyond the accounts given of it by people – the statements, actions, sights, 
sounds, and artefacts which are experienced and reported. 
 None of this means that human identity can be constructed or altered 
at will. But it does mean that there is no single character that can usefully 
be described as an essential human identity. Nor can an account of human 
identity be anything more than an account of what, up to now, can be said 
about accounts of identity in all times and in all places. Identity is in part 
the sum of what a person does. But what a person does is in part what a 
person is seen to do. Th ere is thus a further dimension to identity, which 
is pointed out in the perception of things that Ian Hacking has described 
as ‘dynamic nominalism’. 7 Th e lenses and ﬁ lters of social perception culti-
vate and create identity; they are part of the circumstances in which iden-
tity is nurtured and pollarded. Th is power of naming is dramatically, indeed 
melodramatically, portrayed in Ray Bradbury ’ s short story ‘ Referent’ , where 
the inﬁ nite potential relationships and patterns of sensed phenomena are 
shaped and constricted by the perceptions of observers. A traveller through 
space is trapped in an alien (human) culture by the perceptions of the small 
child whom he meets, and by whom he is identiﬁ ed, and hence shaped and 
trapped, as a small child. 8 A referent is similarly imagined by Jorge Luis 
Borges in his short story ‘ Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius ’, in which a parallel 
world of phenomena both natural and social is brought into existence by 
being described and recorded in an encyclopaedia. 9 It is precisely for this 
reason that Anthony Appiah has raised queries and objections in the 
debate over ‘recognition’, arguing that he does not wish to be ‘recognised’ 
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by others as an instance of social categories, since this constrains and 
distorts, and even more radically shapes and forms, a public identity which 
is not of his choosing. 10 A distinction in practice between aﬃ  rmative rec-
ognition and constraining or oppressive presentation or description can 
be as ﬁ nely balanced as, within theory, are the linguistic distinctions 
between recognition and reiﬁ cation, and expression and distinction. Yet 
the clariﬁ cation of language is necessary if at the level of practice the cul-
tivation of identity is to be carried out by individual persons, rather than 
imposed on them. Th eologians have always been aware of this dimension: 
‘In the beginning was the word’, 11 and the very title of their discipline, 
theology, the word of God, gives the divine word creative primacy. 
 Humans are builders and makers, but so are beavers. But there is an 
added and transforming dimension: humans reﬂ ect on and describe what 
they have made, and in so doing describe and make themselves, and 
others. 12 It is in the addition of ‘and others’ that the further dimension, and 
possible tension, arises. Th ere may or may not be a tension, but there will 
necessarily be a conversation or some degree of dialogue, between who I 
am to myself and who you construct me as. Human nature is in part what 
humans describe themselves as being, or as not being, and that is not only 
the construction of the costumes and the set that cultivate human identity, 
but the comments of the audience and the critics. Th e story told instantly 
becomes part of what it purports only to describe. Th is both extends the 
complex contingency of identity and extends into language the opportu-
nity for continual cultivation of identity by individuals and groups, not only 
by the linguistic dimension of identity, but by the ability of that dimension 
to shape other aspects of the social world. Everything that is done, and 
every description in whatever form, has consequences for the ‘moving 
target’ of identity. Th ere is no certainty in those consequences, but there 
is a certainty that there will be consequences, and that stasis is impossible. 
So human responsibility remains, and inaction is only a particular species 
of action. Th ere is no such thing as ‘a mere observer’ and the highest and 
shiniest of ivory towers is as much a part of the human market place as 
the loudest huckster ’ s stall. 
 Th e dimensions of identity and the character of change 
 To argue that the accounts we give instantly both aﬀ ect the objects and 
persons to which they refer, and themselves become a part of that which 
is described, the reference becoming a referent, is already to have provided 
answers, or partial answers, to some of the questions which immediately 
leap out from the account of cultivated identity. Th e most obvious ques-
tions will be two. First, what is the function of the costumes and scenery 
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and ways of acting which constitute social identity in human life, and if 
they are not epiphenomenal, how do they change? Second, is there an 
escape from saying that everything is aﬀ ected by everything else, and that 
there is no single independent variable or cause, that all we can ever say is 
that at one moment and place these are the identities which can be 
observed, and at another, others? 
 One response, or one starting point, is to say that the costumes and 
scenery are not an indication of, or cause of, or sustainers of something 
else, they are something in themselves, the major dimension of reality. Th at 
means that identity cannot be divided into accidents and essences. One 
qualiﬁ cation to this might be that there may indeed be a distinction 
between ‘pretended’ identity and ‘real’ identity, an instance of incoherence 
which is not only accepted, but consciously cultivated. People may delib-
erately present one identity to one audience, and another to another. But 
the theatre of deceit can be more transparent than its protagonists realise. 
Th ose who strut on the political stage saying they are the people ’ s friend 
can be judged by all their strutting as well as by all their words. It is neces-
sary to ask about other components of their identity: how and where they 
move in relation to their subjects, whether on foot or in convoys of large 
black limousines; what kinds of spaces they inhabit, and who else has 
access to those spaces and on what terms. Sometimes the rupture between 
one identity and another may be deliberately concealed. Th ere are those 
who seem consciously and for eﬀ ect to construct a public personality 
which is diﬀ erent from their ‘private’ or ‘normal’ self: Blair ’ s public good 
temper, Wilson ’ s pipe. But it would be a mistake to conclude that one 
identity is real, the other false. Both are real, but are severed from each 
other by the diﬀ erent functions which they serve. 
 But whilst costumes and scenery, walking and talking, constitute iden-
tity, no particular evident component has a universal signiﬁ cance. What 
appear as similar feathers can relate to other, very diﬀ erent, aspects of 
behaviour. As Darwin realised when studying the Galapagos ﬁ nches, 
context is crucial. And whilst the feathers are important, they do not con-
stitute the entire identity of the bird. Th ere may be a diﬀ erence in ideology 
between Leninist/Stalinist architectural monuments and Nazi ones, whilst 
the systems and relations of power which they compose are closely similar. 
And in considering the similarities and diﬀ erences between identities, any 
answer depends on the criteria used for the taxonomy. If the whole con-
structed identity is built into the taxonomy or the comparison, then there 
are real diﬀ erences as well as real similarities. And if no identity can be 
reducible, or adequately understood, by giving an account of one only of 
its dimensions or features, if attempts at parsimony of any kind are like 
playing a piece of music written for choir and orchestra on a single penny 
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whistle, then identity is never a matter of some dissected-out feature or 
features, but only of the whole. 
 Insisting on the complexity and contingent location of identity, on iden-
tity as composed of many aspects in relation with each other, might appear 
to make change diﬃ  cult or impossible. Th e opposite can be the case. An 
entire identity, because of its complex variety, will be characterised by ten-
sions, contradictions, and discord. It will be constantly subject to a gravi-
tational pull towards coherence, though a pull which is never resolved, 
which is forever shifting the objects on which it operates, and the intensity 
with which it exerts its demands. A wolf in sheep ’ s clothing is as rare as a 
sheep in wolf  ’ s clothing. In most cases what you see is what you get, pro-
vided you know what to look for. Th is constant impetus towards coher-
ence, in circumstances where complete coherence can never be achieved 
and where, therefore, the impetus will never entirely expire, provides the 
dynamism for identity to change. 
 If the relation between identiﬁ cation and meaning and justiﬁ cation – 
feathers and nests and foraging – and other dimensions of social action is 
symbiotic rather than causal, how is change explained? Th e answer is that 
the relation between the various dimensions of action is never entirely 
coherent, and that the search for coherence will involve adaptation of one 
dimension or another, so that the symbiosis is dynamic, and its tensions 
and incoherencies never fully resolved. All variables are both dependent 
and independent in this sense, and whilst a political intervention to change 
one dimension of identity may well lead to other changes, it will not have 
the status of an irreversible and iron causal injection, since it will itself be 
subject to continuing adjustment to other dimensions of the situation. Th e 
history of interventions, whether medical or social, political or economic, 
illustrates not only that the expected eﬀ ects of  x on  y can frequently not 
accurately be predicted, but that  x may have eﬀ ects on other aspects which 
had not been imagined. 13 Even worse, the character of  x will be a feature 
of its relationship with other factors, and in inﬂ uencing those other factors 
and hence its own environment,  x , too, will change. An explanation, there-
fore, unless it is of a severely limited event and chronology, will always be 
an interpretation, narrative, or description. To fully describe a change is 
not to explain why something happened, but to give the fullest account of 
what did in fact happen. Th is is all that is possible, though it is no small 
thing, and all accounts which claim to be explanations are more accurately 
seen as fuller accounts or descriptions. So, for instance, an account of the 
changed character of the Japanese polity and of the place of the imperial 
family in it is not explained by talking either about the diﬀ erent presenta-
tions of the family, or about the check to Japanese power, or about the 
post-war US occupation, or about the growth of democratic sentiment, 
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since all these are elements or dimensions of the whole complex and 
dynamic history, elements in the complex weave, not causes of something 
other than themselves. Th ey are fuller answers to the question ‘What is 
meant or indicated by the phrase “changes in Japan”?’ 
 Th e conclusion of such a narrative is not a cheerful, or lugubrious, ‘ que 
sera ,  sera’ . Some regularities, or at least recurrences and familiarities and 
ubiquities, can be observed, though the most powerful prediction that can 
be made is that there are no grounds to expect that a single-factor account 
of identity will apply universally, or even in any particular instance. Such 
assumptions about what can be said cannot avoid being informed by value 
judgments or by preferences which are the starting point of speculation, 
not its conclusion. So I will state a preference for freedom, variety, toler-
ance, and innovation. All of those involve both planning and a refusal to 
plan. Innovation cannot be planned for since, as Humphrey Lyttelton 
allegedly once replied to a query as to what the future of Jazz would be, ‘If 
I knew that, I ’ d be there.’ But the circumstances which make innovation, 
variety, and useful choices more likely require equality of possibility with 
the avoidance of any orthodoxy as to outcome. Th e starting point, though 
not the conclusion, of an understanding is that nothing is peripheral, and 
everything that people do should be considered. 
 Th e importance of context 
 Rituals and actions possess diﬀ erent meanings as parts of identity in dif-
ferent circumstances. Th e parading of the liberty cap, which at the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century was treated by government as subversive 
and challenging, would, a hundred years later, be either incomprehensible 
or quaint. A similar ﬂ exibility is enjoyed by carnival, which can function 
in the way that Simmel envisaged conﬂ ict functioning, or can be, as in the 
late sixteenth century in south-eastern France, a vehicle for rebellion. 14 It 
can, also, be neither of these things, but a means of pursuing grievances 
in unconventional ways which, while challenging custom and hierarchy, do 
not confront or threaten established government or social order. 15 
 Because artefacts and feathers, stage props and scenery, are made or 
chosen, none of them have any inherent meaning. A swastika which sym-
bolises well-being in its Sanskrit and Hindu form, symbolises something 
entirely diﬀ erent in its Nazi employment. Dark glasses can express laid-
back casualness, or authoritarian reserve. Murals of the mythical hero 
Cúchulainn depict him in one part of Northern Ireland as the defender 
of Ulster and an ancestor of loyalists and unionists, in another part of the 
country as the symbol of nationalism. 16 Analyses remain in an abstract 
realm until they are applied. Once they are applied, the resulting account 
both.indd   229 6/5/2017   12:21:09 PM
230 cultivating political and public identity
is distinct in two ways: ﬁ rst, it is speciﬁ c and contingent, in that the total 
mix of aspects or dimensions identiﬁ ed by analytical categories makes 
each interpretation unique. Second, as with ‘A sharp’, which is and is not 
the same as ‘B ﬂ at’, the presence of other dimensions and the relation 
between the dimensions forms the character not only of the whole but of 
the dimensions. Mark Anthony ’ s description of Caesar ’ s assassins as ‘all 
honourable men’ 17 takes its meaning from all the other things which he 
said, and the occasion on which he said them, and the audience to which 
they were addressed. 
 Identity and autonomy: auxiliaries and the ethics 
 Humans are social beings, and identity is cultivated not only in isolation 
but also in relation to others. Th ere is a constant and continuing tension 
between the cultivation of an individual identity and the attempt to both 
sustain and distinguish that identity by shaping the identities of other 
people, on the one hand seeking to shape them to the individual ’ s view of 
the world and of his or her own character, on the other seeking to cultivate 
an inferior though not hostile identity in others as an expression of the 
individual ’ s superiority. Identity by association always limits diﬀ erence by 
cultivating others within the association, however inferior they are pre-
sented as being, as friends and allies. Other associations, by contrast, can 
be presented as antagonists or enemies whose negative qualities throw into 
relief the virtues of one ’ s own community. 
 Th ere is an inherent conﬂ ict in the manipulation of the identity of others 
as a means of cultivating one ’ s own, though one which rarely reaches the 
point where the entire enterprise collapses. Th e greater the claim, the 
greater the eﬀ ort invested in cultivating the identity. When the claim is to 
political or collective identity, the eﬀ ort can be immense. And, paradoxi-
cally, the cultivation of the identity of others may then be pursued by 
excluding them and marking them oﬀ  from the identity of leaders, rulers, 
or elites, as readily as enlisting them as auxiliaries to the identity at the top 
of the political hierarchy. Th is exclusion, in its most extreme form, can lead 
to a cultivation of identity which is solipsistic and narcissistic. However, at 
this point the two dimensions of identiﬁ cation conﬂ ict, since some common 
identity is a feature of society and polity; the distinction of an elite or a 
leader has become isolation. If everyone speaks a diﬀ erent language there 
is no society. 
 Th ere is no resolution of the conﬂ ict between the desire to enrol or 
subordinate others in the cultivation of a person ’ s identity and the pre-
sumption that the individual is sovereign over himself or herself, apart 
from severe liberal restraint in the face of a constant temptation. Far from 
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precluding such restraint, a recognition of the nature of human identity 
cultivation provides the foundation for it. If there is no human essence, 
whatever exists or has existed is human, and the condemnation of unnatu-
ralness fails. It would seem at ﬁ rst as if this commits one to accepting any 
and all forms of life and conduct, however abhorrent. But this is not so. If 
there is no universal humanity, there is no justiﬁ cation for determining the 
life of anyone but oneself. Tyranny over oneself is a personal choice; tyranny 
over anyone else lacks any justiﬁ cation. Individuals may deﬁ ne and culti-
vate their own identities, but only insofar as that does not require the 
subordination of others to their self-identiﬁ cation. Th is is not because of 
an inalienable right to determine one ’ s own identity and therefore not to 
have it determined by anyone else, but because, since the only human 
reality is the actions of individuals, there is no principle which privileges 
any one individual to subordinate others’ identiﬁ cation to his or her own, 
or treat them as auxiliaries to his or her identity. In that sense, the only 
person who can impugn or challenge individual honour or esteem, is the 
individual himself or herself. Th e actions of others are irrelevant to it. Th is 
individualism conﬂ icts with the ways in which identity is cultivated. But 
an understanding of human identity cultivation which precludes any con-
ception of essential human nature also precludes any justiﬁ cation of 
impinging on the autonomy of others, or subordinating their identity to 
one ’ s own. Th e absence of empirical universals does not block the making 
of ethical judgments – it makes them possible. 
 Interests and identity 
 It may be that the politics of the twenty-ﬁ rst century will increasingly 
become a series of contests, often bitter and violent, over natural resources: 
water, oil, minerals, and land capable of producing food. In a world 
approaching or entering a time of limited resources and continued popula-
tion growth, the contests for food, water, and fuel could become a domi-
nant element in human action. In that case it might appear that a politics 
of identity will be replaced by a politics of interest or of biologically 
grounded needs and responses. Th at would be to misrepresent the relation 
between interest and identity, and between ubiquitous needs and their 
particular expression and pursuit. Th e preceding discussion has presented 
human life as being about meaning, justiﬁ cation, identity, and esteem. Th e 
acquisition and use of material goods has been presented as carried out as 
part of this activity, not as a separate or prior or fundamental activity. It 
might seem a cruel luxury of the richer parts of the world to treat identity 
as important when for large portions of humanity, life is a continual and 
stressful eﬀ ort to secure enough food, water, shelter, warmth, health care, 
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or education for minimal survival. But the accounts given of the varied 
classes and categories of humanity, and of the distribution of rights amongst 
them, would be matters of identity cultivation, creation, and description. 
Narratives of identity would provide the language for the distribution, and 
the restriction of the distribution, of resources between the various classes, 
groups, and categories into which competing claimants divide the human 
population. Identity would be a means of restricting access to resources 
which are insuﬃ  cient to provide subsistence for everyone. Identiﬁ cation 
will not cease to be a human concern or a human activity, but its function 
and its relation to other dimensions of life will alter. Humans wish to 
survive, and to survive and ﬂ ourish physically, materially. But the way in 
which they wish to survive and ﬂ ourish can be as important to them as 
the mere fact of survival and ﬂ ourishing. Th is is the point of Hegel ’ s 
master-and-slave parable, in which the slave initially submits and the 
master does not, because for the master ﬂ ourishing, and ﬂ ourishing 
through a constructed and articulated identity, transcends mere physical 
existence. 18 Material survival is never simply material survival with no 
further human dimension, it is always the survival of real people, whose 
life is cultivated in their identities amongst the deprived no less than 
amongst those more fortunate sections of the world ’ s population. Human 
political activity will never be a simple reﬂ ection of objective and univer-
sally recognised and accepted economic interests. Th e parties to any 
contest will be shaped by shared identities, and the resources for under-
standing the world and for justifying aspirations, aversions, and actions 
within it will be used and developed in the cultivation of identity. Human 
identity, as an inﬁ nitely variable and changing presence, will shape and 
constitute human action as it has always done. 
 In times of hardship, explanations for distress are sought in the sup-
posed actions of those whose identity diﬀ ers from that of the distressed: 
foreigners, or subordinate or marginal categories of people. Th e narratives 
may diﬀ er, from witches in the seventeenth century to immigrants in the 
twenty-ﬁ rst, but the demonisation reﬂ ex of seeing alien identities is the 
same. Identity cultivation as a dividing up of humanity is the language 
of conﬂ ict over material resources. Th is takes the form of both invoking 
alien identities as threatening, and of subordinating and exploiting those 
whose identity is contrasted with that of the more fortunate. Th e con-
tinual recruitment of others in the cultivation and use of identity, either 
as auxiliaries or as contrasting subordinates or aliens, suggests that the 
competition for scarce resources will be conducted with the armoury 
of ideology and all the passion of identity, raising conﬂ icts over mate-
rial well-being or survival to the level of cultural survival. Th e sanctity of 
identity provides justiﬁ cation for expropriation and exploitation. Battles 
over water, or food, or energy will be ruthless even if they are only market 
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commercialism carried to extremes, but they will be shaped, justiﬁ ed, and 
enhanced by conﬂ icts between identities which will raise them to even 
more intense levels. 
 Th e destructive power of identity 
 A recognition of the apparently irrational, eccentric, or deranged element 
in identity cultivation can make sense of all the ‘hopeless’ insurrections, 
resistances, and protests from the Pilgrimage of Grace to the 1989 revolts 
in Eastern Europe, which Michael Rosen presents as the ‘irrational’ cata-
lysts of transformation, or at least of disruption. 19 Such eccentricities are 
irrational only within the limits of a narrow conception of interest and a 
narrow conception of identity. But they can also point towards an under-
standing of movements such as radical Islamism, which appears to place 
no value on any beliefs, practices, or persons other than its own, and to 
pursue a policy of the physical destruction of those alien beliefs, practices, 
and persons. Patriots do not wave ﬂ ags because they are patriots; they are 
patriots because, among other things, they wave ﬂ ags. ‘Patriot’ is a short-
hand way of describing all the things they do. Th is is to say more than that 
a person is what they do. Th ey are also what they make, cultivate, and 
preserve. It is because what people do constitutes who they are, and is not 
reducible to some deeper or more ‘objective’ or material reality, that reli-
gion is again and again so prevalent. Associating who one is with a human 
society gives solidity and dimension, but associating who one is with a 
superhuman or metaphysical dimension gives something else again. Genu-
ﬂ exion is grasping the hand of inﬁ nity. But it is always human beings who 
do the grasping, and whether one sees religion as a human creation, or 
sees knowledge of the divine as necessarily expressed through and by ﬁ nite 
human capacity, all that can be known is human action. Th e question of 
both the cultivation and maintenance, and the destruction, replacement, 
and change of human identity is thus answerable only in terms of that 
identity itself, making understanding and interpretation possible, if diﬃ  -
cult, but explanation and prediction a rainbow ’ s end. Th e resurgence of 
militant, coercive, and intolerant religious movements in the twenty-ﬁ rst 
century demonstrates in murderous and destructive form the overwhelm-
ing power of the search for and the cultivation of identity, and of the 
unavoidable dependence of even the most apparently anti-materialist 
persons and movements on evident action and tangible resources. 
 Beyond face to face 
 Th e resurgence of religion is not the only set of events which has made 
identity both ﬂ uid and unpredictable. Visible identity has grown and 
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become both more accessible and more frequent. Portraiture enabled a 
few people to see a fabricated image of an aristocrat, a monarch, a cleric, 
crafted, if the sitter was powerful or fortunate enough, to show piety, 
heroism, beauty, or wisdom. Photography placed sometimes less mani-
cured images before a wider public; cinema and then television gave the 
images life, and made even more, potentially, fragile the image which 
the object of the vision sought for. But that slow erosion of control by the 
subject over the image was reversed with the rapid expansion, from 
the end of the twentieth century, of the Internet. Social media enabled all 
with access to a computer, a phone, or a tablet to present whatever images 
they wished of themselves, to the point where the gap between what could 
be seen in face-to-face contact and what was presented in an electronic 
world of virtual reality was so deep and broad that any evident connection 
between one side and the other disappeared. Th e conclusion of this chasm 
between the face-to-face person and the electronically presented person 
was the avatar in a virtual world of computer gaming. 
 But a potential universal power of not simply identity cultivation but of 
identity creation was challenged, as it developed and spread, by increasingly 
well-funded and extensive operations, principally though not exclusively 
by the rulers of states, to control, limit, or suppress a form of creation, 
cultivation, and publishing abroad over which, unlike all other forms of 
identity cultivation, they had no immediate control. Th e challenge which 
a freely accessible World Wide Web made to autocracy was not only the 
free dissemination of information and ideas, but the free proclamation 
of identities. 
 Paradoxes of identity 
 Th e man who, when delayed at the theatre box oﬃ  ce, demanded ‘Don ’ t 
you know who I am?’ was illustrating one of the many paradoxes of iden-
tity. On the one hand he was claiming the superiority of his identity, on 
the other revealing that it depended on recognition from those whom 
he considered below him. Human identity is full of tensions and contra-
dictions. People cultivate identity both by associating themselves with 
others and by distinguishing themselves from them. Underlying compe-
tition for material resources is the paradox of public identity: individu-
als not only identify themselves in the sight of others, those others are 
frequently a part of the scenery which they construct or cultivate for the 
performance of their drama of identity. But in so doing, they subvert the 
equal dramatisation of those others. Mutual recognition is diﬃ  cult when it 
involves recognising and acknowledging that others have identities which 
do not conﬁ rm your own preferences and values, and when, therefore, 
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conﬁ dent identity is reliant principally on a drama without a stage or a 
supporting cast. 
 So the cultivation of political identity, of persons, nations, and rulers, is 
an instance of a wider human activity, whereby identity is cultivated across 
the whole plane of individual and social life. And just as in political life, 
others are constantly being recruited, coerced, or attacked as part of the 
supporting cast of the drama, so in all the other dimensions of human life, 
authority can mean not only the autonomy and suﬃ  ciency of an author, 
but the extension of power over others. Th e cultivation of identity is not 
innocent. It gives meaning and justiﬁ cation, but frequently does so by 
privileging some cultivated group at the expense of some other cultivated 
group. Th e positive features of such identities are sustained by contrast 
with their negative reversals in the cultivated identities of dominated, 
managed, or controlled groups. Th ese positive and negative identiﬁ cations 
most familiarly are shaped as class, race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or 
nationality. Th e practices by which others are treated as auxiliaries to 
identity can vary from shaping the identity of those who can be controlled 
or managed, to telling stories about those who are beyond the narrator ’ s 
control or inﬂ uence. In the ﬁ rst case, members of the dominant person ’ s 
group, community, or nation are subordinated to his or her identity. In the 
second case, narratives are cultivated about those who may live in other 
communities or countries, or who may not exist at all. Th e two practices 
can overlap or merge when people within a state are placed in geographical 
or social ghettos both to subordinate them and to cultivate an identity both 
alien and stigmatised. Th is subordination and exclusion can then be further 
intensiﬁ ed by a narrative which links people to real or imaginary external 
or supernatural enemies. 
 To observe the negative function of identity is not to condone it or 
be unable to aﬀ ect it 
 What has been said and argued in the preceding chapters is not a claim 
about causes but about character. Th e various dimensions of human action 
which have been described are presented as constituting social character, 
not causing it. In that sense, an explanation is presented not in terms of 
causality but in terms of the various components of identity which, while 
they may sustain each other, do not have temporal precedence over each 
other. Th e more the particular character of an identity is described, the 
more elements are identiﬁ ed any one of which, by its absence, would have 
meant that the identity was diﬀ erent, and so whether seen as cause or 
constituent of the identity, each part or aspect is essential to the character 
of the whole. 
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 People cultivate identity both by associating themselves with others and 
by distinguishing themselves from others. Th is creates a perpetual tension. 
Th e more precisely, despite these diﬃ  culties, an identity is established, the 
greater the contrast with surrounding identities. In these circumstances, 
distinguishing involves both describing and heightening a diﬀ erence from 
others, yet the greater the diﬀ erence, the more others can be seen, para-
doxically, not as by their diﬀ erence sustaining one ’ s identity, but as threat-
ening it by the very authority which their own identity enjoys. At the same 
time, their alleged diﬀ erence is supportive of the identity with which they 
are contrasted by the very illumination, through contrast, of the identity 
from which they diﬀ er. 
 Recognition of the function of identity cultivation does not preclude 
either recognition of the harm it causes, or the making of ethical judg-
ments about its operation and consequences. It both perceives the nature 
of the diﬃ  culty and provides incentives and justiﬁ cation for confronting 
it. Th e insistence on the possibility and reasonableness of equal respect for 
all identities qualiﬁ es the demand for recognition by excluding some of its 
forms. If others may not be subordinated as auxiliaries to identity or 
treated unequally because of diﬀ erences of identity, recognition is available 
only from an equal, and the diﬀ erence between the recogniser and the 
recognised strengthens the identity of each by combining the authority of 
an independent and diﬀ erent identity with the illuminating contrast which 
that diﬀ erence entails. Th is provides for the possibility of applying ethical 
judgment, though not of empirical solutions, to the likely negative or 
harmful functions of identiﬁ cation in the twenty-ﬁ rst century. To record 
these processes and tensions is not to condone them, and an appreciation 
of their character makes possible an ethical assessment. Th is will not solve 
let alone remove the problems, but it provides a reason and a justiﬁ cation 
for confronting them. But in order to confront them eﬀ ectively, it is neces-
sary to recognise the role of identity cultivation, assertion, and preserva-
tion in providing the language and the perceptions within which 
competition for resources is carried on, which are the elements that enable 
it to be carried on. Confronting these tensions is thus an intensiﬁ ed 
instance of the universal and ubiquitous need to confront the paradoxes 
of identity, whose cultivation is the generator both of human progress and 
of human conﬂ ict. 
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